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ABSTRACT 
China‟s Oil Strategy: the Potential of the Strategic Partnership with Saudi 
Arabia 
Naser AL-Tamimi, Durham University 
 
This thesis focuses on the growing relationship between China, the world‘s second-
largest oil consumer, and Saudi Arabia, the world‘s top oil exporter. The high 
interdependence between China and Saudi Arabia represents a theoretical challenge: 
Does economic interdependence increase or decrease the probability of conflict 
between China and other significant energy users, notably the United States, over 
Middle East oil? The study is literature-based and expanded by exploratory case study 
research using different variables or indicators (import dependence, trade, energy, 
arms sales and political factors).  The thesis‘ main aim is to investigate the causes of 
China's motives to establish a strategic relationship with Saudi Arabia and its 
implications for the United States, using a qualitative method with quantitative 
resources as primary data and the state as unit of analysis.  On the basis of the 
theoretical frameworks, it raises three hypotheses, respectively: (1) China is not 
seeking to challenge the United States in the Middle East; (2) China will contribute to 
the stability of the Middle East because it expects its trade and energy imports from 
the region to increase in the future; and (3) China will not use the military means to 
protect its interests in the Middle East. To verify these hypotheses, the study attempts 
to address the theoretical flaws of both realism and liberalism in regard to Sino-Saudi 
relations, guided by Trade Expectation Theory (TET). The finding is simple: China‘s 
policy of strengthening its relationships with Saudi Arabia is neither aimed at 
undermining U.S. regional interests nor aimed at challenging the U.S.‘s dominant 
position; it is primarily driven by economic imperatives. 
 
 
KEY WORDS: CHINA, SAUDI ARABIA, U.S., MIDDLE EAST, 
INTERDEPENDENCE, OIL, ENERGY, LIBRALISM, RELEASIM AND TRADE 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 OVERVIEW  
 
This thesis focuses on the oil relationship established between The People‘s Republic 
of China (PRC), the world‘s second largest oil importer, and The Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia (KSA), the world‘s top oil exporter. Due to Saudi Arabia‘s dominance of the 
world oil market, China is increasingly focusing its attention on the Kingdom as a 
reliable oil supplier while Saudi Arabia sees China as an enormous potential market 
and strategic trade partner. The study‘s main aims are: to investigate the causes of 
China‘s motives to establish a strategic relationship with Saudi Arabia; to outline the 
potential for successful co-operation between the two countries; and to address the 
wider implications for the U.S. in the Middle East. 
 
Over the last three decades, China has been the world‘s fastest growing economy with 
annual growth over 9 percent. Today, China, the country with a population of over 1.3 
billion, is the world‘s second largest economy. China could be the world‘s largest 
economy as early as 2016 (IMF, 2011) and is likely to be some way ahead of the U.S. 
by 2030 (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2010). China‘s booming economy is leading to 
large increases in the demand for oil and China‘s need for oil is growing faster than 
any other country. China is drawn to the Middle East because of its need for oil. 
China was self-sufficient in energy until 1993 but, after three decades of rapid growth, 
it has turned abroad for its growing energy needs. The country now is the second 
largest oil consumer after the United States. China has been also a net oil importer and 
16 
 
is now the second largest, behind the U.S., and is expected to lead global consumption 
and imports in around twenty years (EIA, 2010). 
 
According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), in 2010 the country‘s oil 
demand reached about 9.1 million barrels per day (IEA, July 2011), China only 
produced about 45 percent of the oil consumed (Ibid). The rest was imported, and 
about half of it has come from the Middle East (almost 20 percent from Saudi 
Arabia‘s alone), (Wang Qian, 2010). China, where demand has surged over the past 
decade, will contribute 36 percent to the projected growth in global energy use, its 
demand rising by 75 percent between 2008 and 2035 (IEA, March 2011). By 2035, 
China is projected to account for 22 percent of world demand, up from 17 percent 
today and could overtake the United States to become the largest oil consumer in the 
world (Ibid). That situation will lead to a high economic interdependence between 
China and the Middle East in general and Saudi Arabia in particular. 
 
In this context, China views Saudi Arabia with great importance for three reasons: (a) 
Saudi‘s history as a reliable partner with all of its customers; (b) The Kingdom is the 
world‘s largest petroleum exporter, with current crude oil production capacity to 
around 12 million barrels per day. That is a capability unmatched in the industry (Al-
Naimi, November 2010); (c) The Kingdom has a vast amount of oil which China 
desires. China realises that nearly 20 percent of the world‘s proven oil reserves are 
located in the Saudi Arabia (BP Statistical Review, 2011: 6), and nearly 60 percent of 
the world‘s proven oil reserves are located in the Middle East (Ibid); (d) Saudi Arabia 
is the largest economy among the Arab countries and the Kingdom is also a member 
of the Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, (G20);  and 
17 
 
(e) China recognises that Saudi Arabia, the leading member of the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), will play an increasingly vital role in 
supplying global energy in the future. Just less than 80 percent of the world‘s proven 
reserves are concentrated in eight countries, of which only Canada (with oil sands 
included) and Russia are not OPEC members (Oil & Gas Journal, 2009: 23-24). With 
all these issues in mind, China is turning to Saudi Arabia as a strategic trade and oil 
partner.  
 
On the other hand, Saudi Arabia is adopting a ―Look East‖ policy and sees China as 
one of the most important strategic markets for its oil exports. At the same time Saudi 
Arabia also has strong political, economic, and security relations with the United 
States. Thus, this study is the first attempt to discuss the evolution of oil relationship 
between China and Saudi Arabia within the framework of the interdependence model 
and the Trade Expectations Theory (TET). It wishes to set energy in a broader 
framework of strategic and regional change particularly the implications for the U.S. 
Furthermore, it is hoped that this study will inspire further research in relation to the 
issue of political economy, especially with regard to China‘s new role in the Middle 
East. 
 
 
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
 
Does economic interdependence between China and Saudi Arabia increase or 
decrease the probability of conflict between the U.S. and China in the Middle East? 
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With the growing of China‘s role at the global stage, there is heated debate about the 
impact of China‘s ―rise‖ on the global system in general and the Middle East in 
particular. There are explanations provided by liberals and realists, but both fail to 
show the conditions under which high energy interdependence between China and 
Saudi Arabia in particular will lead to a pacific or belligerent China. 
 
 
1.3  SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY 
 
 
China‘s rising demand for energy has been of special importance to the global 
political economy in recent years, and that will likely be even truer in the foreseeable 
future. In this context the challenge of energy security will grow more urgent in the 
years ahead. With the prospect that China will become the world‘s largest economy 
within the next decade, this study expects a significant increase in the volume of 
economic and oil interests in the Middle East. These interests make the study a great 
importance in understanding China‘s new role in the Middle East.  
 
In this context, the concept of energy security in the Middle East will be a key theme 
for the U.S. and China for at least the next decade or two. As China is becoming a 
new player in the Middle East and its interests still evolving in the region, the study 
attempts to provide a comprehensive vision of the Sino-Saudi relationship, which 
could help to understand the Chinese behaviour in the region. Currently there is 
confusion about China‘s role in the Middle East and its relations with Saudi Arabia. 
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From this standpoint, the significance of this thesis is to clarify the relationship in a 
comprehensive and objective academic manner. 
 
One of the original ideas provided also by the research is addressing China-Saudi 
relations through the use of international relations theories and in particular its 
development within the framework of the interdependence school of thought and the 
Trade Expectations Theory (TET). Further highlighting the importance of the study, 
the author, through his research, did not come across a single book addressing these 
relations in a comprehensive way as most previous literature focuses mainly on the 
American and Western influence in the Middle East. Today there is an important 
debate regarding China‘s role in the Middle East, and the main aim of this study is to 
shed light on those relations and open the way for other researchers to study the other 
important aspects which are not covered in this research. The author hopes that this 
study helps to fill some of the gaps and contributes positively to the debate.   
 
Most important of all, in light of the developments that have swept the Middle East 
and North Africa in 2011 and the effects that have occurred in world energy markets, 
especially after the cessation of Libyan oil, the spotlight on China-Saudi relations is of 
great significance, (especially if we know that Saudi Arabia is the largest oil exporter 
in the world and China is the second largest oil consumer and importer) as it will help 
to understand China‘s role in the region and her impact in the region in an objective 
way. Additionally, there are doubts among many of the ruling elite in the Middle East 
in general and Saudi Arabia in particular, about the U.S.‘s credibility as a strategic 
ally after they witnessed the speed of how the American Administration abandoned its 
allies in the region. Here comes another important point of the research as it sets out 
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to provide a clear understanding about China‘s intentions in the region, and to 
examine if China could provide a strategic alternative to the United States. 
 
 
1.4 AIMS & OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
 
 
This study aims to assess the growing China-Saudi relations by directly evaluating the 
logic behind it and uncovering the scope of the relations. In doing so, the study 
attempts to correlate directly the developments and trends in Saudi Arabia‘s relations 
and the impact of the United States. To facilitate identified aims, the following 
objectives are developed: 
 
 To fill a gap in the literature and stimulate a debate on China‘s new role in the 
Middle East by looking specifically at Sino-Saudi relations. 
 To suggest an evaluative and analytical research framework needed to 
determine China‘s intentions towards Saudi Arabia and the Middle East. 
 To identify the challenges and obstacles of China-Saudi relations and their 
impact on the U.S. 
 To evaluate future scenarios for China-Saudi relations and its implications on 
U.S. policy. 
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1.5 RESEARCH HYPOTHESES & QUESTIONS 
 
According to Cooper and Schindlerth, research literature disagrees about the meaning 
of the terms proposition and hypothesis (Cooper & Schindler, 1998: 43). They argue 
that the immediate purpose of explorations (research) is usually to develop hypotheses 
or questions for further research (Ibid: 131). A research proposition is a statement 
about the concept that is judged as true or false if it refers to observable phenomena. 
When a proposition is formulated for empirical testing, it is called a hypothesis. As a 
declarative statement, a hypothesis is of a tentative and conjectural nature (Ibid: 43). 
In that regard the following research hypotheses were formulated: 
 
 H1: China is not seeking to undermine the American influence, but is 
looking to secure its energy needs and meet its expanding economic 
interests. 
To decipher China‘s objectives H1 is required in order to investigate two research 
questions, Q1 and Q2:  
Q1: What have been China‘s core (or primary) objectives in pursuing closer ties with 
Saudi Arabia? 
 
The thesis tries to decipher Chinese intentions toward Saudi Arabia. This is the main 
question of the thesis and attempts to address whether Chinese actions were in 
accordance within the realism model or the economic interdependence school of 
thought. If China is acting in the realism model (offensive), it should be attempting to 
expand its power and influence in Saudi Arabia at every opportunity with the intent to 
undermine U.S. influence. If China is acting in accordance with the economic 
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interdependence model, it should interact economically with Saudi Arabia in a 
manner which makes economic sense; and developing a Sino-Saudi relationship based 
on furthering their economic interests and not based on degrading the U.S.-Saudi 
political relationship. 
Q2: Why does the Middle East region have particular significance for China in 
meeting its energy objectives (or security)? 
 
 H2: China will support the stability of Saudi Arabia because it expects a 
significant increase in its trade/energy with Saudi Arabia in the future. 
To measure Saudi Arabia‘s significance for China and Beijing motivations H2 is 
required in order to answer two questions, Q3 and Q4: 
Q3: Why is Saudi Arabia an indispensable partner for China? 
Q4: What is the nature and extent of China‘s strategic motives in pursuing a 
partnership with Saudi Arabia? 
 
 H3: China will work to protect its interests in the region through 
economical and political means and not through using military power. 
To look at the balance between energy and politics in China-Saudi relations and to 
examine if China could provide a strategic alternative to the United States H3 is 
required in order to answer two questions, Q5 and Q6: 
Q5: Does the relationship between China and Saudi Arabia suggest that this is a 
strategic – political or energy – economic partnership? 
Q6: What are the implications for the region and the United States? 
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1.6  RESEARCH DESIGN & METHODOLOGY 
 
To answer these questions, this thesis will be using the single case study with 
qualitative method. This study will adopt literature, statistical analysis and document 
analysis to unfold its arguments. The case that will be examined is Saudi Arabia. This 
case was picked because Saudi Arabia not only has the world‘s largest oil reserves, 
but it‘s also the top oil exporter to China. Saudi Arabia also is the largest economy in 
the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and China‘s top trade partner in this 
region since 2001. Further highlighting Saudi Arabia importance to China, it is the 
only ―swing producer‖ capable of substantially increasing output in a short period of 
time. In addition, Saudi Arabia plays a vital role in the U.S.‘s strategy in the Middle 
East. Taking into account these important issues, the case study will provide strong 
indication about the Chinese intentions and objectives in the region. 
 
The next sections will describe the methods used in conducting this case study 
research. They explain why the case study methodology was selected, the components 
of a case study, the rationale for the procedures used in the case study and how the 
study was analysed and reported.  
 
 
1.6.1 Research Process 
 
 
 Step 1: My interest in the relations between China and Arab countries began 
at the start of my career, but this interest expanded academically during my 
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time at Durham University in 1999, while writing my Master‘s dissertation on 
oil projects in the Caspian region. After my graduation, I worked at the 
League of Arab States in London and with several Arab press institutions and 
through these roles I began to follow closely the Chinese policy in the Middle 
East and start formulating the research interests over the years. 
 
 Step 2: At this point some important developments emerged. In January 2006 
Saudi King Abdullah visited China and it was his first visit after assuming the 
throne in 2005. Three months later Chinese President Jintao Hu visited Saudi 
Arabia. I was then working in the economic section of Pan-Arab daily 
newspaper Asharq al-Awsat in London, where we covered extensively those 
visits. During that time the idea of my thesis begun to take shape as I started to 
investigate the topic in an academic way, using all resources available to me 
about China‘s Middle Eastern policy. Meanwhile, through my work‘s 
experience and attending many international conferences, I became convinced 
that my idea is significant for several reasons: (a) The lack of the number of 
qualified Arab (and Saudis) professionals specialising in China; (b) The 
absence of comprehensive references on Chinese-Arab relations in general and 
Saudi Arabia in particular; and (c) China‘s new rule in the region started to 
generate a ―hot‖ political debate in the region. The whole experience was 
useful in gaining an early understanding of the topics and developing the 
study‘s objectives and defining my research question. 
 
 Step 3: I started looking extensively at literature on the subject studied using 
manual and computer-based methods. In addition to attending several 
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conferences and seminars, several discussions with the academic supervisor, 
colleagues and professional staff in selected organisations were also conducted 
to extract valuable information in order to construct a framework for this 
research. This was followed by the formulation of a theoretical framework 
which formed a structure for the study. The study started to generate a large 
amount of data from multiple sources, so I had to go through databases in 
order to categorise, sort, store, and retrieve data for analysis.  
 
 Step 4: At this stage I started preparing the research design. As time passed I 
found out that a case study is a particularly useful strategy when: (a) ―How‖ or 
―why‖ questions are being posed; (b) The investigator has little control over 
events; and (c) The focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life 
context. Additionally, that ―case‖ should be addressed within theories of 
international relations and political economy (liberalism and realism in 
particular) for the following reasons: (a) The decisions of China-Saudi 
relations are taken at the highest political levels; (b) Most of the trade and 
commercial exchanges are between the National Oil Companies (NOC); and 
(c) The relations are strategic in nature and they have regional and 
international dimensions and repercussions.  
 
 Step 5: The next step was collecting the data. Information and data that were 
collected in stage 4 were analysed and evaluated using many interpretations in 
order to find linkages between the research case and the outcomes with 
reference to the original research questions. A qualitative approach was 
adopted for the China-Saudi study since it is well suited to the questions that 
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require exploration, where a detailed, close-up view is needed and where 
phenomena is to be studied in their natural setting. This approach enabled 
processes to be explored and linkages between different aspects of political 
and historical context, levels of commercial exchanges, energy trade and 
investments and the military dimensions, and the various interested parties to 
be teased out. In all cases, the author treated the evidence fairly to produce 
analytical conclusions. 
 
 Step 6: The next stage was generalisation and interpretation, then preparation 
of the report which contains the conclusion for each case (chapter) which leads 
us to reach the overall conclusion and answer the research‘s main question. 
Here, I hope that the final results will be compelling and open the way for 
other researchers to discuss the subject from different angles so it can be a 
benefit to everyone. Figure 16.1 summarises the whole process of the thesis. 
 
(Figure 1.6.1.1): Research Process 
 
 
Overall Conclusion 
Revise Theory or/and  Findings 
Evidences Examine Findings 
Conduct Case Study 
Collect Data Data Analysis Writing Sub-Cases 
Draw on Existing Theory 
Select Case Design and Pilot Research Question 
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1.6.2 What is Research? 
 
The difference between research and non-research activity is in the way we find 
answers: the process must meet certain requirements to be called research.  The 
research is a process of trying to gain better understanding of the complexities of 
human experience and, in some genres of research, to take action based on that 
understanding, (Marshall & Rossman, 1999: 21). Through systematic and sometimes 
collaborative strategies, the researcher gathers information about actions and 
interactions, reflects on their meaning, arrives at and evaluates conclusions, and 
eventually puts forward an interpretation most frequently in written form (Ibid). 
Therefore, this ―research‖ investigates the causes of China‘s motives to establish a 
strategic relationship with Saudi Arabia, and to address the wider implications for the 
U.S. in the Middle East. 
 
 
1.6.3 Research Strategy and Study Design 
 
 
Research designs refer to the overall strategy or approach of the study.  In this case 
the research strategy is determined by the nature of the research question.  Research 
strategies are merely tools: it is the researcher‘s responsibility to understand the 
variety available and the different purposes of each strategy, to appreciate in advance 
the ramifications of selecting one method over another, and to become astute in the 
selection of one method over another, (Morse, 1994: 220-235). The design is a crucial 
part of research development because it enables your research to be investigated 
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efficiently.  In other words the research design provides the ―glue‖ that holds the 
research project together. Cooper and Schindler define research design as the plan and 
the structure of investigation so conceived as to obtain answers to research questions. 
The plan is the overall scheme or programme of the research. It includes an outline of 
what the investigator will do, from writing hypotheses and their operational 
implications and the final analysis of data. A structure is the framework, organisation, 
or configuration of the relations among variables of a study, (Cooper, Schindler 2003: 
146). Or as Zikmud puts it: a research design is a master plan specifying the methods 
and procedures for collecting and analysing the needed information, (Zikmud, 2006: 
65). 
 
In this regard, Yin suggested that the three conditions could determine the type of 
research programme indicated: (a) The type of research question; (b) the degree of 
investigator controls possible; and finally, (c) the degree of focus on contemporary 
events desired versus historical events, (Yin, 1984: 23). Table 1.6.3 provides an 
outline of the relative performance of each type of research strategy under each 
condition. 
 
(Table 1.6.3.1): Relevant Situations for Different Research Strategies 
 
Strategy Form of Research 
Question 
Requires Control 
Behavioural Events? 
Focuses on 
Contemporary 
Events? 
Experiment How, why? Yes Yes 
Survey Who, what, where, how 
many, how much? 
No Yes 
Archival 
Analysis 
Who, what, where, how 
many, how much? 
No Yes/No 
History How, why? No No 
Case Study How, why? No Yes 
Source: Yin, 2003:5 
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Yin explained that ―What‖ questions usually suggest that exploratory research is 
indicated, or may actually be rephrased as ‗how many‘ or ―how much‖ questions? 
―How‖ and ―why‖ questions are more explanatory by nature, and are likely to lead to 
the use of experiments, histories and case studies. These questions tend to deal with 
operational links which occur during a span of time, rather than the incidents or 
phenomena which occur at intervals over time, (Ibid). In this context, as our form of 
research question is ―how‖ and ―why‖ with the focus on contemporary issue (China-
Saudi relations), that makes the case study strategy the logical choice. 
 
 
1.6.4 Case Study as a Strategic Methodology  
 
 
This research reviews the literature on case study as a strategic qualitative research 
methodology. Although case studies have been criticised by some authors as lacking 
scientific rigour and do not address generalisability, this research, however, reiterates 
its appropriateness when dealing with a process or complex real-life activities in great 
depth. Case study has been commonly used in social science fields like sociology, 
industrial relations and anthropology even though generally it was considered an 
underutilised strategy, (Mohd Noor, 2008: 1602-1604). Case study research excels at 
bringing us to an understanding of a complex issue or object, and can extend 
experience, or add strength to what is already known through previous research. Case 
studies emphasise detailed contextual analysis of a limited number of events or 
conditions and their relationships, (Ibid). In this context, the case that will be 
examined is China‘s oil policy towards Saudi Arabia within the economic 
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interdependence theory. This case was selected because Saudi Arabia not only has the 
world‘s largest oil reserves, but it‘s also the top oil exporter to China. Saudi Arabia is 
also the largest economy in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and has been 
China‘s top trade partner in this region since 2001. Further highlighting Saudi Arabia 
importance to China, it is the only ―swing producer‖ capable of substantially 
increasing output in a short period of time. In addition, Saudi Arabia plays a vital role 
in the U.S.‘s strategy in the Middle East. Taking into account these important issues, 
the case study will provide strong indication about the Chinese intentions and 
objectives in the region. 
 
 
1.6.4.1 What is Case Study? 
 
 
A case study is a research methodology common in social science and it is based on 
an in-depth investigation, (Shepard, 2003: 22). According to Stacks, case studies are 
in-depth studies of particular people, organisations, events, or even processes. They 
provide a richly detailed and complete understanding of the case under study that is 
not available through other methods, (Stacks, 2002: 169). The case study is an 
obvious extension of secondary research, although when researching a case study 
other qualitative methods may also be employed, particularly interviewing and in 
some instances focusing on groups and participant-observation. Furthermore, case 
studies often include quantitative data obtained from secondary research or from 
studies reported in various documents (Ibid: 157). Robert Yin defines the case study 
research method as an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
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phenomenon within its real-life context (Yin, 1994: 23). The case study is the most 
flexible of all research designs, allowing the researcher to retain the holistic 
characteristics of real-life events while investigating empirical events. In general, a 
case study is an empirical inquiry which (a) investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real-life context when (b) the boundaries between phenomenon and context 
are not clearly evident; and (c) in which multiple sources of evidence are used (Ibid).  
 
Gilgun argues that the case study research is important because of its contributions to 
theory. A case study is an intensive look at an individual unit, (Gilgun, 2011: 1-6). In 
political science, the archetypal case is the dominant political unit of our time, the 
nation state. However, this is a matter of convention. The study of smaller social and 
political units (regions, cities, villages, communities, social groups, families) or 
specific institutions (political parties, interest groups, businesses) is equally common 
in many social science disciplines, (Gerring, 2007: 19). Gerring goes further to give 
the ―case study‖ a more comprehensive definition: (a) that its method is qualitative; 
(b) that the research is holistic, thick (a more or less comprehensive examination of a 
phenomenon); (c) that it utilises a particular type of evidence (e.g., ethnographic, 
clinical, non-experimental, non-survey-based, participant-observation, process-
tracing, historical, textual, or field research); (d) that its method of evidence gathering 
is naturalistic (a ―real-life context‖); (e) that the topic is diffuse (case and context are 
difficult to distinguish); (f) that it employs triangulation (―multiple sources of 
evidence‖); (g) that the research investigates the properties of a single observation; 
and (h) that the research investigates the properties of a single phenomenon, instance, 
or example (Ibid: 17). 
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1.6.4.2 Strength & Weakness of using Case Study 
 
Case study methods, referring now to single case as well as comparative designs, 
offer several significant advantages relative to statistical methods. (a) More 
comprehensive and more detailed it can stimulate new research and contradict 
established theory, (Hayes, 2000: 133). (b) Case studies are generally better than the 
alternatives for documenting processes. The world political economy is marked by 
significant processes - market innovation, competition, collusion, equilibrium, 
influence, bargaining, communication, conflict, learning, institutional change, 
regional integration and disintegration, and politics.  (c) Case methods allow stronger 
empirical grounding for a hypothesis for the cases studied. Fuller reporting makes it 
more likely that readers will construct alternative interpretations of the same events 
and generate new hypotheses.   
 
However, case studies have been criticised by some as lacking in scientific rigour and 
reliability and that they do not address the issues of generalisability, (Johnson, 1994: 
47). Critics of the case study method also believe that the study of a small number of 
cases can offer no grounds for establishing reliability or generality of findings. Others 
feel that the intense exposure to study of the case biases the findings. Some dismiss 
case study research as useful only as an exploratory tool, (Ibid). 
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1.6.4.3 Research Method & Strategy  
 
It is obvious that the first question that comes to mind is: What Is Research 
Methodology? The system of collecting data for research projects is known as 
research methodology. There are two basic methodological traditions of research in 
social science, namely positivism and post positivism (phenomenology). Positivism, 
thus, which is based on the natural science model of dealing with facts, is more 
closely associated with quantitative method of analysis. Quantitative research uses 
mathematical measures and statistical techniques to determine relationships and 
differences among large samples of target populations, (Shao, 1999: 151). Highly 
structured, quantitative research involves designing questions with a choice of 
specific responses so that the responses can be measured and analysed 
mathematically, (Ibid). On the other hand, post-positivism that deals with 
understanding the subjectivity of social phenomena, requires a qualitative approach, 
(Noor, 2008). Qualitative research is less formally structured than quantitative 
research and it uses smaller samples. The data gathered using qualitative techniques is 
subjective and non-quantifiable, (Shao, 1999). 
 
The qualitative case study is an approach to research that facilitates exploration of a 
phenomenon within its context using a variety of data sources. This ensures that the 
issue is not explored through one lens, but rather a variety of lenses which allows for 
multiple facets of the phenomenon to be revealed and understood, (Baxter, 2008: 544-
559). Qualitative methods, according to Landman, ―seek to identify and understand 
the attributes, characteristics, and traits of the objects of inquiry, and the nature of the 
method necessarily requires a focus on a small number of countries‖, (Landman, 
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2008: 68-8). Yin argues that five features distinguish qualitative research from other 
kinds of social science research, (Yin, 2011: 7-8): (a) Studying the meaning of 
people‘s lives, under real-world conditions; (b) Representing the views and 
perspectives of the people in a study; (c) Covering the contextual conditions within 
which people live; (d) Contributing insights into existing or emerging concepts that 
may help to explain human social behaviour; and (e) striving to use multiple sources 
of evidence rather than relying on a single source alone. 
 
According to Yin there are three types of case study research and these are 
exploratory, descriptive, and explanatory, (Yin, 1984: 11-15). Researchers in 
business-related subjects sometimes limit case studies to the exploratory use. For 
example, pilot case study can be used as a basis for formulating questions or 
hypothesis testing. Descriptive case study is an attempt to describe, for example, what 
happens to a product when it is launched. Explanatory research can be useful for 
example to study processes in companies, (see Table 1.6.4.3.1). 
 
(Table 1.6.4.3.1): Main Types of Case Study Research 
 
Case Study 
Type 
Definition 
Explanatory This type of case study would be used if you were seeking to answer a 
question that sought to explain the presumed causal links in real-life 
interventions that are too complex for the survey or experimental strategies. 
In evaluation language, the explanations would link program 
implementation with program effects. 
Exploratory This type of case study is used to explore those situations in which the 
intervention being evaluated has no clear, single set of outcomes. 
Descriptive This type of case study is used to describe an intervention or phenomenon 
and the real-life context in which it occurred. 
Source: Yin, 2003 
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Exploratory research will be used in this study to provide greater understanding of 
China-Saudi relations through defining the nature, motives and the scope of these 
relations within regional and global context. The qualitative case study establishes 
general hypotheses about the actions of the actors in their particular context. The case 
study in this research considers the nature of China‘s behaviour towards Saudi Arabia 
as the dependent variable. The independent variables, political contacts, trade, 
investment, energy, arms sale and technology transfer, provide a framework for 
analysing the topic.  
 
 
1.6.5 Research Strategy 
 
 
In social research two reasoning methods are used to find a relationship between 
research theory and the data collected. Deductive reasoning works from the more 
general to the more specific. Sometimes this is formally called a ―top-down‖ 
approach. Conclusion follows logically from premises (available facts). Inductive 
reasoning works the other way, moving from specific observations to broader 
generalisations and theories. It is important to acknowledge that there are elements of 
deduction in qualitative research, as there is induction in quantitative research. 
 
 
 
 
 
36 
 
(Table 1.6.5.1): Deduction and Induction in Research 
 
Key Stages in Deduction Key Stages in Induction 
 Draw on existing theory 
 Conjecture hypothesis 
 Collect data 
 Examine findings 
 Confirm or reject hypothesis 
 Revise theory 
 Select general research question 
 Select sites and participants 
 Generate data 
 Interpret data 
 Develop concepts 
 Repeat the above cycle 
 Generate hypothesis 
Source: Miller, 2010: 60 
 
 
Positivism emphasises that scientific knowledge is arrived at through the 
accumulation of facts, made possible by hypothesis testing. Science is a compendium 
of empirically established facts, and scientists get progressively closer to discovering 
the ‗right‘ explanations. Here, the purpose of science is to generate hypotheses that 
can be tested, thereby allowing explanations to be assessed. This is deduction, 
(Rhodes, 2010: 60). On the other hand qualitative researchers usually begin with a 
general explanatory question or with preliminary concepts (rather than a specific 
hypothesis). They then collect data, observe patterns emerging in the data and 
organise these into a conceptual framework. This is done by systematically comparing 
empirical cases to see whether emerging hypotheses fit. If not, the hypothesis is 
reformulated (or the phenomenon re-defined to exclude the case). The discovery of 
negative cases disproves the explanation and requires a reformulation. This is 
induction, (Ibid: 61). This cycle may be repeated several times until a conceptual 
framework is well developed, and until new data yields only minimal or no new 
information, (Ibid). 
 
As the aim of this research is to analyse China-Saudi relations and its implications on 
the U.S., the deductive reasoning approach could not be used due to the exploratory 
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nature of the study (as discussed in the research design section). Therefore, this study 
adopted the inductive reasoning approach in order to find general patterns of China‘s 
behaviour towards Saudi Arabia and evaluate its implication on the U.S.  This study 
has adopted a qualitative method with quantitative resources as primary data. Since 
large amount of data exists, in general terms, on the subjects of interest, it is clear that 
use of the quantitative resources to address the objectives outlined was a time 
consuming but very productive task when employed in this context. This is important, 
as new findings on the investigation subject have been investigated in a 
comprehensive way, as issues related to energy security in both China and Saudi 
Arabia are considered as strategic issues and will be dealt at the highest levels.  
 
The quantitative secondary resources will be used primarily for this thesis. The 
resources selected for this study will be authoritative and mainly from official 
speeches, interviews and statistical economical reports from several international 
organisations such as the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (DoTS), the World Bank, 
the United Nations (UN COMTRADE) and China/Saudi Arabia official statistics.  
The study will also explore the reports published by energy analysts. Data and 
analysis for oil supply and demand will be adapted from reports such as the 
International Energy Agency (World Energy Outlook), Energy International Agency 
(EIA‟s World Energy Outlook), The United States Department of Energy (DOE), 
International Energy Outlook (IEO), Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries -
OPEC- (World Oil Outlook) and BP Statistical Review of World Energy. The literary 
research will also involve books, newspapers, pamphlets, grey literature and laws; 
published and unpublished statistical material. As for the military statistical data that 
will be gathered from the U.S. Congressional Research Service (Conventional Arms 
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Transfers to Developing Nations), Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
(SIPRI Yearbook) and the U.S. Defence Security Cooperation Agency, (DSCA 
Historical Facts-book and Fiscal Year Series). Internal validity is automatically 
established in qualitative research because the group acts as its own point of 
reference.  External validity cannot be established in the traditional sense with 
qualitative approach because it is not trying to reach a general conclusion about the 
population. Instead, validity for qualitative research is best described as rigorous, 
credible, and trustworthy. 
 
 
1.7 LIMITATIONS OF STUDY 
 
 
As for the limitations, similar to any other study, this study also has a certain 
limitation as an inevitable part of controlled research. The main limitation of this 
thesis is the fact that the study focuses on the oil sector as a result of its centrality in 
the development of China-Saudi relations; this fact may also serve as a limitation 
because this case will not show how China‘s policies are geared for non-energy 
sectors; however, this limitation is not vital since: (a) Much of the China-Saudi 
relations revolves around the oil sector; and (b) China‘s activities in Saudi Arabia is 
driven by its desire to improve its energy security.  
 
The thesis focuses on relations between China and Saudi Arabia at the state level (or 
within the perspective of international relations) and does not focus on the sectoral 
level (i.e. oil companies, political lobbying, human rights organisations or even 
individuals, etc.). This limitation also is not vital since: (a) Oil is vitally important to 
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national survival and the enhancement of national power, in the cases of Saudi Arabia 
and China, to regime survival as well, one must consider the political-strategic subtext 
of Sino-Saudi relations; (b) The political system in both countries is authoritarian; 
therefore, issues related to energy security will be considered as strategic issues and 
will be dealt at the highest levels; (c) China-Saudi relations have been largely 
restricted to oil exports to China and limited cross-investment. (d) Saudi Arabia does 
not allow Chinese companies to invest in its upstream (exploration and production) oil 
sector; (e) Chinese companies are new players in Saudi Arabia and do not contribute 
to the formation of the oil sector in Saudi Arabia, which is the case with U.S. 
companies.  
 
Furthermore, it was very difficult to obtain official documents relating to oil or 
economic agreements between China and Saudi Arabia, due to the secretive system in 
both countries. Thus, it is important to note here that this shortcoming is not just 
facing the author alone, even the international institutions (the International Energy 
Agency in particular) complained on several occasions about the lack of transparency 
in the oil sector, both in China and Saudi Arabia. The irony also here is that even the 
Chinese and the Saudis complain about each other in that issue. In addition, 
conducting interviews was rather difficult, as it was difficult to schedule (or travel to) 
an appointment for an interview with some participants particularly those in high 
positions. It‘s important to note that personal and logistics reasons prevented the 
author from travelling to conduct private interviews with senior Chinese/Saudi 
officials. Despite the limitations and difficulties, the study helps us get an expansive 
picture of the Sino-Saudi relations, its nature with respect to the oil sector and the 
factors associated with its success and growth. The study also provides an analysis to 
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the future developments by providing the true picture of the relations which could 
help many scholars and decision-makers to pursue objective and pragmatic policies. 
 
 
1.8  THE ORGANISATION OF THE RESEARCH 
 
 
The research consists of eleven chapters; three of them or part I (Chapters one, two 
and three) are related to the theoretical foundations of the study. Seven others (from 
three to nine) are devoted to the empirical study; while Chapter ten presents the 
implication for the United States and puts forward the future scenarios. Finally 
Chapter eleven provides the overall conclusion and the key finding of the study. 
 
Chapter one starts with an introduction to the research. It provides a statement of the 
problem, significance of the study, aim and objectives of the study, research 
hypothesis, research design and methodology as well as the outline of the research.  
While Chapter two lays the theoretical foundations of the research, it also attempts to 
provide a comprehensive survey of the nature and implications of China‘s growing 
role in the Middle East and its developing relations with Saudi Arabia from the realist 
and liberal perspectives. In the first two sections, studies from various fields, such as 
realist theories, liberal school of thought, political economy and foreign policy 
analysis are reviewed in conjunction with an analysis of their most studied research 
questions, key variables, policy prescriptions and contribution to the overall study of 
China-Saudi relations. The third section of Chapter two discusses China‘s energy 
concept and how China‘s growing dependence on foreign oil will affect its 
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international behaviour. Chapter three will play a very important role in the 
theoretical argument as it provides statistical data to China‘s oil needs and how it fits 
with its oil strategy. This chapter will specifically try to answer the question: why 
does the Middle East region have particular significance for China in meeting its 
energy objectives (or security)? Subsequently, the chapter will give strong indications 
of China‘s intentions towards its relations with the Middle East.  
 
The next three chapters try to (or part II) explain the logic behind the emerging Sino-
Saudi relations and attempt to find answers for questions three and four. Indeed, 
Chapter four provides an explanation of the development of relations between China 
and Saudi Arabia in the scope of historical and political context.  That brings us 
logically to Chapter five, which will measure Saudi Arabia‘s significance for China 
and examine Beijing motivations to answer questions three and four. Chapter six 
presents in detail the Saudi policy toward China, as the picture cannot be complete 
without discussing the Saudi perspective of China.  
 
Having established the nature and the logic of China-Saudi relations; part III 
(Chapters seven, eight and nine) provides further empirical evidences and looks at the 
balance between energy and politics in China-Saudi relations and examines if China 
could provide a strategic alternative to the United States. Chapter seven explores the 
scope of the economic relationship that China and Saudi Arabia have formed over the 
two decades. The following will be examined in the economic realm: (a) The scope of 
trade ties; and (b) Cross- investments. Additionally the chapter will identify the 
opportunities and impediments for China-Saudi relations. Chapter eight discusses oil 
ties between the two countries and provides strong evidence to show that the oil trade 
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is at the heart of the emerging relations between China and Saudi Arabia. Furthermore 
the chapter will also identify the impediments for the oil trade between the two 
countries. Chapter nine examines the military affairs and technology transfers that 
China and Saudi Arabia have formed over the last three decades. The variety and 
volume of Sino-Saudi arms sales will be examined in the context of the global arms 
trade.  
 
Having uncovered the scope of the Saudi-China relationship, consequently Chapter 
ten assesses the implications for the U.S. as the dominant power in the region and 
attempts to predict some future scenarios.  Finally, Chapter eleven presents the overall 
conclusion and the key finding of the case study based on the empirical findings of 
the research, in addition to the recommendations and suggestions for further research. 
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China and Saudi Arabia (Selected Data and Indicators 2010) 
 
 
Saudi Arabia 
 
 
Country 
 
China 
 
Head of state, prime minister: 
King Abdullah Bin-Abd-al-Aziz 
Al Saud 
Leader 
 
Head of state: President Jintao Hu 
US$448.3 billion GDP US$5.8 trillion 
23 World‟s Ranking 
by GDP 
2 
55 World‟s Ranking 
by Human 
Development 
89 
17 World‟s Ranking 
by Competitiveness 
26 
129 World‟s Ranking 
by Gender Gap 
61 
Monarchy Political System Communist state 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) 
Official Name 
People‘s Republic of China established 
(PRC) 
23 September 1932 (unification 
of the Kingdom) 
Independence Date October  1, 1949 
Saudi riyals (SAR)) Currency Renminbi Yuan (RMB) 
Middle East, bordering the Gulf 
and the Red Sea, north of Yemen 
Location 
Eastern Asia, bordering the East China 
Sea, Korea Bay, Yellow Sea, and South 
China Sea, between North Korea and 
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Vietnam 
2,149,690 km sq Area 9,326,410 km sq 
27,136,977 Populations 1,342,700,000 
Riyadh Capital Beijing 
Riyadh (population: 4,205,960) Largest city Shanghai (population: 14,608,500) 
US$16,641 GDP per Capita US$4,283 
39 
World‟s Ranking 
by GDP per Capita 
95 
85.0 Literacy Rate (%) 93.3 
50 
Worldwide 
Corruption 
Perceptions 
Ranking 
78 
Legal Death Penalty Legal 
Muslim 100% Religion 
Daoist (Taoist), Buddhist, Christian 3%-
4%, Muslim 1%-2%  
note: officially atheist (2002 est.) 
Arabic Languages Standard Chinese (or Mandarin) 
10.0 
Unemployment 
Rate 
4.1 
petroleum and petroleum 
products 90% 
Exports 
electrical and other machinery, including 
data processing equipment, apparel, 
textile, iron and steel, optical and 
medical equipment 
7 
World‟s Ranking 
by Military 
Expenditure global 
2 
2,640 km Coast Line 14,500 km 
Source: IMF, World Bank, UN, Transparency International, World Economic Forum, 
CIA‘s World Factbook, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, NBS and Saudi 
Central Department of Statistics & Information (CDSI), (all figures as for 2010) 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
2.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), China had overtaken the U.S. as 
the world‘s biggest energy consumer by the end of 2009, (IEA, July 2010). 
Furthermore, by the end of 2010, China had also overtaken Japan to become the 
world‘s second largest economy, (U.N., March 2010).  Most important of all, in 2010, 
China had become the world‘s top manufacturing country by output, returning the 
country to the position it occupied in the early 19th century and ending the U.S.‘s 
110-year run as the largest goods producer, (Marsh, March 14, 2011). China, by 2010, 
even had surpassed the World Bank as the largest lender to developing nations, 
particularly in Africa, the Middle East and South East Asia, (Dyer, January 18, 2011). 
The year of 2009 will also be remembered in the Beijing‘s economic history as when 
China surpassed Germany as the world‘s biggest exporter, (Atkins, February 9, 2010). 
Additionally, China became the world‘s largest automobile market, having surpassed 
the U.S. (The Wall Street Journal, January 12, 2010) and the world‘s second largest 
oil importer, (Bloomberg, January 27, 2010). 
 
This impressive performance and rapid economic expansion of China, coupled with 
its high level of growing oil imports has stimulated a heated debate over China‘s role 
in the Middle East and potential conflict in the region between China and the United 
States over oil. What are the international repercussions of the ―rise‖ of China in the 
Middle East? Will prosperous China contribute to regional prosperity or threaten 
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American interests in Saudi Arabia? Will a strong China be tempted to use military 
power to challenge the American ―order‖ in the Middle East, or will it be constrained 
by potent forces of global economic interdependence? Will a more open and reform-
oriented China gradually move towards political liberalisation, thus enhancing the 
stability and security in the Middle East, or will it throw its weight around and 
challenge the American hegemony in the Middle East, providing Saudi Arabia with a 
political and military alternative to America? On the other hand will the United States 
try to contain China in the Middle East and block its access to the region‘s resources, 
or will it be cooperative and understand the Chinese genuine need for energy to 
sustain their economic growth? 
 
There has certainly been no shortage of publications that address some of these 
important questions. However, while the analysts may occasionally refer to some 
international relations theories or make some theoretical points in their discussion, 
little systematic effort has been made to place the entire debate on the ―China‘s 
challenge‖ within specific theoretical framework. One consistent shortcoming in 
much of the literature is that the analysts speak past each other rather than addressing 
the different views about this complex subject, or as Kristin Forbes, a former member 
of the White House Council of Economic Advisers and a professor at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, puts it, ―China is the West‘s greatest hope and 
greatest fear…no one was quite ready for how fast China has emerged‖, (New York 
Times, January 27, 2010). 
 
This chapter attempts to provide a comprehensive survey of the nature and 
implications of China‘s growing role in the Middle East and its developing relations 
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with Saudi Arabia from the realist and liberal perspectives, because as Harvard 
University Professor Stephen Walt puts it, ―Two international relations theories, 
liberalism and realism, that are relevant to the central government‘s efforts and 
describe the general policies that each exhibits‖, (Walt, 1998). The thesis argues that 
while both school of thoughts have made useful contributions to the current debate, 
neither of them is adequate in offering satisfactory answers to the questions raised 
above. China‘s oil strategy is yet to be understood clearly, conflicting incomplete 
information, changing circumstances and an occasional measure of ―paranoia‖ or 
―theoretical mentality‖ of the Cold War has led to speculation over concrete analysis. 
Or as Daniel Yergin described it in very interesting words: ―China‘s thirst for energy 
has become a decisive plot element in suspense novels and films‖, (Yergin, 2006: 69-
82).  
 
It is, therefore, necessary to combine the strength of two theories to reach proper 
understanding of China-Saudi relations and its implications to the region and the 
United States. More specifically, I will be guided by the theory of trade expectation to 
the analysis of factors that will shape China‘s oil policy towards Saudi Arabia. Given 
their different intellectual origins and theoretical orientations, realism and liberalism 
have provided divergent interpretations of consequences of China‘s oil policy towards 
Saudi Arabia. Most realists believe that an economically powerful China will become 
more assertive and expansionist, because of structural constraints. As China‘s 
capabilities increase, they argue, its intentions will become less benign and within this 
context they see China‘s actions in the Middle East as intended to expand Chinese 
power and influence at the cost of U.S. power and influence in the Middle East. This 
may eventually lead to a conflict between the two powers. 
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Liberals, however, contend that China‘s increasing role in the Middle East will foster 
greater interdependence and cooperation between the United States, China, and 
Middle Eastern states, which would lead to benefits for all sides. Both realism and 
liberalism recognise the salience of high economic interdependence in determining 
China‘s future behaviour, but they fail to offer a dynamic theory that will demonstrate 
precisely the conditions under which oil interdependence will have a positive or 
negative impact on Chinese policy towards Saudi Arabia. 
 
Drawing on Trade Expectation‘s Theory (TET), which departs from the two other 
approaches by incorporating both the level of interdependence and the dynamic 
expectations of future trade, and simultaneously considering the levels of 
interdependence and expectations of future trade, could lead to new predictions. In 
this regard I will show the conditions under which high energy interdependence 
between China and the Middle East in general and Saudi Arabia in particular will lead 
to a pacific or belligerent China. If decision-makers‘ expectations of future trade are 
high they will likely pursue policies that will enhance security in the region. On the 
other hand, if they have a negative view of their future trading environment they will 
likely take action to protect their interests in the region.  
 
This chapter is organised around four main sections. The first two sections present the 
realists and liberal perspectives of China‘s policy towards the Middle East and its 
relations with Saudi Arabia. The third section shows why I will be guided by theory 
of trade expectation. The fourth section presents evidence of China‘s concept of 
energy security and highlights the situation which will determine if China is guided 
by political aims or if it is guided merely by economic necessity.  
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2.2 REALIST INTERPRETATIONS: THE CONFLICT IS INEVITABLE 
 
Realism remains the dominant paradigm of international relations theory. The tenets 
of realism include the notions that states seek power to survive and major powers 
dominate the international system, (Zhou, 2008).  The realist view of international 
relations is based on the assumptions that the world is essentially anarchic and has no 
central authority governing the behaviour of individual states, (Li, 2004: 24). To 
protect their national security and survival in such a help system, states must seek to 
acquire or maximise their power through economic and military means, (Ibid). There 
are two main approaches to the role of power in international relations. The first has 
been described as ―defensive realism‖ and is characterised by the work of Kenneth 
Waltz, (Waltz, 1979: 105). Waltz saw the international system as ―a self-help 
system…in which those who do not help themselves, or who do so less effectively 
than others, will fail to prosper, will lay themselves open to dangers, will suffer‖, 
(Waltz, 1979:118). He claims that nations have a tendency to ‗‗balance‘‘ the power of 
other states. If they do not do so, they may suffer the consequences and may be 
eliminated from the system.  
 
The second approach is ―offensive realism‖ which is also dominant among realists 
and largely typified by the work of John Mearsheimer, (Mearsheimer, 2001:30). 
Unlike Waltz, Mearsheimer actually seeks to predict what nations will do when faced 
by opposing power. They will either ―balance‖ or ―buck pass‖ in response, but they 
will not generally ―bandwagon.‖ Mearsheimer‘s Offensive Realism paradigm is often 
seen as the theoretical basis for the ―China Threat‖ theory. Offensive realism makes 
five key assumptions:
 
 (a) States are the key actors in world politics, and they operate 
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in an anarchic system; (b) Great powers invariably have offensive military capability; 
(c) States can never be certain whether other states have hostile intentions; (d) Great 
powers place a high premium on survival; and, and (e) States are rational actors who 
are reasonably effective at designing strategies that maximize their chances of 
survival, (Mearsheimer, 2001). 
 
Waltz puts the argument as follows: ―Actors within a domestic polity have little 
reason to fear the dependence that goes with specialisation.‖ The anarchic structure of 
international politics, however, makes states worry about their vulnerability, thus 
compelling them ―To control what they depend on or to lessen the extent of their 
dependency.‖ For Waltz, it is this ―simple thought‖ that explains, among other things, 
―Their imperial thrusts to widen the scope of their control‖, (Waltz, 1979: 106). 
Meanwhile, Mearsheimer argues that nations that ―depend on others for critical 
economic supplies will fear cut off or blackmail in time of crisis or war.‖ Historical 
precedents suggest that it is when the energy security of nations is most precarious 
and vulnerable that they are most dangerous. Clearly that was true of expansionist 
Imperial Japan in the days leading up to Pearl Harbor. Indeed, Japan‘s lack of stable 
energy supplies was a major factor in its decision to strike on December 7, 1941, 
(Yergin, 1991). Consequently, Mearsheimer argues that ―nations may try to extend 
political control to the source of supply, giving rise to conflict with the source or with 
its other customers.‖ Realists equate interdependence with vulnerability; therefore 
―Interdependence will probably lead to greater security competition‖, (Mearsheimer, 
1990: 45). The difference between Waltz and Mearsheimer is that in the eyes of an 
offensive realist, the international system forces great powers to maximise their 
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relative power over other nations at every possible opportunity, (Mearsheimer, 2001: 
30-31). 
 
In Mearsheimer‘s view, all great powers have some offensive military capability, 
which means that they can hurt each other. Moreover, no state can know the future 
intentions of other states with certainty. The best way to survive in such a system is to 
be as powerful as possible, relative to potential rivals, (Brzezinksi and Mearsheimer, 
2005: 46-50). The mightier a state is, the less likely it is that another state will attack 
it. States that gain regional hegemony have a further aim: to prevent other 
geographical areas from being dominated by other great powers. In a realist world, 
states will compete for power regardless of their regime type, and neither international 
institutions nor global norms will ameliorate this drive for power, (Drezner, 2008: 51-
70). In this context, China, whether it remains authoritarian or becomes democratic, is 
likely to try to dominate Asia the way the U.S. dominates the Western hemisphere, 
(Mearsheimer, 2001: 35). 
 
Realists believe that status quo powers rarely exist in global politics. They believe that 
since the international system creates great benefits and incentives for states to look 
for opportunities to gain power and influence at the expense of their rivals, states are 
encouraged to take advantage of those situations where the benefits outweigh the 
costs. By expanding their relative power over their rivals at every opportunity, the 
survivability and security of that great power is increased. In Mearsheimer‘s words, 
―survival mandates aggressive behaviour‖, (Mearsheimer, 2001: 21). He also believes 
that a state‘s ultimate goal is to be the hegemony in a system, (Ibid);  however, even if 
a state cannot achieve hegemony, Mearsheimer believes that states will still act 
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offensively to gain as much power as possible because states are almost always better 
off with more rather than less power, (Ibid).  
 
Realists also note that, throughout history, rising powers have tended to be 
troublemakers, at least insofar as their more established counterparts in the 
international system are concerned. This is the case, in the realists‘ view, regardless of 
regime type; it was as true of a rising, democratic United States as it was of a rising, 
autocratic Germany, (Friedberg, 2005: 7-45). Historians since Thucydides
1
 have 
pointed to a long string of conflicts generated by the emergence of rising powers that 
disturb the old order and challenge the existing power structure and predict the same 
gloomy future for China‘s rise, (Zakaria, 2007/2008). The realists argue that relative 
material power establishes the basic parameters of a country's foreign policy; they 
note, in Thucydides' formula, that ―the strong do what they can and the weak suffer 
what they must‖, (Strassler, 1996: 89). Look at history, realists say, when a new 
power rises, it inevitably disturbs the balance of power, unsettles the international 
order and seeks a place in the sun. This makes it bump up against the established great 
power of the day (that would be U.S.), so Sino-U.S. conflict is inevitable, (Steinberg, 
2009).  
 
Theoretically, China has the raw capacity for becoming a great power, or as former 
U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said: ―China is a very important – I used to 
say emerging power, but I‘ll say emerged power that can no longer be ignored‖, 
(Scott, 2007: 162). Indeed, China has all the requisite elements of power – an 
                                                             
1 Greek historian, his History of the Peloponnesian War recounts the 5th century BC war between 
Sparta and Athens to the year 411 BC. Modern realists claim Thucydides as their founding father. See: 
Lebow, Richard N. (2003). The tragic vision of politics: ethics, interests and orders. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
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extensive industrial base, a strong state, a nuclear-armed military, a continental-sized 
territory, a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, (Pei, 2010),  a 
huge market with a population of over 1.3 billion renders it the most populous nation 
on earth, accounting for a fifth of the world‘s population; while its 2.25 million troops 
form the world‘s largest armed force, though not the most advanced, (Zinzius, 2004: 
5).  
 
From the realists‘ perspective, China by every measure is a rising power; therefore 
China‘s rise has led to several anxieties in the western world. The first is that a rising 
China will disrupt existing economic and political arrangements. As Stefan Halper 
argues, China arrives with ―the power of a governing idea that will produce rapid 
growth, stability, security — but not freedom in the public square‖, (Williamson, 
2011). The second is that China‘s combination of an extremely dynamic economy and 
an extremely authoritarian political structure constitutes an alternative development 
model that will be embraced by poor countries and undermine the moral authority of 
Western concepts (Kroeber, 2008: 29-44). In this context, Wu Xinbo, a professor at 
Fudan University in Shanghai, argues that in the post–Cold War era, the U.S. model 
used to be hailed as the only way to economic prosperity. Now, the Chinese model 
seems to provide an alternative. He went on to say the record of its tiding over two 
financial crises (the 1998–1999 Asian financial crisis and the 2008–2009 global 
financial crisis) and securing three decades of a high economic growth rate testifies to 
its strength. Unlike Washington, Beijing does not like to boast of its model and 
impose it on others, but the increased appeal of the Chinese experience will certainly 
enhance Beijing‘s international status and augment its influence among developing 
countries, (Wu, 2010: 159). 
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Indeed, the recent global economic slowdown has also bolstered this narrative of 
liberal international decline, (Ikenberry, 2011: 56-68). Ever since the U.S. became the 
world‘s largest economy, towards the end of the 19th century, the most powerful 
economy in the world has been a democracy. But, if China remains a one-party state 
over the next decade, that will change. The confident western slogan that ―freedom 
works‖ will come under challenge as authoritarianism becomes fashionable, once 
again, (Rachman, 2011). The third is that other western analysts worry that 
broadening China-Middle East economic relations could hamper developed 
economies by sucking away trade opportunities the United States and Europe might 
otherwise have in the region, (Teslik, 2008).  For example, Nobel Prize winner Paul 
Krugman calculated that China‘s ―mercantilism‖ is costing America 1.4 million jobs, 
(Krugman, 2009). The Chinese show many signs of understanding these conditions 
and have recognised the potential dangers that a rising power can create. China‘s chief 
strategist, Zheng Bijian, coined the term ―peaceful rise‖,  (Zheng, 2005: 18-24), to 
describe just such an effort on Beijing‘s part to enter into the existing order rather 
than overturn it. Since 2007, and the 17th Communist Party Congress in Beijing, the 
concept has evolved into one of ‗―peaceful development‖, largely because many 
observers outside China found the use of the word ‗rise‘ somewhat ominous, (Brown, 
2010: 151). The question is whether this will be sufficient?  
 
Hypothetically, it should be possible for new powers to emerge in a manner that is 
both peaceful and non-destabilising. The Chinese, wisely, have set the goal of 
developing peacefully. However, many realists argue this model has not yet been 
successfully implemented in the modern world. At the same time, accomplishing a 
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peaceful and non-destabilising rise does not depend simply on the intentions and 
behaviour patterns of the rising power. If other major powers feel threatened by the 
rise, or are not prepared to accommodate the interests of the rising power, their 
reactions could precipitate conflict as easily as the conduct of the emerging country, 
(Stapleto, 2005). As the emergence of China as a great power in the 21
st
 century 
seems highly probable, realists warn that a rising China will present the international 
community with an immense challenge that will not be easy to mange, (
 
Li, 2004: 26).  
 
Historically, the rise of great powers typically has been accompanied by periods of 
power transition and, except in a few cases, is rarely peaceful. While Beijing has on 
many occasions sought to reassure the U.S. that its intentions are peaceful, 
Washington has yet to be convinced and continues to harbour deep concerns, (Yuan, 
2009). In this regard, a recent Pentagon report stated: ―China is developing and 
fielding large numbers of advanced weapons…she has shared only limited 
information about the pace, scope, and ultimate aims of its military modernisation 
programs, raising a number of legitimate questions regarding its long-term 
intentions‖, (QDRR, 2010). Interestingly, the new US defence strategic guidance 
―Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defence‖, which was 
released on Jan 5, 2012 emphasizes that the US will continue to strengthen its 
presence in the Asia Pacific region: 
Over the long term, China's emergence as a regional power will have the potential to affect the 
US economy and our security in a variety of ways. Our two countries have a strong stake in 
peace and stability in East Asia and an interest in building a cooperative bilateral relationship. 
However, the growth of China's military power must be accompanied by greater clarity of its 
strategic intentions in order to avoid causing friction in the region. The United States will 
continue to make the necessary investments to ensure that we maintain regional access and the 
ability to operate freely in keeping with our treaty obligations and with international law. 
Working closely with our network of allies and partners, we will continue to promote a rules-
based international order that ensures underlying stability and encourages the peaceful rise of 
new powers, economic dynamism, and constructive defense cooperation, (defence strategic 
guidance, 2012:2). 
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(Table 2.2.1): China‟s Current Military Modernisation 
 
Section Program 
Military 
Budget 
China will beef up its military budget by 12.7 percent in 2011, a return to 
double-digit spending increases that will stir regional unease. 
Army - China is trying to transform the 2.3 million-strong People‘s Liberation Army 
into a smaller, sleeker modern force capable of short, high-intensity conflicts 
against high-tech adversaries. 
- Electronic warfare and computer network attack capabilities. 
Air Force - Development of J-20 stealth fighter jet. 
- Advanced fighter aircraft, and counter space systems. 
- Developing in-flight refuelling capacity to give its fighters a greater reach, 
and early warning aircraft. 
Navy - Upgrading its destroyers and frigates. 
- Launched its first aircraft carrier in 2011. 
- Building new ―Jin-class‖ ballistic missile submarines, capable of launching 
nuclear warheads while at sea. 
- New attack submarines equipped with advanced weapons 
Missiles - Anti-ship ballistic missile program, which could challenge U.S. aircraft 
carriers in the Pacific. 
- China successfully tested emerging technology aimed at destroying missiles 
in mid-air. 
Source: Adapted from IISS, Reuters and Quadrennial Defence Review 
 
 
Another joint report by three leading U.S. think-tanks - the American Enterprise 
Institute, the Heritage Foundation, and the Foreign Policy Initiative - cast doubts 
about China‘s intentions:  
Actions by the People‘s Republic of China (PRC) have called into question its previous 
assertions that its rise to great-power status would be peaceful declaring that its core interests 
now included some 1.3 million square miles of the South China Sea, dismissing complaints of 
neighbours as failing to recognise that China is a big country, ignoring North Korean acts of 
terror, challenging U.S. naval ships on the high seas, creating new confrontations with Japan 
over disputed islands, slashing its export of rare earth elements, continuing cyber attacks on 
American defence and commercial entities, or testing a new stealth fighter during the visit of 
the American secretary of defence, the picture that emerges is of a China that believes it can 
now throw its considerable economic and military weight around, (Donnelly, 2011). 
 
In the economic realm, thirty years after it embarked on a path of economic reform 
and opening up to the outside world, China has emerged as a dynamic economic 
power. China‘s newly acquired power and influence have enabled it to expand its 
presence around the world,  looking for resources and establishing economic and 
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political ties, and any realist expects that China‘s presence and the influence around 
the world will increase in the future, as its economy becomes stronger.  Nobel 
Laureate Economist Robert Fogel predicts that China‘s economy will be an eye-
popping 40 percent (123 trillion) of global GDP by 2040, (Larson, 2010); while the 
historian Paul Kennedy has predicted that by the time the UN celebrates its centenary 
in 2045, ―China could well constitute the largest economic and productive force in the 
world, bigger even than the United States‖, (Kennedy, 2006).  
 
Other predictions expect that the Chinese are coming sooner. Goldman Sachs 
predicted that China‘s GDP would overtake America in 2027, while Standard 
Chartered forecast that it will happen early or by 2020, 
 
(The Economist, December 
16, 2010). PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP projections suggest the same outcome that 
China could be the largest economy in the world as early as 2020 and is likely to be 
some way ahead of the U.S. by 2030, ((PwC, 2010). Citigroup also in a recent report 
goes in the same direction to predict that China should overtake the U.S. to become 
the largest economy in the world by 2020, 
 
(Buiter, 2011). The Economist forecasts 
that China will get there in 2019, (The Economist, 2010). More recent projections by 
others have calculated significantly earlier dates. In the most extreme estimate Arvind 
Subramanian of the Peterson Institute of International Economics, argues that in PPP 
terms, China has already overtaken the U.S., 
 
(Subramanian, 2011). The Conference 
Board estimates China‘s GDP, again in PPP terms, could overtake the U.S. in 2012  
(The Conference Board Total Economy Database, 2011). 
 
More interestingly, The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has made an optimistic 
prediction that China will become the world's largest economy in five years in terms 
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of purchasing power parity (PPP). For the first time, the IMF has set a date for the 
moment when the ―Age of America‖ will end and the U.S. economy will be overtaken 
by that of China. According to the latest IMF official forecasts, China‘s economy 
(US$ 18.6 trillion) will surpass that of America (US$ 18.2 trillion) by the end of 2015, 
(based on World Economic Outlook; September 2011). 
 
(Table 2.2.2): The Top 10 Largest Economies in the World (US$ trillion) 
 
Rank Country 2010 
(IMF) 
Country 2015 
(IMF) 
Country 2020 Country 2030 
1 US  14.52 US  17.39 China  23.1 China 57.1 
2 China  5.87 China  10.60 US  23.0 US 35.7 
3 Japan  5.45 Japan  6.61 Japan  6.7  India 24.8 
4 Germany  3.28 Germany  3.87 India  6.4 Japan 9.2 
5 France  2.56 India  2.73 Germany  4.5 Brazil 8.7 
6 UK  2.25 Brazil  3.165 Brazil  4.2 Russia 7.3 
7 Brazil  2.09 France  3.161 Russia  3.8 Indonesia 7.2 
8 Italy  2.05 UK  3.05 UK  3.6 Germany 6.4 
9 India  1.63 Russia  2.81 France  3.5 UK 5.8 
10 Canada  1.57 Italy  2.41 Canada  2.7 France 5.2 
Note: GDP is measured in trillion current USD converted at market exchange rates 
Source: Citibank, (February, 2011) and World Economic Outlook, (September 2011) 
 
 
From a realist standpoint, a great power‘s behaviour is determined not so much by its 
intentions but by its capabilities. As China‘s economy expands, it will use its 
newfound power to extend its spheres of influence and to defend its economic 
interests whenever and wherever these interests are challenged, (see Figure 2.2.1 
below). In this regard, the U.S. National Military Strategy 2011 document, both in 
direct references and in implied messages between the lines, amply illustrates that 
China figures as the prime military threat to the United States.  
The United States will remain the foremost economic and military power for the foreseeable 
future, though national debt poses a significant national security risk. Asia will increase its 
regional share of global wealth. Though it faces a number of domestic challenges, 
continuation of China‘s decades-long economic growth is expected to facilitate its continued 
military modernisation and expansion of its interests within and beyond the region…We will 
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continue to monitor carefully China‘s military developments and the implications those 
developments have on the military balance in the Taiwan Strait… We remain concerned about 
the extent and strategic intent of China‘s military modernisation, and its assertiveness in 
space, cyberspace, in the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea, (The US National 
Military Strategy, 2011: 1-3 & 14). 
 
 
 
 
(Figure 2.2.1): China‟s Growing Economic Might 
 
 
Source: adapted from IMF and Citi Investment Research and Analysis  
 
 
A fast growing economy has made it comparatively easy for China to sustain a large 
and expanding military effort. Realists believe there are good reasons to expect that 
China will be able to build and deploy more increasingly capable military systems in 
the years ahead, (Friedberg, 2005: 7-45). While growing rapidly, China‘s military 
spending is still dwarfed by that of the United States, which has about US$700 billion 
in outlays of 2010 for national defence, (Wines, 2010). China would remain very 
clearly in the top 2, the ratio between U.S. and Chinese military spending would 
decrease from (6.6:1) to (3.2:1), (SIPRI Yearbook, 2010: 203). (See Table 2.2.2) 
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(Table 2.2.3): The Countries with the Highest Military Expenditure in 2010 
 
Rank Country Spending 
(US$ 
billions) 
World 
Share 
(%) 
Change, 
2009–
2010 
(%) 
Change, 
2001–
2010 
(%) 
Share of GDP (%, 
est.)
 
 
1 US 698 42.8 2.8 81.3 4.8 
2 China [119] [7.3] 3.8 189 [2.1] 
3 UK 59.6 3.6 -0.8 21.9 2.7 
4 France 39.3 3.8 -8.4 3.3 2.3 
5 Russia [58.7] [3.6] -1.4 82.4 [4.0] 
6 Japan 54.5 3.3 0.8 -1.7 1.0 
7 Saudi 
Arabia  
45.2 2.7 4.0 63.0 10.4 
8 Germany [45.2] 2.7 -1.3 -2.7 [1.3] 
9 India  41.3 2.5 -2.8 54.3 2.7 
10 Italy [37.0] 2.2 0.3 -5.8 [1.8] 
 World 1630 100 1.3 50.3 2.6 
Source: SIPRI, Year book 2011: 203, [ ] = estimated figure. 
 
 
(Table 2.2.4): Military Expenditure by U.S. & China, (2001-2010) 
 
 U.S China 
 Military 
Expenditure (US$ 
billions) 
Military 
Expenditure of 
GDP (%) 
Military 
Expenditure (US$ 
billions) 
Military 
Expenditure of 
GDP (%) 
2010 698,3 4.8 119,4 2.1 
2009 668,6 4.7 110,1 2.2 
2008 618,9 4.3 92,7 2 
2007 576,3 4 84,1 2.1 
2006 561,5 3.9 72,9 2 
2005 552,9 4 62,1 2 
2004 527,8 4 55,2 2.1 
2003 484,2 3.8 49,8 2.1 
2002 425,4 3.4 45,9 2.2 
2001 378,9 3.1 39,5 2.1 
Source: SIPRI, various issues 
 
 
Additionally, a strong economy will provide extra resources to enhance the 
capabilities of research and development. According to a recent report by the Royal 
Society, Britain‘s leading academic institution, China is fast becoming a scientific 
superpower and now ranks second only to the U.S. in its share of published research, 
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(The Royal Society, 2011: 16). China may surpass the United States as the global 
leader in scientific output by as early as 2013, thanks to huge investments in research 
and development (R&D) and education,  (Ibid: 17) (see Table 2.2.4). 
 
(Table 2.2.5): Top 5 Countries in Number of Patent (2006-2010)  
 
Applications Filed Worldwide 2006-2010 
Ranking Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
estimate 
2010 
percent 
2010 
growth 
1 U.S. 51,280 54,043 51,637 45,618 44,855 27.5% -1.7% 
2 Japan 27,025 27,743 28,760 29,802 32,156 19.7% 7.9% 
3 Germany 16,736 17,821 18,855 16,797 17,171 10.5% 2.2% 
4 China 3,942 5,455 6,120 7,900 12,337 7.6% 56.2% 
5 S. Korea 5,945 7,064 7,899 8,035 9,686 5.9% 20.5% 
Source: World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO – February, 2011) 
 
 
Looking at China‘s capabilities: population and the size of territory, resources, 
economic strength, military capability, political stability, competence, (Waltz, 1979: 
131), and the growing scientific and technological expertise, realists would be content 
to conclude that China is a rising power and that, as such, it is unlikely to behave 
differently than have others of its type throughout history, 
 
(SIPRI Yearbook, 2010: 
203). Realists believe the rise of China, therefore, has tremendous potential to 
destabilise the current international system. China‘s growing economic power will 
translate into increased military power and allow China to use force to assert its 
strategic aims.  Realists also believe China cannot rise peacefully, and if it continues 
its dramatic economic growth over the next few decades, the United States and China 
are likely to engage in an intense security competition with considerable potential for 
conflict. Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro in their book ―The Coming Conflict with 
China‖ argued that war between China and the United States was a distinct 
possibility, 
 
(Bernstein, 1997). While Peter Navarro envisaged the same scenario in 
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his book ―The coming China wars: where they will be fought and how they can be 
won‖ which point out that oil will be the source of conflict between China and the 
United States, (Navarro, 2007).  
 
Not to mention Robert Kaplan‘s alarmist 2005 essay: ―How We Would Fight China‖ 
in which he contended that whether or not there will be a Sino-American war is no 
longer a question, the only question, he wrote, is how the United States should fight 
China, (Kaplan, 2007). Moreover, after observing China‘s growing assertiveness in 
foreign policy and purported attempts to undermine the current liberal world order, 
Elizabeth Economy wrote in Foreign Affairs that ―China is transforming the world as 
it transforms itself. Never mind notions of a responsible stakeholder; China has 
become a revolutionary power‖, (Economy, 2010: 142-153). Even Robert Gates, the 
mild-mannered then U.S. defence secretary, warned in 2009 that China‘s military 
modernisation ―could threaten America‘s primary means of projecting power and 
helping allies in the Pacific: our bases, air and sea assets, and the networks that 
support them,  (Thompson, 2010). Additionally, Henry Kissinger, who is against the 
containment policy towards China, has also argued that competition for oil will be the 
driving source of international conflict in the near future, (Caroline, 2005). While 
Patrick Seale, the leading British writer and expert on the Middle East, expects China 
to deploy military forces and bases in the Middle East in the coming decade as part of 
an effort to protect its access to valuable resources like oil, (Seale, 2010). 
 
Against this strategic background, realists correctly recognise the security dilemma 
that states possess in a self-help system; but they fail to take into account that gains 
from trade can provide incentives for peace. China wants stability in the Middle East 
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to ensure the flow of oil; that is why China works within the existing institutions to 
secure a steady access to energy resources at reasonable prices. China‘s recent 
behaviour inside the Security Council regarding issues such as Iran‘s sanctions, 
political crisis in Yemen and the unrest in Bahrain show that trend clearly.  
 
Contrary to realists‘ claim of China‘s potential hegemony, Saudi Arabia is eager to 
diversify its economy and foreign policy, subsequently, not only does Saudi Arabia 
(the government and the public) strongly welcome the Chinese involvement and 
investments, but also views such presence as vital toward the creation of balance in 
international relations and energy markets. The realist approach also tacitly assumes a 
level of coercion in the Sino-Saudi relations. However, in examining the relationship 
between the two sides, one would find that Saudi Arabia is much more eager to 
engage China economically and politically than China itself, (Olimat, 2010). From the 
Saudi perspective, there is little concern that China‘s increasing status as a world 
power will constitute a security threat. They don‘t see China as threatening to their 
national sovereignty, territorial integrity, or exploitative of their national wealth in the 
same manner they view the West. Hegemony, domination, and imperialism are not 
associated with China but with the West, (Ibid). Additionally, and in contrary to 
realists‘ claims, the United States exploited China-Saudi relations to pressure Iran. 
Cables, obtained by WikiLeaks, lay out how U.S. diplomats worked with Saudi Arabia 
and other big Middle Eastern oil suppliers to persuade Beijing to back tougher 
sanctions on Iran,
 
(Lee, 2011). 
 
In this context, the theory failed to provide a practical framework to explain 
convincingly how good relations between China and Saudi Arabia will result in a 
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conflict with the United States. Indeed, as the oil is a global commodity, Saudi 
Arabia, along with the other oil producing countries, has an economy that depends 
entirely on oil‘s exports so it is unlikely there would be support for any conflict with 
China in the region as long as China continues its current rational policy. 
Additionally, some realists make a wrong comparison between China‘s behaviour in 
East Asia and Beijing‘s new role in the Middle East. In East Asia, the ―rise‖ of China 
may raise concerns among countries such as Japan, India, S. Korea, Philippine and 
Thailand, but the situation in the Middle East is completely different as the countries 
of the region welcome a stronger Chinese role. For example, the latest Japan‘s 
defence white paper states that: ―China is expanding and increasing its activities in 
waters close to Japan. The lack of transparency of its national defence policies, and 
the military activities are a matter of concern for the region and the international 
community, including Japan, and need to be carefully analyzed‖, (Japan‘s Ministry of 
Defence white paper, 2011). In contrast, the Arab states always urge China to step up 
its involvement in the Middle East. 
 
Finally, realists contend that interdependence, will probably lead to greater security 
competition. Currently there is no evidence to support this assumption, but on the 
contrary there are many indications of U.S. – Sino cooperation from Sudan to Iraq and 
more importantly both countries view Saudi Arabia‘s stability as a vital interest. 
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2.3  LIBERAL THEORY: INTERDEPENDENCE WILL LEAD TO 
STABILITY  
 
Liberal scholars have long contended that economic interdependence can be a 
powerful source of peace.  Liberal theory suggests that economic and social forces 
will eventually precipitate political change as well. Liberals advocate a policy of 
economic engagement in regard to China. By increasing trade and tying China‘s 
economy more tightly to that of the world, China will hesitate to initiate conflict for 
fear of the economic repercussions. The deepening of economic ties with the United 
States and the Middle East will in turn foster political developments, 
 
(Friedman, 
1999: 155). Liberals‘ logic even influenced some of U.S. presidents.  Bill Clinton 
proclaimed in 1994 that ―The best strategy to ensure our security and to build a 
durable peace is to support the advance of democracy elsewhere. Democracies don‘t 
attack each other. They make better trading partners and partners in diplomacy‖, 
(Clinton, 1994). While in 1999, two years before China‘s accession to the World 
Trade Organization, former U.S. President George W. Bush (junior) argued that 
―Economic freedom creates habits of liberty. And habits of liberty create expectations 
of democracy.… Trade freely with China and time is on our side‖, (Rachman, 2011). 
 
One of the liberals‘ major arguments regarding trade is that increased economic 
interdependence decreases the probability of war, (Madison, 1981: 113).  This belief, 
mainly held by liberals, owes its intellectual origins to Immanuel Kant, who believed 
that free and fair trade between nations provides incentives to develop and maintain 
cooperative and mutually profitable relationships, (Ibid). In other words, the more two 
countries are engaged in bilateral trade, the less they are likely to go to war, 
 
(Russett 
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and Oneal, 2001: 145). Interdependence between two countries influence their 
political behaviour in two ways: (a) because both countries are dependent on each 
other, they have an economic interest in continuing peaceful exchanges, and (b) the 
interdependence between the two countries provides a medium of communication that 
can be useful in preventing or resolving disagreements short of armed conflict, 
(Mansfield, 2001: 139). In this context, liberals argue that interdependent states would 
rather trade than invade, (Copeland, 1996:  5-41), or as Fareed Zakaria, a former 
editor of Newsweek International, puts it ―A new world war is highly unlikely. 
Nuclear deterrence, economic interdependence and globalization all militate against 
it.‖ However, he suggests that we will see instead a ―Soft War, a quiet competition for 
power and influence across the globe. China and the U.S. will be friends one day, 
rivals another, cooperate in one area, compete in another‖, (Zakaria, 2005) (see Figure 
2.3.1 & Table 2.3.1 below). 
 
(Figure 2.3.1): China‟s Trade with the World (selected economies and years) 
 
 
Source: IMF (DOTS, July, 2011) 
0 
500 
1000 
1500 
2000 
2500 
3000 
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2009 2010 
With World 37.6 69.8 116.5 281.1 474.3 1422.8 2207.3 2974.3 
With U.S. 4.8 7.5 11.9 40.8 74.5 212.3 299.1 385.6 
With EU (27) 7.1 10.7 16.4 42.2 71.9 219.6 364.4 479.9 
WithMiddle East 1.1 1.9 1.9 5.3 16.07 53.7 112.9 155.06 
U
S
$
 b
il
li
o
n
s 
China's Trade 
67 
 
Integration into global markets has been a central component of China‘s economic 
development strategy. Since the late 1970s, China has transformed itself into a major 
trading power. China has also become one of the world‘s leading destinations for 
foreign direct investment (FDI), and in recent years China‘s outward FDI has also 
increased rapidly, (see Table 2.3.1). China is now one of the world‘s largest foreign 
investment destinations. More than 470 of the top 500 global companies have 
established their presence in China. By July 2010, China had received 1.05 trillion 
U.S. dollars of foreign investment in cumulative terms, ranking the first among 
developing countries for 18 years in a row, (Xinhua, September 13, 2010).  
 
From the liberals‘ perspective China is indeed a ―responsible stakeholder‖ as a recent 
study conducted by IEA showed that the available evidence suggested that much of 
Chinese equity oil abroad was sold to local or international markets instead, (Jiang & 
Sinton, 2011: 17). The study also concluded that there is no evidence to suggest that 
the Chinese Government currently imposes a quota on the NOCs regarding the 
amount of their equity oil that they must ship to China. Decisions about the marketing 
of equity oil, where the Chinese companies have control over the disposition of its 
share of production, appear to be dominated by market considerations, (Ibid: 18). 
Additionally, a closer look at the China model makes it clear that it is not so easily 
replicated. Most developing countries do not have China‘s bureaucratic depth and 
tradition, nor do they have the ability to mobilise resources and control personnel in 
the way that China‘s party structure allows, (Ibid).  
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(Table 2.3.1): China‟s Inward and Outward FDI Flows, (1990-2010, US$ billions) 
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
 
FDI Inward 
($bn)  
40,7 46,8 52,7 53,5 60,6 72,4 72,7 83,5 108,3 95,0 105.7 
(%) World‟s 
Total 
2.9% 5.6% 8.3% 9.4% 8.2% 7.3% 4.9% 3.9% 6.1% 8.5% 9.4% 
FDI Outward 
($bn) 
0,91 6,8 2,5 2,8 5,4 12,2 21,1 22,4 52,1 56,5 68,0 
(%) World‟s 
Total 
0,7% 0.9% 0.4% 0.5% 0.5% 1.3% 1.5% 0.9% 2.7% 4.3% 5.0% 
Source: UNCTAD; World Investment Report, various issues 
 
 
China is currently a major trading partner of most of the world‘s biggest economies. 
China has not only increased its relative share in world trade but also its rank as a top 
trading partner of major economies. A decade ago, China was the fifth largest trading 
partner of the United States, fourteenth largest trading partner of the European Union, 
third largest trading partner of Japan, and eighth largest trading partner of oil-
exporting countries in the Middle East and North Africa. China is currently the second 
largest trading partner of the United States, eighth largest trading partner of the 
European Union, and the largest trading partner of Japan and the Middle East and 
North Africa, (ESCAP, 2011: 11). Mark Crosby from the Melbourne Business School 
believes that the rise of China in the new global economic order has made for a more 
prosperous and stable world, (University of Melbourne, 2009). Currently China 
conducts around 10 percent of world trade and produces around 10 percent of global 
GDP, (UNComtrade, 2011). Over the ten years to 2010, China‘s exports grew by an 
annual average of 23 percent in dollar terms, more than twice as fast as world trade, 
(Ibid). If it continued to expand at this pace, China might grab around one-quarter of 
world exports within the next decade, (The Economist, January 7, 2010). 
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(Table 2.3.2): World Merchandise Imports/Exports by Region  
 
Selected Periods and Economy,( billion dollars and percentage) 
 1948 1953 1963 1973 1983 1993 2003 2009 2010 
Exports 
World (US$ billions) 59 84 157 579 1838 3676 7376 12178 14851 
U.S. (%) 21.7 18.8 14.9 12.3 11.2 12.6 9.8 8.7 8.6 
China (%) 0.9 1.2 1.3 1.0 1.2 2.5 5.9 9.9 10.6 
Middle East (%) 1.9 2.7 3.2 4.1 6.8 3.5 4.1 5.7 6.0 
Imports 
World (US$ billions) 62 85 164 594 1882 3786 7689 12421 15077 
U.S. (%) 13.0 13.9 11.4 12.3 14.3 15.9 16.9 12.9 13.1 
China (%) 0.6 1.6 0.9 0.9 1.1 2.7 5.4 8.1 9.3 
Middle East (%) 1.7 2.0 2.2 2.6 6.2 3.3 2.7 4.0 3.7 
Source: WTO, (International Trade Statistics 2011) 
 
 
For these reasons liberals argue, in geopolitical terms, China may be a rival, but in 
economic terms it‘s one of the U.S.‘s most important partners. China tops the world 
as a target of foreign direct investment (FDI). China holds more in U.S. Treasury bills 
than any other country, and China has become an active purchaser of overseas 
resources, (Wang & others, 2011: 413-431).  
 
(Table 2.3.3): China‟s Holdings of U.S. Treasury Securities: 2002-2010  
 
(US$ Billions and as a percent of total foreign holdings) 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
China‟s Holdings 
(US$ billions) 
118.0 159.0 222.9 310.0 396.9 477.6 727.4 894.8 1,160.1 
China‟s Holdings 
of Total 
Foreign Holdings 
(%) 
9.6% 10.4% 12.1% 15.2% 18.9% 20.3% 23.6% 24.2% 26.1% 
Source: U.S. Treasury Department, year-end data. 
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(Figure 2.3.2): China‟s Holdings of U.S. Treasury Securities, (2002-2010) 
 
 
Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury (September 2011) 
 
 
The country is also a favourite investment area for American companies and 
consumers reap enormous benefits from the low prices of Chinese goods. 
Additionally, liberals argue that China‘s economy is creating hundreds and thousands 
of jobs in the U.S. and millions of jobs around the world. According to some 
estimates, since China joined the (WTO) in 2001, it had created in less than a decade 
more than 16 million jobs around the world. Most important of all, China is not just 
an export machine, its ratio of imports to GDP (which peaked at 32 percent in 2005) 
was in 2010 about 24.2 percent almost twice that of U.S., (based on UN Comtrade 
database, 2011).  
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(Table 2.3.4): Jobs Dependent on Exports to China (2001-2009) 
 
Country Exports to China (2001-2009, annual average in US$ 
billions) 
Jobs 
(million) 
Philippines 11.7 3.46 
Thailand 15.1 2.91 
South Korea 71.4 2.08 
Taiwan 70.2 2.00 
Malaysia 20.5 1.44 
Japan 99.6 1.41 
Russia 15.1 1.20 
U.S. 52.1 0.59 
Germany 34.5 0.49 
KSA 13.2 0.31 
Brazil 13.2 0.27 
Australia 18.5 0.26 
Singapore 14.4 0.26 
Total 449.2 16.00 
Source: CEIC; IMF, National statistics and the Economist 
 
 
From the start of China‘s reform in 1978 to the end of the twentieth century, the value 
of the trade moving between the China and America grew from one billion dollar, 
(Friedberg, 2005), to about 450 billion dollar in 2010, (see Table 2.3.3). In addition, 
the Americans are active investors in the foreign invested sector, whose share of 
China‘s output is around 15-20 percent, but which dominates the export sector, 
accounting for nearly 60 percent of all exports and 90 percent of exports designated 
―high tech‖ by China. Foreign enterprises are also crucial conduits for the import of 
new technology, management expertise and ideas, 
 
(Kroeber, 2008). For example 
China high-tech exports reached US$377 billion, about 31 percent of China‘s total 
exports in 2009; about 82 percent was processed/assembled high-tech products, 
mainly made of imported parts and components from industrialised economies, such 
as Germany, Japan, Korea, Taiwan and the U.S. China contributed very little 
intellectual properties to these assembled high-tech products, (Li, 2011) (see Table 
2.3.3). 
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(Table 2.3.5): Foreign Direct Investment in China (2000-2009)  
 
 2000 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 2010 
Total Non – Financial Foreign Direct Investment in China  
Number of 
Projects 
22,3 26,1 34,1 41,0 43,6 44,0 41,4 37,8 27,5 23,4 27,4 
Growth (%) 32.1 17.0 30.7 20.2 6.3 0.8 -5.7 -8.7 -
27.3 
-
14.8 
16.9 
Utilized FDI 
(US$ billions) 
40.7 52.7 53.5 60.6 60.3 69.5 67.1 74.8 92.4 90.0 105.7 
Total US Direct Investment in China  
Number of 
Projects 
2,60 2,59 3,36 4,06 3,92 3,74 3,20 2,62 1,77 NA NA 
Utilized FDI 
(US$ billions) 
4.4 4.9 5.4 4.2 3.9 3.1 3.0 2.6 2.9 NA NA 
US Share of 
Utilized 
Investment (%) 
10.8 10.4 10.2 7.9 6.5 5.1 4.1 3.5 3.2 NA NA 
Sources: The US-China Business Council and China‘s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) 
 
 
U.S.-China trade rose rapidly after the two countries re-established diplomatic 
relations in January 1979.  In 1979 (when China‘s reforms began), total U.S.-China 
trade (exports plus imports) was US$2 billion; China ranked as the 23rd-largest U.S. 
export market and its 45th-largest source of U.S. imports. In 2010, bilateral 
merchandise trade was US$457 billion; China was the second-largest U.S. trading 
partner (after Canada), the third-largest U.S. export market (after Canada and 
Mexico), and the largest source of U.S. imports, (Morrison, 2011). The trade between 
China and the United States has increased about 400 percent between 2000 and 2010. 
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao noted that ―The two countries have become increasingly 
interdependent‖, (Xinhua, September 23, 2010).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
73 
 
(Table 2.3.6): China‟s Trade with the United States (US$ billions 1980-2010) 
 
 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
US Export 3.8 3.9 4.8 11.7 16.3 41.8 55.2 65.2 71.5 69.6 91,9 
US 
Imports 
1.1 3.9 15.2 45.6 100.1 243.5 287.8 321.5 337.8 296.4 364,9 
Total 
Trade 
4.9 7.8 20.0 57.3 116.4 285.3 343 386.7 409.2 366.0 456,8 
US 
balance 
2.7 0.0 -
10.4 
-
33.8 
-83.8 -
201.6 
-
232.5 
-
256.3 
-
266.3 
-
226.8 
-
273.1 
Sources: U.S. International Trade Commission DataWeb. 
 
 
In addition to their faith in trade as an instrument of peace, liberal optimists place 
great store in the role of international institutions of various kinds. Today, China is a 
member of 52 intergovernmental institutions, (Union of International Associations, 
2009), is an active participant in many, has signed over 270 international treaties and 
enshrined a significant body of international law in its domestic legal code, (Kent, 
2007: 60). Furthermore, people-to-people and cultural exchanges are very important 
in fostering closer U.S.-China bilateral relations. More than 100,000 Chinese are now 
studying in the United States, and the U.S. side will receive more Chinese students 
and facilitate visa issuance for them.  The United States has approximately 20,000 
students in China.  The United States seeks to encourage more Americans to study in 
China by launching a new initiative to send 100,000 students to China over the 
coming four years, (U.S.-China Joint Statement, 2009). 
 
China and the U.S. have important common interests, (fighting terrorism, dealing with 
proliferation, coping with environmental degradation, and addressing public health 
crises). These issues provide strong incentives for both Beijing and Washington to 
work hard to manage and contain bilateral conflict, 
 
(Goldstein, 2005). Furthermore, 
John Ikenberry argues that China has become more prosperous and capable by 
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operating inside the existing international order. Their economic success and growing 
influence are tied to the liberal internationalist organisation of world politics including 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the newly organised G-20, and they have 
deep interests in preserving that system, (Ikenberry, 2011). Liberals believe that, 
through cooperation and dialogue, China and the U.S. can advance their common 
interest in securing access to sustainable energy resources at fair prices while avoiding 
costly and dangerous competition over scarce oil resources. James Reilly suggests 
three key steps: first, support for energy efficiency and environmental protection in 
China; second engage China in multilateral energy institutions, (particularly the 
International Energy Agency); and finally improve energy efficiency and 
conservation in the U.S. 
 
(Reilly, 2007). Additionally, China could be drawn further 
into the liberal order through its desire to have its currency the renminbi (yuan) 
become an international currency rivalling the US dollar. According to a recent World 
Bank report, ―the most likely scenario for the international monetary system is a 
multicurrency system centred on the US dollar, the euro, and the renminbi. Under that 
scenario, the dollar would lose its position as the unquestioned principal international 
currency by 2025, making way for an expanded international role for the euro and a 
burgeoning international role for the renminbi‖, (The World Bank, 2011: 125-126). 
 
Above all else, liberals always argued that democracy is a force for peace, (Friedberg, 
2005). Liberals believe that, although it is still far from finished, the process of 
democratisation is already well under way in China. This process is being driven 
largely by economic development, which, in turn, is being accelerated by China‘s 
increasing openness to trade. Rising per capita incomes are creating a growing 
Chinese middle class, (Ibid). They argue that, as China develops further, the pressure 
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to change illiberal systems such as state-run media will continue to grow. Indeed, a 
new and authoritative research shows that China and other emerging markets are 
likely to become more democratic as they get richer. A paper from the Federal 
Reserve Bank of San Francisco, titled Re-establishing the Income-Democracy Nexus, 
used broader historical data to overturn previous studies that questioned the link 
between democracy and wealth, (Benhabib & others, 2011). According to estimates 
from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, half of the city dwellers in China will 
be part of the middle class by 2023. Based on data from 2000 to 2009, researchers 
calculated that 37 percent of city dwellers were part of the middle class in 2010, 
(Chen, 2011). 
 
China has so far remained resistant to political change. In the short term, there is little 
likelihood of significant political reforms between 2011 and 2015, as China‘s rulers 
will concentrate on maintaining stability during the transition to a younger generation 
of political leaders in 2012-13, (EIU, 2011: 3), but the democratisation of China is 
critical in the long run. Indeed, there is little evidence that authoritarian states can 
become truly advanced societies without moving in a liberal democratic direction. As 
the economist Amartya Sen has noted, ―While democracy is not yet universally 
practiced, nor indeed universally accepted, in the general climate of world opinion 
democratic governance has achieved the status of being taken to be generally right‖, 
(Ikenberry, 2011). Li Rui, an outspoken liberal who is a Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) member and former secretary to Mao Zedong, argues strongly that Chinese and 
foreign histories prove that autocracy is the source of political turmoil. As the collapse 
of the Soviet Union shows, the root cause is autocracy, (Pei, 2006). Modernisation is 
possible only through democratisation. This is the trend of the world in the twentieth 
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century, especially since the Second World War. Those who follow this trend will 
thrive; those who fight against this trend will perish. This rule applies to every 
country — and every party, (Ibid). 
 
More broadly, Zbigniew Brzezinksi emphasises that China is determined to sustain its 
economic growth. He argues confrontational foreign policy could disrupt that growth, 
harm hundreds of millions of Chinese, and threaten the Communist Party‘s hold on 
power. China‘s leadership appears rational, calculating, and conscious not only of 
China‘s rise but also of its continued weakness, (Brzezinksi and Mearsheimer, 2005). 
He goes further to argue: to have a real collision, China needs a military that is 
capable of going toe-to-toe with the United States. At the strategic level, China 
maintains a posture of minimum deterrence. In a conflict, Chinese maritime trade 
would stop entirely. The flow of oil would cease, and the Chinese economy would be 
paralysed, (Ibid).  
 
Robert Rollick agrees that the overwhelming priority of China‘s senior officials is to 
develop and modernise a China that still faces enormous internal challenges. He goes 
on to say, ―While proud of their accomplishments, China‘s leaders recognise their 
country‘s perceived weaknesses, its rural poverty, and the challenges of political and 
social change. Two-thirds of China‘s population, nearly 900 million people, live in 
poor rural areas, living mostly as subsistence farmers, and 200 million Chinese live on 
less than a dollar a day. In China, economic growth is seen as an internal imperative, 
not as a challenge to the United States‖, (Rollick, 2005). While Zheng Yongnian, the 
Director of East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore, goes further to say 
that China‘s economic growth came with a huge price: ―Environmental degradation, 
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resource wastage, ethnic tensions, widening income disparity, polarisation and 
rampant corruption‖,  (Xinhua, 2010). Furthermore Dominic Barton, the global 
Managing Director of the consulting firm McKinsey, argues that  ―The leadership in 
China is always worried about how do you stay ahead of the growth to create enough 
jobs…They have to create over 30 million jobs a year. They know that. That is why 
there‘s such an obsession with the GDP numbers there‖, (Freeland, 2011).  
 
Nye states that China has a long way to go to equal the power resources of the United 
States, and it still faces many obstacles to its development, (Nye, 2010: 2-12). Like 
Japan, China is becoming an ageing society, the share of the population 60 years and 
above will be 17 percent by 2020, and this ageing will increase healthcare and 
pension costs while reducing savings and investments. China‘s future growth also lies 
in the country‘s export-led growth model. China has relied on exports to increase its 
growth, while this strategy has served China well for the past two decades, its future 
viability is now deeply in doubt, (Pei, 2010). China‘s rise to superpower status will 
also be constrained by a host of political factors. First and foremost, at the moment, 
China is economically prosperous but ideologically bankrupt. Nye argues that the 
ideology of communism is long gone, and the legitimacy of the ruling party depends 
upon economic growth and ethnic Han nationalism. The Chinese political system 
lacks legitimacy, suffers from a high level of corruption, and is vulnerable to political 
unrest should the economy falter, (Nye, 2010: 143-153). Secondly, risks of internal 
fragmentation, on top of the perennial Taiwan problem, will mean structural weakness 
makes China less able to project power abroad and more vulnerable to the 
machinations of its competitors, who could exploit China‘s ethnic tensions to tie 
Beijing‘s hands. Geopolitically, the limits on Chinese power will be equally severe; 
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China has to contend with strong regional rivals - India, Japan, and Russia. China‘s 
rise has already triggered a regional geopolitical realignment aimed at checking 
Beijing‘s ambitions and reach, (Ibid). 
 
As far as China‘s military capability is concerned, liberal scholars agree that it‘s 
exaggerated by the ―China threat‖ school. Despite China‘s determination to achieve 
military modernisation, its defence budget is relatively small compared with that of 
the United States and at the moment (even in the next few decades) the U.S. is the 
dominant military power in the Middle East. According to Andrew Shearer, Director 
of Studies at Australia‘s Lowy Institute for International Policy: ―China has naval 
aspirations but they‘re still a long way from realising that‖, (Critchlow, 2011). 
Furthermore, Feng Zhu, the Deputy Director of the Center for International & 
Strategic Studies (CISS) at Peking University, argues that: ―China‘s navy 
modernisation is impressive. But its naval capability, in the foreseeable future, 
remains a ‗disruptive‘ military technology, rather than comparably ‗rivalling‘ military 
force... No one will actually believe that China‘s navy will be able to carry out deadly 
long distance strikes merely by the virtue of numbers of submarines and destroyers‖, 
(Feng, 2010). 
 
In this regard, some argue it‘s the other way round and that it is China who should 
worry of an ―American threat‖ in the region (Li, 2004: 34). The Economist recently 
quoted a retired Chinese admiral who compared the American navy to a man with a 
criminal record ―wandering just outside the gate of a family home‖, (The Economist, 
March 14, 2009). While Mearsheimer noted that America has been at war for 14 of 
the 21 years since the Cold War ended and is preparing for a war against Iran. That is 
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two out of every three years, 
 
(Mearsheimer, 2010: 381-396). Ivan Eland goes further 
to say that: ―The American national-security establishment knows that a threatening 
nation-state needs to be found to justify future generations of complex U.S. weapon 
systems. The national-security establishment and conservative hawks must identify a 
substantial ―threat‖ to the nation and must make that threat seem imminent. Indeed, 
they have already done so in a rising China‖, (Eland, 2006). 
 
Even Kissinger, who is not within the liberal camp, goes further to say China‘s 
emerging role is often compared to that of imperial Germany at the beginning of the 
20th century, the implication being that a strategic confrontation is inevitable and that 
the United States had best prepare for it. ―That assumption is as dangerous as it is 
wrong…it is unwise to substitute China for the Soviet Union in our thinking and to 
apply to it the policy of military containment of the Cold War…only the reckless 
could make such calculations in a globalized world of nuclear weapons‖, (Kissinger, 
2005). He goes further to say, ―There is no doubt that China is increasing its military 
forces…But even at its highest estimate, the Chinese military budget is less than 20 
percent of America‘s‖, (Ibid). Additionally, Eland argues that the Chinese defence 
spending is being eaten up by that conversion and by the need to pay higher salaries to 
soldiers who might have better opportunities in the rapidly growing private sector. 
Thus, China‘s investment in new military equipment as a percentage of its total 
defence expenditures is actually fairly low when measured against that of comparable 
countries, (Eland, 2006). 
 
Liberals believe strongly that the policy designed to contain China and prevent its rise 
would be exceedingly difficult to implement and would eventually fail. Unlike the 
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U.S. effort to contain the former Soviet Union, an attempt to contain China would 
find little support from the countries whose support is essential for such a strategy to 
succeed. On the contrary, with a few exceptions, such an approach would most likely 
aggravate relations with many American allies and partners around the world, 
(Goldstein, 2005). In the liberals‘ view, the United States cannot thwart China‘s rise, 
but it can help ensure that China‘s power is exercised within the rules and institutions 
that the U.S. and its partners have crafted over the last century, rules and institutions 
that can protect the interests of all states in the more crowded world of the future, 
(John, 2008: 23-37). 
 
Yet, despite liberals‘ ―convincing‖ arguments, they are less explicit on the exact 
causal mechanism that prevents conflict. Liberals also provide no explanation 
regarding how states determine the costs of conflict versus the benefits of trade. 
Liberals fail to develop a consistent and complete causal logic of when trade makes 
the difference between conflict and peace. Liberals may be correct that trade can 
cause citizens within a specific country to seek alternatives to war in order to avoid 
disrupting of trade; but they fail to acknowledge the other side of the coin. Individuals 
within a country are just as likely to put pressure on a country to go to war when they 
believe they are not obtaining enough wealth because other states are preventing gains 
from trade. Thus, while liberals are correct to identify how gains of trade can provide 
incentives to forgo war, the failure to develop an exact causal mechanism that 
explores how states determine when the benefits of trade outweigh the costs of war 
makes most liberal arguments regarding the influence of trade incomplete. 
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2.4 Constructivism Approaches: Impact of Ideas vs. Material Factors 
 
Constructivism offers alternative understandings of a number of the central themes in 
international relations theory including the meaning of anarchy and balance of power, 
the relationship between state identity and interest, an elaboration of power, and the 
prospects for change in world politics, ( Hop, 1998:171-200). Constructivism aspires 
to describe itself as a ―middle ground‖ position. Nicholas Onuf introduced the actual 
label of constructivism to IR in 1989. Alexander Wendt has followed with influential 
articles and a book in the 1990‘s, (Uzgören, 2007). Constructivism holds that 
international politics are not merely influenced by state interaction, trade relations, or 
military power, but also by the identity, the beliefs and norms of the political elites 
who direct state policies. Whereas realism and liberalism tend to focus on material 
factors such as power and trade, constructivist approaches emphasize the impact of 
ideas, (Walt, 1998: 38). In short, constructivism challenges the material and rational 
assumptions of the mainstream IR theories and attempts to address neglected issues, 
(Price & Tannenwald, 1996). 
 
According to constructivists, the international system ―is a set of ideas, a body of 
thought, a system of norms, which has been arranged by certain people at a particular 
time and place‖, (Jackson & Sorenson, 2006). In this regard, three elements make 
constructivism a distinct form of international relations theorizing. Firstly, global 
politics is said to be guided by the inter-subjectively shared ideas, norms, and values 
held by actors. Secondly, the ideational structure has a constitutive and not just 
regulative effect on actors. Thirdly, ideational structures and actors (―agents‖) co-
constitute and co-deter-mine each other. Structures constitute actors in terms of their 
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interests and identities, but structures are also produced, reproduced, and altered by 
the discursive practices of agents, (Copeland, 2000: 187-212). Constructivist theory 
rejects the basic assumption of neo-realist theory that the state of anarchy (lack of a 
higher authority or government) is a structural condition inherent in the system of 
states, (Wendt, 1992: 391-426). Rather, it argues, in Alexander Wendt‘s words, that 
―anarchy is what states make of it‖. That is, anarchy is a condition of the system of 
states because states in some sense ―choose‖ to make it so, (Ibid). Thus, constructivist 
theory holds that it is possible to change the anarchic nature of the system of states, 
(Ibid). 
 
The main limitation of this theory is that it is better at describing the past than 
anticipating the future. Thus the theory is not equipped to explain China-Saudi 
relations for several reasons. Firstly, the relations between China and Saudi Arabia are 
contemporary with very little historical interaction and yet it is important to anticipate 
the future scenarios for this relationship. Secondly, the relationship is between two 
states that are external to each other‘s regions. The only thing that ties them in terms 
of identity is the Islamic question, and so that as long as this does not get out of 
control there will not really be an identity issue to mar the convergence of pragmatic 
interests. Thirdly, the development of ties at present are based on material factors and 
interests (i.e. trade and oil) and do not require close convergence of values. Finally 
and most important of all, policy-makers decisions are driven by the convergence of 
pragmatic concerns, or as Herman puts it: ―material circumstances ... affect the 
intellectual evolution and policy choices of political decision markers is not in 
dispute‖, (Herman, 1996:276). There may be some research programme to be 
developed in the future about the normative similarities and differences between East 
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Asian states and Arab states but this is not a highly significant factor at present in the 
development of the China-Saudi partnership. 
 
 
2.5 TRADE EXPECTATION THEORY (TET) 
 
 
Realism and liberalism both recognise the salience of high economic interdependence 
in determining China‘s future behaviour, but they fail to offer a dynamic theory that 
will demonstrate precisely the conditions under which economic interdependence will 
have a positive or negative impact on Chinese policy towards Saudi Arabia.  
 
 
(Table 2.5.1): The Competing Theories 
 
 Core Liberal Theory (e.g., 
Rosecrance) 
Core Realist Theory 
(e.g., Waltz, 
Mearsheimer) 
Trade Expectations 
Theory (Copeland) 
Nature of the 
System 
Anarchy Anarchy Anarchy 
Nature of the 
State 
Generally rational, unitary 
calculator of costs/benefits, 
but may also have aggressive, 
unit-level drives 
Rational, unitary actor 
seeking to reduce 
vulnerability to 
improve security 
Rational 
Analytical 
Focus 
The individual state‘s 
concern for its own 
dependence 
The state‘s concern for 
its own dependence 
The state‘s concern for its 
own dependence 
State‟s 
Decision for 
War or Peace 
Driven by 
Benefits of trade (the ―gains 
from trade‖ from 
specialization) 
Costs of several trade 
(the costs of adjustment 
after being cut off, due 
to specialization) 
Benefits of trade and costs 
of several trades, plus 
expectations of future 
trade 
Ultimate 
Reason that 
State goes to 
War 
If level of dependence low 
(i.e., trade is low), ―restraint‖ 
on unit-level aggressive  
tendencies removed 
High dependence 
creates a systemic 
incentive to use force 
to overcome 
vulnerability 
High dependence and 
pessimistic expectations 
for future trade, creating a 
low or negative expected 
value for trade 
Reason for 
State 
Choosing to 
Stay at Peace 
If level of dependence high 
(i.e., trade is high), then high 
dependence ―restrains ― by 
making benefits of trade 
greater than value of war 
Low dependence 
removes another 
systemic incentive for 
war 
High dependence and 
optimistic expectations 
for future trade, creating a 
high expected value for 
trade 
Source: Copeland, Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations 
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This dynamic feature of TET allows it to avoid the pitfalls of both liberalism and 
realism by being able to explain variance in state behaviour over time. Trade 
expectations theory introduces a new causal variable, the expectations of future trade, 
(Copeland, 1996). High interdependence can be either peace-inducing or conflict-
inducing, depending on the expectations of future trade. This dynamic perspective 
helps bridge the gaps within and between current approaches, (Ibid). 
 
This brings up the second casual variable of (TET) - expectations of future trade 
(EFT). This variable will enable us to predict that the lower the expectations of future 
trade, the lower the expected value of trade, and therefore the more likely it is that 
conflict will be chosen. In this context I will show the conditions under which high 
energy interdependence between China and the Middle East in general and Saudi 
Arabia in particular will lead to a pacific or belligerent China. If decision-makers‘ 
expectations of future trade are high they will likely pursue policies that will enhance 
security in the region. On the other hand, if they have a negative view of their future 
trading environment they will likely take action to protect their interests in the region.  
 
 
2.6 CHINA„S RESPONSE TO WESTREN THEORIES 
 
 
2.6.1 Peaceful Development vs. China Threat 
 
 
The People‘s Republic of China, following its founding in 1949, has endorsed and 
practiced a consistent policy of peaceful diplomacy. New China cherished its 
independence, actively sought peaceful coexistence with other countries around the 
world and worked hard to improve its external environment, particularly in its 
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surrounding areas, (Jiabo, 2004). In the 1950s, Zhou Enlai played a crucial role in 
formulating the well-known ―Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence‖; in the early 
1980s, Deng Xiaoping proposed to implement ―independent and peace-oriented 
diplomacy‖; and since the turn of the century, the Chinese leadership has pledged to 
take a ―path of peaceful development‖, characterized by good neighbourhood 
relationships, (Ronghua, 2006). Later on, after China joined the WTO and after 
rapidly becoming integrated to the international system and the world market, China‘s 
President Hu Jintao articulated the, ―Harmonious World‖ perspective at the United 
Nations 60th anniversary in 2005, (Hu, 2005). 
 
In handling international relations, China has consistently taken the ―Five Principles 
of Peaceful Coexistence‖ as the guide instead of using social system, ideology or the 
concept of values as the criterion, (Embassy of China in the U.K, 2003). The Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence were first articulated by Chinese Premier Zhou 
Enlai in December 1953.
 
They were eventually written into the ―Agreement between 
the People's Republic of China and the Republic of India on Trade and co-operation‖ 
signed between the two countries in April 1954, (UN, 1958). The ―Five Principles of 
Peaceful Coexistence‖ and are a set of principles to govern relations between states. 
(1)Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, (2) Mutual 
non-aggression, (3) Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, (4) 
Equality and mutual benefit, and (5) Peaceful co-existence 
 
In the decades that followed, Chinese leaders continued to advocate these principles 
internationally. While the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence remain as guiding 
principles of Chinese foreign policy, over the years, China‘s policies have been 
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adapted to the changing international conditions and its own capabilities. Perhaps 
1960s was an exceptional period in modern Chinese history, when indeed China 
attempted to export its brand of revolutionary communism including Mao Zedong‘s 
so-called ―Three World Theory‖. Following Mao‘s explanation, the first world in his 
theory of world order comprised the USA and the Soviet Union; the second world was 
represented by Japan, Europe, Australia and Canada, whereas the third world 
consisted of the remaining socialist, least developed states and former colonies. 
China, in this model, was classified as socialist state and part of the ―Third World‖, 
opposing hegemonic claims of the USA and the Soviet Union (Ye, 2001:131-134). 
 
However, already by the late 1960s, it became clear that this was not a sustainable 
policy as it was deflecting attention from China‗s primary goal of economic 
development, (Pant, 2008). Later in the 70s, China entered a strategic partnership with 
the United States against the Soviet Union, and embarked upon an open up policy. 
Indeed, since 1978, China has adopted a uniquely pragmatic reform approach, with 
frequent changes in policy approaches, and constant political contestation. This 
pragmatism also marked the new approach to international collaboration, (de Haan, 
2011). In the earlier 1980s, Deng Xiaoping forwarded the ―Peace and Development‖ 
(heping yu fazhan) theory, arguing that the challenges China faced were ―matters of 
North South divide‖, rather than East West differences. China faced no threat of war, 
but was threatened by its own lack of (economic) development, (Zheng & Tok, 2007).  
 
But a few years later and in the wake of the 1989 ―Tiananmen square massacre‖, the 
China ―Threat Theory‖ of today began to emerge and with the end of the Cold War in 
the early 1990s, which abruptly ended the West‘s honeymoon courtship with China, 
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(Kwok, 2011).   In response, Deng laid down two main post-Cold War foreign policy 
paths for China in March 1990, namely, pursuing anti-hegemonism, and establishing a 
new multi-polar international order of politics and economics, (Zhu, 211). The ―New 
Security Concept‖, espoused since the mid-1990s, calls for a departure from ‗Cold 
War mentality‘ and hence US bilateral alliances, and has been pivotal in China‘s co-
operation with ASEAN as it resonates with their idea of ‗cooperative security‖, 
(Acharya, 2004). 
 
In the first decade of the 21st century, China took a turn in its international diplomacy 
to match its economic power and to dispel fears that as China rises it will become 
dangerous. As Avery Goldstein has argued, a central objective of China‘s current 
―grand strategy‖ has been to reassure other countries of its benign intentions and this 
has been in large part a reaction to the ‗China threat‘ debate, (Goldstein, 2005:203). 
The process of reassurance came with the doctrine of China‘s peaceful rise in 2003, 
(Dellios, & Ferguson, 2011). Zheng Bijian, one of China‘s leading intellectuals and 
former vice-chair of the Central Party School and deputy to Chinese President Hu 
Jintao, is often given credit as the first person to espouse ―peaceful rise‖ as a policy of 
China in a speech entitled ―A New Path for China‘s Peaceful Rise and the Future of 
Asia‖ given on November 3, 2003 at the Bo‘ao Forum for Asia. In the speech, he says 
that ―China‘s path is not only to strive to rise, but to adhere to peace, and never seek 
hegemony…China‘s only choice is to strive to rise and, more importantly, to strive 
for a peaceful rise‖, (The Brookings Institution, 2005). However in 2004, the Chinese 
government quickly retracted this concept and renamed it to an even less threatening 
term ―peaceful development‖ because ―rise‖ was too distressing for some; and in 
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recent years, it has come to promote the concept of ―win-win‖ to characterize joint-
cooperative efforts with other countries, (Cho, 2011). 
 
A more proactive slogan came in the form of ―harmonious world‖, which matched the 
domestic slogan of ―harmonious society‖ (Zheng & others, 2005). In July 2005 the 
―Harmonious World‖ idea made its way into a joint statement by China and Russia 
during Hu‘s visit to Moscow. Hu Jintao then sketched it out further in September 
2005 at the United Nations, (Yee, 2008).  In his speech Hu said that the ―Harmonious 
World‖ is based on four basic principles: (1) Uphold multilateralism to realize 
common security. (2) Uphold mutually beneficial cooperation to achieve common 
prosperity. (3) Uphold the spirit of inclusiveness to build a Harmonious World 
together. Diversity of civilizations is a basic feature of humanity and an important 
driving force behind human progress. (4) Promote UN reform actively and prudently. 
The purposes and principles of the UN Charter are consistent with the historic tide of 
peace, development and cooperation, (Hu, 2005). 
 
Building a ―Harmonious World‖ has become a new vision for China‘s diplomatic 
theory. It has ushered in a new era for China‘s diplomacy, in which China will stick to 
peaceful development while contributing to world harmony, (Wenbin, 2011). Indeed 
the idea of ―Harmonious World‖ has become a strategic conception of constructing a 
new world order through diplomatic effort. ―Harmonious World,‖ being the 
development of an independent foreign policy of peace to a higher level, has become 
the major item in the three ideas of the Chinese government; peace, harmony and win-
win, and it clearly declares to the outside world China‘s resolution to peaceful 
development, (Hao, 2009: 34). 
89 
 
Most Chinese official and academics disagree with those arguments based on power 
transition theory, according to which, the rise of China will ultimately lead to Chinese 
power parity with the US, (Li & Worm, 2011). From the Chinese perspective, the 
concept of ―Peaceful Development‖ is China‘s strategic reaction to counter the so-
called ―China Threat Theory‖, (Ronghua, 2006). Deng Xiaoping‘s admonition that 
China should tao guang yang hui (to bide our time and build up our capabilities) still 
dominates China‘s strategic thinking. There have been calls, especially from the 
People‘s Liberation Army and some nationalistic and realists scholars, for China to 
play a bigger role in international affairs and be tougher in dealing with disputes. At 
the academic level there are also hot debates about ―China‘s Model‖ or ―China 
alternative‖. However, Chinese leaders seem to agree that China still has a long way 
to go before becoming a developed country, (Zhu, 2011). Indeed at the state level, 
China‘s priority in the ―important strategic opportunity period‖ is still domestic 
development so that China would try her best to avoid conflict and seek peace, (Li & 
Worm, 2011). Additionally, at the global level, the international system is 
characterized by economic interdependence and nuclear weaponry. This reality makes 
a military or confrontational power-shift/rise less likely or too costly for China to 
even consider, (Ibid). 
 
 
2.6.2 The Evolution of China‟s Energy Policy 
 
 
Since it became an oil importer in 1993, China has sought to enhance its energy 
security by gaining access to the world energy market, diversifying its energy supply 
through imports and by acquiring overseas assets, (Tunsjø, 2010: 25-45). Yet China 
90 
 
still imports more than half of its oil needs. Growing dependence on imported oil later 
combined with rising oil prices and political/military developments has steadily 
pushed oil security up the Chinese Government‘s agenda (Andrews-Speed, 2010). 
 
(Figure 2.6.2.1): China Growing Appetite for Oil (1980-2030) 
 
 
Source: EIA (1980 to 2010) and OPEC (2015 to 2030), F= forecast 
 
 
 
2.6.2.1 What is Energy Security? 
 
 
The International Energy Agency (IEA) defines the energy security as: the 
uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price, (IEA, 2010). While 
the UN concept of energy security is as follows: a nation-state is energy secure to the 
degree that fuel and energy services are available to ensure: (a) Survival of the nation; 
(b) Protection of national welfare; and (c) Minimisation of risks associated with 
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supply and use of fuel and energy services, (UN, 2006: 149). Daniel Yergin argues 
that the objective of energy security is to assure adequate, reliable supplies of energy 
at reasonable prices and in ways that do not jeopardise major national values and 
objectives, (Yergin, 1988: 110-132). On the other hand, Saudi expert Anas Alhajji 
provides a different view; he argues that historically researchers and politicians have 
limited the concept of energy security to consuming countries, (Alhajji, September 
2007). According to Alhajji, almost all OECD countries have designed their energy 
policies around three dimensions: security of supplies, the environment, and 
economics, (Ibid). In this regard, Alhajji provides a more comprehensive definition 
for energy security as ―The steady availability of energy supplies in a way that 
ensures economic growth in both producing and consuming countries with the lowest 
social cost and the lowest price volatility‖, (Alhajji, January 2008).  
 
Saudi ARAMCO‘s president and CEO Khalid A. Al-Falih argues that ―Energy 
independence is a misleading, unachievable goal; rather, the focus should be on 
energy interdependence…energy security should be addressed in the framework of a 
strong interdependent relationship between suppliers and consumers‖, (Martinchalk, 
2010). While Prince Turki al-Faisal, the Chairman of the King Faisal Centre for 
Research and Islamic Studies and the former Director of Saudi intelligence and 
ambassador to Britain, Ireland, and the United States, takes the argument further to 
argue that American politicians should scrape the term of ―energy independence‖ 
once and for all: 
―Energy independence‖ has become a byword on the American political scene, and invoking 
it is now as essential as baby-kissing. All the recent U.S. presidential candidates employed it, 
and to this day, the White House Website lists as a guiding principle the need to ‗curb our 
dependence on fossil fuels and make America energy independent‘…But this ‗energy 
independence‘ motto is political posturing at its worst — a concept that is unrealistic, 
misguided, and ultimately harmful to energy-producing and -consuming countries alike...The 
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allure of demagoguery is strong, but U.S. politicians must muster the courage to scrap the 
fable of energy independence once and for all. If they continue to lead their people toward the 
mirage of independence and forsake the oasis of interdependence and cooperation, only 
disaster will result, (Al-Faisal, 2009). 
 
In the debate about China‘s conception of energy security Yergin notes that ―Many 
describe Beijing‘s policy options in ways that come perilously close to the shortage-
equals-security-threat scenarios of the 1970s‖, (Yergin, 1998: 36). Similarly, and 
more recently, Erica Downs argues that the mainstream thinking about energy 
security in China shares the characteristics of the ―traditional‖ approach: it is state 
centric, supply-side biased, overwhelmingly focused on oil and tends to equate 
security with self-sufficiency, (Downs, 2004: 22-23). While Phillip Andrews-Speed 
argues along these lines that the Chinese Government has adopted a ―strategic‖ 
approach to China‘s energy security and, as such, prefers political means to economic 
ones to ensure the country‘s energy security, (Andrews-Speed, 2002:16-17). 
Meanwhile, the International Energy Agency recognises that the strategies deployed 
by China to respond to its increasing dependence on foreign markets are ―the classic 
moves‖ of nations that find themselves in a new situation of reliance on imports,  
(IEA, 2000:74). 
 
In this context, China‘s energy security concerns include the following aspects: (a) 
Unavailability & Political Risk; Oil is no longer a simple economic product, but a 
political product and a strategic material, (Beijing Times, May 31, 2006). Political 
instabilities in the Middle East, Africa, Latin American and Russia also can cause 
sudden falls in oil supply. Some hostile countries can use embargos and sanctions to 
cut off China‘s oil supply from the international market; (b) Fluctuation of oil price: 
high oil prices or the fluctuation of oil prices impact on China‘s macroeconomic 
instability, (Ibid). Bank of America-Merrill Lynch estimates that each US$1 increase 
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in oil prices per barrel may cut China‘s annual trade surplus by US$1.9 billion, 
(Bloomberg, 2011). For example, between January 2007 and July 2008, the price of a 
barrel of oil rose from US$50 to more than US$140; by the end of 2008, it had 
crashed to just over US$30; less than a year later, it had breached $80 again. In early 
2011, on the back of strong global demand and the political turmoil in the Middle 
East, oil sold for over US$120 a barrel, (Robert & Michael, 2011). China paid for 
crude oil imports over US$11.6 billion in 2001 and more than US$47 billion in 2005. 
The amount jumped to US$135 billion in 2010 and the first half of 2011 China paid 
for crude oil imports only about US$95.2 billion, (MOFCOM, July 2011) (see Table 
2.6.2.1.1 below). 
 
(Table 2.6.2.1.1): China‟s Oil Imports Bill (US$ billions, 2001-2010) 
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Crude 
Petroleum Oils 
11,6 12,7 19,7 33,9 47,7 66,4 79,8 129,3 89,2 135,2 
Petroleum Oils, 
not Crude 
3,7 3,7 5,8 9,2 10,4 15,5 16,6 30,1 16,9 22,4 
All other 
Energy 
Products 
2,1 2,7 3,6 4,8 5,9 7,1 8,6 9,7 17,7 31,2 
Total Energy 
Imports 
17,5 19,3 29,2 48,0 64,0 89,0 105,1 169,2 123,9 188,9 
Source: UN COMTRADE, (December, 2011) 
 
 
(c) Safety of international shipping lanes and pipe lines such as the Strait of Hormuz 
and  the Strait of Malacca (around three quarters of China‘s oil imports cross through 
Strait of Malacca); and (d) Most important of all, the ruling Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) has staked its legitimacy on its ability to deliver ever-wider prosperity. As a 
result, the government‘s focus on energy security is not merely an economic necessity 
- it is also a fight for political survival, (The Economist, July 12, 2007). Subsequently, 
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there are three major goals for China‘s energy strategy: (a) Ensuring China‘s long-
term economic growth and prosperity; (b) Reducing China‘s energy vulnerability; and 
(c) Protecting the environment and avoiding ecological degradation and diseases, (He 
& Qin, 2006: 93-104). 
 
 
2.6.2.2 The Evolution of China‟s Energy Policy 
 
 
China began to pay attention to the issue of energy as early as 1980. On August 26, of 
that year, the Fifth National People‘s Congress Standing Committee decided to 
establish a National Energy Commission, (Bo, 2010). The Commission was soon 
dissolved in 1982 as it had too many overlapping responsibilities with other 
government commissions and ministries, (Wu & Wang, 2010: 17-20). In 1988 China 
formed the Ministry of Energy (MOE) after abolishing four other ministries - water 
conservancy and power, petroleum (where China National Petroleum Corporation or 
CNPC was formed), coal, and nuclear power, (Ibid).  
 
Five years later, in 1993, however, the Ministry was also abolished in another round 
of the State Council restructuring, (Bo, 2010). Energy security became a major 
concern for China since the country became a net oil importer in 1993. Securing long-
term oil supply has been a primary issue in China‘s policy towards the Middle East, 
where almost two thirds of the world‘s crude oil reserves are located, (Zhang, 2008). 
As early as 1993, the then Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng set the stage by defining 
the objectives of the country‘s energy policy as ―to secure the long-term and stable 
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supply of oil to China.‖ This fundamental objective guided most of the energy 
decisions taken during almost the rest of the decade, (Scott, 2007: 137).  
 
By February 1999, a major report was issued that indicated Chinese rethinking of 
energy security issues. China‘s Energy Research Institute (ERI), under the State 
Development Planning Commission (SDPC, later became SDRC), issued Study on 
Long Term Energy Development Strategies of China, (Christoffersen, 2004). The 
report called for a radical break with past Chinese practices for energy security, 
changing from a coal-dependent, self-sufficient energy policy to the expansion of 
natural gas production and increasing imports of oil, (Ibid).  
 
China‘s vision for its companies to become international players was spelled out only 
in 1999 with the introduction of the ―goes-out‖ policy, (EIU, 2010: 5). Chinese 
concerns about oil supply security became widespread in 2000, when the volume of 
China‘s oil imports almost doubled to 70.2 million tons (1.4 mb/d), (Zha, 2005: 39-
54). This was coupled with the sharp rise in crude oil price in 1999–2000, (Lee, 2005: 
265-301), followed later by the events of September 11, 2001, which had a profound 
impact on international relations and strengthened the links between China and the 
Middle East, especially the Gulf region. There was a significant change in China‘s 
policy on the Middle East as a whole, (Zhang, 2008). Subsequently, the issue of 
Chinese energy security had been inserted into the 10th Five-year plan (2001-2005), 
for the first time recognising it as a security issue, (Christoffersen, 2004).  
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2.6.2.3 China‟s “Goes-Out” Strategy 
 
Since 2001, however, which was the year when China became a member of the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO), the support of the overseas expansion of Chinese 
companies became a major concern for the Chinese Government, (Schüller and 
Turner, April 2005: 3-14). In order to seize the opportunities the WTO entry and the 
closer global economic integration offered to the Chinese economy, the government 
wanted them to become internationally competitive players, (Ibid). With explicit 
reference to China‘s forthcoming accession to the WTO, Shi Guangsheng, the former 
Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, underlined the importance of 
overseas investment as follows:  
By ―Going Global‖, the enterprises can invest and set up factories overseas, better utilize the 
domestic and foreign markets and resources, further expand the export of equipment, 
materials and labour service and create new export growth points. Thus we can enhance the 
level of China‘s opening to the outside world. (Ibid) 
 
After entering the WTO in November 2001, China refocused its economic diplomacy 
on the tasks of securing access to energy and other resources, building competitive 
international companies, and opening developing country markets to Chinese goods 
and investment, (Saunders, 2006).  At the end of 2001, the Chinese Government 
officially launched a broader policy of global economic engagement, namely the “Zou 
Chu Qu” or ―goes-out‖ strategy. Later, ―Zou Chu Qu‖ became an essential element in 
China‘s energy development strategies, (Zhang, 2008). In this regard Hongtu Zhao , 
one of the leading experts in Chinese energy politics, defines the ―goes-out‖ policy in 
a comprehensive way: ―Goes-out‖ (sometimes translated as ‗going out‘ or ‗go 
abroad‘) is actually a part of China‘s policy of opening up which means ―invites in‖ 
and ―goes out‖ to learn from the outside and integrate with the world. In the energy 
sector, ―invites in‖ means attracting energy investment from overseas, lifting tariffs, 
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opening petroleum sales and carrying out initial public offerings (IPOs) of stock, 
(Hongtu, 2010). ―Goes-out‖ means getting involved in the world market to be 
internationalised and developed into multinational corporations with high 
international competitive ability, (Ibid).  
 
This policy of overseas investments in oil assets by the state-owned oil companies is 
meant to help China‘s energy security by (1) diversifying oil supplies sources, (2) 
ensuring a better control on the production of these supplies, (3) depleting overseas 
deposits instead of national resources; and (4) insulating China‘s economy from 
outside shocks, (Downs, 2004: 19-23). Additionally, it calls for Chinese companies to 
move into global markets to grow their revenue, to learn to be globally competitive, 
and, if possible, to acquire international brands, (Medeiros, 2009: 66) (see Table 
2.6.2.3.1 below). 
 
(Table 2.6.2.3.1): China‟s NOC Motivations and Strategies 
 
Motivations for Investing Abroad Main Strategies Used to Expand 
Expand oil and gas reserves and production. Diversify energy supply sources and take 
advantage of new business opportunities. 
Diversify energy supplies to avoid risks. Target assets to add synergy to existing 
assets. 
Become ―international NOC.‖ Partner with other NOCs and IOCs, build 
relationships and diversify risk. 
Develop an integrated supply chain. Pursue market-for-resources deals that 
exchange access to China‘s market for access 
to resources. 
Gain technical know-how and streamline 
managerial capacities. 
Utilise strong financial resources and 
government policy support. 
Source: Jiang & Sinton, 2011: 13 
 
 
By 2003, the Chinese Government realised that their country was facing an energy 
crisis and that the main threat to security of energy supply was domestic rather than 
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international. A year later Beijing announced a new draft energy strategy which 
emphasised the overriding importance of energy efficiency and energy conservation 
and which set specific targets for energy savings, (Andrews-Speed, 2005).  Energy 
security became a top priority in China‘s diplomacy after two key events: U.S. 
military deployments to Central Asia after 9/11 and the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 
2003. China sought to diversify its reliance on imported oil and gas from Middle 
Eastern suppliers, (Medeiros, 2009: 136). These developments were followed by a 
power crunch and in 2004 as China suffered severe power shortages, (Bai & Miles, 
2011), when severe energy shortages at home resulted in a sharp increase in China‘s 
demand for imported oil, causing international energy prices to soar to 20 year highs, 
(The Economist, July 12, 2007). Since then China has aggressively supported the 
―goes-out‖ policy. According to EIU, almost half of China‘s outbound M&A 
transactions have been driven by the need to support the country‘s growing demand 
for energy and natural resources (EIU, 2011) (see Figure 2.6.2.3.1 below). 
 
(Figure 2.6.2.3.1): Motivations of Chinese Investment Abroad (2004-2009, %) 
 
 
Source: CICC, Thomson Reuters, EIU 
Resources 
45% 
Market Expansion 
33% 
Technology 
and R&D 
12% 
Financial 
Investment 
10% 
(%) of China’s Outbound M&A Transactions by Motivation 
99 
 
Despite that enthusiasm, China shortly realised that ―goes-out‖ policy is not the 
―magic‖ solution for its energy security. In May 2005 Ma Kai, Chairman of the 
China‘s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), which is in charge 
of planning and regulating the overall development of energy, defined four elements 
in the achievement of energy security: (a) Energy diversification; (b) Conservation; 
(c) Renewal; and (d) Cooperation,  (Yao, 2006: 165-201).  Two complementary 
strategies have been used by Beijing to diversify and secure their oil supplies. On the 
one hand, the government has used its diplomatic resources to lock long-term supply 
and transport agreements with producing countries; on the other, bilateral cross-
investments in the oil and gas industry, (Downs, 2004).  
 
Indeed, after implementing the ―goes-out‖ strategy, it became clear that, while the 
companies have profited, neither Chinese citizens nor policymakers have seen much 
reward. If all the equity oil produced outside China was transported home (it is not) it 
would still only meet a fraction of the country‘s import needs. This means it actually 
provides little insurance against supply disruptions, (Houser, 2011). Subsequently, a 
growing number of Chinese energy experts started to believe that ―goes-out‖ strategy 
may not be fundamentally improving China‘s energy security, and that the need for 
oil imports is simply growing too quickly to be met through equity investments and 
bilateral deals with producing countries, (Herberg & Zweig, 2010). There are also 
some in Beijing who feel that the overseas investment interests of China‘s NOCs are 
not necessarily synonymous with China‘s energy security interests. For example, most 
of the oil produced by China‘s NOCs abroad is not shipped back to China, but sold 
into the global market in the same way other commercial oil companies do, (Ibid). In 
this regard, Downs noted that several Chinese oil company executives have stated 
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publicly and privately that they disagree with the notion that the acquisition of oil 
assets abroad can enhance China‘s energy security, (Downs, 2006). 
 
On the global stage, Beijing‘s ―goes-out‖ strategy was rapidly becoming a source of 
geopolitical tensions between China and the United States and had been regarded as 
―mercantilist‖, (see Table 2.6.2.4.2). The attempt of a Chinese NOC to buy out the 
American oil corporation UNOCAL in July 2005 triggered a political backlash in the 
U.S. Congress causing the final withdrawal of the Chinese company, (Li and Clark, 
2010). The incident indicates the lack of trust of the U.S. in China‘s energy 
diplomacy, because the Chinese move was interpreted as undermining American 
energy security, (Ibid). In September 2005, the then  U.S. deputy secretary of state, 
Robert Zoellick, called on China not to adopt a mercantilist strategy for achieving 
energy security, not to deal with failed or weak states, and to become ―a responsible 
stakeholder‖ in the international system, (Zoellick, 2005). Additionally, the U.S. 
Administration‘s focus on China‘s quest for oil at that time was signalled when it 
published a revised National Security Strategy in March 2006, approved by then 
President Bush. The document stated that country‘s leaders are ―expanding trade, but 
acting as if they can somehow ‗lock up‘ energy supplies around the world or seek to 
direct markets rather than opening them up, as if they can follow a mercantilism 
borrowed from a discredited era‖, (The White House, March 2006). 
 
Indeed, China‘s activities abroad have generated international concerns about possible 
confrontation between China and the West over energy resources. These concerns 
include: (a) China would disrupt the existing oil supply through the acquisition of 
overseas assets in the energy field or purchase of equity oil; and (b) China‘s interest in 
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developing a stronger military capability to protect the safety of oil transportation, 
(Tang, 2006). As for the Middle East there are a number of reasons for analysts to 
believe that China‘s growing energy relations with the Middle East, may cause a 
change of the status quo in the Middle East and post security challenges to the United 
States.  (a) Dependence on Middle Eastern oil might affect its international behaviour 
and shape its foreign policy; (b) China takes a strategic approach to energy security 
instead of a market-oriented one; (c) China‘s oil companies are still largely 
instruments of the State and are being treated as an arm of the Chinese Government‘s 
international expansion; and (d), China has no qualms about supporting some so-
called ―problematic countries‖ in these regions such as Iran and Sudan, (Hongtu, 
2007).  
 
Recognising these various constraints as a major bottleneck for achieving its social 
and economic strategies, the Chinese Government in 2007 put energy concerns at the 
top of its list of priority problems to be resolved in its development path, thereby 
fundamentally altering its development philosophy, (United Nations Environment 
Programme, 2011: 106). The 11
th
 Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social 
Development (2006-2010) sets 22 quantitative indicators of which eight are 
mandatory targets, five of them related to environment and resources, (Ibid). It 
targeted reducing the energy consumption per unit of GDP by 20 percent in five years 
(from 2005 levels). According to the Chinese Government the country has met that 
target by the end of 2010, (Miles, 2011). Most important of  all we witnessed a major 
shift in the behaviour of Chinese companies when they started to buy stakes in 
companies through the mechanisms of the international market (Canada, Australia, 
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Brazil, etc.), this in addition to entering into partnerships with western companies 
(Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, etc.), (UNEP, 2011). 
 
Furthermore, in January 2010, China established the National Energy Commission 
with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao as the director of it, (People‟s Daily, January 27, 
2011). The Commission includes the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of State 
Security, and People‘s Liberation Army (PLA). Beijing‘s inclusion of the foreign 
affairs, security, and military intelligence apparatus in the NEC reflects China‘s deep 
concerns about energy security, (Lin, April 2011). Subsequently, China‘s ―12th Five-
Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development‖ (2011-2015) has 
introduced 24 major targets/indicators, some of which are binding while some are not. 
In relation to resource and environmental protection, seven out of the eight targets are 
binding, (Xinhua, March 31, 2011). This has resulted in the main target of (a) raising 
the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption to 11.4 percent, (Ibid). 
Finally, with the power shortage still gripping many parts of China (2004, 2008, 2010 
and 2011), amid growing concerns that these shortages could lead to public anger and 
slow the economic growth, energy security debate will always be in the top of the 
Chinese  leaders‘ agenda for years to come, (Wang & Li, 2011). 
 
 
2.6.2.4 Chinese Energy Debate 
 
 
China‘s shift to a net oil importer has generated much speculation outside China about 
how China‘s growing dependence on foreign oil will affect its international 
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behaviour, (Downs, 2004). While still a very significant oil producer, China now 
imports more than half of its crude oil needs (over 9 million barrels per day in 2010). 
China‘s share in global oil consumption rose from 6 percent in 2000 to over 10 
percent in 2010, (World Economic Outlook 2011: 94). OPEC‘s World Oil Outlook 
2011 projects that China‘s share in global oil consumption will rise to around 12 
percent in 2015 and jump to over 14 percent in 2020, (World Oil Outlook 2011: 63). 
The growing dependence on oil imports has created an increasing sense of ―energy 
insecurity‖ among Chinese leaders, (World Economic Outlook, 2011). 
 
(Table 2.6.2.4.1): China‟s Share of Global Oil Consumption, 1965-2010 (%) 
 
 United States OECD (excluding United States) China 
1965 37.0 37.3 0.69 
1970 32.1 42.5 1.2 
1975 29.8 40.4 2.4 
1980 27.7 38.6 2.7 
1985 26.4 36.1 3.0 
1990 25.4 36.4 3.4 
1995 25.3 38.2 4.8 
2000 25.7 36.5 6.2 
2005 24.9 34.3 8.3 
2010
a 21.7 30.5 10.3 
Source: IMF, (World Economic Outlook, April 2011) 
(a) Adapted from IEA, (Oil Market Report , December 2011) 
 
 
To meet China‘s quickly growing energy demands, Chinese leaders have struggled 
between a market-oriented approach and a state-centred approach.  The market-
oriented approach (liberals) mainly relies on national and international energy markets 
and seeks to reduce the risk of disruption by improving the efficiency of these 
markets, 
 
(Umbach, 2004: 137-168).  The liberals‘ approach seeks energy security 
through enhanced integration of national and international markets and encourages 
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domestic and international investment in production and transportation, (Andrew-
Speed, Liao, Dannreuther, 2002: 16-17). State intervention would be limited to the 
diffusion of information in a multilateral context, the support of innovation, and, for 
some, the management of a strategic oil reserve which would be used in case of 
momentary supply disruption, (Constantin, 2007: 1-30).  
 
In contrast, the strategic (mercantilist) approach primarily involves state-sponsored 
economic measures and political initiatives, (Yuanming, 2009: 165-201). The 
mercantilist theory argues that the world economy is an arena of competition among 
states. States will seek to ensure their self-sufficiency in key strategic industries and 
commodities, and by using trade protectionism (tariffs and other limits on exports and 
imports), subsidies, and selective investments in the domestic economy and abroad, 
(Baylis & Steve, 2001: 285). It is also based upon neo-mercantilist thinking that relies 
on bilateral diplomatic contacts with oil producing countries to beef up energy 
security by the use of national resources and state-owned enterprise investments in 
overseas energy assets and a tight control of exports and imports of energy products, 
(Zhao, 2008: 207- 227).   Accordingly, there is tension between those arguing that 
China‘s increasing dependence on imported oil supplies presents a strategic threat to 
China‘s national security, and those arguing that China‘s increasing oil imports should 
be treated as a normal by-product of its growing interdependence with the rest of the 
world, (Zha, 2006: 2-16). 
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(Table 2.6.2.4.2): The Differences between Strategic and Market Approaches 
 
 Strategic Approach 
(realists) 
Market Approach (liberals) 
Supply-Side 
Economic 
Measures to 
Reduce 
Probability of 
Disruption 
 Control through state 
companies 
 Self reliance 
 Investment in 
domestic and overseas 
production and 
transportation 
Liberalize energy markets: 
 Integrate with international 
markets 
 Encourage domestic and 
international investment in 
production and transportation 
Demand-Side 
Economic 
Measures to 
Reduce 
Probability of 
Disruption 
Use administrative measures 
to:  
 Increase energy 
efficiency 
 Adjust transport 
policy 
 Diversify transport 
fuels 
Use market measures to: 
 Increase energy efficiency 
 Adjust transport policy 
 Diversify transport fuels 
Political 
Measurers to 
Probability of 
Disruption  
 Enhance political 
links with energy 
exporters 
 Outward investment 
and aid to energy 
exporters 
 Promote the efficient 
functioning on international 
markets 
Measures to 
Reduce Impact of 
Disruption 
 Strategic reserves 
 Oil sharing 
 Emergency response 
procedures 
 Fuel switching 
 Surge capacity 
 Strong U.S.-China 
cooperation 
 Implement IEA‘s framework 
of strategic oil reserves (oil 
stocks equivalent to 90 days 
of its prior year‘s net 
imports). 
 Effective cooperation with 
IEA and the International 
organisations 
 Deepen interdependence with 
oil producers. 
Source: Andrew-Speed, Liao, Dannreuther 2002: 16-17 and Zha, 2006: 2-16 
 
 
Shambaugh argues that China‘s ‗‗realists‘‘ are the dominant group in the discourse on 
international relations and China‘s global role today, (Shambaugh, 2011: 7-27). 
Kenneth Lieberthal goes along similar lines to say that ―China‘s energy strategy 
currently appears rooted in a statist, mercantilist mentality among political leaders in 
Beijing‖, (Lieberthal and Herberg, 2006: 9). Chinese realists take the nation-state as 
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their core unit of analysis, uphold the principle of state sovereignty above all else, and 
reject arguments that transnational issues penetrate across borders. Like realists 
elsewhere, they tend to see the international environment as anarchic and 
unpredictable, thus placing a premium on building up a strong state that can navigate 
its own way in the world and resist outside pressures, (Ibid). Chinese realists argue 
that China should accelerate naval build-up because its military self-defence 
capability lags far behind China‘s energy interest and military warfare, especially 
military warfare on the sea, which is the final means for great powers to solve 
international trade disputes, (Zhang, 2003: 16). Even the Chinese Government in its 
2010 Defence White Paper proclaimed that its navy would take on a more expansive 
role, reaching out beyond its traditional focus on the coastline. 
In line with the requirements of offshore defence strategy, the PLA Navy (PLAN) endeavours 
to accelerate the modernisation of its integrated combat forces, enhances its capabilities in 
strategic deterrence and counterattack, and develops its capabilities in conducting operations 
in distant waters and in countering non -traditional security threats. It seeks to further improve 
its combat capabilities through regularized and systematic basic training and actual combat 
training in complex electromagnetic environments. By organizing naval vessels for drills in 
distant waters, it develops training models for MOOTW missions. New types of submarines, 
frigates, aircraft and large support vessels have been deployed as planned. The PLAN 
enhances the construction of composite support bases so as to build a shore-based support 
system which matches the deployment of forces and the development of weaponry and 
equipment, (China‘s 2010 Defence White Paper, March 2011). 
 
Zhang Wenmu, a famous Chinese realist, argues that China is almost helpless to 
protect its overseas oil import routes. This is an Achilles heel to contemporary China, 
(Zhang, 2006: 17-31). The most crucial conduit connecting China with the Middle 
East and with the rest of the world is the sea lanes and, therefore, China must have a 
powerful navy, (Ibid). Zhang goes further to say: ―We must build up our navy as 
quickly as possible…Otherwise, China may lose everything it has gathered in normal 
international economic activities, including its oil interests, in a military defeat‖, 
(Wemmu, 2003). Chinese influential scholar Shi Yinhong argues that the majority 
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among China‘s political elites are hoping for long-term accommodation with the 
United States, but seriously doubt its probability, believing that perhaps there may be 
a long ―Cold War‖ confrontation or even major conflict between China and the 
United States in the coming decades, (Shi, 2001).  
 
On the extreme, Liu Mingfu, a senior colonel who is a professor at the elite People‘s 
Liberation Army‘s National Defence University and the author of ―The China 
Dream”, has declared that replacing the United States as the world‘s top military 
power should be China‘s goal, (Wang, 2011: 68-79). Liu call for China in his recent 
published Chinese-language book to abandon modesty about its global goals and 
―sprint to become world number one…China‘s big goal in the 21st century is to 
become world number one, the top power…If China in the 21st century cannot 
become world number one, cannot become the top power, then inevitably it will 
become a straggler that is cast aside‖, (Buckley, March 1, 2010). Liu and other PLA 
officers, however, say they see little chance of avoiding deepening rivalry with the 
United States, whether peaceful or warlike. 
 
In this regard, some Chinese officials and scholars also noted that China is 
uncomfortable with the fact that the United States‘ navy dominates the sea lanes 
stretching from the Middle East to the South China Sea through which the bulk of 
China‘s oil imports must pass. PLA Gen. Qian Guoliang stated that the threat to China 
emanates concurrently from ―one point and one lane.‖ While the ―point‖ refers to 
Taiwan, the ―lane‖ was an allusion to the long voyage of Chinese tankers returning 
home via the Indian Ocean and the Straits of Malacca, (Jha, 2010).  
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(Figure 2.6.2.4.1): China‟s Sea-lines of Communications  
 
 
Source: Google‘s maps 
 
 
Another Chinese  commentary puts it strongly, ―It is no exaggeration to say that 
whoever controls the Strait of Malacca (SOM) will also have a stranglehold on the 
energy route of China‖, (Zhongguo Qingnian Bao, 2004). In fact, some Chinese 
analysts have accused the United States, Japan, and India of using transnational 
threats (especially piracy) in the area as a pretext to bolster their regional naval forces. 
According to Lu Guoxue, Washington‘s intention is to curtail China‘s rising power by 
restricting its access to energy supplies through the SOM, (Ibid). While Chinese 
scholar, Chen, argues that in every respect the Straits of Malacca
2
 can be regarded as 
                                                             
2 The Straits of Malacca are one of Important World oil transit chokepoints. Located between the east 
coast of Sumatra Island in Indonesia and the west coast of Peninsular Malaysia and linked with the 
Strait of Singapore at its southeast end, the Straits of Malacca are 600 miles long and provide the main 
corridor between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea, (Chen, 2009).  
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a lifeline of the rising dragon. However, as China lacks the capacity to project its 
naval power, her growing reliance on the Strait is rapidly turning into a strategic 
weakness, (Chen, 2009). China‘s President Hu calls this strategic weakness ―the 
Malacca dilemma‖, and considers it key to China‘s energy security. He is concerned 
that ―certain powers (a codeword for the United States) have all along encroached on 
and tried to control the navigation through the Strait‖, (Zweig & Jianhai, 2005:24-38). 
 
In this context Chinese scholars recognise the American dominant position in the 
Arabian Gulf and Middle East‘s instability, noting that since 1951 ten of the sixteen 
major global oil supply disruptions have originated in the region, (Erickson and 
Goldstein, 2009: 43-76). There is a concern that if Sino-U.S. relations sour, the United 
States could use its superior military power to disrupt China‘s oil supply, (Downs, 
2004: 45).  The U.S. navy controls all critical energy transport sea lanes, (Greg, 
2005). China does not possess the military capabilities to secure the sea lines of 
communication, (through which the majority of its oil imports travel), but must rely 
on the United States to guarantee safe passage, (Downs, 2004).  
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(Figure 2.6.2.4.2): World‟s Major Oil Transit Chokepoints  
 
 
Source: EIA, 2011 (data estimates based on APEX tanker data); GAO (map) 
 
 
Furthermore, the former Chinese special envoy to the Middle East ―Sun Bigan‖, a 30-
year veteran of the Middle East, a former Ambassador to Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia 
and, now retired, who now works for a government-run association promoting ties 
with Asia and Africa, argues ―clashes are unavoidable‖ between China and the United 
States in the Middle East. He thinks that China and the United States risk deepening 
rifts over influence and oil in the Middle East. He also believes ―the U.S. has always 
sought to control the faucet of global oil supplies. There is cooperation between China 
and the U.S., but there is also struggle, and the U.S. has always seen us as a potential 
foe…bilateral quarrels and clashes are unavoidable. We cannot lower vigilance 
against hostility in the Middle East over energy interests and security‖, (Reuters, 
September 30, 2009). He also thinks ―U.S. Obama‘s new Middle East policy is 
merely a tactical adjustment, and the United States will not and cannot alter its global 
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goals and dominance…both now and in the future, the Middle East should be our first 
choice in importing oil and developing oil cooperation…China should focus on 
strengthening trade with Saudi Arabia, Iran and Oman‖, (Ibid). His worries were 
echoed by Dai Songyang, an energy journalist writing for the internet-based China 
Energy Web. Dai argues that ―The United States recognises Yemen‘s geographic 
ability to choke China‘s oil import lifelines.‖ He then hints that the United States may 
bring the war on terror to Yemen, in order to ―strangle China‘s oil imports and its 
economy‖, (Simpfendorfer, 2010). Additionally, Soozhana Choi, an oil analyst with 
Deutsche Bank in Singapore who has just published a report on the subject – ―China‟s 
SPR ambitions‖ – argues along these lines that the recent events in the Middle East 
and North Africa ―only serve to emphasise the importance of energy security and 
strategic oil reserves as a policy tool‖, (Blas, 2011). 
 
On the other hand, Chinese liberals argue that oil is a global commodity which needs 
cooperation not conflict. For Chinese liberals, it is not in geopolitics but the politics of 
conservation that Beijing policymakers need to turn. Factors such as ―efficiency, 
liberalization of domestic energy investment and markets, and other domestic 
components of energy security‖ offer much more leverage against the challenge, 
(Blair, 2006: 32-64).  Professor Zha Daojiong of Peking University, a leading 
representative of a market or interdependent view, argues that ―China‘s dependence 
on maritime energy transportation is a natural state of affairs that must be managed, 
(Zha, 2006). China‘s path to oil security lies in greater integration with the existing 
global oil market, (Zha, 2005). While Chu Shulong of Qinghua University, one of 
China‘s pre-eminent experts on U.S.–China relations, has criticised the notion that 
China can or should try to match U.S. military power, whether to protect the sea lines 
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of communication through which energy shipments flow or for other reasons. In his 
view, such a goal would be unrealistic, unnecessary and provocative, (Kennedy, 2010: 
137-158). Furthermore, Fu Mengzi, an assistant president of and a research professor 
with the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations argues that on the 
security front, the U.S. has the enviable capability of ―striking balance‖, while 
China‘s influence is growing in its neighbourhood and it has more say in regional 
thorny issues, (Fu, 2011). For Chinese liberals economic interdependence serves as 
the single most powerful deterrent against an embargo or blockade by China‘s 
neighbours. According to them, China must now view energy security in terms of 
economic threats and market solutions rather than military threats and diplomatic 
responses, (O‘Brien, 1997: 8-13).  
 
Indeed, Hongtu Zhao, deputy director of the Institute of World Economics Studies at 
the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, argues that an oil 
blockade by the U.S. would only be likely to occur in wartime. The United States 
would not be able to insulate itself from the disruption of the world oil market that 
would result, and that it would be impossible to blockade the Malacca Strait 
effectively without cutting off oil to Japan and South Korea as well. Zhao thus sees an 
American-led blockade of China as unlikely, (Kennedy, 2011). While Chinese 
scholar, Mao Yushi, furthers this point: ―War and killing over resources has been 
rendered unnecessary. Taking Japan as an example once again, it remains a resource-
poor country, yet it has achieved the status of a world economic power. It purchases 
all vital resource and energy needs‖, (Mao, 2006: 106-115). Zhang Jian, a consultant 
in the office of the Chief Economist at the World Bank, argues that the impact of the 
recent global financial crisis after the 2008, as well as turmoil in many parts of the 
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Middle East and North Africa in early 2011, have caused Beijing to further realise the 
importance of energy source diversification, the linkage of fiscal and monetary policy 
with energy policy, especially monetary policies that relate to international energy, 
commodity trading, equity markets, and financial markets, (Chen, 2011).  
 
 
2.7 CONCLUSION  
 
 
In sum, China through her evolving energy policy since 1993 seems to combine the 
two approaches (Market and Strategic) by pursuing a two-pronged strategy toward 
energy; (engages but hedge). Beijing will continue on the one hand to enhance 
cooperation with the U.S. and political links with energy exporters, increase energy 
efficiency, diversify, accelerate investments and overseas production and 
transportation, while on the other hand will strengthen China‘s emergency response. 
 
(Table 2.7.1): Summary of China‟s Oil Development 
 
The Development History of China‟s Oil Industry  
Phase 1:  
1978 - 
1992  
Self-reliance and self-sufficiency are the key objectives of energy policy. The 
National Development and Reform Commission is founded and placed in charge 
of the energy sector. State-owned enterprises can access limited foreign markets.  
Phase 2:  
1993 - 
1999  
Production of oil can no longer meet domestic demand. Government starts to 
conduct reform to increase competitiveness of the SOEs. Enterprises start to seek 
oil in foreign markets  
Phase 3:  
2000 - 
2008  
―Goes out‖ starts to become the main slogan and government encourage firms to 
go abroad. China‘s accession to WTO further increases domestic business 
competition. SOEs and private firms expand their business worldwide.  
Phase 4:  
2008 - 
present  
―Go abroad and buy‖, is the response to the financial turmoil that began in 2008, 
and hastened China‘s investment expansion at the global level. China‘s 
investments in resource and energy sectors have increased dramatically. 
Source: Chen, 2011:6 
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This thesis expects growing interdependence between China and the Middle East in 
general, and Saudi Arabia in particular. 
 The study forecasts that the volume of bilateral trade between China and Saudi 
Arabia could double over the next few years 
 Our research projects that China will overtake the U.S. and become Saudi 
Arabia‘s top oil importer during the next five years 
 
Within the framework of these expectations and guided by Trade Expectations Theory 
(TET), the study expects that the stability of Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf States 
will be at the top of China‘s interests in the coming years.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
CHINA-MIDDLE EAST OIL BACKGROUND 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
With the end of the Cold War and China‘s emergence as a net oil importer, Beijing‘s 
primary interest in the Middle East has been to gain access to the region‘s vast energy 
supplies in order to expand its economic opportunities. While China is trying to 
diversify its energy import supplies, the Chinese still depends on the Middle East for 
half of their oil imports, (IEA, 2011).  In the last decade, China has been upgrading its 
diplomatic, economic, cultural, and military relations with several countries in the 
Middle East, (Medeiros 2009: 160).  China‘s growing demand for energy is an 
important driver of this upgrading but it is not the only one, (Ibid) or as Weilie Zhu, 
the Director of the Middle Eastern Studies Institute at Shanghai International Studies 
University, puts it: ―Its geographical position, religious significance, and, above all, 
massive oil reserves all make it a critical region for any country that wants to retain its 
status as a great power‖, (Zhu, March 31, 2011). 
 
Since China became a net oil importer, the amount of oil from overseas increased 
from nil to over 50 percent in merely two decades, (Economides, January 26, 2010). 
China‘s surging imports have risen from zero imports in 1992 to over 4.8 million 
barrels a day in 2010 and are expecting to rise to about 7 million barrels daily (mb/d) 
in 2020, (see tables 3.11, 3.2.1.4 & 3.2.1.2). This will inevitably elevate the Middle 
East to the top of China‘s supply chain, (Blair, Yali, & Hagt. 2006: 33-63). This 
dependence on foreign oil has become a key driver for Beijing to establish close 
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economic and political ties with major oil producing countries, especially Saudi 
Arabia, (Tu, 2006). 
 
(Table 3.1.1): China‟s Oil Production, Consumption and Imports, 1990-2010 
 
 Total Oil Supply 
(mb/d)  
Total Consumption of Petroleum 
Products (mb/d) 
Oil Imports 
 (Thousand Barrels 
Per Day) 
1990 2,76 2,29 58 
1991 2,83 2,49 121 
1992 2,85 2,66 230 
1993
a
 2,90 2,95 312 
1994 2,95 3,16 251 
1995 3,05 3,36 349 
1996 3,21 3,61 459 
1997 3,28 3,91 717 
1998 3,30 4,10 579 
1999 3,31 4,36 744 
2000 3,37 4,79 1400 
2001 3,43 4,91 1353 
2002 3,52 5,16 1394 
2003 3,55 5,57 1805 
2004 3,65 6,43 2448 
2005 3,79 6,69 2598 
2006 3,86 7,26 2904 
2007 3,92 7,53 3264 
2008  3,98 7,81 3568 
2009  3,99 8,22 3880 
2010
 4,30 9.08 4787 
Source: EIA, International Energy Statistics, various years 
(a) China became net oil importer in 1993 
 
 
This chapter provides a statistical survey to China‘s oil situation and describes how it 
fits in with Beijing‘s Middle East strategy. The chapter will give a strong indication of 
China‘s intentions towards its relations with the Middle East and will discuss why the 
Middle East region has particular significance for China in meeting its energy 
objectives. This case study attempts to decipher Chinese motives towards the Middle 
East. If China is acting within the realist model, it should be attempting to expand its 
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power and influence in the Middle East at every opportunity with the intent to 
undermine U.S. influence. If China is acting in the economic interdependence theory, 
it should be developing a Sino-Middle East relationship based on energy security and 
not based on a political agenda. In this regard we will show the conditions under 
which high energy interdependence between China and the Middle East will lead to a 
pacific or belligerent China. If decision-makers‘ expectations of future trade are high 
they will likely pursue policies that will enhance security in the region. On the other 
hand, if they have a negative view of their future trading environment they will likely 
take action to protect their interests in the region. 
 
 
3.2 CHINA‟S OIL SITUATION: STATISTICAL EVALUATION  
 
 
China‘s growing appetite for oil is the product of the country‘s 30-year-long 
economic boom, which has seen expanding external trade, rising incomes, a growing 
population, and increasing urbanisation. Over the last 10 years, Chinese GDP has 
almost tripled and its energy consumption has more than doubled, (Dudley, May 24, 
2011). It has become the world‘s largest energy producer, (Ibid) and the largest 
energy consumer (20.3 percent of the world‘s total) (BP Statistical Review, 2011: 2), 
taking over from the U.S., and the largest aggregate emitter of energy-related carbon 
dioxide, (Dudley, 2011). British Petroleum ―Energy 2030 Outlook‖ suggests China‘s 
energy demand will increase by 80 percent over the next 20 years – that is twice the 
rate of growth for the world as a whole and is likely to account for over 40 percent of 
the increase in total energy demand in this period, (BP Energy Outlook 2030, 2011). 
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Drawing from the World Energy Outlook 2010, three scenarios are presented in this 
chapter (and the next chapters), differentiated by the underlying assumptions about 
government policies. The New Policies Scenario takes account of the broad policy 
commitments that have already been announced and assumes cautious 
implementation of national pledges to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 and 
to reform fossil-fuel subsidies. The Current Policies Scenario (Reference Scenario in 
OPEC‘s World oil Outlook) takes into consideration only those policies that had been 
formally adopted by mid-2010. The third scenario, the 450 Scenario, assumes 
implementation of the high-end of national pledges and stronger policies after 2020, 
including the near-universal removal of fossil fuel consumption subsidies, to achieve 
the objective of limiting the concentration of greenhouse gases. In this regard the 
International Energy Agency (IEA) forecasts in its annual World Energy Outlook 
2010, that China will drive a surge in world oil demand over the next quarter century, 
(see Figure 3.2.1 below) 
 
(Figure 3.2.1): China‟s Share of the Projected Net Global Oil Net Imports  
 
Source: World Energy Outlook 2010 
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3.2.1 China‟s Oil Demand: Skyrocketing Trend 
 
China‘s oil demand tripled over the past two decades, increasing from 2.95 million 
barrels per day (mb/d) in 1993 to over 9 (mb/d) in 2010, (IEA, May 12, 2011), or over 
10 percent of the world‘s global demand, making it second only to the United States, 
(Ibid). China consumed an estimated 9.1 (mb/d) of oil in 2010, up nearly 900 
thousand barrels per day, or over 10 percent from year-earlier levels. China‘s net oil 
imports reached about 4.8 (mb/d) in 2010 and it became the second largest net oil 
importer in the world behind the United States in 2009, (EIA, May 2011). 
 
Chinese and international oil experts alike agree that China‘s demand will increase, 
the only question is by how much? Oil experts also agree that China‘s oil demand will 
continue to grow through to 2035, although their projections vary. Recent estimates 
range from 7 (mb/d) to around 13 (mb/d). Different assumptions about the growth rate 
of China‘s gross domestic product (GDP) and the income elasticity of demand 
probably explain a large portion of the discrepancies. In addition, China does not 
release official oil demand statistics, and reporting agencies often have differing 
figures for the country‘s apparent oil demand. If history is any guide, higher estimates 
may prove to be more accurate; both Chinese and international forecasters have 
repeatedly underestimated China‘s oil demand, (Downs, 2006).  
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(Table 3.2.1.1): Real GDP Growth by Selected Region  
 
Compound Average Annual Growth Rates 
 1990-2008 2008-2020 2010-2015 2020-2035 2008-2035 
China 10.0% 7.9% 9.5% 3.9% 5.7% 
India 6.4% 7.4% 8.1% 5.6% 6.4% 
Middle East 3.9% 4.0% 4.3% 3.8% 3.9% 
Africa 3.8% 4.5% 5.5% 2.8% 3.55% 
Latin America 3.5% 3.3% 4.0% 2.7% 3.0% 
Brazil 3.0% 3.6% 4.1% 3.1% 3.3% 
United States 2.8% 2.0% 2.4% 2.1% 2.1% 
EU 2.1% 1.4% 2.1% 1.7% 1.6% 
Japan 1.2% 1.0% 1.9% 1.0% 1.0% 
Russia 0.6% 2.9% 4.1% 3.1% 3.0% 
World 3.3% 3.6% 4.1% 2.9% 3.2% 
Sources: IMF and World Bank Databases  
 
 
In the medium term the IEA‘s forecasts for global oil demand a growth of 1.3 percent 
annually over the next five years as the economy expands in China. Global oil 
consumption will increase 1.2 million barrels a day over the next five years, (IEA, 
June 2011: 36-56). Net oil demand growth of 7.2 (mb/d) during 2010-2016 (+1.2 
mb/d annually) derives entirely from the non-OECD countries, with China alone 
accounting for 41 percent of the total, or about 2.9 million barrels, (Ibid: 16-52). As 
for the Chinese estimates,  according to Liu Xiao Li of the Energy Research Institute, 
part of China‘s economic planning agency, the National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC), demand for oil will grow 4-5 percent a year to hit 530 -560 
million tonnes (10.6 -11.3 mb/d) in 2015, with transport fuel and chemical feedstocks 
driving the increase. Growth will then slow to 2-3 percent a year, to reach 590-650 
million tonnes (11.8-13 mb/d) by 2020, (Platts, May 24, 2011). While China‘s Social 
Science Academy forecasts that China‘s oil consumption could reach 10.6 million 
barrels per day by 2015, and imported oil is likely to reach the U.S. level of 65 
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percent of total consumption by 2020. It is estimated that China may need 16.1 
percent of the tradable oil in the world market by 2020, (Economides, 2010). 
 
(Table 3.2.1.2): Forecast of Global Oil Demand, 2010-2016 (mb/d) 
 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Global Demand 88,02 89,3 90,6 91,92 93,1 94,2 95,2 
China 9,07 9,6 10,1 10,5 11,0 11,5 12,02 
Non-OPEC Supply 52,7 53.2 54.1 54.2 54.3 55.1 55.3 
OPEC Crude Capacity 35.7 34.2 34.4 35.8 36.9 37.6 37.8 
Source: IEA, Medium-Term Oil and Gas Markets, (June 2011) 
 
 
In the long-term, BP‘s ―Energy Outlook 2030‖ projects that Non-OECD Asia (mainly 
China and India) accounts for more than three-quarters of the net global increase, 
rising by nearly 13 (mb/d), (BP Energy Outlook 2030, 2011: 27). While the IEA‘s 
World Energy Outlook 2010 New Policies Scenario, predicts that global demand for 
oil will continue to grow steadily, reaching about 99 (mb/d), (excluding bio-fuels) by 
2035 — 15 (mb/d) higher than in 2009. All of the growth comes from non-OECD 
countries, 57 percent from China alone, mainly driven by rising use of transport fuels; 
demand in the OECD falls by over 6 (mb/d), (World Energy Outlook, 2010: 101), 
while oil demand increases the most in China (7.1 mb/d), (Ibid: 77). The IEA in its 
World Energy Outlook 2010 ―Current Policies Scenario/Reference Scenario‖ projects 
that China‘s daily demand for oil will be higher to reach 11.4 million barrels a day by 
2020, to hit over 14 (mb/d) by 2030, (World Energy Outlook, 2010). While in BP‘s 
Energy Outlook 2030 predicts that China will be the largest source of oil consumption 
growth, with consumption forecast to grow by 8 (mb/d) to reach 17.5 (mb/d) by 2030, 
overtaking the U.S. to become the world‘s largest oil consumer, (BP Energy Outlook 
2030, 2011: 33). More interestingly, OPEC and U.S.‘s projections put China‘s oil 
demand even higher, (see Table 3.2.1.3). 
122 
 
Indeed, China will continue to lead the charge as the No. 1 energy consumer over the 
next quarter century, and oil will remain the dominant fuel despite huge investment in 
alternatives. China is expected to account for more than a fifth of world demand by 
2035. The World Energy Outlook 2010 predicted that China‘s demand would jump 75 
percent between 2008 and 2035, contributing 36 percent to the projected growth in 
global energy use. Global demand would reach 16.74bn metric tonnes of oil 
equivalent by 2035, (World Energy Outlook, 2010). The biggest increase in demand 
in absolute terms occurs in China, where it jumps from just over 9 mb/d in 2010, 
(IEA, July 13, 2011), to more than 15 (mb/d) in 2035 — an increase of 2.4 percent per 
year on average in the New Policies Scenario, (World Energy Outlook, 2010: 104) 
(see Tables 3.2.1.2 and 3.2.1.3 below).  
 
(Table 3.2.1.3): Oil Production and Supply by Source and Scenario (mb/d) 
 
   New Policies 
Scenario 
Current Policies 
Scenario 
 450 Scenario  
 1980 2009 2020 2035 2020 2035 2020 2035 
OPEC 25.5 33.4 40.5 49.9 41.9 54.2 40.1 41.7 
Non-OPEC 37.1 47.7 48.2 46.1 48.9 49.9 45.1 36.7 
World production 62.6 81.0 88.7 96.0 90.8 104.1 85.2 78.5 
World Supply 63.8 83.3 91.3 99.0 93.5 107.4 87.7 81.0 
Source: World Energy Outlook 2010 
 
 
(Table 3.2.1.4): China Oil Demand and Projection 2015-2030 
 
Reference Case/Current Policies Scenarios (mb/d)) 
 2010 2015 2020 2030 
  OPEC IEA  EIA OPEC IEA  EIA OPEC IEA EIA 
China total 9.07 11.6 11.6 12.1 13.8 - 13.6 17.1 14.1 16.4 
World total 88.24 92.9 94.4 93.3 97.8 - 97.6 105.8 106.4 108.0 
China‟s 
Share of 
World 
Demand (%) 
10.3 12.4 12.2 12.9 14.1 - 12.5 16.1 13.2 14.3 
Source: based on World Oil Outlook 2011, World Energy Outlook 2010, International Energy 
Outlook 2011 and IEA, Medium-Term Oil and Gas Markets, (June 2011) 
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Indeed, by 2035, China could overtake the United States to become the largest oil 
consumer in the world, as oil demand in the United States declines from 17.8 mb/d in 
2009 to 14.9 mb/d in 2035, (World Energy Outlook, 2010: 86). Although China‘s per-
capita energy consumption is currently below the world average, in 2035 it is 
predicted to be 40 percent higher than today‘s global average (or 30 percent higher 
than the 2035 global average), thanks to strong economic growth and relatively slow 
population growth, (Ibid: 89). By 2035, China will account for 22 percent of world 
energy demand, up from 17 percent today, (Ibid: 47) (see Table 3.2.1.4). 
 
(Table 3.2.1.5): China‟s Total Consumption of Energy and Its Composition 1990-
2010 
 
  As Percentage of Total Energy Consumption 
 Total  
(million metric tonnes of 
coal equivalent) 
Coal 
(%) 
Oil 
(%) 
Natural 
gas 
(%) 
Others 
(includes hydro-, 
Nuclear and Wind 
Power) 
1990 987.0 76.2 16.6 2.1 5.1 
1991 1037.8 76.1 17.1 2.0 4.8 
1992 1091 75.7 17.5 1.9 4.9 
1993 1159.9 74.7 18.2 1.9 5.2 
1994 1227.4 75.0 17.4 1.9 5.7 
1995 1311.8 74.6 17.5 1.8 6.1 
1996 1351.9 73.5 18.7 1.8 6.0 
1997 1359.1 71.4 20.4 1.8 6.4 
1998 1361.8 70.9 20.8 1.8 6.5 
1999 1405.7 70.6 21.5 2.0 5.9 
2000 1455.3 69.2 22.2 2.2 6.4 
2001 1504.1 68.3 21.8 2.4 7.5 
2002 1594.3 68.0 22.3 2.4 7.3 
2003 1837.9 69.8 21.2 2.6 6.8 
2004 2134.6 69.5 21.3 2.5 6.7 
2005 2360.0 70.8 19.8 2.6 6.8 
2006 2586.8 71.1 19.3 2.9 6.7 
2007 2805.1 71.1 18.8 3.3 6.8 
2008 2914.5 70.3 18.3 3.7 7.7 
2009  3066.5 70.4 17.9 3.9 7.8 
2010
a 3247.4 70.0 19.1 4.3 6.6 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, (2010) 
(a) Adapted from The Wall Street Journal (28 February, 2011) 
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Despite increases in the use of renewable and nuclear energy sources, the pattern of 
China‘s primary energy usage has remained relatively constant since 1978 as 
illustrated in Table 3.2.1.5.  Oil accounts for only about 20 percent of China‘s total 
energy consumption in the past decade and is unlikely to change in the next decade, 
(see Tables 3.2.1.6, 3.2.1.7 and Figure 3.2.1.1).  Coal remains the dominant energy 
source, making up 70 percent of China‘s total energy consumption. Unless new clean 
coal technologies drive up the cost, coal will remain inexpensive relative to other 
resources in China and it is likely to remain China‘s main source of energy in the next 
few decades, (Jian, July 2011).  
 
In general, transport can be regarded as a ‗‗captive market for oil‖, as there is no cost-
effective and efficient substitute for oil in this sector. Fatih Birol, the IEA‘s chief 
economist, argues that:  ―The greatest driver for oil demand will come from the 
transportation sector.‖ Indeed, China‘s transport fuel and chemical feedstock will 
account for 70 percent of the oil demand in 2020, up from less than 50 percent in 
2000, with oil production in 2020 expected to be 200-230 million tonnes, which 
would imply an import dependence of around 65 percent, (Ibid). Demand for cars in 
China is set to increase about tenfold by 2035, (Pfeifer, November 9, 2010) (see 
Tables 3.2.1.5 & 3.2.1.6). 
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(Table 3.2.1.6): China‟s Future Oil Demand in Current Policies and 450 
Scenarios 
 
 Energy Demand (Mtoe) (a) Shares (%) 
 2020 2030 2035 2020 2030 2035 2020 2035 
 Current Policies 
Scenario (CPS) 
450 Scenario  CPS 450 CPS 450 
TPED (b) 3288 3907 4125 3097 3094 3131 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Fossil Fuels 
Coal 2104 2422 2574 1878 1398 1189 63.9% 60.6% 61% 38% 
Oil (Mtoe) 567 698 755 543 605 617 17.2% 17.5% 18% 20% 
(mb/d) 11.4 14.1 15.2 10.9 12.2 12.4 
Gas 179 270 326 178 266 321 5.4% 5.7% 8% 10% 
Renewable Energy 
Nuclear 124 174 189 143 288 358 3.7% 4.6% 4% 11% 
Hydro 92 106 112 94 117 120 2.8% 3.0% 3.0% 4.0% 
Biomass and 
Waste 
191 184 196 200 259 308 5.8% 6.4% 5.0% 10% 
Other 
Renewable 
32 54 63 61 162 218 0.09% 1.9% 10.% 7.0% 
Source: World Energy Outlook 2010 
(a)  Million Tonne of oil equivalent  & (b) Total Primary Energy Demand 
 
 
(Table 3.2.1.7): China‟s Energy Demand in New Policies Scenario 
 
 Energy demand (Mtoe) Shares (%) (a) 
 2008 2015 2020 2025 2030 2008 2015 2020 2025 2030 
TPED 2131 2887 3159 3369 3568 100 100 100 100 100 
Fossil Fuels 
Coal 1413 1879 1952 1981 1990 66.3 65.1 61.7 58 55.7 
Oil (Mtoe) 369 509 558 616 675 17.3 17.6 17.6 18.2 18.9 
 (mb/d) 7.4 10.2 11.2 12.4 13.5 
Gas 71 142 181 223 277 3.3 4.9 5.7 6.6 7.7 
Renewable Energy 
Total 
Renewable 
278 357 468 549 278 13.1 11.4 14.6 16.1 13.1 
Nuclear
  
18 60 136 178 210 0.08 2.0 4.3 5.2 5.8 
Hydro 50 74 94 106 112 2.3 2.5 2.9 3.1 3.1 
Biomass 
and Waste 
203 200 195 196 215 10.7 6.9 6.1 5.8 6.0 
Other 
Renewable 
7 23 43 69 95 0.03 0.07 1.3 2.0 2.6 
Source: World Energy Outlook 2010 
(a) Percentages were calculated by the author 
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China‘s strategy to mitigate the risk associated with such a high dependence on 
imports includes efforts to improve energy conservation and efficiency; increased 
focus on domestic exploration and production; increased investments in oil and gas 
abroad; diversification of import sources; and the development of alternative transport 
fuels. The country is also investing heavily in clean energy technologies, as well as 
electric cars, and could become a big exporter, (Pfeifer, 2010). China aims to reduce 
the portion of coal in the energy mix from 70 percent to 63 percent and to increase the 
proportion of non-fossil fuels in overall primary energy use to 11.4 percent by 2015, 
(Xinhua, March 4, 2011). The target has been included in the 12th Five-Year Plan 
(2011-2015), (Ibid); as part of China‘s long plan to achieve the goal of 15 percent by 
2020. Currently non-fossil fuels account for 8 percent of China‘s total energy 
consumption, (Xinhua, September 14, 2010).  
 
Cheng Siwei, a renowned Chinese economist and a former senior legislator, estimated 
that China could reduce the proportion of fossil fuel (natural resources: coal, oil and 
natural gases, and various forms of these, such as oil shales, methane, clathrates and 
lignite), in its total energy mix from the current 91 percent to 85 percent in 2020, 
(Xinhua, 2011). But most of the decline in fossil fuels has to come from the 
consumption of coal. China‘s National Energy Administration (NEA) predicts that 
China‘s coal consumption is likely to drop to 63 percent of total energy consumption 
by 2015, down from 70 percent in 2010. Non-fossil fuels will provide 11 percent of 
China‘s energy needs in 2015 and 15 percent in 2020, (Xinhua, July 20, 2010) (see 
Figure 3.2.1.1). 
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(Figure 3.2.1.1): China‟s Energy Mix Forecast by Fuel, 2008-2030 (%)  
 
 
Source: World Energy Outlook 2010 
 
 
It‘s predicted that China‘s oil demand will keep rising as the country is indeed in the 
middle of three rapidly evolving and energy intensive transformations: 
Industrialisation, Urbanisation and Motorisation. Industrialisation is driven by heavy 
industries like steel, cement and petrochemicals, all big energy consumers, (Dirks, 
September 13, 2007). The pace of urbanisation is progressing rapidly each year with 
almost 15 million rural Chinese moving into cities. Every year, China adds a total of 2 
billion square meters of building space, (Ibid). According to Tianyong Zhou, a 
professor at the Party School of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
China, currently, about 200 million rural residents have migrated into cities, and an 
additional 400 million to 500 million are going to do so, (Zhou, March 10, 2011). 
Around 55-60 percent of Chinese are expected to live in urban areas in 2020 
(Goldman Sachs, February 2011), compared to 47 percent today (635.8 million of 
1.34 billion), (UN, May 2011) and 20 percent in the 70s and 80s, (Yeo, 2010). 
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Additionally, McKinsey Global Institute has projected 15 ―super-cities‖ for China 
with an average population of 25 million or 11 ―city-clusters‖ each with combined 
populations of more than 60 million, (Ibid). 
 
(Table 3.2.1.8): China‟s Population Projections, Reference Case, 2010-2030 
 
 2010 2015 2020 2030 
Population (millions) 1,35 1,389 1,421 1,458 
Urbanisation (%) 46.9 51 55 60.2 
Source: World Oil Outlook 2011and NBS 
 
 
Motorisation is another major driving force for oil demand. The key forces driving 
China‘s transport oil demand include (a) the rapid growth of road transport, (b) the 
dieselization of rail transport and (c) the remarkable development of domestic air 
transport, (Leung, February 2010). Transport consumed about 14.7 percent of oil used 
in 1990, but this share had risen to about 45 percent in 2010.  The sector is still 
expanding rapidly: China overtook the U.S. in car sales in 2009, when its people 
bought 13.7 million cars (a 50 percent increase from 2008), rising to 17 million in 
2010, (Fangfang, January 31, 2011).   
 
(Table 3.2.1.9): Projection of China‟s Vehicle Population Through 2050 (Million 
car) 
 
 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
Total 63.5 184.8 383.8 499.0 606.7 
Passenger vehicles 50.1 165.8 342.8 477.8 585.4 
Buses 1.13 1.86 2.28 2.46 2.65 
Trucks 12.3 17.1 18.7 18.7 18.7 
Source: (Hao, 2011:1351)  
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As road transport is fuelled overwhelmingly by oil, its rapid expansion is assumed to 
have contributed significantly to the increase in transport oil demand. Tianyong Zhou, 
a professor at the Party School of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
China, estimates that at least 60 percent of the world‘s newly increased oil 
consumption in the future will be to fuel vehicles in China, (Zhou, 2011). While 
Wang Fuchang, the Chinese Director of the Department of Equipment Industry under 
the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, estimates that automobile 
ownership in China will exceed 200 million in 2020, causing serious energy security 
and environmental issues, (see Table 3.2.1.8). As no efficient and economical 
substitutes exist for diesel, gasoline and jet fuel (aviation kerosene) for transport and 
the military, oil is a necessity to the economy and military, therefore the oil‘s share in 
transport fuel mix in China could increase during the next decade, (World Energy 
Outlook 2007: 262) (see Table 3.2.1.10 below). 
 
(Table 3.2.1.10): China‟s Oil Demand, (2008-2030) 
 
In Economic Sectors, Reference Case (mb/d) 
 Level 
(million barrel per day) 
Growth 
(%) 
 2008 2010 2020 2035 2008-
2035 
Oil Demand  in Road Transportation 2.3 2.6 5.2 6.2 3.9 
Oil Demand in Marine Bunkers 0.2 0.2 0.6 2.1 1.9 
Oil Demand  in 
Residential/Commercial/Agriculture Sectors 
1.2 1.2 1.8 2.4 1.3 
Oil Demand  In other industry 2.0 2.1 2.4 2.6 0.6 
Oil Demand  in Domestic Waterways and 
Railways 
0.5 0.6 1.0 1.5 0.9 
Oil Demand  in Aviation 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.4 
Oil Demand in Petrochemicals 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.3 0.5 
Oil Demand  in Electricity Generation 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 - 0.1 
Total 8.3 8.9 13.8 18.4  
Source: World Oil Outlook 2011 
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3.2.2 China‟s Oil Supply: Not Enough Any More 
 
China produced an estimated 4.3 (mb/d) of total oil liquids in 2010, of which 96 
percent was crude oil, (EIA, May 2011). China ranked as the world‘s fifth biggest oil 
producer in 2010, (see Table 3.2.2.2). China‘s oil output in 2010 accounted for 5.2 
percent of the world‘s total, following Russia, Saudi Arabia and the U.S., and Iran 
(see Table 3.2.2.1). 
 
(Table 3.2.2.1): Top 10 World Oil Producers, (2010, mb/d) 
 
Rank Country  Production 2010 share of 
World‟s Total (%) 
1 Russia 10,27 12.9% 
2 Saudi Arabia 10,00 12.0% 
3 United States 7,51 8.7% 
4 Iran 4,24 5.2% 
5 China  4.07 5.2% 
6 Canada 3,33 4.2% 
7 Mexico 2,95 3.7% 
8 United Arab Emirates 2,84 3.3% 
9 Kuwait 2,50 3.1% 
10 Venezuela 2,47 3.1% 
 Total World 82.09 100% 
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy (June, 2011) 
 
 
According to China‘s National Statistical Bureau crude oil output in 2010 hit 203.01 
million tonnes, or 4.06 (mb/d), up 6.9 percent from 2009, while it warns that oil 
output could fall down to 190 million tonnes in 2011, (Bai,  January 19, 2011). 
China‘s apparent oil demand rose by 11.1 percent to 9.1 (mb/d) in 2010 which is 
equivalent to over a third of global demand growth in that year, (IEA, May 12, 2011).  
While China‘s oil demand in 2011 is projected to grow 6 percent, the equivalent of 40 
percent of global demand growth to 9.9, (Ibid) and oil supply will increase from 4.1 
(mb/d) to 4.3. As a result, China could import around 5.6 (mb/d) in 2011, (Ibid). 
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(Table 3.2.2.2): China‟s Oil Profile (selected indicators) 
 
 At end 
1999 
At end 
2010 
Share of World‟s total at end 2010 
(%) 
Proved Oil Reserves 
(m/b)  
15.1  14.8 1.1% 
Total Oil Production 
(mb/d) 
3.21 4.07 5.2% 
Consumption (mb/d) 4.47 9.05 10.6% 
Refinery Capacities 
(mb/d) 
5.40 10.12 11% 
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy (June 2011) 
 
 
(Figure 3.2.2.1): China‟s Demand Surpassed Production (1994-2035, mb/d) 
 
 
Source: IEA, May 2011 (years 1994-2010) and EIA, September 2011(years 2015-2035) 
 
 
The Chinese oil and gas sectors are dominated by the big three, China National 
Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation, 
(Sinopec), and China National Offshore Oil Corporation, (CNOOC). Together they 
account for 88 percent of China‘s oil and 94 percent of gas output, (World Energy 
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Outlook 2007: 268).  China‘s onshore oil reserves are mostly located in the Northeast 
and in Xinjiang. China‘s indigenous oil production rose from about 2.7 million barrels 
a day in 1990, (Chen, March 3, 2009), to nearly 4.06 million barrels a day in 2010 
(see Figure 3.2.2.5). The newly increased demand is mainly met by imports. China‘s 
overseas equity oil production grew significantly this decade from 140,000 barrels per 
day in 2000 to 1.2 (mb/d) in 2009, (EIA, May 2011 May). Analysts forecast China‘s 
net overseas oil production at 1.7 (mb/d) by 2015 and 2 (mb/d) by 2020, (Dittrick, 
February 8, 2010). 
 
(Figure 3.2.2.2): Map Of China Indicating Major Provinces and Oil Field 
 
Source: Rigzone 
 
 
Domestically, China relies on coal to meet nearly 70 percent of its total energy needs. 
Chinese policymakers clearly understand that there are good reasons to diversify 
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away from coal but China has limited domestic alternative supply options, (Dirks, 
2007). The skyrocketing and sustained economic growth, in conjunction with a 
population of more than 1.3 billion people, has demanded more energy supplies. 
Despite the surging demand, domestic supply of oil has been a disappointment. 
China‘s domestic oil supply has failed to keep pace with demand, and the outlook for 
substantially increasing it is grim. China also till now has never discovered large oil 
reserves. Its traditional fields are old and their production is either flat or declining, 
(Ibid) (see figure 3.2.2.3 below). Recent projections of China‘s oil production for 
2030 expected the production to increase from 4 million barrels per day in 2010 to 4.5 
(mb/d) in 2030. There is no evidence (till now) to suggest that China‘s domestic oil 
reserves will double or triple in the next decade, thus a significant proportion of its 
incremental consumption will have to be met by imports. 
 
(Figure 3.2.2.3): China‟s Oil Production in the New Policies Scenario (mb/d) 
 
 
Source: World Energy Outlook 2010 and China‘s NSB (2010) 
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3.2.3 China‟s Oil Imports: Growing Appetite 
 
Currently, China is the second largest oil importer in the world and there is every 
reason to believe that it will soon top the United States in consumption of foreign 
petroleum. China‘s emergence as a major oil importer has occurred both relatively 
recently and quite rapidly. It testifies to the nation‘s success in growth and 
development. China, the world‘s fastest-growing major economy, has grown 9.88 
percent annually over the past 30 years. So to begin, in terms of China‘s oil demands 
and imports, it‘s important to note that China was self sufficient in oil as recently as 
1993.  
 
Ten years later, in 2003, China with a 5.6 (mb/d) consumption rate surpassed Japan to 
become the world‘s second largest consumer of oil, (The International Crisis Group, 
2008: 2). In 2004, China became the world‘s third largest importer of oil behind the 
United States and Japan. And in 2009 Japan dropped to third place among oil 
importers, behind the U.S. and China, (Sato & Okada, 2010). China has made large 
strides in exploiting its domestic resources, but the effects of growth have outstripped 
those resources and led to rising net oil imports. The trend has probably become 
irreversible, unless large new reserves of economically-exploitable oil can be found, 
(IEA, 2000: 43).  The widening gap between China‘s oil demand and domestic supply 
indicates that it will be increasingly dependent on imported oil (see Figure 3.2.3.1). 
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(Figure 3.2.3.1): Top Ten Net Oil Importers, 2010 (mb/d) 
 
 
Source: EIA, Short-Term Energy Outlook (April 2011) 
 
 
Since China became a net oil importer in 1993 its net import dependency soared from 
7.5 percent in 1993 to around 54 percent in 2010 and about 55 percent in the first half 
of 2011, (Fei, 2011). The psychological 50 percent threshold made China‘s ―energy 
security‖ an inevitable issue among the country‘s national press, think tanks and the 
authorities, (Economides, 2010). According to Lin Boqiang the director of the China 
Center for Energy Economic Research at Xiamen University, China‘s foreign oil 
dependency ratio, (the ratio of crude oil imports to overall oil consumption), has 
grown 2.8 percent annually over the last 10 years, (Boqiang, 2011).  According to 
China‘s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), China‘s foreign 
crude oil dependency ratio in the first half of 2011 recorded about 55 percent, for the 
first time exceeding that of the United States, (Cai, 2011). 
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(Table: 3.2.3.1): China‟s Oil Production, Consumption and Imports, 1990-2010 
 
 Oil 
Production 
(million 
metric tons) 
(a) 
Oil 
Consumption 
(million 
metric  tons) 
Oil 
imports 
(million 
metric 
tons) 
Oil 
Exports 
(million 
metric 
tons) 
Net Oil 
Imports 
(million 
metric 
tons) 
Net Oil 
Dependency 
(%)(b) 
1980 106.0 87.6 0.4 13.3 - 12.9 - 14.7 
1985 124.9 91.7 0.7 31.2 - 30.5 - 33.3 
1990 138.3 114.9 7.6 31.1 - 23.5 - 20.5% 
1991 141.0 123.8 12.5 29.3 -16.8 - 13.6% 
1992 142.1 133.6 21.2 28.6 - 7.3 -5.5% 
1993 145.2 147.2 36.2 25.1 11.1 7.5% 
1994 146.1 149.5 29.0 23.8 5.2 3.5% 
1995 150.1 160.6 36.7 24.5 12.2 7.6% 
1996 157.3 174.3 45.4 27.0 18.4 10.6% 
1997 160.7 194.1 67.9 28.2 39.7 20.5% 
1998 161.0 198.2 57.4 23.3 34.1 17.2% 
1999 160.0 210.7 64.8 16.4 48.4 23.0% 
2000 163.0 224.4 97.5 21.7 75.8 33.8% 
2001 164.0 228.4 91.2 20.5 70.7 31.0% 
2002 167.0 247.9 102.7 21.4 81.3 32.8% 
2003 169.3 271.3 131.9 25.4 106.5 39.3% 
2004 175.9 317.0 172.9 22.4 150.5 47.5% 
2005 181.4 325.3 171.6 28.9 142.8 43.9% 
2006 184.8 348.8 194.5 26.3 168.3 48.2% 
2007 186.3 366.5 211.4 26.6 184.8 50.4% 
2008  190.4 373.2 230.2 29.5 200.7 53.8% 
2009  198.8 408.3 251.5 33.1 218.4 53.5% 
2010 
© 
203.01 442.3 239.3 3.3 236.01 53.4% 
Source: China‘s Energy Statistical Yearbook, 2010, 2005 and 2003 
(a) One metric ton oil = 7.33 barrels of oil (Approximate conversion factors, BP 
Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2009) 
(b) Net oil dependency stands for the percentage of the amount  of net oil imports over 
the amount of total oil consumption 
(c) China daily ( January 21, 2011) 
 
 
Indeed, China will become increasingly reliant on imports for its growing oil demand 
as domestic production will see no big breakthrough in the years ahead. China‘s 
production levels are expected to be near peak. There are relatively few new source 
projects in the inventory to offset declines in the producing base. Without significant 
improvements in new reserve discoveries production will begin to decline in less than 
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a decade. Based on future demand growth crude oil imports would have to double by 
the middle of the next decade (see Figure 3.2.3.2 & 3.2.3.3 below). 
 
(Figure: 3.2.3.2): China‟s Current Oil Demand Supply Gap (1994-2011) 
 
Source: EIA database 
 
 
(Figure: 3.2.3.3): China‟s Future Oil Demand Supply Gap (2010-2025) 
 
 
Source: China‘s Energy Statistical Yearbook 0111 and World Energy Outlook 2010;  
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In this context, Beijing will have to rely on imports for 60-78 percent of its total oil 
demand by 2020-2030, (up from 54 percent now). Based on the demand and supply 
projections, China‘s oil imports are expected to increase from about 4.8 million 
barrels per day (mb/d) in 2010 to between 6-8 (mb/d) in 2015 and 7-11 in 2030, (see 
Table 3.2.3.2). This wide projected range reflects the uncertainty about China‘s future 
economic growth. Chinese and international experts expect China‘s oil demand and 
imports to continue to grow. Chinese scholars suggest that oil imports will account for 
60 percent of Chinese energy needs, while the International Energy Agency believes 
that the figure could be higher.  Ultimately, it doesn‘t matter how different the figures 
and predictions are, the fact is that China therefore will have no choice but to rely on 
imported oil from Middle East in particular. While analysts may quibble over the 
actual figure, there is consensus that the Chinese thirst for oil will only increase, (Jin, 
2005: 3-10). According to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), 64.5 
percent of the country‘s oil consumption is likely to be met by imports in 2020, (Wan, 
December 21, 2009). While IEA put the figure at 67 percent, (see Table 3.2.3.2 
below). According to the International Energy Agency, by 2030 foreign supplies 
(mainly from the Middle East) will account for 78 percent of China‘s total oil 
consumption, and the U.S. Energy Information Administration puts it at 77 percent 
(World Energy Outlook 2008: 105). 
 
(Table: 3.2.3.2): Estimates of China‟s Oil Imports Dependency 2010-2030, (mb/d) 
 
  2010  2015 2020 2030 
Supply 4.0 3.8 3.7 3.1 
Demand 8.8 11.3 11.4 14.1 
Balance -4.8 -7.3 - 7.6 -11 
Imports dependency 54% 65% 67% 78% 
Source: based on World Energy Outlook 2010 (Current Policy Scenarios) 
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(Figure: 3.2.3.4): Oil Imports From Middle East (2030) 
 
Source: Strategic Trends 2011 (Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich) 
 
 
China is not unique in this position and it is not the only major country that has passed 
the 50 percent energy security alert level, the U.S., Japan and Germany, to name a 
few, import on a considerable scale. Almost half of U.S. oil consumption comes from 
abroad, (EIA, 2011). Germany has virtually no domestic oil production and its 2.5 
(mb/d) consumption relies on external supply, (Ng, 2007 and EIA, 2011). Japan for 
example buys 90 percent of its crude oil from the Middle East, while Singapore gets 
about 85 percent of its needs from the region and South Korea about 82 percent. India 
imports 80 percent of its crude oil needs, mostly from the Middle East, (Rook, 2011) 
(see Figure 3.2.2.3). This situation will definitely bring China closer to the oil 
consumer countries in coordinating measures to stabilise the world oil market. 
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(Figure: 3.2.3.5): China‟s Net Import Dependence 2008-2030 
  
Source: World Energy Outlook, 2009 
 
 
3.3 MIDDLE EAST OIL: VITAL ROLE AND FEW ALTERNATIVES  
 
 
The importance of the Middle East oil cannot be over-emphasised. The Middle East is 
by far the well-endowed region in the world. In 2010, it held 753 billion barrels of 
proven reserves, (EIA, 2011). In the same year, the region produced 25.45 million 
barrels per day (mb/d), accounting almost 30 percent of the world‘s total. Unlike 
many other producers, the Middle East exports the bulk of its oil production, and thus 
the region‘s exports constitute more than 42 percent of the world‘s crude oil exports, 
(see Table 3.3.3). Spare capacity is concentrated in three Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) member states of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE, with Saudi Arabia 
holding the bulk of the world‘s available spare capacity. This has allowed the KSA to 
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act as swing producer, filling the gap at times of supply disruptions. Finally, Oil 
reserves in the Middle East countries are among the cheapest to find, develop and 
produce in the world. The IEA estimates total production costs typically average 
between US$3 and US$5 per barrel of oil produced. This compares with over US$15 
in the North Sea and US$12 in the Gulf of Mexico, (IEA, 2005: 133). In spite of 
China aggressive policy to diversify its oil imports, in 2010 nearly half of China‘s oil 
imports was supplied by the Middle East. Growing oil imports from the Middle East 
since the mid-1990s can be partly attributed to China‘s active oil diplomacy of 
targeting large oil producers, ((Lai, 2007: 519-537). As late as 1995 China‘s oil 
imports from the Middle East primarily relied on smaller oil producers, such as Oman 
and Yemen. By 2003 the large producers Saudi Arabia and Iran had surpassed Oman 
and Yemen to become China‘s top two oil suppliers, (Ibid) and since then Saudi 
Arabia hold the position of China‘s top oil supplier.   
 
(Figure 3.3.1): Middle East Proved Oil Reserves (at end 2010) 
 
 
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy (June 2011) 
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(Figure 3.3.2): Liquid Fuels Production in MENA, (at end 2010) 
 
 
 Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, (March, 2011) 
 
 
OPEC, which is mainly controlled by Middle Eastern countries, will see its power 
increase over the decades. OPEC‘s share in global oil production is set to increase 
from 41 percent currently to 46 percent by 2030, a share not seen since 1977, (BP 
Energy Outlook 2030, 2011:79). Projections suggest total OPEC production will rise 
continually through to 2035, with its share of global output increasing to 52 percent. 
Gains will be concentrated in Saudi Arabia, which will boost output 52 percent to 
14.6 million barrels a day by 2035, (World Energy Outlook 2010: 101). By contrast, 
total non-OPEC oil production is broadly constant to around 2025, as rising 
production of NGLs and unconventional production offsets a fall in that of crude oil; 
thereafter, production starts to drop, (Ibid) (see Figure: Table 3.3.2). 
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(Figure 3.3.3): OPEC‟s Critical Role in the Oil Market 
 
 
Source: BP‘s Energy Outlook 2030 (January 2011)  
 
 
China‘s appetite for oil is set to grow in the coming years and its dependence on 
Middle Eastern sources of energy is also set to increase, (Pant, 2008). The Middle 
East (excluding North Africa) holds about 54 percent of the world‘s proven 
conventional oil reserves.  The world‘s proven oil reserves reach 1383.2 billion 
barrels, (excluding Canadian oil sands), Middle Eastern producers accounted for 54.4 
percent of global reserves (752.5 billion barrels), led by Saudi Arabia with 264.5 
billion barrels or about 20 percent of the world‘s total, (BP‘s Statistical Review of 
World Energy, 2011: 6). 
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(Table 3.3.1): Middle East Oil Production  
 
In the New Policies Scenario (Selected indicators, mb/d and %) 
 1980 2009 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 
Total Middle East  18.5 24.8 29.6 31.3 32.8 35.2 38.1 
Total OPEC Production 25.5 33.4 38.5 40.5 42.7 46.0 49.9 
(%) of World‟s 
total 
 
 
41% 41% 44% 46% 47% 49% 52% 
Total non-
OPEC 
Production 37.1 47.7 48.2 48.2 48.2 47.4 46.1 
(%) of World‟s 
total 
 
 
59% 59% 56% 54% 53% 51% 48% 
Saudi Arabia 10.0 9.6 11.2 11.5 12.2 13.2 14.6 
Iraq 2.6 2.5 3.6 4.8 5.3 6.1 7.0 
Iran 1.5 4.3 4.7 4.8 5.0 5.1 5.3 
Angola 0.2 1.8 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.5 1.4 
Canada 1.7 3.2 3.8 4.0 4.5 4.9 5.3 
Mexico 2.1 3.0 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.5 
Caspian 0.9 2.9 3.7 4.4 5.3 5.4 5.2 
Source: World Energy Outlook 2010 
 
 
The Middle East also controls a significant portion of the hydrocarbons that are yet to 
be discovered. According to the U.S. Geological Survey, over 50 percent of the 
undiscovered reserves of oil and 30 percent of gas are concentrated in the region 
primarily in Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, UAE, and Libya, (Gal, June 2, 
2008). Additionally, the U.S. Geological Survey estimates there are some three 
trillion barrels of heavy oil
3
 in the world, about 100 years of global consumption at 
current levels, (Casselman, May 25, 2011). It is therefore no surprise that diplomatic, 
economic and energy relations between China and the Middle East have been 
systematically deepened over the last ten years, (Andrews-Speed, July 13, 2009). 
Nobuo Tanaka, the Executive Director of the International Energy Agency, predicts 
                                                             
3
 Heavy oil, which can be as thick as molasses, is harder to get out of the ground than light oil and costs 
more to refine into gasoline. Only a fraction of it - about 400 billion barrels - can be recovered using 
existing technology. Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have embarked on an ambitious 
experiment to coax it out of the Neutral Zone.  
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that the global dependency on the members of the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries for oil (OPEC) will rise in the next five to 10 years as production 
by non-OPEC countries declines, and the cost of production in OPEC states is also 
much cheaper, (Sharma,  September 3, 2010). The Middle East now supplies around 
half of China‘s oil imports.  Saudi Arabia alone, in 2010, accounts for around 20 
percent of this oil portion, (China Oil Web, March 1, 2011). The Middle East remains 
the largest and key swing supply region, (IEA, May 2011: 17). Middle East sales 
average 16.7 (mb/d) by 2016, and exports to non-OECD Asia rise by more than 1.7 
mb/d, (Ibid) (see Table 3.3.2 below). 
 
(Table 3.3.2):  OPEC‟s Members Proved Oil Reserves (at end 2010) 
 
 Country Billion Barrels Share of 
World‟s Total 
1 Saudi Arabia 264.5 19.1% 
2 Venezuela 211.2 15.3% 
3 Iran 137.0 9.9% 
4 Iraq 115.0 8.3% 
5 Kuwait 101.5 7.3% 
6 U.A.E 97.8 7.1% 
7 Libya 46.4 3.3% 
8 Nigeria 37.2 2.7% 
9 Qatar 25.9 2.0% 
10 Angola 13.5 1.0% 
11 Algeria 12.2 0.9% 
12 Ecuador 6.2 0.4% 
Total OPEC All Countries 1029.4 77.3% 
Middle East -OPEC Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, 
Kuwait, U.A.E. and Qatar 
741.7 53.7% 
GCC - OPEC Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 
U.A.E. and Qatar 
489.7 35.5% 
World All Countries 1383.2
a 
100.0% 
Source:  Adapted from BP Statistical Review of World Energy (June 2011) 
(a) Excluding Canada‘s oil sand 
 
 
Within this context, China views the Middle East with great importance for four 
reasons. (a) The Middle East has a vast amount of oil which China desires. (b) China 
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realises that nearly two-thirds of the world‘s proven oil reserves are located in the 
Middle East, (Ibid). Currently over one trillion barrels are believed to be in (OPEC) 
Member Countries, (El-Badri, 2010). This figure will certainly increase in the future, 
given the under-explored status of most of OPEC‘s countries and the potential for 
increases in the ultimate recovery factors. Furthermore, China recognises that Middle 
Eastern nations belonging to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) will play an increasingly vital role in supplying global energy in the future. 
(c) The Middle East is currently the region with the lowest production cost for oil, and 
(d) China can offset much of its oil costs by increasing its export of construction and 
labour services; export goods; and by attracting Arab Gulf investments, (Shichor, 
2006: 665-683). 
 
China is seeking to diversify its sources of crude oil toward overland sources of 
supply such as Russia, Central Asia and Africa, but the reality of the balance of oil 
reserves globally means that China has little choice but to seek new reserve access in 
the Middle East, (Andrews-Speed 2009: 9). If China only needed two to three million 
(mb/d) of oil, it might be able to purchase them from neighbours such as Russia, 
Kazakhstan and Asian countries, supplemented by purchases from smaller Middle 
Eastern and African producers. But with the huge oil imports predicted for the next 
decade and beyond, China is compelled to turn to the Middle East, (Ghafouri, 2009: 
80-90). In this regard, Saudi Arabian Oil Minister Ali al-Naimi argues that Russia‘s 
rising crude shipments to Asian markets via the Pacific Ocean pose no threat to 
Middle Eastern producers‘ position as the largest suppliers to the region, (Alejandro, 
March 16, 2010). He went to highlight the importance of OPEC by saying: ―We‘re 
not concerned about a blip here and there…We‘ve got the world‘s highest reserves, 
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the world‘s largest production capacity -- we can compete with anyone big or small‖, 
(Ibid). Indeed, OPEC has most of the world oil spare capacity. OPEC‘s spare capacity 
now is put at anything between 6 (mb/d) (by OPEC) and 3-5 (mb/d) (by industry 
analysts); Saudi Arabia‘s share of that excess is perhaps 3-3.5 (mb/d), (The 
Economist, March 11, 2011) (see Figure 3.3.3). 
 
(Figure 3.3.4): OPEC‟s Spare Oil Capacity, 2001-2013 
 
 
Source: EIA, Short-Term Energy Outlook, (January, 2012) 
 
 
The Middle East region also has other comparative advantages compared to the two 
other major oil producing regions, Africa and Eurasia, in terms of reliability. Most 
countries in the region have a strong political will to ensure stability of oil supply due 
to the high dependency of their economies on oil revenue. Middle Eastern oil also has 
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a comparative price advantage, as the average cost of lifting a barrel of oil in the 
regions is much lower than other regions, (Ma, June 2008) (see Table 3.3.3 below).  
 
(Table 3.3.3): World Oil Production/Exports (mb/d)), 2001-2010 
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Share of 
2010 (%)  
Total Oil Supply 
World 77.67 76.98 79.59 83.11 84.57 84.53 84.40 85.40 84.23 86.7 100% 
OPEC 30.59 28.92 30.63 33.26 34.95 34.72 34.37 35.70 33.87 35.05 40.4% 
Middle 
East 
22.77 21.54 22.90 24.65 25.55 25.18 24.55 25.84 24.40 25.4 29.2% 
Saudi 
Arabia 
9.15 8.80 10.07 10.49 11.09 10.66 10.24 10.78 9.76 10.5 12.1% 
Crude Oil Exports 
World 38.05 38.04 39.96 43.27 44.41 43.56 42.67 42.69 41.22 37.82
 100%a 
OPEC 20.40 19.41 21.03 23.46 24.96 24.56 24.09 24.77 22.73 22.77 60.2%
b 
Middle 
East 
15.53 14.50 15.33 17.05 17.85 17.25 16.72 17.53 15.77 15.98 42.2%c 
Saudi 
Arabia 
6.25 5.98 6.87 7.14 7.69 7.30 6.94 7.24 6.35 6.64 17.5%d 
Source: EIA (2011) and OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 2010/2011 (for a, b, c and d) 
 
 
Since 2000 China has attempted to diversify sources of energy and has increased 
imports from Africa, Latin America, Central Asia and other regions. Yet, in 2010 
almost half of China‘s oil imports came from the Middle East. Given the global oil 
reserve and production pattern and statistics, the Middle East‘s status as China‘s 
leading oil supplier is unlikely to change any time soon, (Zhu, May 12, 2009). In the 
coming years, China can perhaps moderate, but will not escape, dependence on crude 
oil from the Middle East, (IEA 2000: 64). According to Raja Almarzoqi Albqami, 
Director of the Saudi-based Institute of Diplomatic Studies, ―Fifty percent of China‘s 
oil imports currently come from the Middle East region and by 2015 this share will 
increase to 70 percent‖,  (EIU, May 9, 2011: 9) (see Table 3.3.4). 
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(Table 3.3.4): China‟s Oil Dependence on Middle East (1993-2010, million tons) 
 
Year  China‟s Import from 
Middle East (Mt) 
China‟s Total 
Import (Mt) 
Middle East of China‟s Total Oil 
Imports (%)  
2010 114.1 239.3 47.7 
2009 97.4 203.7 47.8 
2008 89.6 178.8 50.0 
2007 72.7 163.1 44.5 
2006 65.6 145.1 45.1 
2005 59.9 127.0 47.2 
2004 55.7 122.8 45.4 
2003 46.3 91.1 50.8 
2002 34.3 69.4 49.5 
2001 33.8 60.2 56.1 
2000 37.6 70.2 53.5 
1999 16.9 36.6 46.1 
1998 16.6 27.3 61.0 
1997 16.7 35.4 47.3 
1996 11.9 22.6 52.8 
1995 7.7 17.0 45.4 
1994 4.9 12.3 39.7 
1993 6.5 15.6 42.1 
Average 1993-2010 (%) 48.4 
Source: China‘s Energy Statistical Yearbook, various years 
 
 
The vital role of the Middle East in China‘s energy strategy is due to their cordial 
economic and political relationship, the advantages of the region as an oil supplier, 
and the difficulty for China to substitute Middle East oil by other sources. Taking into 
consideration global oil distribution, producing capacity, supply potential, import 
costs and other factors, most of China‘s future oil imports, accounting for more than 
half of the total, will have to come from the Middle East and North Africa particularly 
from the Arab Gulf States, (John, 2007). China has no near term substitute for Middle 
Eastern oil. It is no secret that even as China is attempting to diversify its foreign 
sources of energy, the Middle East remains a key supplier of the oil that China 
depends upon to sustain its continuous economic growth, (Jiang, 2007: 12-15) (see 
Figure 3.3.3). 
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(Figure 3.3.5): Oil Production by Country and Region, 2008 and 2035 
 
 
Source: International Energy Outlook 2011 (September, 2011) 
 
 
In this regard, the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) predicts that the world‘s 
dependence on GCC oil and gas will rise between now and 2020. Most of the 
increases in oil supply are expected to come from the Middle East, which has the bulk 
of the world‘s proven reserves and relatively low production costs, (EIU, March 
2009). Much will come from the GCC; Iraq and Iran have significant long-term 
output potential but their development will be hampered by political factors, (Ibid). 
The scope for non-OPEC supply growth appears to be limited. Large new projects (in 
Brazil and Kazakhstan among others) will be partly offset by falling production in 
maturing fields (for instance in Mexico and the UK), (Ibid). Finally, there are 
expectations that unconventional oil (shale rock, oil sands, and heavy oil formations) 
production will rise rapidly in the U.S., Canada and South America over the next 
decade. Taking into consideration the timetable, producing capacity, supply potential, 
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import costs and other factors the Middle East will still be dominant in years or 
maybe decades to come. 
 
For example, non-OPEC supply, including non-conventional, bio-fuels and NGLs, 
will likely peak by 2011 at around 52.3 (mb/d). Thereafter, we see steady declines in 
production, reaching 51 million (mb/d) by 2015. As a result, reliance on OPEC crude 
will only grow from now to 2015. In contrast OPEC oil supply will increase from 
over 34 (mb/d) in 2009 to around 43 (mb/d) in 2015, (Bank of America Merrill 
Lynch, February 16, 2010). OPEC plans to add 12 million barrels to its daily 
production capacity by 2015, equal to Saudi Arabia‘s current capacity. Global oil 
demand is expected to advance 1 percent a year to 105 million barrels a day by 2030 
from over 87 million barrels a day in 2010. Most of the increase in output would need 
to come from OPEC countries, which hold the bulk of remaining recoverable 
conventional oil resources.  OPEC‘s oil production is expected to increase 1.8 percent 
a year through 2030 to 53.8 million barrels a day. The group‘s share of global oil 
output is forecast to rise to 52 percent, (Martinez, 2010).  
 
Abdullah El-Badri, OPEC‘s Secretary-General, told the Financial Times recently: 
―OPEC‘s member countries now have a total of 150 projects under development, 
which would add about 12 (mb/d) of oil-production capacity by 2014...We base our 
projection not mainly on OECD countries: 80 percent of the growth that we see in the 
future will come from India and China, and the Middle East and Asia as a whole‖, 
(Hoyos, March 30, 2010). He noted that demand from developed nations would 
shrink by 4.4 (mb/d) and that growth in Asian demand would be almost the same 
amount. ―Really the world is going east as we see it. Whatever the decline in OECD 
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countries is, it is picking up in Asia‖, (Ibid). Indeed, China‘s share of total global oil 
consumption is forecast to increase from 10 percent today to 16 percent (see Table 
3.2.1.4). The largest volumes of exports are likely to come from the Middle East. 
Some forecasts envisage China‘s reliance on Middle East oil (see Table 3.3.5) 
reaching as high as 70 percent of net import by 2015, (Ma, 2008).  
 
(Table 3.3.5): World Total Liquids Production by Region and Country 
 
Reference Case, 2008-2035 
 2008 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 Average Annual 
Percent Change, 
2008-2035 
OPEC 35.6 38.6 40.8 43.1 45.0 46.9 1.0 
Middle East 24.2 27.0 28.9 31.2 33.3 35.2 1.4 
Iran 4.2 4.0 3.8 3.7 3.8 3.9 -0.3- 
Iraq 2.4 2.9 3.6 4.5 5.5 6.3 3.7 
Kuwait 2.7 3.0 3.1 3.3 3.7 4.0 1.4 
Qatar 1.2 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.5 2.7 
Saudi Arabia 10.7 11.6 12.8 13.9 14.6 15.4 1.4 
United Arab Emirates 3.0 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.3 3.2 0.2 
North Africa 4.1 3.5 3.4 3.4 3.3 3.2 -0.9- 
Algeria 2.2 2.6 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.3 0.3 
Libya 1.9 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 -3.0- 
West Africa 4.2 5.3 5.5 5.5 5.4 5.4 1.0 
South America 3.1 2.9 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.1 -0.1- 
Non-OPEC 50.0 54.7 56.8 60.1 63.0 65.3 1.0 
Russia 9.8 10.8 11.4 12.2 12.8 13.3 1.1 
Caspian Area 2.6 3.5 3.8 4.2 4.4 4.5 2.1 
China 4.0 4.0 4.2 4.8 5.2 5.3 1.0 
Middle East (Non-
OPEC) 
1.5 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.1 1.1 -1.3- 
Africa 2.7 3.0 3.2 3.4 3.5 3.5 1.0 
Central and South 
America 
4.3 6.2 7.2 8.1 8.9 9.4 3.0 
Total world 85.7 93.3 97.6 103.2 108.0 112.2 1.0 
Middle East share of 
world production
a 
27.2% 28.3% 26.8% 28.9% 29.6% 30.2%  
Arabian/Persian Gulf 
share of world 
production 
27% 28% 27% 29% 30% 30%  
Note: Conventional liquids include crude oil and lease condensates natural gas plant liquids 
and refinery gains 
(a) All percentages were calculated by the author 
Source:  International Energy Outlook (September 2011) 
 
 
153 
 
3.4  CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has attempted to decipher Chinese intentions towards the Middle East. 
The main question it attempted to address was whether Chinese actions are primarily 
guided by economic imperatives or a political agenda. This chapter has shown that 
China‘s oil policy toward the Middle East is primarily driven by economic 
imperatives. Among these imperatives, China‘s need for oil is the most important. 
China is seeking to diversify its sources of crude oil toward overland sources of 
supply such as Russia, Central Asia and Africa.  
 
However, the reality of the balance of oil reserves, production and exports globally 
means that China has little choice but to seek new reserve access in the Middle East. 
This chapter has also shown that the Middle East region has particular significance for 
China in meeting its energy needs. The orientation of China‘s oil policy towards the 
Middle East, both in terms of timing or location fits with the economic 
interdependence theory as China realises that its ability to meet its future energy 
demands strongly hinges mostly on the Middle East region. China has no near term 
substitute for Middle Eastern oil, given that its own oil fields are almost fully 
exploited. As for the future, this study expects Saudi Arabia (and the Middle East) to 
play a major role in meeting Chinese demand for oil the next two decades.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
STRATEGIC AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
CHINA-SAUDI RELATIONS 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
China and Saudi Arabia cherish a long tradition of friendship, and the two peoples 
started contacts quite early. The Prophet Mohammed is said to have advised Muslims 
to‚ seek knowledge even unto China. This famous remark of the Prophet of Islam 
both affirmed the value of Chinese culture and ties between the two countries and 
encouraged later generations to continually strengthen contacts, (Liu 2006). In 650 
CE, the Muslim Caliph Uthman Ibn Affan sent one of the companions of the Prophet 
Mohammed as an emissary to the newly established Tang Dynasty. That date marks 
the beginning of Islam in China. Ever since, Muslims have played a prominent role in 
Chinese society, (Freeman, 2011).  
 
Contemporarily, the political relations between China and Saudi Arabia date to the 
mid-30s and 40s of the last century. These relations were stopped after the founding 
of communist China in 1949.  However, after China‘s opening up to the outside world 
in 1979, despite the absence of diplomatic relations, unofficial ties between the two 
countries have been developed in three directions. At the beginning came resuming 
the Chinese Muslims Hajj (pilgrims) to Makkah at the end of the seventies, then 
economically through the entry of Chinese goods to the Saudi market at the beginning 
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of the eighties, and finally militarily by providing Saudi Arabia with long-term 
missiles in the second half of the eighties. Relations later developed further to peak in 
1990 after the resumption of formal diplomatic relations.  
 
This chapter attempts to provide a historical and political background of Chinese 
behaviour towards Saudi Arabia and to decipher whether China‘s actions were based 
on economic interests or a political agenda to undermine the American influence. 
 
 
4.2  HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE  
 
 
In recent history Saudi Arabia‘s diplomatic relations with China span back to 1939, 
when the Kingdom was the first Arab country to normalise its political ties with 
China. Also, Saudi Arabia was the first Arab country to support the Chinese people‘s 
struggle against the invasion of Japan as some sources claim that the Saudi King 
Abdul Aziz met with a political delegation of China‘s Muslims in 1937 and expressed 
sympathy and support to the cause of the Chinese people against the threat of Japan, 
(Jafar, 1999). The relationship came even closer, when the two countries signed the 
treaty of amity in Jeddah, on November 15, 1946. 
His EXCELLENCY THE PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA, on the one hand, and His MAJESTY THE KING OF SAUDI 
ARABIA, on the other hand, Animated by the desire to establish and to consolidate the bonds 
of friendship and good understanding between their respective countries, have resolved to 
conclude a Treaty of Amity and have for this purpose appointed as their  Plenipotentiaries:  
His Excellency the President of the National Government of the Republic of China:  His 
Excellency Mr. Cheng Ye-tung, Ambassador Extraordinary and  Plenipotentiary of the 
Republic of China to Iran;  His Majesty the King of Saudi Arabia:  His Excellency Sheikh 
Youssif Yasseen, Acting Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia,  Who, having communicated their 
Full Powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:  
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Article I: There shall be perpetual peace and amity between the Republic of China and the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as well as between their peoples.  
Article II:  The High Contracting Parties agree to establish diplomatic relations between the 
two States in conformity with the principles of Public International Law.  They also agree that 
diplomatic representatives of each State shall enjoy, on the basis of reciprocity, in the territory 
of the other, the treatment recognized by the general principles of Public International 
Law…‖, (United Nations Treaty Series Online Collection, 1946). 
 
The relations continued until the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) seized power in 
China in 1949, and the diplomatic relations between the two countries was broken off, 
(Jafar, 1999). Despite the absence of diplomatic relations, unofficial meetings 
between China and Saudi Arabia continued and date back to 1950s, through the so-
called ―Hajj diplomacy.‖ For example, with the support of their government, Chinese 
Muslims, in 1952, organised the first Hajj team of 16 people. Subsequently, China 
sent Muslims every year to Saudi Arabia for Hajj (pilgrimage). The Hajj was 
suspended for a period of time during the Chinese Cultural Revolution in the 60s and 
70s, but China resumed the Hajj activities after the open-up policy, (see Table 4.2.1).  
 
In this regard, Chinese Scholar Wu Bingbing noted that China‘s Gulf policy has 
witnessed six phases since the late 1950s: (1) a focus on Iraq (1958-1967); (2) a focus 
on revolutionary movements in the Gulf (1967-1971); (3) opposition to Soviet 
expansionism (1971-1979); (4) a focus on Iran and Iraq (1979-1990); (5) a focus on 
Iran (1990-2001); and (6) a focus on Saudi Arabia and Iran (2001 till now), (Wu, 
2011: 10). Although Saudi Arabia is still playing a pivotal role in Beijing‘s strategy in 
the Middle East, China started to pay attention to the Arab countries in general, 
especially with the changes or the so-called Arab Spring that swept the Middle East 
and North Africa in 2011. 
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(Table 4.2.1): Timeline of Contacts between China and Saudi Arabia (1949-1990)  
 
Year Place Notes 
1952 China & Saudi 
Arabia 
Chinese Muslim organised the first Hajj team of 16 people 
1955- 
1964 
China & Saudi 
Arabia 
China sent Muslims every year to Saudi Arabia for Hajj 
(pilgrimage). The pilgrimage was suspended for a period of 
time. 
1979 China China resumed the pilgrimage activities. 
1981 Cancun, Mexico - Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang shook hands with 
Crown Prince Fahd at the North- South conference. 
- Unconfirmed reports that Saudi prince made 
unannounced visit to China. 
1985 Oman - Chinese Vice-Premier Yao Yilin initiated a 
conversation with Crown Prince Abdullah. 
- Saudi Arabia began negotiating to purchase the 
missiles from Beijing in 1985 after it became apparent 
that the U.S. would be prevented by congressional 
opposition from selling Saudi Arabia up to 48 F15 jet 
fighters. 
1986 Washington DC U.S. Congress rejected selling missiles to Saudi Arabia. 
1987 Saudi Arabia The first major envoy of Chinese entrepreneurs visited Saudi 
Arabia. Headed by Jia Shi, President of the China Council for 
Promotion of International Trade, the delegation met with the 
Second Deputy Prime Minister Prince Sultan, and negotiated 
for increased Sino-Saudi economic collaboration. 
 
1988 Washington, D.C - Chinese and Saudi ambassadors to the United States, 
Han Xu and Prince Bandar respectively, signed on 
November 11, 1988 a memorandum of understanding 
in Washington, D.C. stating their intention to establish 
―commercial representative offices‖, creating the first 
permanent representative bodies between the two 
nations. 
- On April 6 Xinhua published a statement by Chinese 
Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian confirming China‘s sale 
of CSS-2 model ground-to-ground missiles to Saudi 
Arabia. 
1989 Beijing China appointed as its first representative Arabic-fluent 
businessman Deng Shaoqin. 
1990 China and Saudi 
Arabia established 
diplomatic 
relations 
- Saudi Ambassador to the United States Prince Bandar 
travelled to Beijing on July 9, 1990. 
- Saudi Arabia‘s Minister of Industry and Electricity 
visited Taipei where he delivered a letter requesting to 
downgrade their embassies to ―representative offices.‖  
- Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen travelled to 
Riyadh on July 20, 1990, and on July 21 the nations 
issued a joint communiqué announcing official 
recognition of each other‘s governments. 
 
Source: adapted by the author from various media reports 
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4.2.1 The Islamic Dimension  
 
In 1955, when the Bandung International Conference of Non-Aligned Countries was 
convened in Indonesia, the late Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai met with Saudi Crown 
Prince (and the future King) Faisal at that time, (China Radio International, 2010), 
and discussed with him the Hajj (pilgrimage) of Muslim Chinese. In the meeting 
Prince Faisal agreed to allow Chinese Muslims to make the pilgrimage to Makkah. In 
the same year, a 20-member Chinese team, which included famous Chinese Muslims 
Da Pusheng and Ma Yuhuai, accomplished their mission, (Yong, 2010). Between 
1955 and 1964, the China Islamic Association organised 10 Hajj trips to Makkah. 
From 1955 to 1964, China sent Muslims every year to Saudi Arabia for Hajj. A few 
dozen did so every year until 1966, (Gresh, 2010).   
 
The Hajj was suspended during China‘s Cultural Revolution between 1966 and 1976.4 
Relations deteriorated further when Riyadh established diplomatic relations with 
Taipei (Taiwan), and took an active part, in the 1960s and 1970s, in the World Anti-
Communist League founded by Chiang Kai-shek, (Gresh, 2010). Fourteen years later 
the Hajj visits resumed, on October 19, 1979, the Chinese Muslim Delegation with 
Zhang Jie as president went to Makkah for Hajj. Ties were also set by the Peking 
leadership to a delegation of Chinese Muslims who visited Saudi Arabia in November 
1979, (Shoujiang and Jia, 2004). The number of the Hajis has grown considerably 
from 2,200 in 1985, then exceeded 6,000 in the 1990s, and by 2009 had ballooned to 
over 12,700, (China View, 2009) to reach 13,500 in 2010, (Yong, 2010). 
                                                             
4
 Between 1966 and 1976, Chinese leader Mao Zedong implemented the ―Cultural Revolution,‖ 10-
year political and ideological campaign aimed at reviving revolutionary spirit, producing massive 
social, economic and political upheaval. 
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This initial exchange established a pattern of interaction based on Islamic cultural 
similarities. The annual Chinese Hajj came to include prominent Chinese officials, 
notably local government officials from the Ningxia Hui and Xinjiang Uyghur 
autonomous regions, both of which possess large Muslim populations. Such pilgrims 
pursued political missions as well, gaining audiences with high-ranking Saudi 
officials.   
 
Indeed, in 1984, King Fahd granted an audience to Ilyas Shen Xiaxi, Vice-President 
of the China Islamic Association (CIA), and extended an invitation for larger future 
pilgrimages. China responded by sending thousands to Makkah in 1985, (Anderson, 
2004). Greater freedom of travel was also given to Chinese Muslims, businessmen 
and students, facilitating an exchange of trade and ideas between the two 
communities. Funds from Saudi Arabia and other Arab nations funnelled into Muslim 
regions, financing the construction of mosques, the purchase of the Holy Qur‟an, and 
scholarships for study abroad, (Ibid). The greatest sign of an increasingly friendly 
Sino-Saudi dialogue over Islam came in 1987, when the Saudi-sponsored Muslim 
World Association (MWA) coordinated with the China Islamic Association (CIA) to 
hold a five-day conference of three hundred Muslim leaders in Beijing. Extensively 
covered in the Chinese and Saudi press, it underlined China‘s new role in the Muslim 
community, (Ibid).  
 
There are no doubts that these missions provided a link between the two countries and 
demonstrated to some extent China‘s tolerance of the Islamic religion, (Harris, 1981), 
and helped to lay the foundations for establishing the diplomatic relations between the 
two countries a few years later. 
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4.2.2  Pursuing Diplomatic Relations 
 
After the Communist Revolution, China and Saudi Arabia had conflicting interests in 
various fields including political and economic development. The Saudi policy was 
allied with the West in the fight against communism, while China adopted the support 
of revolutionary forces in the region. China did seek to generate anti-colonial 
sentiment in the region in the 1950s and 1960s and this was mainly in the context of 
supporting the Arab countries in winning and preserving their independence in the 
struggle against ―imperialism‖ and ―colonialism‖, (Li, 2009). In addition, China was 
seeking to check Moscow influence in the 1970s. It was not until the late 1970s and 
1980s that Beijing, in conjunction with its broader political opening to the world, 
started to become more seriously involved in the Middle East, (Yetiv, 2009: 199-218). 
 
In the early years of the Cold War, China attempted to export its brand of 
revolutionary communism throughout the Third World, including the Middle East 
which was seen as a potentially fertile ground for radical ideologies. However, 
already by the late 1960s, it became clear that this was not a sustainable policy as it 
was deflecting attention from China‘s primary goal of economic development, (Pant, 
2008). Later in the 70s, China entered a ―strategic partnership‖ with the United States 
against the Soviet Union, and embarked upon an ―open up‖ policy. As a result, 
China‘s bilateral relations expanded both in number and complexity. China‘s interest 
and involvement in the Gulf during the 1970s reflected these general trends, 
(Calabrese, 1992: 471-485). A set of substantive and tangible interests gradually have 
dominated China‘s Middle East policy since the 1980s. Among these interests, the 
quest for oil is the most important one, followed by strengthening economic relations 
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with the Middle East and arms sales, (Yetiv and Lu, 2007). After the end of the Cold 
War, China fundamentally altered its internal and external strategies; internally 
Beijing‘s focus shifted to economic and social development, and externally the 
government focused on maintaining world peace and promoting global development 
and cooperation, (Li, 2009). 
 
Concerted efforts on the part of China to improve its relations with Saudi Arabia 
began in 1978. China was motivated by a number of factors to continue to push 
towards improving relations with the Arabian Kingdom. Seeking to balance Soviet 
power, China saw relations with Saudi Arabia as a positive step in securing the Gulf 
region, (Anderson, 2004). China‘s balancing efforts focused on Iran and Egypt 
throughout the 1970s; the Chinese had been ―walking on two legs‖ in the Middle 
East. One ―leg‖ was the Shah of Iran; the other, President Sadat of Egypt. China 
decided to renew its relations with Saudi Arabia in the early 1980s, while the alliance 
between Beijing and Washington was strengthening, and again it used ―hajj 
diplomacy‖ or as Yitzhak Shichor puts it:  ―The Chinese wanted to kill two birds with 
one stone: they wanted to show their Muslim population that they were not against 
religion, and they wanted to get closer to Saudi Arabia, (Gresh, 2010). 
 
After the fall of the Shah in late 70s and the assassination of Egyptian president 
Anwar Sadat in 1981, the Chinese began to look for an alternative plan, as well as for 
an alternative ally. Both could be offered by Saudi Arabia, (Shichor, 1982: 101-110). 
The Saudi hostility to the Soviet Union converged with China‘s principal interest in 
the Middle East. Yet, unlike both Egypt and Iran, Saudi Arabia seems to have enough 
leverage to influence American policies in the region. As the undisputed centre of 
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Islam and the supreme distributor of funds, Riyadh has been respected by most of the 
Arabs, moderate as well as radical. In addition, the Saudis‘ moderate stand on oil 
prices, though serving their own interests as well, is intended to minimise the 
difficulties for Japan and the West, a policy which the Chinese of course appreciate, 
(Ibid). In addition, China saw in Saudi Arabia a chance to gain further legitimacy by 
urging Gulf nations to shift diplomatic recognition to Beijing away from Taiwan, 
(Ibid). Finally, trade with Saudi Arabia was an obvious step towards improving trade 
with the region, providing a desirable market for Chinese goods. For these and other 
reasons, China developed an ambitious agenda to improve Sino-Saudi relations 
throughout the 1980s, consisting of the following phases: the demonstration of 
common interests, utilization of Muslim identity, development of trade ties, and 
support of Saudi Arabia‘s security efforts, (Anderson, 2004). 
 
Initial forays towards diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia were made through 
Kuwait (Kuwait established diplomatic relations with China in 1971), whom China 
sought to use as a mediator towards improving the relations with Saudi Arabia. While 
these largely failed, yielding no new official dialogue between China and Saudi 
Arabia, Beijing continued urging Kuwait to work towards improving relations with 
Saudi Arabia, on the basis of China‘s support for the Palestinian cause, (Ibid). While 
this concerted diplomatic pressure gained minor concessions from Saudi Arabia, 
namely their allowance of minor amounts of indirect trade, its failure to secure 
improved relations led China to amplify efforts towards a common agenda. Chinese 
periodicals began to grant increased attention to Saudi affairs, lauding Saudi efforts to 
build up unity among the Gulf countries, bring about a ceasefire in Lebanon, and 
resolve the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, (Ibid). Beijing has made persistent efforts 
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to impress upon Riyadh their common interest in preventing Soviet dominance in the 
Gulf. The Saudis have, however, remained adamant in their refusal to establish 
diplomatic relations with Beijing, (Harris, 1980). 
 
Following the assassination of the Egyptian president Anwar Sadat in 1981, Chinese 
support swung away from the Camp David agreements between Egypt and Israel 
towards Saudi Crown Prince Fahd‘s eight-point peace plan5, praising it as ―genuine, 
comprehensive, fair, realistic and concrete.‖ Through such efforts, analyst John 
Calabrese maintains, ―China gradually built a reputation as a supportive rather than a 
subversive force in the region‖, (Calabrese, 1992). China was rewarded for its efforts 
by a growing Sino-Saudi dialogue. In 1981, Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang shook 
hands with Crown Prince Fahd at the North-South conference held in Cancun, 
Mexico, and pursued talks that were later described by Chinese officials as ―very 
productive‖ and ―quite fruitful‖, (Ibid). Arab diplomats in Beijing also reaffirmed that 
Saudi Chinese negotiations to establish formal relations had already begun, (Ibid). 
 
On May 27, 1981, just two days after the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), was 
formed, China established diplomatic ties with it, (Ibid). Significantly, in 1983 China 
began to import crude oil from Oman as a temporary measure, in order to alleviate the 
problem of transporting its own oil from its northern provinces to refineries on the 
Yangtze River, (Ghafour, 2009: 82-93). Two years later, the first Sino-Saudi official 
meeting took place in Oman in November 1985, following several years of 
heightened contact between the two countries, (Yetiv, 2007). At a second meeting 
between high-level Chinese and Saudi officials in Oman in 1985, the then Chinese 
                                                             
5
 For more details about the plan see the United Nations at: 
http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/5fb09709f4050b8985256ced007390d8?OpenDocument 
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Vice-Premier Yao Yilin initiated a conversation with Crown Prince Abdullah, 
praising Saudi Arabia‘s support for the Palestinian cause and regional stability, and 
discussing possibilities for improved relations. Beijing Radio later described the 
meeting as a ―new page in the annals of a relationship between China and Saudi 
Arabia‖, representing the opening of dialogue between the two nations, (Anderson, 
2004) (see Table 4.2.1). During the 1980s, China established diplomatic ties with 
other Arab smaller states in the Gulf. This action included the United Arab Emirate 
(UAE) in 1984, Qatar in 1988 and Bahrain in 1989. Yet, it was not until 1990 that 
China established diplomatic relationship with the regional power, Saudi Arabia, 
(Zhang, 2009). 
 
 
4.2.3 Security and Trade  
 
 
The most important development came when the secret talks between the two nations 
commenced in China during the mid-1980s. Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the Saudi 
Ambassador to the U.S at that time, negotiated a billion-dollar purchase of Chinese 
long range missiles, (Kaiser, and Ottaway, 2002). In 1987, during the Iran-Iraq War, 
China secretly sold an estimated 36
6
 CSS-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles 
(IRBM) to Saudi Arabia for about US$3-3.5 billion. The range of the Saudi CSS-2s is 
about 2,800 km (1,740 miles), enough to reach Iran, Iraq, and Israel. The Saudis 
reportedly approached China for missiles after the Reagan Administration could not 
persuade Congress to lift the limit of 60 F-15 fighters that could be sold to Saudi 
                                                             
6 Some sources put the number up to 50 and others may be more, most put them between 30 to 50  
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Arabia. Riyadh said it acquired the missiles as deterrence against possible missile 
attacks from Tehran, (Shuey, and Kan, 1995). The United States - and Israel - failed 
to discover what was going on for two years. When intelligence agencies in both 
countries realised what had happened, they were livid. The U.S. State Department 
instructed Hume Horan, the recently arrived US ambassador in Riyadh, to see King 
Fahd in March 1988 to deliver a stern message expressing ―surprise and disapproval 
of this action‖, (Kaiser, Ottaway 2002). In this regard, the then Ambassador of Saudi 
Arabia to the United States reassured the Americans that the missiles would be 
deployed in a way that made it clear that they were no threat to Israel. They had a 
conventional warhead and were intended to deter Iraq and Iran, Saudi‘s traditionally 
hostile neighbours, and would be used only in retaliation, (Ibid).  
 
For China the sale helped to gain the political and strategic benefits of subsequent 
diplomatic recognition from Riyadh, the continuing presence of Chinese military 
advisers and technicians in Saudi Arabia, and Riyadh‘s recognition of China as a great 
power patron in the region, (Gill, 1993). Geoffrey Kemp Director of Regional 
Strategic Programs at The Nixon Center argues that the Chinese missiles sales 
apparently contributed towards an effort to convince Saudi Arabia to switch 
recognition from Taipei (Taiwan) to Beijing, which Riyadh did in 1990, (Kemp, 
1991: 62). Interestingly here to read what The Washington Post, 23 years ago said in 
its commentary on the subject: 
Chinese Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian today vigorously defended his government‘s 
increasing international weapons sales, including the recent sale of intermediate-range ballistic 
missiles to Saudi Arabia. Wu, speaking at a news conference, confirmed that China had sold 
―some nonnuclear, conventional surface-to-surface missiles‖ to Saudi Arabia. China‘s sale of 
missiles to Saudi Arabia has caused concern in Israel, even though Saudi Arabia is believed to 
want them as protection against Iran. The missiles, which could be equipped with nuclear 
warheads, have a range of up to 1,625 miles. They could be used with conventional warheads 
to attack cities, but are not considered accurate enough to be useful against military targets, 
(The Washington Post, April 7, 1988). 
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In this context, the trade was also moving forward in parallel with the political and 
militarily contacts. Since the late 1970s, and almost without notice, Saudi Arabia had 
become one of the largest importers of Chinese goods in the Middle East absorbing a 
quarter of all Chinese exports to the region, (Shichor, 1982).  Saudi Arabia had 
initially yielded to small amounts of indirect trade in 1979. China, encouraged by the 
initial reception of Saudi imports, doubled the trade volume by 1980. Saudi 
businessmen first attended the Canton trade fair in the early 1980s, and began 
investing in Chinese development projects, (Anderson, 2004). Trade blossomed 
between 1980 and 1990, nearly doubling from US$152 million in 1980 to US$297 
million in 1990, (Embassy of China in Saudi Arabia, 2004). This growing trade 
relationship encouraged the first material step towards establishing diplomatic 
relations. 
 
In 1987, the first major envoy of Chinese entrepreneurs visited Saudi Arabia. Headed 
by Jia Shi, President of the China Council for Promotion of International Trade, the 
delegation met with the then second Deputy Prime Minister Prince Sultan, and 
negotiated for increased Sino-Saudi economic collaboration. China and Saudi Arabia 
signed the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on the mutual establishment of a 
trade representative office on November 11, 1988. The trade representatives of the 
two countries assumed their posts in 1989, (Ibid). China appointed as its first 
representative an Arabic-fluent businessman, Deng Shaoqin. On April 11, 1989, he 
stated his intentions to the Saudi press: ―We will work and make efforts to increase 
mutual understanding, strengthen co-operation, and develop Saudi-Chinese relations 
in all fields, so that our relations can reach a higher level in the interest of both 
countries and both peoples‖, (Anderson, 2004). By framing his mission in political, 
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not just economic terms, Shaoqin indicated that his mission went beyond trade; 
indeed, trade offices were merely a step on the road to full recognition.  
 
China‘s sensitivity and willingness to support Saudi security efforts was a final step in 
alleviating Saudi concerns. By 1989, Saudi Arabia was alone among the Gulf States 
in not recognising China. Saudi reluctance to make ties official stemmed from its 
long-standing relationship with Taiwan. But, while such concerns delayed the Saudi 
concession, it did not do so indefinitely. In this regard, the former Chinese 
ambassador to Saudi Arabia and first Chinese ambassador to the Kingdom ―Sun 
Bigan‖ noted that: 
―…The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has strengthened its exchanges with China after the mid-
eighties of the last century, where China was also willing to cooperate with Saudi Arabia. 
Hence the relations between them have evolved rapidly. However, conditions in the late 
eighties were very complex and the Saudis developed the ―two steps‖ strategy to further the 
relations between the two countries. The first step is to create a trade representation office in 
the capital of each country; the other step is to further develop bilateral relations after the 
establishment of offices and the establishment of diplomatic relations. In our view, the signing 
of memorandum of understanding to exchange trade representation in 1988 played a positive 
role in the development of bilateral relations‖, (Arab Information Centre, 2010). 
 
Finally, Saudi Arabia had come to view an official relationship with China as being in 
its interest, (Ibid). Saudi Ambassador to the United States, Prince Bandar, travelled to 
Beijing on July 9, 1990, receiving little to no press coverage in the Arab or Chinese 
media. Shortly afterwards, Saudi Arabia‘s Minister of Industry and Electricity visited 
Taipei (Taiwan) where he delivered a letter requesting to downgrade their embassies 
to ―representative offices.‖ Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen travelled to Riyadh 
on July 20, 1990, and on July 21 the nations issued a joint communiqué announcing 
official recognition of each other‘s governments, (Anderson, 2004).  
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On July 21, 1990, China and Saudi Arabia signed a Communiqué and announced the 
establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Analysis of the 
wording of Communiqué Concerning the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations 
between the People‘s Republic of China and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on July 21, 
1990, summaries the political dynamics of the new Sino-Saudi relationship: 
The Government of the People‘s Republic of China supports the policy of the Government of 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in pursuit of achieving its security, stability and national 
interests.  The Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia recognises that the Government 
of the People‘s Republic of China is the sole legitimate government that represents the entire 
Chinese people. The two Governments have agreed to develop cooperation and friendly 
relations between the two countries on the basis of the principles of mutual respect for 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other‘s 
internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence, (Communiqué 
Concerning the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the People's Republic of 
China and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 1990). 
 
 
 
4.3 ESTABLISHING A COMMON AGENDA  
 
 
Despite the delayed diplomatic establishment, China and Saudi relations have been 
strong in both political and economic spheres in recent times. Since the establishment 
of diplomatic ties between China and Saudi Arabia in 1990, bilateral ties have 
witnessed smooth and rapid development, helped by the joint efforts of the leaders, 
the governments and people of both countries. The Chinese Consulate General in 
Jeddah opened on April 25, 1993. In April 1998 China agreed on the establishment of 
the Consulate General in Hong Kong by Saudi Arabia. The two countries founded the 
Sino-Saudi Friendship Association and the Saudi-Sino Friendship Association 
respectively in October 1997, (Anderson, 2004). 
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The significance of a strong bilateral relationship between China and Saudi Arabia, 
founded on energy but extending to other spheres cannot be overemphasised in 
economic, as well as strategic terms. Despite their obvious differences – China, a 
Communist state with the world‘s largest population, and Saudi Arabia, a monarchy 
whose constitution is the Islamic Sharia‟a Law – the two nations share substantial 
similarities in many terms, (Matthews, 2005). 
 
From a political standpoint, both countries‘ leaders have the same paramount 
objective: regime survival. In China‘s case, this means the continued rule of the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP); while for Saudi Arabia, it refers to the power of the 
―Royal Family‖, (Ibid). For both, regime survival depends on economic prosperity, 
which depends largely on energy: China must secure enough energy to fuel rapid 
economic growth, and Saudi Arabia must find a market for its abundant energy 
resources. The two countries are also similar in that both are aspiring powers: China 
aspires to become a world power, while Saudi Arabia aspires to be the global 
economic power house. 
 
Furthermore, China and Saudi Arabia are important countries in eastern and western 
Asia respectively. China is a permanent member of the United Nations Security 
Council, and enjoys ever enhancing international status and influence, while Saudi 
Arabia, as a big Arabian and Islamic country, serves a heavyweight in the Arab 
World, Gulf region and the Muslim world. Both states are dominant in their own 
regions, with Saudi Arabia the driving force behind the six-nation Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) and China a major actor throughout East Asia, (Ibid). The two 
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countries hold a shared perspective on many major international and regional issues, 
and have maintained coordination and cooperation in international affairs.  
 
According to Li Guofu, a Middle East expert at the China Institute of International 
Studies, ―There‘s no fundamental conflict of interest between China and Saudi 
Arabia. They both share the same or similar views on many important international 
issues, like the establishment of a new international order, a multi-polar world, anti-
terrorism and reconstruction in Iraq. The cooperation on energy lays a good 
foundation for friendly political relations‖, (Li, 2006: 3). Moreover, both pursue an 
independent foreign policy of peace, hold the same or similar opinions on many major 
international and regional issues and coordinate with each other in international 
affairs, (Liu, 2006). Furthermore, Beijing and Riyadh are in one key way alike, in that 
both seek to take advantage of economic globalisation without endangering their 
political status quo, (Pant, 2008).  
 
Additionally, both states are led by an older generation of leaders, many of whom 
witnessed or actually participated in the weaving of the basic fabric of their respective 
nation-states; these older leaders, with assistance from younger technocrats providing 
important international economic and geopolitical analysis, enjoy a rare perspective 
from which to make important strategic decisions for the good of their citizens, 
(Matthews, 2005). Finally, both states also, due to their ideological underpinnings as 
well as their significant strategic positions, are often solitary actors on the world 
stage, eschewing regional and international coalitions and group diplomacy when they 
deem their own interests not to be fully aligned with those of other states, (Ibid). 
171 
 
In the economical realm, China is an important polar of the world economy, while 
Saudi Arabia is among the world top 20 economies. Both are developing countries 
and the two economies are highly complementary. Along with continuous economic 
growth China will accordingly need more energy. Saudi Arabia, with world top 
petroleum reserve and production, is worthy of the name ―Kingdom of oil‖, (Liu, 
2006). In this regard, what is working to the Kingdom‘s advantage is that China is the 
second largest economy in the world, with a vast potential demand for energy. With 
its growth predicted on using hydrocarbons, China needs Saudi oil and the Kingdom 
needs to ―look East‖ to find growing markets for its oil and petrochemicals over the 
coming decades, (Ramkumar, 2010). Saudi Arabia and China are partners at various 
levels. Both are key members of the G20. The Kingdom represents the supply side of 
global energy economics in the bloc, while China represents the emerging economies.  
 
Since energy is vitally important to national survival and the enhancement of national 
power, and in the cases of Saudi Arabia and China, to regime survival as well, one 
must consider the political-strategic subtext of Sino-Saudi relations.  At the 
geopolitical level, both want long-term stability for the Middle East-Gulf region and 
long-term energy supply security with emphasis on Asia, (Ibid). In addition, both 
countries are exporting nations and, as a result, both countries hold massive foreign 
reserves and particularly U.S. government paper, (Sfakianakis, 2009), which enable 
them to influence the exchange rate of the dollar. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia and China 
share common geopolitical and cultural interests, which should deepen along with 
economic ties. These include a desire to liberalise their economies without losing 
governmental control, support for a counterbalance to U.S. dominance in global 
affairs, resistance to perceived U.S. and UN ―meddling‖ in internal affairs and human 
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rights criticisms, and finally, interest in maintaining stability in the Middle East and 
unfettered access to global oil supplies, (Obaid, 2002: 28). 
 
It is also interesting to look at the development of Sino-Saudi economic ties at the 
level of economic enterprises. The energy sectors in both countries, while in the 
process of being restructured, are controlled by a handful of giant firms. Saudi 
Arabian Oil Company, (ARAMCO), for example, is the largest oil company in the 
world which has a monopoly on upstream oil development and controls virtually all 
of the country‘s oil reserves.  ARAMCO and Saudi Basic Industries Corporation 
(SABIC), the biggest petrochemicals firm in the Middle East, dominate the Saudi 
economy. In China, the picture is similar in the sense that three oil giants dominate 
the energy sector: CNPC, Sinopec, and CNOOC. Of the three, CNPC is by far the 
largest and the most active overseas. The most obvious consequence of this 
concentration of power and wealth in both countries is that energy firms are 
considered by many as largely instruments of the state. The consolidation of Sino-
Saudi energy ties can thus be viewed as an extension of state policy,  (Calabrese, 
2005), or to form the so called – ―Oil Diplomacy.‖7   
 
Finally, culturally, both countries have brilliant civilisations. China is an oriental 
ancient civilisation while Saudi Arabia is the birthplace of Islam. Both the Islamic 
culture and traditional Chinese culture belong to oriental civilisation and consequently 
bear many similarities in social values and morals. In that regard, both China and 
Saudi Arabia stress the respect for cultural diversity, equal-footed dialogue and 
                                                             
7
 Oil diplomacy is defined as the foreign activities with explicit involvement of the central government 
aiming to secure foreign oil and gas resources or promote interstate oil and gas business cooperation 
(See Journal of Chinese Political Science, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2008. pp. 80 -104) 
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exchanges between different civilisations, and oppose cultural conflict and 
confrontation. This serves a common language between the two countries for further 
strengthening humanity exchanges and expanding cultural cooperation, (Liu, 2006). 
 
 
4.4 BUILDING POLITICAL MUTUAL TRUST  
 
 
The Sino-Saudi relationship, being established in 1990, is relatively new when 
compared to the U.S.-Saudi relationship. Ever since relations were established, the 
two countries have witnessed rapid development in exchanges and cooperation in 
political, economic, cultural, educational, religious and other aspects. The Chinese 
Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, in an article to Saudi daily newspaper Arab News, 
summaries two decades of high-level visits between China and Saudi Arabia by 
regarding them as a model of the friendly cooperative relations between China and 
Arab States: 
 The Sino-Saudi relations can be regarded as a model of the friendly cooperative relations 
between China and Arab states. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations 20 years ago, 
the Sino-Saudi strategic friendly relations have developed rapidly. We have seen frequent 
high-level exchanges with growing mutual political trust. King Abdullah visited China in 
1998 as the crown prince and in 2006 again during his first overseas visit after his accession as 
king. President Jintao Hu visited Saudi Arabia in 2006 and 2009 respectively. Chinese Vice 
President Xi Jinping visited Saudi Arabia in June 2008. In 2010, Yang Jiechi, Chinese foreign 
minister, and Chen Deming, minister of commerce of China visited Saudi Arabia respectively. 
In May, Prince Saud Al-Faisal, Saudi Arabian foreign minister, visited China and attended the 
Fourth Ministerial Meeting of the China-Arab Cooperation Forum. This year the leaders of the 
two countries also exchanged congratulatory messages on the 20th anniversary of diplomatic 
ties, (Yang, 2010) 
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(Table 4.4.1): Saudi Arabia and China Major Official Visits 1990-2010 
 
Year Party Official Visit 
1990 Saudi Foreign Minister Saud AL-Faisal and Undersecretary of Foreign Ministry  
Chinese State Councillor and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen 
1991 Saudi  
Chinese Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng 
1992 Saudi Saudi Minister of Finance and National Economy Aba Al Khail 
Chinese President of the Chinese People‘s Association for Friendship with Foreign 
Countries Han Xu 
1994 Saudi Minister of Oil Hisham Nazer and Minister of Commerce Sulaiman Salaim 
Minister of Oil Hisham Nazer 
Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Tian Zengpei 
1995  Saudi Minister of Petroleum Ali al-Naimi 
Chinese State Councillor and Secretary-General of the State Council Luo 
1996 Saudi Minister of Finance and National Economy Dr. Ibrahim Bin Abdul Aziz 
Al-Assaf 
Chinese Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the CPC Central 
Committee, State Councillor and Defense Minister Chi Haotian and Vice 
Chairman of the Chinese People‘s Political Consultative Conference 
(CPPCC) Ye Xuanping 
1997 Saudi Minister of Petroleum Ali al-Naimi and Minister of Higher Education Dr. 
Khalid Al-Angary 
Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Tian Zengpei 
1998 Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah, Deputy Prime Minister, Commander of the 
National Guards and  
Chinese Qian Qichen Minister of Foreign Affairs of China 
1999 Saudi Prince Salman, Emir of Riyadh District and Minister of Commerce Osama 
bin Jafar Faqih 
Chinese President Jiang Zemin  and Vice Foreign Minister Ji Peiding 
2000 Saudi Second Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Defense and Aviation and 
Inspector-General Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz, Minister of Information 
and Minister of Agriculture and Water Conservancy, 
Chinese  
2001 Saudi Ali Al-Naimi Minister of Petroleum and Vice Foreign Minister Dr. Nizar 
bin Obaid Madani 
Chinese Vice Governor of Hebei Province Guo Shichang, Vice Minister of the 
General Administration of Sport Yu Zaiqing, President Wang Tao of the 
Sino-Saudi Friendship Association, Vice Governor of Hebei Province Guo 
Shichang, Vice Minister of the General Administration of Sport and Yu 
Zaiqing President Wang Tao of the Sino-Saudi Friendship Association 
2002 Saudi Salih bin Hamid, Chairman of the Consultative Conference of Saudi 
Arabia and Minister of Higher Education Khalid Al-Anqari 
Chinese State Councillor Wu Yi, Vice Foreign Minister Yang Wenchan, and 
Minister of Water Resources Wang Xucheng  
2003 Saudi President of China-Saudi Friendship Association and Chairman of Saudi 
Arabian Council of Industry and Commerce  Hilashi 
Chinese China‘s special envoy to the Middle East Wang Shijie 
2004 Saudi Ali Al-Naimi Minister of Petroleum 
Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing, Chinese Assistant Minister of Commerce Yi 
Xiaozhunand   chief of SINOPEC Wang Jiming. 
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2006 Saudi King Abdullah Al Saud 
Chinese Chinese President Jintao Hu 
2007 Saudi Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources Ali Al-Naimi 
Chinese  
2008 Saudi Prince Muqrin bin Abdul Aziz, special envoy of Saudi Arabian King 
Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz Secretary-General of Saudi Arabia‘s National 
Security Council, Prince Bandar bin Sultan bin Abdulaziz and Abdallah 
Jum‘ah Abdallah then Aramco president 
Chinese Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping and Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi 
2009 Saudi Ali Al-Naimi Minister of Petroleum and  Khalid Al-Falih Saudi Aramco 
President 
Chinese Chinese President Jintao Hu 
2010 Saudi Foreign Minister Saud AL-Faisal, Minister of Commerce and Industry of 
Saudi Arabia, Mr. Abdullah Alireza and Khalid Al-Falih Saudi Aramco 
President 
Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, Chinese Public Security Minister Meng 
Jianzhu and Chinese Minister of Commerce Chen Deming 
Source: Adapted from various sources and reports 
 
 
Indeed, in recent years, their political mutual trust and exchanges of high-level visits 
have also been on the rise. Between 1991 and 1998, over sixteen high-level exchanges 
occurred, only occasionally resulting in a solid agreement; instead, they served to 
reinforce the relationship between the two parties, (Anderson, 2004). In this regard 
Sun Bigan, the former ambassador to Saudi Arabia, said that:  
―The tasks of Chinese diplomats in Saudi Arabia were many and very important, especially 
the one to introduce the Chinese to the Saudi royal family and to increase confidence in the 
Chinese Government. The second task was to establish links with Saudi businessmen, and 
explain to Saudi officials the situation of China in the areas of industry, trade and arranging 
meetings between officials of the two countries in these two areas, in order to push trade‖, 
(Arab Information Centre, 2010) 
 
The relationship moved to higher level, as King Abdullah, then crown prince, visited 
China for the first time in 1998, becoming the highest-level Saudi official ever to visit 
China, (Ibid). In that visit Crown Prince Abdullah called China ―the best friend of 
Saudi Arabia‖, (Zhang, 2009)… ―There is no doubt that the great Chinese people and 
their history have a place in the hearts of the people of Saudi Arabia‖, (Saudi 
Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Washington, 1998). Referring to the long discussion he 
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had with the Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji on political and economic affairs, the crown 
prince said: ―There have never been differences between the two sides on political 
issues.‖ Concerning economic cooperation, he said: ―I had an impression of truth and 
openness during my talks with the Chinese Premier‖, (Ibid). 
 
The Sino-Saudi relationship further expanded, with even higher level visits. Among 
all these visits, two were particularly significant. The first was President Jiang 
Zemin‘s visit in 1999 and the second was King Abdullah‘s trip in 2006. Jiang‘s one 
was the first time a Chinese President had visited Saudi Arabia. During his visit, the 
Chinese President pronounced a ―strategic oil partnership‖ between China and Saudi 
Arabia, (Zhang, 2009). This trip is regarded as having cemented bilateral relations 
since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, (Ibid). In 
Jiang‘s state visit to Saudi Arabia in 1999, China and Saudi Arabia signed an 
agreement which ―inaugurated a strategic oil partnership‖, and through talks with 
Premier Zhu Rongji and President Jiang Zemin, the two sides formulated a  joint press 
communiqué which indicated they had ―reached consensus‖ on a variety of issues, 
(Ibid). In a speech there, Zemin emphasized the five principles of peaceful 
coexistence
8
 and ―Third World‖ nature of both China and the Arab world; as a result, 
he noted, ―The two sides share broad common views on human rights and a wide 
range of other issues‖, and were engaged in a common identity and community of 
interests, (Anderson, 2004). 
 
                                                             
8 The five principles of peaceful coexistence are: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other‘s internal affairs, equality and mutual 
benefit, and peaceful coexistence.   
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The year of 2006 brought about a renewed effort to develop closer Sino-Saudi 
relations. The visits between President Jintao Hu and Saudi King Abdullah bin Abdul-
Aziz in 2006 and the impressive array of new agreements between the Saudi and 
Chinese Governments indicate such a trend. First was the visit of King Abdullah bin 
Abdulaziz al-Saud‘s to China in January 2006. This visit carried special significance 
due to two reasons: (a) It came five months after succeeding his half-brother, it was 
King Abdullah‘s first visit outside the Middle East since he took the throne in 2005. 
(b) It was the first visit by a Saudi monarch to the People‘s Republic since diplomatic 
relations were established in 1990, (Madsen, 2006). The new king‘s (at that time) 
decision to visit China, rather than the U.S., was a sign of the growing importance of 
Riyadh‘s trade ties with Beijing, (Evans, 2009). During King Abdullah‘s visit to 
China in January 2006, both countries signed numerous agreements for cooperation in 
energy (petroleum, mineral, and natural gas), trade, and professional 
training/technical matters, (Asia Times, 25 January 2006). 
 
A short three months later, President Jintao Hu made a diplomatic visit to Saudi 
Arabia further highlighting the seriousness of Sino-Saudi relations. That visit was also 
important for several reasons: (a) Hu‘s trip to Saudi Arabia occurred only three 
months after Abdullah‘s trip to China. Indeed, during his trip to Saudi Arabia, 
President Hu himself pointed out that head-of-state exchanges in such a short amount 
of time are extremely rare; (b) Hu was only the second foreign president to address 
the Saudi Consultative Council, after former French President Jacques Chirac; and (c) 
Hu‘s visit ended with tangible results, not only in regards to energy, but also other 
fields, such as health and trade, (Douglas and others, 2006). Accordingly, Chinese 
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Middle East envoy Sun Bigan pointed out, the visits ―laid a solid foundation for the 
growth of bilateral ties in the years ahead‖, (Ibid). 
 
The mutual trust continues between the two countries through many channels. When 
China was struck by a severe earthquake in May 2008, Saudi Arabia donated US$60 
million to the stricken areas, becoming the largest donor to the Chinese Government. 
This certainly played a positive role in bilateral relations. For example, on the evening 
of June 6, 2008, Chinese President Jintao Hu held a telephone conversation with 
Saudi Arabian King Abdullah bin Abdul-Aziz.  Hu said King Abdullah offered 
sympathy and condolences to the Chinese Government and people and swiftly 
provided aid to the quake-stricken area at this crucial moment when a strong 
earthquake shocked China‘s southwestern province of Sichuan. The move embodied 
the profound friendship of the king, the Saudi Arabian Government and its people 
toward the Chinese people, (China‘s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 6, 2008). One 
month after the earthquake, Xi Jinping, the Vice President of the PRC, visited the 
Saudi Arabia and signed The Joint Statement of the PRC along with Saudi Arabia on 
Strengthening Cooperation and Strategic Friendly Relations, (Xinhua, June 22, 2008). 
 
Six months later after the Jinping visit, President Jintao Hu made another trip to 
Riyadh, his second in three years, (Zhang, 2009). Hu met with Saudi Arabian King 
Abdullah bin Abdul-Aziz in February 2009 and the two leaders vowed to deepen their 
strategic friendly ties, work together to tackle the global financial crisis and 
strengthen coordination in international and regional affairs. Following the talks, the 
two leaders witnessed signing ceremonies for five cooperation deals in energy, health, 
quarantine, transportation and culture, (Xinhua, February 11, 2009). 
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In addition, Hu raised a six-point proposal on developing China-Saudi Arabia 
strategic friendly ties, (China‘s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 11, 2009). (a) 
Maintain high-level visits and establish a high-level consultation mechanism. (b) Take 
advantage of their resources and markets, promote an all-round energy partnership 
and expand two-way investment. (c) Expand the scale of economic and trade 
cooperation and raise the level of cooperation. The Chinese Government encourages 
more competent businesses of the country to participate in Saudi Arabia‘s 
infrastructure construction and enhance cooperation on project contract and labor. (d) 
Advance exchanges in the fields of education, sports and tourism and expand 
personnel contacts. (e) Strengthen communication and coordination in major 
international and regional issues and safeguard regional peace and stability. (f) 
Enhance the cooperation between China and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). 
 
Having consecutive head-of-state exchanges in such a short time is considered 
unusual. In its daily opinion column, the Saudi daily paper Al Jazirah described the 
relations between the countries: ―Three visits between the leadership in Saudi Arabia 
and China in just three years. This fully demonstrates the qualitative development and 
big step forward in their relations‖, (Al Jazirah, February 10, 2009). Indeed, both 
Beijing and Riyadh feel that closer Sino-Saudi political relations will lead to great 
economic benefits. China hopes that closer political relations will lead to greater 
energy access and larger trade markets. Saudi Arabia is hoping that closer political 
relations will lead to a stable market for its oil exports and greater Chinese 
investments and assistance in economic development. In this regard during a meeting 
between Chinese President Jintao Hu and special envoy Prince Bandar bin Sultan bin 
Abdulaziz of Saudi King Abdullah, in March 2011, Hu said China treasures its 
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friendship with Saudi Arabia, and considers the country a reliable good friend and a 
sincere partner, (Xinhua, March 18, 2011). He added, ―We are willing to make joint 
efforts with Saudi Arabia, to consolidate political trust, enhance strategic coordination 
and substantial cooperation, to boost bilateral strategic and friendly ties to a new 
high‖, (Ibid). 
 
The most interesting aspect of all these developments is that Washington is following 
the Sino-Saudi relations very closely. In one of the confidential documents leaked by 
Wikileaks, James Smith, the U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia, wrote to Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton, as she prepared for the February 2010 visit to Saudi Arabia,   
summarising the results of the Chinese foreign and commerce ministers to Saudi 
Arabia in January 2010: 
Since King Abdullah‘s historic visit to Beijing in January 2006, the Saudi has focused 
predominantly on energy and trade.  However, the relationship may be showing signs of 
political evolution.  While the Chinese would likely prefer to stay away from political 
controversy, their economic power and permanent seat on the UN Security Council has made 
it more and more difficult for them to avoid politics altogether...The incentives for the Saudis 
to try and leverage their economic relationship with China for political gain with respect to 
sensitive regional issues, such as Iran and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, are significant and 
growing.  After patiently focusing on building the economic relationship since 2006, FM 
Sauds public and private prodding of FM Yang indicates the Saudis are ready to try and cash 
in some political chips, (Wikileaks, January 27, 2010). 
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4.5 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has shown that Chinese economic interests are the driving force behind 
the expansion of the Sino-Saudi relationship – and not China‘s desire to expand its 
power and influence in the Middle East at the cost of the United States. China was in 
its quest to establish diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia not attempting to increase 
its power and influence in Saudi Arabia at the cost of the United States as realists may 
contend. China‘s policy to improve relations with Saudi Arabia came after the 
implementation of China‘s policy of openness to the outside world and focus on 
economic development away from ideological considerations.  
 
In fact, the entry of China to the Middle East was not, as happened with the former 
Soviet Union to counter U.S. influence but, on the contrary was for the following 
reasons: (a) China entered a ―strategic partnership‖ with the United States against the 
Soviet Union, and embarked upon an ―open up‖ policy; (b) China‘s desire in 
strengthening economic relations with the Middle East and arms sales; (c) the quest 
for oil and their appreciation of Saudi Arabia‘s oil policy; (d) China saw in Saudi 
Arabia a chance to gain further legitimacy by urging Gulf nations to shift diplomatic 
recognition to Beijing away from Taiwan. China‘s actions were closely aligned with 
the economic interdependence theory. If China was acting in the realism model, it 
should be actively pressuring Saudi Arabia to weaken its political ties to the United 
States; thereby increasing the amount of Chinese influence in Saudi Arabia. There has 
been no indication that this has been the case. On the contrary China‘s actions were 
helpful to American policy on many occasions. More important of all, China decided 
to renew its relations with Saudi Arabia in the early 1980s, while the alliance between 
Beijing and Washington was strengthening.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CHINA‟S SEARCH FOR A RELIABLE PARTNER 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
While gaining access to the region‘s vast energy resources is China‘s primary 
motivation for deepening relations with Saudi Arabia, there are also a number of other 
factors driving China‘s Middle East policy. (a) Politically, China is seeking to 
enhance the security of its oil imports from the Middle East by increasing its 
diplomacy in the region. The Chinese Government appears to believe that strong 
bilateral political relationships can produce greater supply security during crises, 
(Downs, 2000: 49). (b) In the security realm, they intend to fight what the Chinese 
call the ―three ugly forces‖ - religious extremism, national separatism and terrorism. 
Since Saudi Arabia is the religious centre of the Islamic world, China has attempted to 
maintain good relations with Riyadh in order to get their support on the Uyghur 
insurgency in Xinjiang Province and maintain amicable relations with the over 20 
million Muslims residing in China, (Li, 2009). (c) China is seeking full support of the 
Arab States in the international arena on issues like the Taiwan or ―One China 
Policy‖, as well as its position on Tibet and other domestic controversies in the 
international arena like human rights. (d) It laid the groundwork for the expansion of 
commercial ties with Saudi Arabia with the hope that this would stimulate commerce 
with other Gulf States as well, (Calabrese, 1998: 351-366). 
 
In this context, Zhang Xiaodong, Deputy Chief of the Chinese Association for Middle 
East Studies, argues that, ―The Arab nations need China‘s help in protecting their 
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rights, as China is a permanent member of the UN Security Council. And China hopes 
to be backed up by Arab nations in certain issues, such as Taiwan, climate change and 
human rights‖, (Wu, 2010). One good example illustrating this mindset occurred on 
December 10, 2010 when Saudi Arabia with other Arab countries supported China by 
not attending the Nobel Peace Prize ceremony for Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo, 
(BBC, December 7, 2010). 
 
China has got along well with Arab countries for a long time now and has avoided 
intervening in their domestic affairs. Indeed, during the turbulences that swept the 
Arab World, Beijing enforced that policy in very clear way and called to solve the 
problem without any outside interference. In that regard China‘s special envoy to the 
Middle East Wu Sike told China Daily at the National Committee of the Chinese 
People‘s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) National Committee on March 
2011 that:  ―The U.S.‘s values and interests clashed (in the regional chaos in the 
Middle East) this time, and it chose to protect its interests…Washington‘s support for 
discarding Hosni Mubarak, the former Egyptian president, a long-term strategic ally 
of the U.S., hurt and disappointed both Arab leaders and America‘s other allies in the 
region‖, (China Daily, March 14, 2011). 
 
This chapter will examine China‘s perspective of developing relations with Saudi 
Arabia and attempts to answer two questions. Why is the Saudi Arabia an 
indispensable partner for China? And what is the nature and extent of China‘s 
strategic motives in pursuing a partnership with Saudi Arabia? The chapter also 
attempts to decipher Chinese intentions in regarding to Saudi Arabia. If China is 
acting within the context of realist theory, it should be attempting to expand its power 
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and influence in Saudi Arabia at every opportunity with the intent to undermine U.S. 
influence and to encourage Saudi Arabia to shift their close political relations from 
the United States over to China. If China is acting in the economic interdependence 
model as the liberals argue, it should be developing a Sino-Saudi political relationship 
based on furthering their economic interests and not based on degrading the U.S.-
Saudi political relationship. In this regard I will show the conditions under which high 
interdependence between China and the Saudi Arabia will lead to a pacific or 
belligerent China. If decision-makers‘ expectations of future relations and trade are 
high they will likely pursue policies that will enhance security in the region. On the 
other hand, if they have a negative view of their future environment they will likely 
take action to protect their interests in the region. 
 
 
5.2 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SAUDI ARABIA IN CHINA‟S OIL 
STRATEGY  
 
 
Over the past several years Sino-Saudi relations have grown closer, as Riyadh seeks 
to reduce its dependence on the United States, and Beijing‘s thirst for oil has 
increased, (Wu & Storey 2008: 190-208). Today, Saudi Arabia is China‘s top oil 
provider and Saudi Arabia is the largest market for Chinese products in the Middle 
East, (Ibid). China‘s efforts to develop closer political relations with Saudi Arabia are 
based on two goals, (Jin, 2005). First, China is attempting to ensure it has access to 
Saudi energy sources in the future in order to meet its energy demands. Secondly, 
China is also attempting to maintain its diversity in energy sources. While China may 
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be limiting the amount of Saudi oil it imports, Saudi Arabia still plays a vital role in 
maintaining the diversity in Chinese oil supplies (i.e. keeping China from becoming 
too reliant on Angola, Iran and Russia), (Ibid). 
 
(Figure 5.2.1): Top Proven World Reserves by Country 
 
 
Source: EIA (August, 2011)   
 
 
In a Speech by Yang Honglin, the Chinese Ambassador to the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia, made on the occasion of the Chinese National Day in 2008, he stated the 
Chinese position regarding Saudi Arabia in a very clear way: ―An influential country 
in the Middle East and Gulf region and the largest energy supplier in the world, Saudi 
Arabia has played an important role in maintaining the peace and stability of the 
region, pushing forward the regional economic development, enhancing Arab 
countries‘ solidarity, promoting dialogue among different religions and civilisations 
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Saudi Arabia has the Largest Oil Reserves in the World   
186 
 
and safeguarding the stability of international energy supply‖, (Yang, 2008). While 
former Chinese ambassador to Saudi Arabia Zheng Dayong described the Sino-Saudi 
relations in very interesting words:  
I can use a vivid description to introduce the country: it‘s a country ‗grasping with its two 
hands‘ – one hand for oil and the other for the Qur‘an … Oil and religion play an important 
part in its people‘s lives. Saudi Arabia is the world‘s leading petroleum exporter. Saudi Arabia 
is also the birthplace of Islam. The two holiest places in Islam – Mecca and Medina—are in 
Saudi Arabia, and 1.3 billion Muslim pilgrims from all over the world head to Mecca each 
year. (China Daily, February 12, 2009) 
 
Indeed, spiritually-wise, Saudi Arabia plays a unique role for the world‘s 1.3 billion 
Muslims as the birthplace of Islam and home of the two holiest cities. Politically, its 
leaders enjoy broad domestic support, regional influence and global reach. 
Economically, as the world‘s sole energy superpower and the de facto central banker 
of the global energy markets, Riyadh is the economic powerhouse of the Middle East, 
representing 25 percent of the combined gross domestic product of the Arab world. 
The Kingdom has amassed around half trillion dollars in foreign reserves, (Obaid, 
2011). 
 
China and Saudi Arabia enjoy the mutual benefits of very complementary economies 
which has strengthened economic ties. China is currently the fastest growing oil 
consumer, while Saudi Arabia is the largest oil producing country. As China‘s 
demand for oil continues to rise and with Saudi Arabia seeking to secure stable 
markets, Sino-Saudi relations are expected to rapidly expand in the coming years. 
Analysis of the wording of Memorandum of Understanding on Petroleum 
Cooperation between China and Saudi Arabia, (October 31, 1999), reveals the 
economical dynamics of the new Sino-Saudi relationship: 
The two sides shared the view that the stability of the international oil market is in the interest 
of oil producing and consuming countries and health of the world economy. Both sides agreed 
that Saudi Arabia is a large, dependable, reliable and secure petroleum supplier, while China 
is a large, dependable and reliable consumer; therefore, the two countries are strongly 
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complementary to each other in this field. Both sides expressed their willingness to establish 
long-term friendly and cooperative relationship in the field of petroleum, (Memorandum of 
Understanding on Petroleum Cooperation between the Government of the People's Republic 
of China and the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 1999). 
 
From the Chinese perspective, energy security lies at the heart of the bilateral 
relationship with Saudi Arabia, as has been the case with many of China‘s most 
important strategic relationships over the past decade, (Wagner & Karasik, 2010). 
According to the Chinese ex-ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Song Wei, there are two 
key words as far as ties between China and Saudi Arabia is concerned, they are 
―energy cooperation‖, (Wei, 2009). He added, ―Energy cooperation has gone far 
beyond a buy-and-sell relation...when I was an ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Saudi 
Arabia suggested that we build a strategic cooperation, which means Saudi Arabia 
needs a stable market, and China needs a stable supply‖, (Ibid). Indeed, Saudi Arabia 
has been the top supplier of crude oil to China since 2002, and it is unlikely to give up 
this leading position in near future, (Ebel, 2009: 2). 
 
China recognises Saudi Arabia‘s uniquely dominant role among the world‘s oil 
producers and continues to work hard at building closer ties to the Kingdom. The 
Chinese investment in Saudi Arabia has also expanded significantly. Strategically, 
these trade and investment ties are meant to reinforce Beijing‘s efforts to establish 
itself in Saudi calculations as a desirable long-term customer for the Kingdom‘s oil 
exports.  There are no other producers capable of stepping into Saudi Arabia‘s shoes 
now or at least in the next decade. Only Russia and the United States produce 
volumes comparable to Saudi Arabia‘s, (IEA, 2010). But Russian oil, which is more 
expensive than Saudi low-cost oil, is ill suited to serve as spare capacity, and Russia 
has also shown little interest in cooperating with other producers to help stabilise 
prices. Nor is there any prospect in the near future that the United States will step 
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back into the swing-producer role it played half a century ago, when it held huge low-
cost reserves and was not massively dependent on imported oil, (Robert & Michael, 
2011). Within this context, China regards Saudi Arabia as a very reliable supplier of 
crude oil. Over the past decade, the Saudis have repeatedly told the Chinese that they 
can count on Saudi Arabia to provide China with the oil it needs for continued 
economic growth, (Down, 2011: 62). Perhaps the greatest reassurance the Chinese 
have received from the Saudis about their reliability as an oil supplier came during 
President Jintao Hu‘s state visit in February 2009. While Hu was in Riyadh, the 
Saudis promised to guarantee the supply of crude oil to China at all times as part of a 
―gentleman‘s agreement‖ between Saudi Aramco and China Petrochemical 
Corporation (Sinopec), (Ibid). 
 
From the Chinese perspective, Beijing needs a reliable supplier of oil. Indonesia is 
now a net importer of oil, Iran and Sudan are unreliable, Russia has political agendas, 
Canada and Venezuela are too far away and Iraq needs long years to recover. A 
comment by the China News Agency summarised Beijing‘s view of the emerging 
Sino-Saudi relationship: ―Saudi Arabia is a very good and reliable oil supplier. It is 
not like Nigeria, which is so fraught with uncertain factors that its oil supply 
fluctuates sharply. Neither is it like Iraq and Iran, whose oil supply was affected by 
unstable political situations‖, (Alterman, 2008: 33). Even Venezuela, which has the 
second largest oil reserves in the world, can‘t match the production power of Saudi 
Arabia. Venezuelan oil output peaked in mid 2009 at 3.0 mb/d; today it is down to 2.5 
mb/d in spite of record demand and high prices, (Financial Times, August 16, 2011). 
Iran is similar: output peaked at 4.2 mb/d in mid 2006; today it has fallen to 3.5 mb/d, 
(Ibid). 
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Indeed, Saudi Arabia has always been banking on its credibility as a reliable oil 
supplier, or as Ali Al-Naimi, Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources of Saudi 
Arabia, puts it, the Kingdom ―has an important role to play in promoting stability in 
world oil markets. The most powerful tool we have for achieving a balanced market is 
our maintenance of spare production capacity‖, (Al-Naimi, 2009).  Paul Horsnell, the 
veteran oil watcher at Barclays Capital, notes that when it comes to production 
increases, ―Saudi Arabia is the world‘s sole swing producer, giving it a level of 
control not seen since the heights of OPEC in the 1970s‖, (Financial Times, August 
16, 2011). While John Sfakianakis, the Chief Economist of Banque Saudi Fransi, 
argues along similar lines: ―For China Saudi Arabia is a voice of moderation and 
stability – and undoubtedly the single most important country in the world of energy. 
It is the driving force that tries to bring moderation in prices and to supply global 
markets with sufficient oil‖, (Sfakianakis, 2009). Saudi Arabia‘s ability to calm global 
markets in periods of high stress gives the Kingdom an important political influence. 
If Saudi ARAMCO‘s spare capacity shrinks, oil prices will become even more 
volatile, (Peter, 2011). In a recent speech to ―Royal Air Force Molesworth, UK‖ 
Prince Turki Al Faisal underlined the pivotal role rule of Saudi Arabia:  
Saudi Arabia itself now possesses 75 percent of the spare production capacity in the world, 
with every other country possessing a very small amount or practically nothing. To put this 
into perspective, Saudi Arabia has so much production capacity – nearly 4 million barrels/day 
– that we could almost instantly replace all of Iran‘s oil production. This massive spare 
capacity is the outcome of a capacity expansion program from 10 million barrels per day to 
12.5 million barrels per day, which the Kingdom undertook between 2002 and 2008 at a 
capital cost of over US$45 billion. Current plans are in place to sustain this capacity further by 
a new field development at Manifa, which will bring on a further 900 thousand barrels of oil 
capacity per day by 2014 at a capital cost of US$16 billion to offset decline at other fields. In 
addition to this spare production capacity, Saudi Arabia is committed to insuring sufficient 
refining capacity on a global basis to guarantee its oil production reaches the end use markets 
across the world. Current plans are to increase its Saudi based refining capacity from 2 million 
barrels per day to 3 million barrels per day by 2014 at a capital cost of over $26 billion 
dollars, (Al Faisal, 2011). 
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For China, with its sensitivity to volatility in oil price and supply, the stability of 
Saudi oil supply is enticing, as is the level of influence the Saudis are seen as having 
over both ―OPEC‖ and ―non-OPEC‖ oil producers. Additionally, a closer economic 
relationship with Saudi Arabia should be absent of the possible political consequences 
and image concerns that occur in Sino-Iranian relations, (Douglas & others, 2006). In 
China‘s eyes, stable relations with Saudi Arabia are the best possible approach to 
avoid being shut-off from vital oil resources in the case that the Sino-American 
relationship should take a turn for the worse, (Jochen 2006), or/and in the event of 
political turmoil as it has been demonstrated in Libya in 2011. Indeed, Saudi Arabia 
has boosted its crude oil production, reaching a 30-year high of almost 10 (mb/d) in 
July 2011, (Financial Times, August 16, 2011). Tellingly, the last time that Saudi 
Arabia was pumping as much crude oil as it did in July, 2011 was in early 1981, when 
the Kingdom was replacing the production lost after the Iranian revolution and the 
start of the Iran-Iraq war, (Ibid). 
 
At the moment, the Saudis are in a unique position; Saudi Arabia is the largest oil 
producer of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). With 
approximately one fifth of the world‘s proven oil reserves and some of the lowest 
production costs, Saudi Arabia is expected to remain the world‘s largest net oil 
exporter for years to come, (EIA, January 2011). Saudi Arabia produced over 10 
(mb/d) of oil in 2010, the majority of which was crude oil. Asia, including Japan, 
South Korea, China, and India, now receive an estimated 50 percent of Saudi Arabia‘s 
crude oil exports, as well as the majority of its refined petroleum product and NLG 
exports, (Ibid). Saudi Arabia is also the world‘s only ―swing producer‖: the country 
retains the single, largest spare production capacity of all oil producers. This means 
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that the world market and the world‘s largest oil consumers have a major interest in a 
cooperative Saudi Government, (Aarts & Rijsingen, 2007: 23-58), (see Table 5.3.1). 
 
(Table 5.2.1): Estimated OPEC Sustainable Crude Production Capacity (mb/d) 
 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
OPEC 35.74 34.65 35.48 36.39 37.04 37.82 38.07 
Saudi Arabia  12.07  12.04  11.88  11.73  11.59  11.82  11.90 
Iraq 2.50  2.76  3.16  3.51  3.88  4.25  4.36  
Iran  3.87  3.70  3.53  3.46  3.30  3.12  2.98  
Source: IEA, Oil Market Report, (December, 2011) 
 
 
Saudi Arabia continues to have substantially more spare capacity than any other 
OPEC member and, as such, should be prepared to ramp up volumes as demand 
recovers, (Bank of America Merrill Lynch, 2010). Saudi Arabia has recreated its 
spare production capacity by bringing new facilities on-stream. Riyadh has spent 
billions of dollars in new oil fields and its maximum production capacity has steadily 
risen over the last decade. Today Saudi Arabia could boost its production further to 
more than 10 mb/d, potentially up to 12.5 mb/d, (Financial Times, August 16, 2011). 
This enables it to retain its OPEC leadership and consolidate its international 
influence, (Shell International BV, 2011: 26). The increase in Saudi Arabia‘s spare 
production capacity will be the critical element in moderating oil price volatility in the 
next few years. Over the next two decades, according to official forecasts, the world 
will rely even more heavily on Saudi oil. The International Energy Agency, which 
represents the oil-consuming countries, predicted in its latest ―New Policies‖ scenario 
that by 2035 Saudi Arabia‘s oil output would have roughly doubled from over 8 
(mb/d) in 2009, (World Energy Outlook 2010: 133) to 15.4 million barrels per day in 
192 
 
2035, (The International Energy Outlook 2011: 34) The Kingdom‘s share of total 
world oil production would rise from 12 per cent to almost 14 per cent, (Ibid:34-35) 
(see Table 5.3.2). 
 
(Table 5.2.2): Production of World Key Oil Producers, (2010-2030) 
 
In the New Policies/Reference Scenarios(mb/d)  
 IEA (in the New Policies Scenario) EIA(in the Reference Scenario) 
 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Saudi Arabia 8.4 11.2 11.5 12.2 13.2 11.6 12.8 13.9 14.6 
Russia 10.4 10.2 9.5 9.2 9.2 10.8 11.4 12.2 12.8 
U.S. 7.7 6.9 6.9 6.8 6.9 10.4 11.2 11.7 12.2 
Iran 3.7 4.7 4.8 5.0 5.1 4.0 3.8 3.7 3.8 
China 4.1 3.8 3.7 3.6 3.1 4.0 4.2 4.8 5.2 
Canada 3.3 3.8 4.0 4.5 4.9 4.2 4.7 5.4 6.0 
Mexico 2.9 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.3 1.8 1.4 1.5 
Caspian 3.1 3.7 4.4 5.3 5.4 3.5 3.8 4.2 4.4 
U.A.E 2.3 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.9 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.3 
Iraq 2.4 3.6 4.8 5.3 6.1 2.9 3.6 4.5 5.5 
Kuwait 2.3 2.9 3.0 3.1 3.3 3.0 3.1 3.3 3.7 
Venezuela 2.5 2.8 2.7 2.9 3.4 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Nigeria 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.3 2.5 3.0 3.2 3.3 3.3 
Brazil 2.1 3.1 4.4 5.0 5.2 3.8 4.7 5.5 6.0 
Algeria 1.2 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.6 2.7 2.6 2.5 
Angola 1.7 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.5 2.2 2.3 2.2 2.1 
Libya 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.9 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.8 
Qatar 0.8 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.5 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.5 
Source:  Adapted by the author from IEA, World Energy Outlook 2010 and EIA, 
International Energy Outlook 2011 
 
 
The world, (China in particular), will continue to rely on traditional fossil fuels for 
most of its energy needs for the coming decades.  In fact, these energy sources, 
namely coal, oil and natural gas, are expected to account for about four out of every 
five units of energy that mankind will consume for the foreseeable future, (Al-Falih, 
September 13, 2010). Oil remains the world‘s leading fuel, at 33.6 percent of global 
energy consumption, but oil continued to lose market share for the 11th consecutive 
year, (Statistical Review of World Energy 2011: 2). 
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(Table 5.2.3): World Primary Energy Demand by Fuel and Scenario 
 
   New Policies 
Scenario 
Current Policies 
Scenario 
 450 Scenario  
 1980 2008 2020 2035 2020 2035 2020 2035 
Coal 25% 27% 27% 24% 29% 29% 26% 17% 
Oil 43% 31% 30% 28% 30% 28% 29% 26% 
Gas 17% 21% 22% 22% 12% 22% 21% 20% 
others 15% 21% 21% 26% 29% 21% 24% 37% 
Source: World Energy Outlook 2010 
 
 
Over the medium term, most of the increase in the global production of crude oil is 
expected to come from the GCC countries (and Iraq). The GCC countries, and in 
particular Saudi Arabia, are the only credible, sizable, long-term alternative providers 
of crude oil to China. Saudi Arabia is also a source of capital for China and can 
provide the chemical products that China needs to continue gaining export markets as 
well as the refined products and crude oil to manufacture these chemicals themselves, 
(Andrews-Speed, 2009: 50).  
 
According to Khalid AL-Falih, President of Saudi ARAMCO, ―Oil reserves in Saudi 
Arabia of about 260 billion barrels represent roughly a fifth of the world‘s proven 
reserves and, at our current production rate, these reserves are enough for more than 
80 years of production, (Al-Falih, September 13, 2010). Yet AL-Falih expects that 
over time those reserves will grow by an additional 40 percent, and ARAMCO is 
working to raise the rate of recovery from Saudi‘s major oil fields to 70 percent , or 
twice the worldwide average, (Ibid). In sum, as a result of all the previous reasons, 
China cannot ignore the position of Saudi Arabia in global oil markets, which makes 
Saudi Arabia an indispensable partner for China for years to come. 
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5.3 EXPANDING ECONOMIC INTERESTS  
 
Saudi Arabia represents over 20 percent of the combined GDP of the Middle East-
North Africa (MENA) region and an estimated quarter of the Arab World‘s GDP 
according to the latest IMF numbers, (IMF, September 2011), making it the economic 
engine of the region and the logical choice to be a permanent influential member of 
the G20. The Saudi stock market represents about 50 percent of the entire stock 
market capitalisation of the MENA region and the listed Saudi companies make up 5 
of the top 10 companies in the region with the top two slots being the Saudi 
conglomerates, ARAMCO and SABIC, (Al Faisal, June 8, 2011). The Saudi Arabian 
Monetary Agency (SAMA), the Kingdom‘s central bank, is the world‘s third largest 
holder of foreign exchange reserves managing just under US$550 billion, (Ibid).  
 
Since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1990, the trade between the two 
countries flourished based mainly in Saudi oil exports, but also provided the Chinese 
with new markets. The two-way trade between Saudi Arabia and China in the  last 
two decades increased almost 34 times from US$1.28 billion in 1990 to almost 44 
US$ billion in 2010, Saudi Arabia is now China‘s largest trading partner in the 
Middle East and North Africa, (Xinhua, May 12, 2010). Saudi Arabia has been 
China‘s biggest trade partner in West Asia (including the Middle East and the League 
of Arab States), for the last nine consecutive years, (Xinhua, January 11, 2011). 
 
China is seeking to not only improve its energy security but also to expand its trade. 
Saudi Arabia has emerged as a major Middle Eastern trading partner for China and it 
is looking to further expand this relationship. Currently, the Middle East is also one of 
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the most important destinations for China‘s labour-intensive products. And the GCC 
countries, rich in capital but short of labour, are a particularly important market for 
China‘s contract labour exports, (Jin, 2010), (see Table 5.3.1 below). 
 
(Table 5.3.1): China‟s Exports and the World Trade, 2001-2010a  
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
 
World Total  
Exports 
(US$ 
trillions) 
6,06 6,38 7,45 9,12 10,38 12,07 13,8 15,9 12,14 15,23
b 
China‟s Total Exports to:   
World 
(US$ 
billions) 
266,1 325,5 438,2 593,3 761,9 968,9 1220 1430 1201 1578 
(%) of 
World‟s 
Total 
4.3 5.2 5.8 6.5 7.3 8.02 8.8 8.9 9.8 10.4 
Arab World 
(US$ 
billions) 
7,2 9,6 13,05 17,6 23,6 31,7 43,2 59,3 51,8 64.9 
(%) of 
China‟s 
Total 
2.7 2.9 2.9 2.9 3.1 3.2 3.5 4.1 4.3 4.1 
Saudi 
Arabia (US$ 
billions) 
1,3 1,6 2,1 2,7 3,8 5,05 7,8 10,8 8,9 10.3 
(%) of 
China‟s 
Total 
0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.6 
Source: General Customs Administration of China and UN COMTRADE 
(a) Percentages  were calculated by the author (b) WTO 
 
 
Additionally, Saudi Arabia plans to spend hundreds of billions of dollars over the next 
five years to improve infrastructure and develop the economy and to promote 
diversification. These future plans provide tremendous opportunities for Chinese 
companies. As part of its larger economic strategy, China continues to promote its 
goods to the region, while the Arab Gulf States look to China and the rest of Asia for 
its own exports and investments. Saudi Arabia has a growing need for more 
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investment in technology, management skills, science, technology and infrastructure. 
China has an opportunity to establish an important commercial presence in the 
Kingdom beyond an energy relationship. China also has the capability to expand its 
already significant export of labour services to a region with a growing demand in 
construction areas, (Ramady, 2007), (see Tables 5.3.2 & 5.3.3). 
 
(Table 5.3.2): Future Major Market Opportunities in Saudi Economy  
 
Sector Market Opportunities 
Government 
Spending 
The government is planning to spend US$400 billion on roads, airports 
and energy projects over a five year period between 2009 and 2014. 
US$70 billion of this expected to be invested in 2010. Saudi Arabia in 
March 2011 announced increases in government spending. The package 
included US$67 billion on housing and funds. 
Energy Saudi ARAMCO, pledged US$130 investment programmed, over the 
next five years, with a growing share spent on gas, (US$70 billion of 
investment in the petrochemical sector by 2011 is expected). 
Infrastructure Saudi Arabia‘s ambitious rail plans are fuelling activity in the 
infrastructure sector, with US$30 billion worth of contracts under way or 
at the bidding stage.  
Electricity The state-owned Saudi Electricity Company (SEC) intends to invest 
US$28 billion to add approximately 13GW of power in the next three 
years. The utility company also plans to spend US$70 billion by 2018 to 
add 25GW to meet the growing demand from a rapidly increasing 
population. 
Water Saudi Arabia is the third largest consumer of water per capita in the 
world, but has limited groundwater to tap. Desalination forms the 
backbone of the government‘s water strategy. US$6 billion a year has 
been committed by the government to bolstering the water sector over 
the next two decades. 
Information 
Technology (IT) 
Saudi Arabia has the biggest IT market in the Gulf region, with a forecast 
value of US$3.7 billion in 2010 expected to rise to US$5.2 billion by 
2014. 
Source: USDC, Arab News, May 18, 2011, Abed, 2010: 2 and Crooks, 2010. 
 
 
(Table 5.3.3): Saudi Ninth Five-Year Plan Allocations 2010-2014 
 
Development Sector Allocations (US$ billions) Share (%) 
Human Resources 195 50.6 
Social and Health Services 73 19 
Economic Resources 60.7 15.7 
Transportation & Communications 29.6 7.7 
Municipal and Housing Services 26.8 7 
Total Expenditures 385.1 100 
Source: Saudi Arabia Ministry of Economy and Planning 
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In addition, the Middle East is a major source of global investment flows. For 
example, the six GCC states could invest a staggering US$250 billion in Asia over the 
next five years, most of which would go to China, (Kawach, September 23, 2010). 
According to the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, the Middle East Sovereign Wealth 
Fund has US$1438.78 billion by the end of 2010, representing 35 per cent of the 
world‘s total assets of Sovereign Wealth Funds,9 (see Table 5.3.4). The combined 
foreign assets of GCC governments, state institutions, and banking systems (i.e. 
excluding non-financial corporate sector), estimated around 1.5 trillion by the end-
2010 and projected to rise to US$1.7 trillion in 2011, (Abed, 2011: 2-5). 
 
(Table 5.3.4): Sovereign Wealth Funds, World‟s Market Share by Region (2010) 
 
Country Billion Dollars % World‟s share 
China (including Hong 
Kong) 
1123.3 26.3 
United Arab Emirates 709.3 16.6 
Norway 556.8 13.0 
Saudi Arabia 444.4 10.4 
Singapore 392.8 9.2 
Kuwait 202.8 4.7 
Russia 142.5 3.3 
Qatar 85 1.9 
Libya 70 1.6 
U.S. 58.2 1.3 
Others (25 countries) 470.8 11.0 
Region Billion Dollars % World‟s share 
Asia 1687.3 39.6% 
Middle East 1481. 8 34.8% 
Europe 760. 3 17.8% 
Africa 134.4 3.1% 
Americas 106.7 2.5% 
Other 85.4 2% 
Total 4,255.9 100 
Source: Calculated by the author from Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute (March, 2011) 
 
 
                                                             
9 SWF Institute, See [http://www.swfinstitute.org/fund-rankings/] 
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Chas Freeman, the former United States Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, argues that 
Middle East markets, including its capital, arms, and consumer markets, are prizes for 
the world‘s great powers to compete in. Its political economy is a central determinant 
of the global future, (Freeman, 2009). In the future, the GCC (including Saudi 
Arabia), will grow in importance as an economic and trading hub. In 2020, the GCC 
is projected to be a US$2 trillion economy, providing nearly one-quarter of the 
world‘s oil supplies as well as increasing quantities of petrochemicals, metals and 
plastics. As economic weight gradually shifts southwards and eastwards, emerging 
markets will become increasingly important trading partners and investment 
destinations. Gulf investors and sovereign wealth funds are likely to diversify their 
assets into Asia and Africa, and the region is likely to export more of its oil to 
industrialising countries, (EIU, March, 2009). 
 
China on the other hand, is also increasing investments in the GCC region, with 
Chinese firms having contracts to build everything from railways and cement plants in 
Saudi-Arabia, to a port in Kuwait, and a sewage system in UAE. Furthermore, China 
is predicted to considerably strengthen GCC relations as experts predict China will 
import 20 percent more oil from the region in the next few years, going from the 
current 50 percent to 70 percent in 2015, (Mobrez, 2008). China also seeks to increase 
petrochemical, phosphate and aluminium imports, which are abundant in GCC 
countries. China may be importing 16.82 million tonnes of petrochemicals by 2015, 
almost 3.5 times more than the imports in 2008.  It is anticipated that 90 percent net 
imports of ethylene derivatives and 70 percent net imports of propylene derivatives in 
the world will come from Middle East by 2013, (YarnsandFibers, March 16, 2010). 
The six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, which sit atop 45 per cent of the 
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global recoverable crude aluminium deposits, produced around 2.2 million tonnes of 
aluminium in 2009 and are pushing ahead with mega aluminium projects which will 
boost their output to 10 million tonnes and allow them to control around 20 percent of 
the world‘s total aluminium output, (Kawach, September 10, 2010). 
 
Saudi Arabia is expected to become a major aluminium exporter when three mega 
smelter projects worth more than US$10 billion start production of nearly 2.4 million 
tonnes within five years, (Kawach, May 5, 2010). In addition, Saudi Arabia today 
accounts for about 62 percent of chemical production in the GCC region and 
approximately 8 percent of global production. Saudi Arabia is already the world‘s 
largest methanol producer and the second largest ethylene producer.  By 2015 the 
Kingdom‘s petrochemical production is projected to increase from today‘s levels of 
about 60 million tons per year to more than 80 million tons per year, (Al-Naimi, 
December 9, 2009). Saudi Arabia alone is committed to producing 10 per cent of the 
world‘s petrochemicals output by 2015, (KPMG, 2011). Increased dependency on 
GCC oil, phosphate, and aluminium exports, could result in further Chinese 
investments in the region, (Kawach, May 5, 2010). 
 
Overall, the future of Sino-Saudi relations seems to be promising, considering China‘s 
overwhelming growing need for energy security. GCC‘s oil exports to China are 
expected to grow an average of 3.7 percent annually through to 2030, (Al-Naimi, 
December 9, 2009). In short, China can‘t ignore its economic interests in the 
Kingdom. Saudi Arabia is the largest economy in the Arab States and Middle East. It 
is also a member of the top 20 economies in the world (G20) and also has a strong 
influence in the IMF, (see Table 5.3.5). 
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(Table 5.3.5): Saudi Arabia Regional Power and Global Influence 
 
The largest 
Economy in the 
Middle East and 
North Africa  
Saudi Arabia‘s 2010 GDP was over US$448.3 billion, about 20% of 
the total GDP of MENA and almost quarter of the total Arab League 
aggregated economies.
10
 
The Largest Stock 
Market in the 
Region 
At its peak during February 2006, Saudi Arabia‘s market 
capitalisation reached over US$800 billion. Despite a massive 
correction, it still represents approximately 50% of region‘s market 
capitalisation. 
The World‟s 
Leading Petroleum 
Power: 
Saudi Arabia has the largest oil production capacity, the largest oil 
spare capacity and is the largest oil exporter and holder of the largest 
oil reserves in the world. Saudi Arabia is also the world‘s largest 
exporter of petrochemicals and it boasts the fifth largest reserves of 
natural gas. 
The World‟s 
Leading Financial 
Power: 
- - Saudi Arabia has one of largest Foreign assets, It‘s Sovereign 
Wealth fund by the end of 2010 has US$444.4 billion  
- - Member of the top 20 economy in the world (G20)  
- - Occupies the eighth place of members‘ quotas and voting power in 
the Fund IMF 
Source: IMF, World Bank, SWFs Institute and SAMA 
 
 
 
5.4 CHINA‟S GEOSTRATEGIC INTERESTS  
 
 
Chinese strategist Dai Bingguo, who plays a major role in Beijing foreign policy 
making, identified China‘s ―core interests‖ as: ―The PRC‘s first core interest is the 
survival of China‘s ‗fundamental system‘ and national security, second, the 
safeguarding of China‘s sovereignty and territorial integrity; and third, continued 
stable economic growth and social development‖, (Wu, 2009). In specific terms, 
Tibet, Xinjiang, Taiwan and South China Sea Islands as well as strategic resources 
and trade routes. Thus, China regards the situation in Middle East and Saudi Arabia in 
particular with strategic lenses. 
                                                             
10 The IMF GDP data for the year 2010 for all 22 members of the Arab League was US$ 1,697,123 
billion 
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China today maintains good relations with all of the region‘s potential energy 
suppliers, (Zweig & Jianhai 2005: 84). China‘s strategic advantages here are obvious: 
Beijing is first unencumbered by the historical ballast of a colonial power and, 
second, it is at present not pursuing a grand design for the region. Without any 
exaggerated political ambitions, China‘s leadership appears above all to be motivated 
by pragmatic considerations: how best to promote China‘s policy of economic 
modernisation and to secure the supply of energy it needs, (Ibid). In this regard 
China‘s special envoy to the Middle East, Wu Sike, argues that China is not seeking 
to compete with the United States in exerting influence in the Middle East but is 
confident about its ties to the region despite recent power transfers, (China Daily, 
March 14, 2011)… Despite these setbacks for the U.S., Beijing is not trying to surpass 
Washington in exerting influence in the Middle East, (Ibid)…There is no need for 
comparisons or to think that as the U.S. goes down, China will necessarily fill the 
void‖, (Ibid). 
 
 
5.4.1 Security Interests 
 
 
While the United States has focused on weeding out global terrorist networks such as 
Al Qaeda, China is more interested in maintaining security within its borders, (Zhu, 
May 12, 2009). The collapse of the Soviet Union brought about a second wave of 
Islamic extremism throughout the Middle East in general, and in Central Asia in 
particular, which stimulated the rise of what the Chinese call  the ―three ugly forces‖: 
religious extremism, national separatism, and terrorism,  (Li, 2009). Since then, and 
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from China‘s perspective, the three ugly forces have been the major threat to stability 
and security in the region. For quite some time, the Middle East has been the source 
of religious extremism and has served as a hiding place for the three ―ugly forces.‖ 
Therefore, the Middle East has been regarded as the front line in fighting the three 
―ugly forces‖ with the aim of preserving the security and stability of the region around 
China‘s western borders, (Ibid). 
 
As the ideological centre of the Islamic world, China has attempted to maintain good 
relations with the Arab world in order to get its support on the Uyghur insurgency in 
the Xinjiang autonomous region and maintain amicable relations with the Muslims 
residing in China, (Bajpaee, 2006). While China‘s main efforts in preventing external 
factors from fuelling the Uyghur insurgency have focused on Central and South Asian 
states, countries in the Middle East, most notably Saudi Arabia and Iran, have also 
had an important role to play in quelling the insurgency given their moral and material 
support. Most notably, the so-called ―Salafi/Wahabbi  version of Islam‖, which some 
scholars regard as ―an export‖ from Saudi Arabia, has played a significant role in the 
rise of extremists in Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Central Asian republics on China‘s 
western borders, (Ibid). 
 
China‘s relationship with its Muslim population and fear of Islamic extremism is a 
major factor that impacts on Chinese policy in the Middle East. China cannot ignore 
the existence and influence of the Muslim states, and cannot ignore their sympathy 
and support in international affairs. China is home to a large population of adherents 
of Islam. Chinese official figures indicate there are more than 20 million Muslims 
from 10 ethnic groups, (Wen, September 7, 2009).  The Central Intelligence Agency 
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CIA World Factbook states that about 1-2 percent of the total population in China are 
Muslims, (The World Factbook-China, 2011). Furthermore, a 2009 study done by the 
Pew Research Centre, based on China‘s census, concluded there are 21,667,000 
Muslims in China, accounting for 1.6 percent of the total population, (Pew Research 
Centre, 2009:7 & 28). Additionally, Chas Freeman argues that ―There is a lot of 
evidence that suggests that the number of Muslims in China is well over 100 million, 
(Freeman, 2009).  
 
There are Muslims living in every region of China, the highest concentrations are 
found in the northwest provinces of Xinjiang, Gansu, and Ningxia, with significant 
populations also found throughout Yunnan province in southwest China and Henan 
Province in central China. Of China‘s 55 officially recognised minority peoples, ten 
are predominately Muslim. The Hui and Uyghur are the largest groups, followed by 
the Kazak, Dongxiang, Kirghiz, Salar, Tajik, Uzbek, Bonan, and Tatar. Except for the 
Hui, these other groups are based in northwest China, and most have their own 
Turkic-related language, and unique culture, (Armijo, 2006). Xinjiang – or ―New 
Frontier‖ – is a vast province that covers a sixth of China and shares borders with 
eight countries, including Afghanistan and Pakistan, and in this regard, China shares a 
2,800-km (1,740-mile) border with Central Asia but has long remained on the 
sidelines, keeping a watchful eye on regional power politics from afar, (Golovnina, 
2010). The Uyghur, the biggest ethnic minority in the region, are predominantly 
Muslims, speak a Turkic language and have close cultural ties with other groups in 
central Asia, (Dyer & Anderlini, 2008). 
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Domestically, China can ill afford to ignore its many Muslim voices, which have 
grown more vocal in recent years. Although proportionally small in population, the 
majority of Muslims are concentrated in the north-western regions bordering 
Mongolia, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, 
(Gladney, 1994). The Islamic religious and political ideologies from the Middle East 
and Central Asia often influence the Muslims in China. If the religious ideologies 
integrate with the minority separatism, it will be a great challenge to the social 
stability and economic development in Northwest China. Therefore, in both 
international and internal affairs, Islam challenges Chinese policy-making and 
academic circles. For example, following the Chinese Government‘s harsh response 
to the 1997 Uyghur riots in the Xinjiang city of Yinning, Saudi clerics called upon the 
Saudi Royal Family to support Chinese Muslim populations financially and 
diplomatically. The late Sheikh Abdulaziz bin Baz, former grand mufti of Saudi 
Arabia, proclaimed, ―We have a moral obligation to help our Muslim brothers.‖ It was 
in response to this incident that the Chinese leadership began its charm offensive to 
co-opt Muslim leaders, (Ibid).  
 
China sees Xinjiang as a security bulwark that projects its influence into Central and 
South Asia. China believes that the region is exposed to the influence of militant 
Islamists in nearby countries. Beijing rejects out of hand any demands to grant 
Uyghur full self-rule or independence, (Reuters, September 5, 2009). Xinjiang, more 
than any other area of China, is strategically vulnerable. This is partially as a result of 
its location in one of the most fractious neighborhoods in the world outside the 
Middle East. Xinjiang is rich in oil, gas, and mineral deposits. The region also 
contains numerous sensitive Chinese military installations, including some of the 
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country‘s premier nuclear research and testing facilities, (Clarke, 2010). Zhang 
Xiuming, a retired senior security official of Xinjiang, argues that dozens of terrorist 
organisations and armed groups are based in the crescent-shaped belt to the west of 
Xinjiang - parts of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan - 
turning the region into a hotbed of terrorism, (Xinhua, September 11, 2010). 
 
While most Uyghur in China want more political and religious autonomy, and most 
importantly, greater economic parity with the continuous stream of Han immigrants, 
some Uyghur call China‘s presence in Xinjiang a form of imperialism, and they 
stepped up calls for independence—sometimes violently—in the 1990s through 
separatist groups like the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), (Bhattacharji, 
2009). Pan Zhiping, a researcher with the Central Asia Studies Institute under the 
Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences, says that among the ―East Turkistan‖ forces, 
the most violent and dangerous is the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) - 
based somewhere along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. The United Nations and the 
Chinese Government have labelled it an international terrorist organisation, (Xinhua, 
September 11, 2010). 
 
In the face of a complicated and changeable international situation, China must 
soberly consider and work out a strategy and policy to deal with the key area of Islam 
— the Middle East, (Blumenthal, 2005: 11-19). China‘s initial strategy was, rather 
predictably, to focus on acquiring international support for its efforts to maintain 
domestic stability, which it did by accepting U.S. intervention in Afghanistan (which 
shares a very short border with China) while linking Uyghur separatists to Al-Qaeda 
in order to pressure the United States to label such groups as terrorist organisations. 
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The United States ultimately labelled ETIM a terrorist organisation, but did not 
designate other groups as such, (Fishman, 2011). In the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
Region (XUAR), Beijing‘s strategy is a carrot-and-stick policy. The carrot is the 
economic development of Xinjiang; US$300 billion of investments are planned up to 
2015. The stick is the threat to eliminate any elements considered to be potentially 
subversive, (Peyrouse, 2011). 
 
One of the ways in which China has tried to quell unrest in its Muslim dominated 
region is by building ties with the Middle Eastern states which are the ideological 
centre of global Islam. States such as Saudi Arabia and Iran have been most active in 
propagating their version of Islam across the globe by providing resources and 
training to various organisations, (Pant, 2008). China feels that it is necessary to have 
their support if it wants to successfully tackle Uyghur insurgency even though it‘s 
primarily the Central and Southern Asian states from where Uyghur militants have 
found support, (Ibid). 
 
Inside China, the July 2009 ethnic riots in Xinjiang – the largest ethnic riots between 
the Uyghur and the Chinese Han majority since 1949 – demonstrated the gravity of 
the situation. Renewed violence in the region in late July 2011 confirmed that the 
problem is far from resolved, (Peyrouse, 2011). But in the Muslim world the Chinese 
strategy so far appears to be working. The silence from Muslim governments is 
grounded in growing economic relations but it is also bolstered by China‘s policy of 
non-intervention in the internal affairs of its trading partners, (Hauslohner, 2009). 
Both Riyadh and Tehran have been largely silent about the Chinese Government‘s 
post-9-11 crackdown on the Uyghur, particularly in the 2009 riots that swept Urumqi 
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the capital of Xinjiang which killed hundreds. The silence of the Middle Eastern states 
on the issue of the Chinese Government‘s attitudes towards its Muslim population 
perhaps indicates a measure of success that China has achieved in keeping this issue 
under control, (Ibid). 
 
Indeed, no muftis
11
  in the Islamic world have yet found the time to issue any fatwa 
against China. The same applies to the Arab League, governments of Muslim 
countries and Muslim organisations in Europe and Asia. They have either been mute 
or their reaction has been too little, too late, (Moises, 2009).  Even some Jihadis were 
not very critical towards China.  Hamid al-Ali, a prominent Kuwaiti activist and 
religious adviser well known among Jihadis around the globe, has argued that 
competition between the West and China for allies and resources creates opportunities 
for Jihadis to reduce the West‘s global influence, which he said was at the heart of the 
Al-Qaeda project. He urges China to seek peace with ―Islamic nation‖ and to stop the 
persecution of Muslims in China: 
―Today it is our duty to stand with the plight of the Uyghur Muslims against Chinese 
repression, (a) because this is our duty with all the Muslim people; (b) to send a strong 
message from our nation to China, that the persecution of Muslims in China, will only benefit 
the West, which will take advantage of this racial discrimination in order to deepen the 
hostility between China and the Islamic World, then to free the world stage for the ambitions 
of Western and Zionists.‖  He urges China to seek peace with the ―Islamic nation‖ because it‘s 
the nation that will have a future, (Al-Ali, 2009). 
 
In addition, China remains relatively popular among Arab populations, not just its 
governing elite. A 2010 poll found that China (16 percent) is second only to France 
(35 percent) among Arabs when asked which country they would prefer to be the 
world‘s only superpower. When asked which two countries posed the biggest threat to 
                                                             
11 A mufti is an Islamic scholar who has the authority to issue legal opinions known as fatwa about fine 
points of Islamic law 
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them, only 3 percent answered China compared to 77 percent that mentioned the 
United States (Israel ranked highest with 88 percent), (Telhami, 2010). For now, 
China‘s position in Xinjiang is more secure than at any previous time in the 60-year 
history of the PRC. China‘s sovereignty over Xinjiang is not challenged by any other 
state, territorial disputes with its Central Asian neighbours have largely been settled, 
Xinjiang–Central Asian trade is blossoming and Xinjiang has experienced substantial 
economic development, (Clarke, 2010). 
 
 
5.4.2 Taiwan Issue 
 
 
The New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman once summarised the two major 
objectives of Chinese foreign policy in the 21st century: unification with Taiwan and 
search for oil, (Zhu, 2009). Therefore, China needs the support of Arab countries in 
the international arena on issues like the ―One China policy‖ and human rights, (Li, 
2009). Analysis of the wording of Communiqué Concerning the Establishment of 
Diplomatic Relations between the People‘s Republic of China and the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia on July 21, 1990, summaries the Saudi position in Taiwan issue: 
.‖..The Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia recognises that the Government of the 
People‘s Republic of China is the sole legitimate government that represents the entire 
Chinese people.‖12 
 
China is seeking full support of Arab States regarding Taiwan and the ―One China‖ 
principle, as well as its position on Tibet and other domestic controversies, (Zambelis, 
                                                             
12 Communiqué Concerning the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the People's Republic 
of China and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, (July 21, 1990), available on: 
[http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/tyfls/tyfl/2631/t15494.htm] 
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2008: 60-72). During the talks held between Chinese President Jintao Hu and Saudi 
Arabian King Abdullah Bin Abdul-Aziz on January 23, 2006, the Saudi King 
reaffirmed Saudi Arabia‘s position with regard to Taiwan: ―Saudi Arabia will 
continue to resolutely pursue the ―One China‖ policy and commit to promoting in-
depth development of bilateral friendly cooperative relations‖, (China‘s Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, January 23, 2006). China also has Arab full support regarding the 
Taiwan issue. Indeed, during Chinese President Jintao Hu‘s meeting in Beijing with 
Arab representatives to the Fourth Ministerial Meeting of the China-Arab Cooperation 
in May 2010, Arab nations assured the Chinese leader that they would adhere to the 
―One China‖ policy and support China‘s peaceful reunification, and work with China 
in the future development of the forum in a bid to build the strategic cooperation 
relationship as a model between states, (Xinhua, May 14, 2010). 
 
 
5.4.3 Protecting Chinese Interests in the Middle East  
 
 
China is looking to protect its economic interests in the Middle East by curtailing U.S. 
unilateral actions. China feels uncomfortable with the current Middle East 
environment for two main reasons: (a) The preponderance of U.S. military forces in 
the region; and (b) the U.S. willingness to take unilateral action. These two reasons 
are interrelated for obvious reasons. The first, the preponderance of U.S. military 
forces allows the United States to take unilateral action in the region. There is no 
denying that China is seeking to curtail U.S. power and influence in order to preserve 
the status quo in the Middle East which provides China with a steady flow of energy, 
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(Fandy, 2005). Secondly, by expanding its political and economic relations with Saudi 
Arabia (or the Middle East) and increasing the common interests they share, China 
may be seeking to influence U.S. behaviour through the Sino-Saudi relationship.  
 
As discussed in earlier chapters, the bulk of China‘s oil imports come from the 
Middle East; with China importing nearly 50 percent of its overseas oil imports from 
the region. Accordingly, the peace and stability of the Middle East is of strategic 
interest to Chinese political calculations. In recent years, Beijing increased its political 
activities across several hot spots in the region. China is now the largest exporter to 
the Middle East, the biggest importer of Saudi oil, the second-biggest importer of 
Iranian oil, and the largest player in the Iraqi oil game, (Dehghanpisheh, 2010). Thus, 
the Chinese are making a very delicate act in the region particularly between Saudi 
Arabia and Iran. On one hand China does not want war/conflict, or sanctions stringent 
enough to trigger war that would further destabilise the inherently unstable Middle 
East.  This is especially true of the Gulf, the source of most of China‘s crude oil. On 
the other hand, the Chinese are not particularly fond of nuclear proliferation that 
would also destabilise the region, so they nudge Iran to negotiate, (Ibid). 
 
 
5.4.3.1 Promoting the Role of Responsible Power 
 
 
China is seeking to enhance the security of its oil imports from the Middle East by 
increasing its diplomacy in the region. The Chinese Government appears to believe 
that strong bilateral political relationships can produce greater supply security during 
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crises, (Ibid: 49). Chinese officials also appear to believe that, by cultivating closer 
ties to Saudi Arabia, a long-standing U.S. ally, they may compel the United States to 
take China more seriously as a global player, (Leverett & Bader, 2005: 187-201). The 
Middle East is also a region where Beijing can demonstrate its role as a responsible 
power. China‘s diplomacy in recent years indicates that it regards participation in the 
peaceful solution of regional disputes as a significant part of its strategy of national 
image-building, (Jin, 2010). 
 
For all the above reasons China‘s engagement in the Middle East has enhanced 
significantly. Over the past decade or so, China‘s relationships with Arab countries 
developed very quickly and, with frequent exchanges of high level visits, relations 
have entered a new stage. At the same time, China has shown a new willingness to be 
increasingly active and engaged in Middle Eastern affairs. China in 2002, for the first 
time, appointed a special envoy to travel to regional capitals and promote the Middle 
East peace process, (Li, 2009). While this has had little significance for the Israeli-
Palestinian peace process, it has, nevertheless, demonstrated China‘s increasing 
attention to the region, (Bajpaee, 2006). This has also been shown by the 
establishment of the China-GCC Forum in 2003, its active role in the UN peace 
missions in the Middle East, and the wide engagement in issues related to the region, 
(Olimat, 2010: 307-335). In 2004, at the initiative of the Arab League, China and the 
Arab countries established the China–Arab Cooperative Forum, which has provided 
an important platform for both sides to regularly exchange views on international, 
regional, and bilateral issues, (Li, 2009). China also held the First Ministerial Meeting 
of the Strategic Dialogue between China and the Cooperation Council for the Arab 
States of the Gulf (GCC) in Beijing on June 4, 2010, (People‟s Daily, June 4, 2010). 
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China also attended the second round of strategic dialogue in Abu Dhabi (UAE) in 
May 2011, (China‘s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 3, 2011). 
 
The recent turbulence (2011) in the Middle East made China re-evaluate its policy, 
but up until now Chinese diplomacy is also proving to be proficient in creating a 
balance between contending interests in the region, and striking a balance between 
adversaries in the turbulent Middle East. China‘s economic growth is also one of the 
main factors leading to the Sino-Middle Eastern strategic partnership, and provides an 
inspiring model of development, (Olimat, 2010). Besides economic cooperation and 
national image building, factors shaping China‘s Middle East policy also include its 
national identity as a developing country, its belief that international disputes should 
be resolved by peaceful means, and its interaction with the U.S. and other major 
world players. 
 
 
5.4.3.2  Advancing the Middle East Peace Process 
 
 
China‘s efforts in the Middle East peace process are also worth mentioning. China is 
not a part of the Quartet addressing the Palestine-Israel conflict, but since 2002, China 
has appointed three special envoys on the issue. Their mediating efforts among the 
parties have helped prevent the escalation of tensions, (Jin, 2010). The multilateral 
track of the Arab-Israeli peace process that began in Madrid in 1991 provided China 
with the opportunity to play a constructive role in the peace process and thereby earn 
political credit with the Arab Gulf States. China participated in the five multilateral 
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working groups, chaired the Water Committee, dispatched observers to the 1996 
Palestinian elections, and bid for membership in the Middle East Development Bank 
(MEDB), (Li, 2009). China also capitalised on the initial progress toward peace to 
normalise its relations with Israel in 1992, at a point in time when the risk of 
offending Arab sensibilities was relatively low. 
 
In this context, Wu Sike, China‘s Special Envoy to the Middle East, argues that China 
can play a role in two aspects. Firstly, China can advance the Middle East peace 
process through bilateral engagements. China has maintained good bilateral relations 
and mutual trust with related countries in the Middle East. China can push forward 
related work through bilateral channels. Secondly, China can conduct some work 
through the United Nations and at other multilateral occasions, (Wu, 2009). 
 
 
5.4.3.3 Resolving Iran‟s Nuclear Standoff Peacefully 
 
 
China and Iran first established diplomatic relations in August 1971. The relationship 
continued even after the 1979 Islamic revolution, (Canning, 2007: 47-63). From the 
Chinese perspective, Iran is a major power in the Middle East region. With a 
population of nearly 74 million, it is the most populous country in the Middle East. 
Moreover, Iran has the second largest territory in the region. Tehran‘s military 
capabilities exceed those of other countries in the region. As a Middle Eastern power, 
Iran could play a key role in helping China to expand its influence in the region. 
China‘s oil security strategy seeks to maintain a stable supply of reasonably priced 
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energy resources and to ensure the safety of crude oil shipments to Chinese ports, 
(Chen, 2010: 39-54). China has contradictory interests in the Middle East, specifically 
regarding the Iranian nuclear issue, and balances those contradictory interests in an 
effort to protect both. On one hand, Beijing wants access to Iran‘s fabulously rich but 
still largely unexploited oil and gas resources to meet China‘s skyrocketing demand 
for imported energy, (Garver, 2011: 75-88). On the other hand, Beijing must 
cooperate strategically with the United States (and Saudi Arabia) to maintain a 
favourable macro-climate for China‘s development drive, (Ibid). 
 
In Beijing‘s view, Iran could play a dual role in strengthening the security of China‘s 
oil supply. First, Iran has the natural capacity to be one of China‘s key oil suppliers. 
Second, Iran could provide China with a westward source of oil, (Ibid). Iran is 
strategically located between the Caspian Sea and the Arabian Gulf. It has the world‘s 
second largest reserves of natural gas and the fourth-largest reserves of oil. 
Negotiations have taken place on the construction of a pipeline in Iran to transport oil 
about 620 miles to the Caspian Sea and link up with the Sino-Kazakh pipeline to 
China, (Basit, 2008). Another option is to build a pipeline from Iran to Pakistan and 
then transport energy by rail, road, pipeline or ship to China. If these plans are 
realised, China will have additional land routes for its energy supplies, which avoid 
sea routes and the narrow straits of Hormuz and Malacca, (Ibid). Iran has also joined 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as an observer. Some observers 
contend that the SCO is largely a Chinese tool to counter U.S. presence in Central 
Asia and also to promote Beijing‘s interests, (Chang, 2010).  
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Against this background, China‘s energy ties with Iran are constrained and 
conditioned by Sino-U.S. cooperation and competition and by the Middle Eastern 
power structure, particularly the dispute over Iran‘s nuclear programme. In contrast to 
what many believe, China‘s position on the Iranian nuclear issue is consistent. China 
has always supported and safeguarded the international nuclear non-proliferation 
system, and opposed the possession of nuclear weapons by Iran. At the same time, 
Iran is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and has the right to 
use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, (Wu, 2009). Beijing‘s active participation in 
the six-party mechanism on the Iran nuclear issue since early 2006 is one of many 
recent two-way interactions between China and the West, and a sign of China‘s 
gradual integration into the world, (Jin, 2010).  While China has long held that Iran 
must adhere to the international nuclear non-proliferation scheme and not pursue 
nuclear weapons, it has also resisted attempts by the United States to gather 
international consensus to punish Iran by ―crippling‖ sanctions, (STRATFOR, March 
17, 2010). 
 
In recently published memoirs China‘s long-time ambassador to Tehran, Hua Liming, 
admitted that his diplomacy in Iran after China became an oil importer in the early 
1990s had been entirely dictated by energy politics. In 2010, Iran accounted for about 
9 percent of China‘s oil imports, ranking third among China‘s main oil suppliers after 
Angola and Saudi Arabia, (Wines, 2010). China relies on Iran‘s vast energy reserves, 
perhaps 15 percent of the world‘s natural gas deposits and a tenth of its oil, to offset 
its own shortages. The Chinese are estimated to have US$120 billion committed to 
Iranian gas and oil projects, and China has been Iran‘s biggest oil export market for 
the past five years, (Ibid). On paper, the European Union (EU) still ranks as Iran‘s 
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largest trading partner, but if Chinese goods imported in Iran via the United Arab 
Emirates are considered, China has already overtaken the EU, (Becker, 2010). 
Although it‘s a hard political game, China will do its utmost to find a balance between 
Iran, the United States and Arab Gulf States to protect China‘s interests in the region, 
(Ibid), (see Table 4.6.3.3.1). 
 
(Table 5.4.3.3.1): China‟s Trade with Iran, (2001-2010, US$ billions) 
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
China‟s Exports 0,88 1,3 2,3 2,5 3,2 4,4 7,3 8,2 7,9 11.09 
China‟s Imports 2,4 2,3 3,3 4,4 6,7 9,9 13,3 19,5 13,2 18.2 
China‟s Crude 
Petroleum Oils 
Imports (US 
billions) 
2,0 1,9 2,6 3,5 5,3 7,7 10,4 15,7 9,8 12,05 
Total Trade 3,3 3,7 5,62 7,04 10,08 14,4 20,6 27,7 21,2 29.29 
Source: General Customs Administration of China and UNCOMTRADE 
 
 
But economics is not the only reason; China is guided in its foreign relations by two 
primary principles, both of which reflect domestic priorities. First, China wants to 
encourage a stable international environment in which it can best pursue domestic 
development without conflict or other limiting factors. To that end, Beijing is much 
more likely to pursue diplomatic means that preserve cordiality and de-emphasise 
conflict in international relations. Secondly, China is extremely sensitive to 
international policies that ―interfere‖ in sovereign decisions, because of sensitivities to 
perceived international interference in Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang, (Freeman, 2010). 
 
China would, even without its increasing economic interests in Iran, be less inclined 
to impose sanctions, (Ibid). In this regard Li Weijian, director of the Research Center 
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of West Asian and African Studies at the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, 
argued that the U.S. tactic to ―bribe and threaten‖ China through its oil trade with 
Middle East producers will not work. He said: ―China has established an oil supply 
network based on various importers. Iran and Saudi Arabia are part of the multiple 
sources.‖  He added that China‘s stance on the Iranian nuclear issue is not subject to 
Beijing‘s demand for Iranian oil imports, but based on judgment of the whole picture, 
(Kang, 2010). Meanwhile, Evron provides a very interesting argument: although 
China opposes possession of nuclear weapons by Iran, it is interested in continued 
economic relations with it and does not wish to be perceived as doing Washington‘s 
bidding. On the other hand, China also does not intend to allow Iran to jeopardise its 
relations with the U.S. It is therefore expected that it will continue to manoeuvre to 
avoid taking a strong stand or playing a significant role in the matter‖, (Evron, 2009). 
 
China‘s strong relations with Iran do not indicate that Beijing is on a collision course 
with Saudi Arabia‘s agenda in the region.  On the contrary, it is not China‘s veto 
power in the Security Council over sanctions against Iran that matters, but that 
China‘s balanced and perceived fair diplomacy could be an influence on Iran. The key 
to China‘s diplomacy is to hold a firm line on non-proliferation while avoiding 
prejudging Iran‘s nuclear intentions, (Afrasiabi, 2010). China emphasises Iran‘s right 
to develop peaceful nuclear programs, while urging Iran to put its nuclear program 
under the watch of the IAEA. From the Chinese perspective, China‘s position on a 
peaceful solution to Iran‘s quest for nuclear power benefits all, instead of just 
protecting its oil supply, as perceived by many.  
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That is why China‘s approach is shared by many Muslim and Arab countries, 
including Saudi Arabia. The Saudis seems to understand the Chinese position but hold 
deep concerns of the Iranian intentions. Indeed Saudi Prince Turki Al-Faisal, the 
former Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the US and former Head of Saudi Intelligence, 
in a speech in November 2010 at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
said: ―No one denies that a nuclear Iran is a major international danger, but claiming 
that the U.S. must take military action against Iran to push forward the Israeli-
Palestine peace process is to attempt to harvest apples by cutting down the tree ... A 
war over Iran‘s nuclear program would be calamitous and not just catastrophic ... It 
would turn back the clock on peacemaking across the Middle East; from Iraq to Israel 
... Iranians have to be aware of the explosive nature ... of pursuing their present course 
of enrichment‖, (Al-Faisal, November 4, 2010). 
 
China also supported the Arab draft in building a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free 
zone, maintaining that Israel should join the NPT as a non- nuclear-weapon state at an 
early date, and put all its nuclear facilities under the comprehensive safeguards of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), (Xinhua Agency, September 17, 2010). 
In addition, China supports the United Arab Emirates‘ (UAE) position to regain the 
islands occupied by Iran in the Gulf. Recently the Speaker of UAE‘s Federal National 
Council (FNC), Abdul Aziz Abdullah Al Ghurair, hailed China‘s stance in support of 
the UAE side in the issue of its three Islands - Lesser and Greater Tunb and Abu 
Musa - that are currently under Iranian occupation. He held in high esteem China‘s 
initiative to mediate between UAE and Iran to resolve the dispute by peaceful means 
consistent with international law, (WAM, September 21, 2010). To cite another 
example concerning the Arab Gulf States, in November 2010, Iran summoned 
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China‘s ambassador to protest after organisers of the 16th Asian Games in Guangzhou 
(China) used the term ―Arabian Gulf‖ at the opening ceremony, (Middle East Online, 
November 17, 2010).  In short, China‘s policy toward Iran is based on realistic goals 
within a strategy that aims to promote the diversification of energy sources and is not 
directed against the United States. 
 
 
5.4.3.4 Maintaining the Stability of Iraq 
 
 
The view from Beijing is that a stable Iraq is good for the region and for China‘s core 
economic interests. Indeed, China‘s position in Iraq evolved quickly, from among the 
most outspoken of critics of the 2003 U.S.-led invasion to topple Saddam Hussein, to 
emerging as one of the biggest economic beneficiaries of the war, snagging five 
lucrative deals. While western firms were largely subdued in their interest in Iraq‘s 
recent oil auctions, China snapped up three contracts, shrugging off the security risks 
and the country‘s political instability for the promise of oil, (Salaheddin, 2010). 
 
Beijing is betting big in Iraq, which many Western companies are avoiding. In 
November 2009, the Chinese National Petroleum Co. (CNPC) won a large stake in a 
US$15 billion deal to develop the Rumaila oil field in southern Iraq, thought to be the 
second largest in the world. That followed a US$3 billion deal to develop the Ahdab 
oil field in 2008. And two other Chinese firms just closed a deal on a large oil field in 
eastern Iraq. Chinese companies have also shown much greater willingness to take on 
risk by placing their own nationals in war zones: CNPC has an office in Baghdad 
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partly led by Chinese nationals, (Dehghanpisheh, 2010). Again, China‘s policy in Iraq 
is directed mainly towards energy as part of its oil imports diversification.  
 
 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
 
 
This chapter has attempted to decipher Chinese intentions toward Saudi Arabia. The 
main question it attempted to address was whether Chinese actions were in 
accordance with the offensive realism theory or economic interdependence model. As 
stated earlier in the chapter, if China is acting in the offensive realism model: (a) It 
should be attempting to expand its power and influence in Saudi Arabia at every 
opportunity with the intent to undermine U.S. influence; (b) Encouraging Saudi 
Arabia to shift their political allegiance from the United States over to China. If China 
is acting in the economic interdependence model, it should be: (a) Interacting 
economically with Saudi Arabia in a manner which makes economic sense (i.e. 
profitable); (b) Developing a Sino-Saudi political relationship based on furthering 
their economic interests and not based on degrading the U.S.-Saudi political 
relationship. 
 
China‘s political objectives of the Sino-Saudi relationship are also closely aligned 
with the economic interdependence school of thought for numerous reasons. Firstly, 
China‘s political policies are geared towards increasing its energy security. China is 
looking to develop closer Sino-Saudi ties so Saudi Arabia remains a vital long-term 
energy source and to keep Chinese energy sources diversified. Secondly, China is also 
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looking to expand its trade market in Saudi Arabia. Thirdly, China is seeking full 
support of Saudi Arabia in the international arena on issues like the Taiwan as well as 
its position on Tibet and other domestic controversies in the international arena like 
human rights. These three main Chinese objectives are economic and defensive in 
nature which aligns Chinese actions closer to the economic interdependence model 
rather than the realism model. If China was seeking to decrease U.S. influence in the 
Middle East, its objectives in the Sino-Saudi political relationship should not be 
mainly economic in nature and should be geared towards weakening the U.S.-Saudi 
political relationship; thereby increasing the amount of Chinese influence in Saudi 
Arabia. There has been no indication that China has been taking such actions.  
 
While there is no denying that China is looking to curtail U.S. unilateral action in the 
Middle East region, even this intention fits within the economic interdependence 
model. China is seeking greater influence in the Middle East not because it wants to 
expand its powers at the cost of the United States, but because it is seeking to prevent 
the United States from taking unilateral actions which may damage Chinese economic 
interests. This indicates that China is mainly concerned about economic matters and 
not on balance of power issues; therefore, China‘s actions fit more closely along the 
lines of the economic interdependence model. China‘s expectations of future relations 
and trade with the Middle East in general and Saudi Arabia in particular are high; 
subsequently they will likely pursue policies that will enhance security in the region.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
SAUDI ARABIA HEDGING FOR THE FUTURE 
 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
On September 23, 1932, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was founded by King 
Abdulaziz. The U.S. officially recognised the Saudi Kingdom in 1931, though their 
mutual interests were not well defined until 1933 after Saudi Arabia signed an oil 
concession with the U.S. firm of Standard Oil of California, (Brown, 1999: 9-56). 
Despite the recognition of the Kingdom in 1931, no American diplomat visited in a 
formal capacity until 1940, when the U.S. envoy to Egypt, Bert Fish, was co-
accredited to the Kingdom of the Hijaz and Najd and Its Dependencies, as it was then 
called, (Hart, 1998: 35-37). In mid-February 1945, King Abdulaziz (Ibn Saud) met 
with the American President Roosevelt in the Great Bitter Lake, between the north 
and south part of the Suez Canal on aboard the USS Quincy, (Yergin, 1991), (see 
Table 6.1.1).  
 
When the founder of Saudi Arabia, King Abdulaziz (Ibn Saud), died in 1953, he was 
succeeded by his eldest son, King Saud (1953-1964). However, Ibn Saud also named 
his second-eldest son, Faisal, crown prince. Since then the throne has passed from 
elder brother to the next in age - and Ibn Saud had thirty-four sons who survived him, 
born to seventeen of his twenty-two wives. After Saud came his half-brother King 
Faisal (1964-1975), then King Khalid (1975-1982), then King Fahd (1982-2005), and 
now,   King Abdullah (2005 - ), (Henderson, 2006 and Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, 
Washington D.C, 2011). 
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(Table 6.1.1): Chronology of Establishment of Saudi-U.S. Relations 
 
1932 July 14, First oil concession in Saudi Arabia granted to Standard Oil of California 
1932 
September 
23, 
Unification of the modern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia under the leadership of 
King Abdulaziz Bin Abdulrahman Al-Saud. 
1933, 
November 7 
Agreement signed establishing diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia 
and the United States; Also covers commercial relations and navigation. 
1938, March 
3 
Oil found in large quantities in the Eastern Province. 
1940, 
February 4 
U.S. Minister Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary in Cairo, Bert Fish, 
accredited as 
Chronology of Saudi-U.S. Relations envoy to Saudi Arabia. 
1942, April 
13 
James S. Moose, Jr., sent to Jeddah as chargé d‘affaires of the first U.S. 
legation in the Kingdom. 
1943, 
October 
Prince Faisal and Prince Khalid meet with President Roosevelt in 
Washington; It is first high-level Saudi Arabian delegation to visit the United 
States. 
1944 Saudi Arabian legation opens in Washington, later raised to the rank of 
embassy; 
U.S. consulate established in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. 
1945, 
February 14 
King Abdulaziz and President Franklin D. Roosevelt meet on board the USS 
Quincy in the Great Bitter Lake of the Suez Canal. 
Source: Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, Washington D.C, (July 2011)  
 
 
Ever since the 1940s, the United States and Saudi Arabia have shared a close 
beneficial relationship. An article written in the Middle East Insight by then 
Ambassador of Saudi Arabia to the United States, Bandar bin Sultan, as introduced 
into the Congressional Record on March 12, 1996,  summarised the US-Saudi 
relations in a few words: 
[T] he historic meeting between King Abdulaziz Al-Saud and President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
aboard the USS Quincy . . . launched the special relationship between the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia and the United States of America…Two people who work so closely together toward 
the common goals of security, prosperity, and economic advancement will surely remain 
friends, and partners, far into the future, (Bandar, 1996). 
 
While Kaiser and Ottaway described the Saudi-American relationship in very 
interesting words ―the relations was always more like an arranged marriage than a 
romantic union ... the alliance has been convenient for both parties, giving Saudi 
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Arabia the security it craved in a dangerous neighbourhood while assuring the United 
States a reliable supply of oil at - nearly always - an affordable price‖, (Kaiser, 
Ottaway 2002). Indeed, the strategic features of the relationship are manifest in many 
ways. Chief among them are the contracting of American corporations to help build 
military facilities in Saudi Arabia and to train local military personnel and the sales of 
weaponry to the Saudi state by American industries, (Conge, Okruhlik, 2009: 359-
374). Economically, Saudi Arabia agreed to play a vital role in providing the United 
States with enough oil to meets its demands at a reasonable price. Militarily the 
United States provided Saudi Arabia with a security guarantee to protect Saudi Arabia 
from international threats.  
 
During the Cold War the U.S.-Saudi relationship has been characterised as ―oil for 
security.‖ The U.S. energy needs were partially met by the first oil producer country 
in the world in exchange for guaranteeing the long-term security of the Kingdom 
under the U.S. military umbrella, (Petrini, 2006: 65-82). The security guarantee that 
the United States provided became more vital to the Saudis as time passed, 
particularly after the Iranian Revolution and also after the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. 
Aarts identifies four pillars that traditionally characterised the U.S.-Saudi relationship. 
The first two are energy and security. The third is the Saudi moderate policy toward 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; and the last pillar concerns the Saudi ―balancing‖ role 
in the Middle East, which was evident particularly during the Cold War, (Aarts, 2005: 
399-429). 
 
This mutually beneficial relationship continues. However, the attacks on the United 
States on September 11, 2001 (9/11) have put a strain on this relationship. In addition 
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the rising anti-American sentiment in the Middle East, as a result of the unpopularity 
of the occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan coupled with the continued Israeli 
occupation of Palestine, has further strained the U.S.-Saudi relationship. The strains 
imposed on the US-Saudi relationship have provided China with an opportunity to 
develop closer relations with Saudi Arabia. Over the past few years, Arab countries 
(including Saudi Arabia) have diversified their foreign policies by shifting their focus 
from the West to the East as a response to changing international and regional 
situations. This is partly a means to neutralise American pressure, and partly because 
Asian economies, particularly China and India, have developed rapidly. The Arab 
countries believe that the successful Asian economies have provided them with an 
alternative development model and/or markets, (Li, 2009). 
 
From the Saudi Arabia perspective, the increase in cooperation with China may signal 
an attempt to end the Kingdom‘s overwhelming reliance on ―one big friend‖ and ―one 
big product‖, i.e. the United States and oil. Saudi Arabia has recognised that increased 
diversity of its oil exports and movement away from its heavy reliance on the 
American market has both economic and political benefits. Saudi Arabia cannot 
ignore the increased energy needs among Asian countries, notably China and India. 
Furthermore, by distancing itself from a disproportionate reliance on the U.S. energy 
market, Saudi Arabia will be in a better position to extricate itself from the political 
costs of a close relationship with the United States, (Douglas & others, 2006). 
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6.2 SAUDI ARABIA‟S DESIRE FOR SECURITY  
 
Saudi Arabia‘s primary parameter is its desire for security, and the survival of the 
Saudi Royal Family. Threats to Saudi Arabia have shifted from Nasser‘s Egypt in the 
1960s to Iran in the 1980s to Iraq in the 1990s and to internal and external terrorism 
after 2001, (Anderson, 2004). For these reasons, Saudi evaluations of interest put 
security concerns squarely at the top of its priorities, (Ibid). The 1979 Iranian 
revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan helped fuel a decade of 
collaborative U.S.-Saudi foreign policy efforts, including shared support for anti- 
Soviet mujahidin fighters in Afghanistan and for Saddam Hussein‘s war against Iran, 
(Blanchard, 2010). Throughout the 1980s, the two countries worked together, at first 
quietly, and then more visibly, to roll back Soviet aggression in Afghanistan and 
Iranian ventures throughout the Gulf and in Iraq, (Bronson, 2009: 82). 
 
During the 1990s the Soviet forces were driven out of Afghanistan; the Iranian 
revolutionary momentum was blunted; the Cold War was won by the Americans, with 
support from Riyadh and elsewhere, (Gause, 2009: 75). In his own words Prince Saud 
AL-Faisal Foreign Minister of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia described the Saudi-U.S. 
relations during the Cold War:  
―...We have proven to be a reliable ally during the Cold War and our contributions in the 
political, security and especially in the economic spheres, attest to that beyond any doubt‖, 
(Prince Saud Al-Faisal, September 30, 2003). 
 
According to Niblock two developments emerged which were to change the dynamics 
of the U.S.-Saudi relationship: the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 (leading 
to the Gulf War of 1991) and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The latter 
brought to an end the perceived Soviet security threat to the region. The confrontation 
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with Iraq deepened the military and political cooperation between Saudi Arabia and 
the United States. The Saudi decision to invite U.S. military forces onto Saudi 
territory, taken within 10 days of the Iraqi invasion, was unprecedented in Saudi 
history, (Niblock, 2006: 151). For the Saudis the period of the entire nineties was 
devoted to dealing with the threat of Iraq and Iran.  Economic interest largely defined 
the relationship between China and Saudi Arabia in that era, as Saudi Arabia‘s 
security concerns were met by the United States, and China‘s concept of centricity led 
to a focus on the domestic policy of economic development.  
 
Then we witnessed the second development which was the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. The United States was now no longer in 
need of Saudi support in the confrontation with Soviet communism, (Ibid). At that 
time some basis for Saudi-U.S. cooperation on the global level still existed. Niblock 
argues that Saudi Arabia‘s Islamic role had three possible uses for the United States, 
within the New World Order. The first was as a counter to Russian influence in the 
Caucasus and Central Asia. The second was to prevent the expansion of Iranian 
religious influence (again, mainly in the Caucasus and Central Asia), given that Iran 
was also seeking to use religious channels to strengthen its political position. The 
third was to bring the excesses of radical Islam under control, through spreading a 
more conservative vision of Islam, (Ibid). 
 
It is safe to say that the Gulf War of 1990-91 was the high point of Saudi-American 
cooperation, with the military and civilian infrastructure built using Saudi petro-
dollars and American construction companies during the 1970s and 1980s, (Gause, 
2009: 75). American presence in Saudi Arabia did not come without costs. There had 
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been a decade of drift in the U.S.-Saudi security relationship, highlighted by the 
obvious discomfort of the House of Saud with the continuing presence of U.S. forces 
operating out of Prince Sultan Air Base. With the presence of these forces seized upon 
for criticism by emerging domestic political forces in the Kingdom, the House of 
Saud found it could no longer quietly conduct business with the Americans out of the 
public view, (Crooke, 2010: 7-20).  
 
Changes to the region‘s security environment also flowed from a variety of incidents.  
Firstly, in 1996 and 1998, bin Laden issued a fatwa calling on Muslims to kill 
Americans, even civilians. In August 1998 al Qaeda terrorists attacked the U.S. 
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, (Williams, 2011). Subsequently, the Salafi jihadist 
issue began to cause tensions in the Saudi-American relation, (Niblock, 2006: 167). 
Secondly, Niblock argues that the 9/11 attacks became the central issue in the greatest 
crisis the relationship had experienced since the 1973-74 oil embargo, if not since the 
inception of the relationship. The 9/11 terrorist attacks and the U.S.-led war on terror 
caused both Riyadh and Washington to re-evaluate their ―special relationship‖, (Ibid). 
The Kingdom had moved within a few months from being a key friend and partner of 
the United States to having the status of a problem country, (Ibid). Even worse than 
that, for example, Laurent Murawiec of the Rand Corporation to the U.S. Defence 
Policy Board on July 10, 2002, described the Kingdom as an enemy of the United 
States, (Prince Saud AL-Faisal, August 6, 2002). In response, Saudi Foreign Minister 
Saudi Saud AL-Faisal described the Murawiec statement as ―pure fiction.‖ And 
added: ―...It is unfortunate that there are people in some quarters who are trying to 
cast doubt and undermine the solid and historic ties between our two countries.  I am 
confident that they will not succeed‖, (Ibid). 
229 
 
One symbol of the changed relationship between the two countries in the period 
following 9/11 was Saudi Arabia‘s non-participation in the two major U.S. military 
operations in the region at that time: those in Afghanistan (from November 2001) and 
in Iraq (from March 2003), (Ibid). These developments pushed Saudi Arabia and 
China politically closer regarding the use of force by the Americans. For example, 
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue told reporters in January 2003 
that China supported a Saudi Arabian initiative to dissuade the United States from 
attacking Iraq, adding it remained committed to a political solution and ―some 
countries, like Saudi Arabia, have urged a peaceful settlement…These efforts are in 
the spirit which China has espoused...China‘s consistent policy to seek a political and 
diplomatic settlement within the framework of the United Nations remains 
unchanged‖, (Middle East Online, January 16, 2003). 
 
After the AL-Qaeda attacks, it was no longer realistic to imagine that Saudi religious 
influence could be used to promote U.S. security and political interests within the 
region, (Ibid). Ever since September 11, 2001, when it emerged that fifteen of the 
nineteen men who carried out the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington were 
Saudi citizens, the American media had been full of tales of Saudi laxity in fighting 
terror. Public anger at the Saudis had also begun to be reflected in the workings of the 
U.S. Government. Anti-Saudi sentiment in Congress was also running high, and there 
has been a steady drumbeat of opposition to the presence of American forces on the 
Saudi peninsula, (Luft & Korin, 2004).  Saud AL-Faisal, Saudi Arabia‘s long serving 
foreign minister in a public speech, summarised the situation:  
.‖..Saudi Arabia has since (9/11) been forced to witness a distressing change in the way 
Americans perceive our country. We are concerned by what we believe is an organised 
campaign waged against the Kingdom by some in the United States‖, (Prince Saud Al-Faisal, 
September 30, 2003). 
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Meanwhile, the retention of the U.S. bases in the country added fuel to the fire of 
those opposing the regime that used the U.S. presence as a rallying point and an 
example of the disloyalty and deviance of the Saudi regime, which opponents said 
sullied the sacred soils of Saudi Arabia with U.S. military personnel, (Friedman, 
2004). To complicate the situation even further, in 2003, following the defeat of 
Saddam Hussein, the Bush Administration responded to this pressure by withdrawing 
the bulk of those forces, relocating them in nearby Qatar. Though it was done quietly, 
the American military departure may turn out to be a major strategic turning point. It 
certainly has created new opportunities for both the Saudis and the Chinese to 
strengthen their relations, (Ibid). Furthermore, due to the unfolding revelations by the 
IAEA that had long been suspected by many – that Iran is engaged in a 
comprehensive and systematic program to develop fissile material outside of 
international oversight, this has created an incentive for the Saudis to work together 
with the Chinese. Last, but not least, is an emerging and complicated domestic 
political landscape within the Kingdom that is forcing the ruling family to play to its 
varied ―publics‖, yet at the same time it is waging an increasingly active war against 
an entrenched militant infrastructure, (Crooke, 2010). This has been an important 
factor in pursuing the relations with China in order to assure the Saudi public in 
regard to the balanced foreign policy of their countries. 
 
In Saudi Arabia itself, growing U.S. animosity has fed doubts about America‘s 
dependability as an ally, if not outright fears of Washington‘s long-term intentions. 
Many worry, with reason, that the liberation of Iraqi Shiites from Saddam Hussein‘s 
oppressive rule may ignite discontent among the Kingdom‘s own Shiites, who happen 
to be situated geographically atop of the largest oil fields, (Luft & Korin, 2004). 
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Equally disturbing for many Saudis is the American effort to revive Iraq‘s shattered 
oil industry. The infusion of an additional 6 million barrels per day into world oil 
markets will inevitably mean fewer petrodollars for the economically stretched 
Kingdom, (Ibid). In addition, Saudi public opinion, never particularly pro-American 
because of the Arab-Israeli issue, among other things, reacted very negatively to the 
American wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. These were the makings of a serious rift, and 
opened the doors for expanding Sino-Saudi relations, (Gause, 2009: 75). George 
Friedman, CEO of the private intelligence corporation ―Stratfor‖, goes further to point 
out that, one of the key goals of the U.S. war in Iraq was to put increased pressure on -
- and effect change in -- Saudi Arabia, (Friedman, 2004). These developments 
promoted a strong Saudi response and opposition to Americans to reform the Middle 
East, for example, the interesting words from the Saudi Foreign Minister reflected that 
sentiment: .‖..Reform is a response to the aspiration of the people and their needs, and 
not a theory in the head of some planner. It is for their benefit in order to provide 
them with good governance and transparency‖, (Prince Saud Al-Faisal, September 30, 
2003). 
 
It is in this context that Riyadh has begun courting an Asian alternative, (Pant, 2006: 
45-52). The Saudi leadership was disturbed by the anti-Saudi backlash in both the 
―Congress‖ and in U.S. public opinion following the September 11 attacks. As a result 
of these concerns, the Saudis have been pursuing a ―hedging strategy‖ toward the 
United States, its traditional partner, by developing a more robust strategic 
relationship with China, (Leverett & Bader, 2005-06: 187-201). For example, the 
Saudi foreign minister Saud AL-Faisal told an audience in Bahrain in December 2004 
that the security of the region should not depend on the United States, but should stem 
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from guarantees, he went on to say ―…Provided by the collective will of the 
international community through a unanimous declaration by the Security Council 
guaranteeing the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all the 
countries of the Gulf and promising to act forcefully against any external threats‖, 
(Ibid). 
 
Shortly after that Prince Saud AL-Faisal expressed his concerns strongly to an 
American audience at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York in April 2004: 
―Saudi Arabia and the United States have enjoyed a well known ‗special relationship‘ 
which, over a period of 70 years, had developed and blossomed into a strategic 
alliance that benefited both countries. Recently this relationship has come under 
extreme strain. A critical juncture has been reached, and unless joint efforts are 
brought to bear to redress and rectify the underlying causes, the damage may be 
grave‖, (Prince Saud Al-Faisal, April 27, 2004). He went on to lash out at the Saudis 
critics: ―The ensuing onslaught on Saudi Arabia has been intense and at times 
purposefully malicious...Instant so-called experts sprang from nowhere and 
everywhere, most of whom have never even visited Saudi Arabia, claiming a gift of 
analysis denied to mere mortals. By using such words as jihad, Wahabbism, madrassa, 
they endow them with emotively negative contents that surpass the realm of 
objectivity and defy any sense of reality. These are at the core of the attacks for what 
may be termed ‗Saudi bashing‘‖, (Ibid). 
 
Meanwhile Osama bin Laden had ambitious plans to follow up the attacks of 9/11. He 
had a third front (after Afghanistan and Iraq) in mind: his own homeland in Saudi 
Arabia, where he would wage a terrorist campaign with the intention of driving the 
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United States and its British allies out of Islam‘s holy land and of toppling the 
―apostate‖ Saudi monarchy, (Riedel & Saab, 2008: 33-46). This development changed 
the landscape of the Saudi-U.S. relations. The 2003 terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia 
mobilised the Saudi regime to take an active role in confronting the Salafi jihadist 
movement with cooperation with the United States on intelligence sharing and steps 
to dry up the sources of financial support for jihadist groups, (Gause, 2009: 76). 
Within this context, Aarts identifies also a fifth pillar characterising the Saudi-U.S. 
relationship in addition to the four enlisted above, namely the fight against terrorism. 
He argues that 9/11 produced a new common ground linking Riyadh and Washington. 
In his view, the war on terror is likely to encroach further rather than divide the U.S. 
and Saudi Arabia, (Aarts, 2005). 
 
Despite the Chinese limited involvement in this regard, they offered a very much 
needed political support to Saudi Arabia, On November 9, 2003, President Jintao Hu 
sent a message to King Fahad, strongly condemning the terrorist bombing in the Saudi 
Arabian capital, Riyadh, which caused mass casualty of innocent civilians. Hu 
expressed sincere condolences to the wounded and families of the victims, (China‘s 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 10, 2003). Hu emphasised that, ―The Chinese 
government is firmly opposed to terrorism in any form and is willing to make 
unremitting efforts with Saudi Arabia and other members of the international 
community to safeguard the world‘s peace and security‖, (Ibid). 
 
On the other hand the situation between the Saudi Arabia and the United States 
improved further when in its final report, released on July 23, 2004, the U.S. National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission) 
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described Saudi Arabia as having been ―a problematic ally in combating Islamic 
extremism.‖ However, the Commission found ―no evidence that the Saudi 
government as an institution or senior Saudi officials individually funded AL-Qaeda‖, 
(Blanchard, 2010). The report acknowledged increased Saudi efforts in that regard 
after mid-2003, when terrorists began attacking targets in Saudi Arabia with more 
frequency. The Commission concluded that the Saudi Government had become 
―locked in mortal combat with Al Qaeda‖, (Ibid). 
 
Other developments put the Saudis in the driving seat, with Iraq in a mess and Iran a 
continuing challenge to American power and goals in the region, the U.S. could not 
afford a further deterioration of its only working relationship with a major Gulf 
power, (Ibid). Indeed, increased official counterterrorism cooperation and shared 
concerns about Iranian foreign policy have provided a new strategic logic for U.S.-
Saudi security relations since 2003. Long-standing defence ties remain intact, and 
U.S. arms sales have continued, with over US$18.7 billion in potential foreign 
military sales to Saudi Arabia approved by the executive branch and Congress since 
2005, (Ibid). The relations recovered quickly in May 2008 with the visit of President 
Bush‘s to Riyadh to commemorate the 75th anniversary of the establishment of U.S.-
Saudi relations. On the eve of the visit the then U.S. National Security Adviser, 
Stephen Hadley, argued that the U.S.-Saudi relationship was in ―pretty good shape‖, 
(Ibid). 
 
The culmination of the improvement came in June 2009 when President Obama 
visited Saudi Arabia (it came almost four months after the visit of the Chinese 
President on his first leg of a Mideast trip). President Obama said that he was 
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confident that the United States and Saudi Arabia can ―make progress on a whole host 
of issues of mutual interests.‖ He went on to say that he was ―struck by his [the 
king‘s] wisdom and his graciousness. Obviously the United States and Saudi Arabia 
have a long history of friendship. We have a strategic relationship‖, (CNN, June 3, 
2009). Tellingly, in that visit President Obama greeted the King‘s of Saudi Arabia 
with a full bow from the waist, which was strong indication of the shift in American 
policy towards Saudi Arabia.  
 
Nevertheless, Riyadh and Washington differ, often widely, on preferred strategies. 
For example, Riyadh was not supportive of the American decision to significantly 
reduce forces in Iraq, believing that the decision was premature and would contribute 
to further chaos. At the same time, Riyadh was deeply concerned about the American 
decision to surge forces into Afghanistan. The Saudi Government has also been quite 
vocal in its critique of the administration‘s approach toward the Israelis and 
Palestinians, (Bronson, 2009: 84). Chief among all differences is the growing 
assertiveness of Saudi Arabia as it confronts Iranian influence in the region. The 
Saudis are very concerned with U.S. policy or as the Saudi expert and a consummate 
insider Nawaf Obaid, puts it: ―Riyadh fights a cold war with Tehran, Washington has 
shown itself recently to be an unwilling and unreliable partner against this threat‖, 
(Obaid, 2011). In this regard a secret document sent by David Rundell, the Deputy 
Chief of U.S. Mission in Saudi Arabia, and leaked by ―WikiLeaks‖ in November 2010 
summarises the Saudi American differences in very interesting words: 
While U.S.-Saudi relations have improved dramatically since their post-9/11 nadir, differences 
remain over U.S. Middle East policies. The Saudis have three principal issues areas of concern 
about U.S. policies: (a) As the author of the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, King Abdallah risked 
his personal prestige to advocate a comprehensive Middle East peace as the ―strategic option‖ 
for the Arabs, only to be frustrated by what he saw as U.S. reluctance to engage over the next 
seven years. (b) Similarly, in the Saudi view, we ignored advice from the King and Foreign 
Minister against invading Iraq. In the words of Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud AL-Faisal, 
236 
 
―Military intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan has tilted the (regional) balance of power 
towards Iran.‖ (c) Finally, the U.S. debate over whether and how to engage Iran has fuelled 
Saudi fears that a new U.S. Administration might strike a ―grand bargain‖ without first 
consulting Arab countries bordering the Persian Gulf, (Wikileaks, March 31, 2009). 
 
These differences surfaced strongly in 2011 due to the Saudi king‘s anger at 
Washington‘s response to uprisings across the Arab World, especially its 
abandonment of Hosni Mubarak, the deposed Egyptian president, who was a long-
time Saudi and U.S. ally. On the key political issues Abdullah Askar, the Vice 
Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Saudi Arabia‘s Consultative 
Council, or Majlis Shura, in Riyadh, told the Los Angeles Times recently ―the Obama 
Administration doesn‘t really listen to the Saudi views‖, (Richter and Banerjee, 2011). 
In May 2011, Saudi grievances were laid out in a Washington Post op-ed by Nawaf 
Obaid, a senior fellow at the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies 
headed by former Saudi intelligence chief Prince Turki AL-Faisal. Describing a 
―tectonic shift‖ in the Saudi-U.S. relationship, he argues that: ―Riyadh intends to 
pursue a much more assertive foreign policy, at times conflicting with American 
interests‖, (Obaid, 2011). He went on to say:  ―For more than 60 years, Saudi Arabia 
has been bound by an unwritten bargain: oil for security…American missteps in the 
region since September 11, an ill-conceived response to the Arab protest movements 
and an unconscionable refusal to hold Israel accountable for its illegal settlement 
building have brought this arrangement to an end‖, (Ibid). Obaid also echoed some of 
the criticisms made in 2010 by Prince Turki al Faisal, a former ambassador to the 
United States, who said that ―negligence, ignorance and arrogance‖ had cost America 
the ―moral high ground‖ it held after 9 / 11,  (Lister, 2011). 
 
Deeply frustrated with the Obama Administration‘s stalled efforts on Israeli-
Palestinian peace, Riyadh is pushing for UN recognition of Palestinian sovereignty, 
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an approach the White House is determined to thwart, (Richter and Banerjee, June 19, 
2011). In July 2011 Prince Turki AL-Faisal Prince Turki al Faisal, the former Saudi 
intelligence chief and ambassador to the United States, and who holds now no official 
position but is part of the ruling family issued in the Washington Post, a thinly veiled 
warning to Washington of further looming problems: 
There will be disastrous consequences for U.S.-Saudi relations if the United States vetoes UN 
recognition of a Palestinian state…American leaders have long called Israel an ‗indispensable‘ 
ally. They will soon learn that there are other players in the region - not least the Arab street - 
who are as, if not more, ‗indispensable‘ (Washington Post, June 10, 2011). 
 
The United States and Saudi Arabia are drifting apart on energy, too. For decades 
both countries saw mutual benefit in holding down oil prices. But now, with Riyadh 
stepping up foreign aid and embarking on a US$ 130-billion domestic subsidy 
program to prevent internal unrest, it needs steeper oil prices (Richter and Banerjee, 
June 19, 2011). Riyadh is less certain about the strength of its alliance with 
Washington and may thus be less willing to incur the costs and risks involved in 
contributing to the U.S.-Saudi partnership in these ways, (Robert & Michael, 2011). 
 
This shift doesn‘t mean the end of the 70-year-old U.S.-Saudi alliance, but it does 
mean a further loss of influence for Washington in the Middle East, (Richter and 
Banerjee, June 19, 2011). Thomas Lippman, a scholar at the Middle East Institute in 
Washington and an expert on US-Saudi relations, argues that this marriage of 
convenience is likely to survive the latest strains, ―Where are they going to go? When 
there is real danger, who are they going to call? Beijing? Moscow? Islamabad? I don‘t 
think so‖, (Financial Times, June 17, 2011). While David Rothkopf, a foreign policy 
analyst and former Clinton administration official, goes on similar lines: ―It‘s a 
fraught but critical relationship…My sense is that they‘re trying to manage it because 
of what they used to call during the Thatcher era the ‗Tina‘ phenomenon - There Is 
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No Alternative‖, (Ibid). Furthermore, Tom Donilon, the national security adviser in 
the U.S., emphasised recently that the U.S.-Saudi relationship has remained ―in pretty 
good shape‖ despite ―scratchy‖ disagreements over Arab Spring revolutions, (AFP, 
September, 16, 2011). Tom believes that Washington and Riyadh ―have a shared 
interest in seeing that no country or force in the region seeks or tries to achieve 
dominance…We have a very important shared interest in seeing restrictions on 
weapons of mass destruction proliferation in the region. We have a shared interest in 
counterterrorism cooperation. We have a shared interest in the pursuit of peace. We 
have a shared interest in a stable supply of energy and in a healthy global economy. 
And that is the basis on which we work with the Saudis‖, (CNN, 2011).  
 
Indeed, the two countries continue to cooperate closely on counter-terrorism, and 
have collaborated on the political crisis enveloping Yemen that has raised the spectre 
of a resurgent Al Qaeda. The United States is selling the Saudis US$60 billion (with 
the upgrade to the Saudi navy it could reach US$90) in arms and other military 
hardware in a multiyear deal, the largest U.S. weapons transaction ever, (Richter and 
Banerjee, June 19, 2011). The United States and Saudi Arabia are quietly expanding 
defence ties on a vast scale, led by a little-known project to develop an elite force to 
protect the Kingdom‘s oil riches and future nuclear sites, (Burns, 2011). Bremmer of 
the Eurasia Group says the United States does hold important cards - through multi-
billion-dollar arms contracts and long-established relationships in the oil industry. 
And regional analysts say that ultimately Saudi Arabia would likely appeal for and get 
U.S. help in any showdown with Iran, (Lister, 2011). In a secret letter sent to U.S. 
Secretary Hilary Clinton on her visit to Saudi Arabia on February 2010 and published 
by ―Wikileaks‖, U.S. Ambassador James B. Smith to Saudi Arabia wrote that: ―Saudi 
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leadership still sees the United States as its most important strategic partner and 
guarantor of its stability‖,   (Wikileaks, February 11, 2010). 
 
As for China, in the post 9/11 era, the economic interests still largely defined the 
Sino-Saudi relations but they have developed rapidly, coupled with frequent high-
level exchanges with growing mutual political trust.  It is clear that China was not 
looking to provide Saudi Arabia with the protection it gets from the United States, 
which maintains air, naval and army bases in the Gulf, (Meyer, 2010). Shi Yinhong, a 
professor of international relations at Renmin University in Beijing, argues that 
increasing economic ties to Saudi Arabia: ―Will play some role in gradually eroding 
American preponderance over that country, but this is not a very elaborate and 
conscious objective of China‘s relationship with Saudi Arabia..This is a by-product. 
China‘s objective is energy‖, (Ibid). In this context, Prince Turki AL-Faisal noted in a 
discussion with USA Today, that: ―China is not necessarily a better friend, but a less 
complicated friend. I don‘t think, nor does anybody in Saudi Arabia think, that China 
is a counterweight to the United States. But your country (U.S.) is courting China 
because you obviously think that it is important to court China. We‘re simply 
following your lead‖, (Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, May 10, 2006). While Turki 
went on to state that Saudi Arabia does not see China as a counter-weight to the U.S., 
his comment can be read as a realisation by many in Saudi Arabia of the negative 
aspects of too close an association with the U.S. 
 
A Saudi analyst summarised the Kingdom‘s position when he told the Financial 
Times that the politics was a factor for the Kingdom after the September 11, 2001 
attacks on the U.S. strained relations with traditional allies in the West. ―The 
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relationship with the US will always be strong. . It‘s a long relationship and we cannot 
ignore it whatever happens. But after the September 11 attacks, when we started 
looking around, nobody was there because we had never built relationships with 
Russia or China. And we thought: Let‘s build bridges with other countries‖, (England, 
2009). 
 
 
6.3 ECONOMIC DYNAMISM:  LOOK EAST POLICY  
 
 
These political developments were coupled with change in the geopolitical landscape 
of the world‘s energy demand and supply. First, most consumers in the West are 
starting to view ―green‖ sources of energy in a more favourable light than the fossil 
fuels that have hitherto largely powered the industrialised world, (Hoyos, 2010). 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the oil industry – and specifically OPEC, is 
facing a significant shift in demand from West to East. Demand from the customers 
which OPEC has supplied for the past 50 years is stagnating, as market saturation and 
environmental policies move the U.S. and Europe away from oil. However, energy-
hungry Asian nations, such as India and particularly China, are taking their place, 
refocusing the organisation‘s attention eastward, (Ibid). 
 
Developing Asia
13
 will be the fastest growing region, driven by population and 
income per capita growth; it will grow by 7.0 percent annually between 2010 and 
                                                             
13 Developing Asia: Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, China, Fiji, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, 
Kiribati, Lao People's, Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Papua 
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2030, (Ibid). While the region‘s share is predicted to rise from 27 percent of world 
GDP to 44 percent in 2030 (Ibid) and per capita GDP growth rates will be highest in 
Developing Asia (6.1 percent p.a. between 2010 and 2030), (Ibid). Saudi official 
figures show that ―between‖ 1989-2010 Saudi oil exports declined in all regions of 
the world except Asia, where oil‘s demand has been growing rapidly over the last 20 
years.  
 
(Figure 6.3.1): Economic Weight is shifting to Asia 
 
         
Note: GDP is measured in current USD converted at market exchange rates.  
CIS = Commonwealth of Independent States 
Source: adapted from Citi Investment Research and Analysis, (February, 2011) 
 
 
Accordingly, energy demand is shifting from the developed world to the developing 
world, and Asia is expected to account for much of the growing demand during the 
next 20 years, (Dittrick, 2010). In its latest projections OPEC expects the world‘s oil 
demand outlook in the Reference Case to hit 105.8 (mb/d) in 2030. Over the period 
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2010–2030, consumption in developing countries will increase by more than 21 mb/d. 
Of the total global oil demand growth in the long-term, 75 percent is in developing 
Asia (half of it or 8.2 mb/d in China only), (World Oil Outlook 2011: 63). In this 
regard the International Energy Agency (IEA) has said Chinese oil demand will rise 
by 3.5 percent every year until 2030, and that it will take over the United States to 
become the world‘s largest oil and gas consumer by 2025, (Reuters, January 15, 
2010). The IEA also noted that producers such as Saudi Arabia and Russia are shifting 
supplies from their traditional customers to China and other rapidly developing 
countries. The changing global market reflects a stark division between the stagnating 
developed world and the rebounding emerging economies. Jim Williams, Energy 
Economist with WTRG Economics Inc, told the global and Mail: ―They‘re going 
where the customers are...It‘s not a strategy to exclude us. It‘s a strategy to go where 
the market growth is‖, (McCarthy, 2010) (see Table 6.3.2). 
 
(Table 6.3.1): World Oil Demand Outlook in the Reference Case, (2010-2030) 
 
Region (mb/d) 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 
OECD 46.1 46.0 45.2 44.2 43.1 41.9 
South Asia 4.0 4.8 5.8 6.8 8.0 9.2 
Southeast Asia 6.2 6.8 7.6 8.4 9.1 9.9 
China 8.9 11.6 13.8 15.6 17.1 18.4 
Developing countries 35.9 41.8 47.2 52.2 57.0 61.9 
World 86.8 92.9 97.8 102.0 105.8 109.7 
Source: World Oil Outlook 2011 
 
 
Within this context, Saudi Arabia increasingly recognised that Asia will provide the 
region‘s largest and fastest-growing oil and gas export markets in the future. Already, 
two-thirds of the Saudi Arabia‘s oil exports go east to Asia, reflecting this profound 
shift in the balance of global oil, (Andrews-Speed, 2009: 8). Between 1989 and 2010 
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Asia‘s share of Saudi‘s oil exports jumped from nearly 31 percent to almost 65 
percent. But, in contrast, Saudi crude exports to the U.S. in 2009 have taken a deep 
plunge and now are at their lowest level in 20 years to nearly 386 million barrels (1.05 
mb/d). Saudi oil exports to Western Europe are also plummeting to their lowest level 
since 1989 (see Table 6.3.2). 
 
(Table 6.3.2): Saudi Crude Oil Exports by Region, 1989-2010 (%)
 a 
 
 North 
America 
South 
America 
Western 
Europe 
The 
Middle 
East 
Africa Asia 
and the 
Far 
East
14 
Oceania Total 
2010
b 18.2% 10.0% 9.9% 4.4% 2.2% 64.1% 0.7% 100% 
2009 16.8% 1.01% 9.9% 4.5% 2.6% 64.8% 0.1% 100% 
2008 22.1% 0.86% 11.6% 4.1% 2.8% 58.4% 0.07% 100% 
2007 22.5% 0.88% 12.04% 4.4% 2.8% 57.1% 0.1% 100% 
2006 20.8% 0.9% 14.6% 4.3% 3.1% 56.1% 0.1% 100% 
2005 20.1% 0.9% 16.7% 4.2% 3.2% 54.5% 0.01% 100% 
2004 22.4% 0.8% 18.4% 3.8% 3.5% 50.3% 0.4% 100% 
2003 25.0% 1.0% 18.2% 3.0% 4.0% 48.2% 0.2% 100% 
2002 25.3% 1.1% 17.7% 2.5% 3.5% 48.8% 0.7% 100% 
2001 25.4% 1.6% 18.4% 2.6% 2.9% 48.4% 0.4% 100% 
2000 25.2% 0.9% 21.1% 2.6% 3.4% 45.7% 0.6% 100% 
1999 25.5% 1.2% 21.7% 3.3% 3.5% 44.1% 0. 3% 100% 
1998 23.3% 1.3% 27.6% 3.2% 2.1% 41.6% 0.5% 100% 
1997 21.6% 1.4% 26.1% 3.4% 1.7% 44.7% 0.7% 100% 
1996 21.9% 2.1% 23.7% 3.7% 1.5% 46.1% 0.7% 100% 
1995 21.9% 2.3% 26.0% 3.5% 1.5% 43.8% 0.8% 100% 
1994 22.9% 2.6% 26.4% 3.5% 1.5% 42.0% 0.7% 100% 
1993 21.2% 2.6% 27.3% 3.2% 1.4% 42.9% 0.1% 100% 
1992 25.5% 2.8% 26.4% 3.2% 1.4% 39.7% 0.7% 100% 
1991 27.8% 3.0% 26.1% 3.3% 2.5% 36.1% 0.8% 100% 
1990 29.2% 3.6% 23.1% 4.7% 1.9% 36.1% 0.7% 100% 
1989 31.2% 2.9% 26.3 5.7% 0.3% 31.9% 1.4% 100% 
Source: adapted from Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency Annual Report, (July, 2010) 
(a) All percentages were calculated by author 
(b) OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin, (2011: 47) 
                                                             
14 Territories and regions conventionally included under the term Far East are: China, Hong Kong, 
Japan, Macau, Mongolia, North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan, Brunei, Cambodia, East Timor, 
Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam 
and Russian Far East 
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Saudi Arabia has cast its eye on Asia with greater fervour over the past decade, 
recognising that Japan‘s thirst for oil, combined with China‘s and India‘s economic 
growth and increasing influence in the global economy, meant that Asia will 
eventually replace the West as the largest consumer of Saudi oil, (Wagner & Karasik, 
2010). As Table 6.3.2 shows, Saudi Arabia‘s exports to Asia doubled between 1990 
and 2010, while the exports to U.S. and Western Europe declined dramatically. 
Indeed, Noé van Hulst, secretary-general of the International Energy Forum, told the 
Financial Times recently that the shift is of ―overwhelming importance...The Middle 
East is looking east more and more, that is where the growth (in demand) is‖, (Hoyos, 
2010). 
 
From the Saudi perspective the argument is very simple: Just as China wants to secure 
energy supplies, Saudi Arabia wants to guarantee buyers and is eager to build its 
relationship with a fast-growing customer, (Oster, 2006). On the one hand, there is 
China, the world‘s fastest-growing major importer of oil, and, on the other hand, the 
Middle East, a region set to dominate world oil and gas supplies for the next two 
decades. It is therefore no surprise that diplomatic, economic, and energy relations 
between China and the countries of the Middle East have systematically deepened 
over the last ten years, (Andrews-Speed & others, 2009: 19). Saudi Arabia strategy to 
court China is two-pronged, one is diplomatic, in which they are increasing 
diplomatic activities to high-level state visits that indicate on the diplomatic level that 
the Gulf States are interested in tightening their relations. Secondly, there has been a 
marked increase in economic activities as well, (Basu, 2009). 
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Saudi Arabia regards China as a reliable customer for oil, a promising market and 
place to invest, an investor, a friend on the UN Security Council, and, not least, a 
leading political power that could serve as a counterweight to the dominant influence 
wielded by the U.S. in the region, (Jochen, 2006)  (see Table 6.3.4). John Sfakianakis, 
Chief Economist at Banque Saudi Fransi in Riyadh, argues that: ―China offers 
demand security, something that for a long time the oil-producing countries including 
Saudi Arabia have called for...As global demand has been picking up in the 
east. . Saudi Arabia has been looking east... The U.S. wants to reduce her dependence 
on foreign oil and encourage renewable fuels. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia wants stable 
markets for its oil reserves‖, (Meyer, 2010) (see Table 6.3.4). 
 
(Table 6.3.3): China‟s Economic Power 
 
The World‟s Second 
Largest Economy 
China surpassed Japan as the world‘s second-largest economy after 
the U.S. in the second quarter of 2010 
The World‟s Biggest 
Energy Consumer   
According IEA China overtook U.S. as world‘s biggest energy 
consumer in 2009 
The World‟s Top 
Exporter 
In 2009 China passed Germany as World‘s Top Exporter 
The World‟s Largest 
Car Manufacturing 
Country 
China has overtaken the United States and Japan to become the 
world‘s largest car manufacturing country in 2009 
The World‟s Leading 
Financial Power 
- China is by far the largest holder foreign reserves, with 
stockpiles of U$3.2 trillion at the end of June 2011.  
- The Top Foreign Holder US‘s Treasury Securities: 
According to the US Treasury, China is Top Foreign Holder 
US‘s Treasury Securities, holding of U.S. government debt 
of US$ 1165.5 billion (26.1% of total) at the end of June 
2011. 
- Member of the top 20 economy in the world (G20) 
- A voting power in the IMF 
The world‟s factory China today produces three-quarters of the world‘s toys; two-thirds 
of the world‘s digital electronics; around half of all computers; and 
more than a quarter of the world‘s clothes 
Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury, IEA, Bloomberg, Reuters, Financial Times and 
McKinsey 
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The development of Gulf-Asia relations has been propelled by other factors beside the 
energy market. Gulf countries are seeking to rebalance their relations with the major 
powers. More specifically, they are seeking to reduce their level of dependence on the 
United States, as well as their susceptibility to U.S. pressure, (Calabrese, 2009). For 
Saudi Arabia, China has, especially since 9/11, become a profitable and relatively 
secure haven for huge gains from the Saudi oil business. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia 
has managed to successfully diversify its export strategy in its trade with China, above 
all by supplying the gigantic Chinese textile industry with Saudi petrochemical 
products – at the expense of China‘s traditional Asian suppliers, (Jochen, 2006). 
 
Saudi Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources Ali AL-Naimi seemed to 
prognosticate the implications of these developments for Sino-Saudi relations as early 
as 2001 and was one of the first to introduce the now-common language of 
interdependence to describe Sino-Saudi relations. Speaking before the World 
Petroleum Congress in Shanghai September 19, 2001, AL-Naimi noted that: ―China is 
the second biggest economy in Asia and the seventh in the world; it is the second 
largest oil consumer in Asia after Japan and the third worldwide. Saudi Arabia, on the 
other hand is the largest economy in the Arab World, and also the largest world oil 
producer…This interdependent relationship in the energy field between our two 
countries makes for a model strategic partnership for the world‖, (AI-Naimi, 2001) 
(see Tables 6.3.5). 
 
 
 
 
247 
 
(Table 6.3.4): Saudi Arabia Exports Main Regions 2002-2010 (US$ billions)  
 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Saudi Arabia Total exports  72,4 93,2 125,9 180,7 211,3 234,9 311,2 120,1 213,4 
 
To Asia 
 
Total 36,01 54,5 77,4 112,5 136,5 150,4 161,2 123,7 143,2 
Mineral fuels, 
oils, distillation 
products, etc 
33,6 46,9 66,1 99,3 120,7 130,4 153,6 106,7 125,6 
To China Total 3.4 5.1 7.5 12.2 15.0 17.5 31.0 23.6 32,8 
Mineral fuels, 
oils, distillation 
products, etc 
2.4 3.7 5.4 9.2 11.8 13.6 26.4 19.3 25,8 
To 
Europe 
Total 12,0 13,2 19,6 26,2 28,1 24,5 31,8 15,6 21,3 
Mineral fuels, 
oils, distillation 
products, etc 
10,2 11,1 16,7 22,7 23,7 19,8 27,0 12,4 16,4 
 To North 
America  
(US,  
Canada 
and 
Mexico) 
Total 13,8 19,5 22,5 28,9 33,0 37,1 57,0 23,2 35,0 
Mineral fuels, 
oils, distillation 
products, etc 
13,2 18,7 21,8 28,1 32,4 36,4 56,2 22,6 33,9 
Source: Calculated by the author from UNCOMTRADE (July, 2011) 
 
 
Saudi Arabia sees the its strategic and energy future as revolving around becoming a 
global economic and energy power, ―an indispensable economic power‖, based on 
being a dominant global supplier not only of oil but also of other energy-based 
commodities, (Andrews-Speed & others 2009:.8). The country is seeking to be the 
largest, at least in chemicals and fertilisers, as well as a dominant player in 
aluminium, cement and steel, (Seznec, 2009: 41-51). According to Jean-Francois 
Seznec, a professor for contemporary Arab studies at Georgetown University in 
Washington DC, China also buys a significant amount of petrochemicals from Saudi 
Arabia as it strives to maintain the quality of packaging for the vast range of goods the 
country sells, (Guiffrida, 2011). Additionally, China is becoming a major investor in 
Saudi Arabia, less so in the energy sector but more in petrochemicals, mining, and 
railroads. Finally, expanding Saudi-Chinese relations would allow the Saudis to 
248 
 
become less dependent on the United States for their economic and even strategic 
future, (Ibid).  
 
In this context, Prince Walid bin Talal, Saudi billionaire investor and member of the 
Royal Family, told the New York Times: ―We are opening new channels, we are 
heading East...China is a big consumer of oil. Saudi Arabia needs to open new 
channels beyond the West. So this is good for both of us...When you have a country 
of 1.3 billion people growing at 10 percent annually, importing millions of tons of oil, 
Saudi Arabia has to be there...It‘s clear Saudi Arabia is going where its interests are, 
and China is going where its interests are‖, (Fattah, 2006). That argument was echoed 
by the then Saudi Minister of Commerce and Industry, Fawaz AL-Alami, who pointed 
out that: ―The growth in our oil exports and petrochemicals will be China and 
India…Once dependent in its foreign policy almost exclusively on the U.S., Riyadh 
has been diversifying its friendships in recent years, with Asia, where demand for 
Saudi oil is at its highest, emerging as an important strategic partner‖, (Khalaf, 2006). 
 
Meanwhile Ben Simpfendorfer, the Editor of China Insider and the former Chief 
China Economist at the Royal Bank of Scotland, argues that the partnership between 
Saudi Arabia and China is part of a broader strategy by the Saudis to supply Asian 
markets and extend their global influence. It also helps Saudi Arabia reduce reliance 
on the United States, which since World War II has protected Saudi security in return 
for stable oil supplies, (Meyer, 2010).  Furthermore, Li Wei, a Chinese diplomat in 
Riyadh, shares that view: ―China‘s rise has provided Saudi Arabia with an excuse to 
knock on Washington‘s door and to say - You are not our only partner‖, (Ibid). 
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Indeed, for the Saudis, partnership with China has advantages and does make 
economic sense. Although oil is bought and sold on the market, it comes in its crude 
form in many varieties, and countries often lack the refineries to process some forms. 
Saudi investment in Chinese refineries will help to make the country captive 
consumers for Saudi crude, (Giridharadas, 2006). China‘s market will almost 
certainly be the largest incremental oil market in the world for the next twenty years. 
As such it will be the target of marketing campaigns by all of the world‘s suppliers 
capable of increasing output at a rapid rate, (Obaid, 2002). From the Saudi 
perspective, to penetrate China‘s markets it will need to insure that its crude oil can be 
refined into useful products. Saudi ARAMCO invested in China‘s refining industry 
and upgraded some of its capacity to handle Saudi crude oil. Not only will this  give 
China priority access to Saudi crude, it will also give Saudi Arabia a direct entry into 
the downstream sectors in China, one of the fastest growing markets in the world, 
(Lee & Dan, 2007). 
 
In addition, Saudi Arabia needs to find growing markets for petrochemicals over the 
next decades, (Sfakianakis, 2009). The Kingdom also needs to build its market 
knowledge in Asia. China offers important economic advantages to Saudi Arabia‘s 
downstream expansion into the wider region. And closer to home, China‘s affordable 
contractors and low-cost labour force do offer Saudi Arabia an extra cushion for the 
country‘s development projects, (Ibid).  Speaking on the subject of ―Saudi Arabia and 
China: Natural Partners in the Global Economy‖, at the Financial Times China-
Middle East Summit, held in Riyadh May, 2008, Saudi Basic Industries Corporation 
(SABIC) Vice Chairman and CEO Mohamed Al-Mady argued that Saudi Arabia‘s 
large hydrocarbon resources made the Kingdom a ―natural strategic trading partner‖ 
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for China‘s dynamic industrial and economic growth, (Arab News, May 7, 2008).  
Also, Al-Mady said that China‘s rapidly growing population provides important 
markets for Saudi Arabia‘s growing petrochemical industry. He went on to add: 
―Saudi Arabia and China are indeed natural trading partners supported by cooperative 
political ties. The geographic location of the partners permits an economic pathway 
for two-way trade‖, (Ibid). Furthermore, Isam Fakhru, Chairman of the Bahrain 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry and head of the Federation of the Dammam-
based GCC Chambers, argues that the two sides ―strategically need each other…Each 
party realise this fact‖, (Kawach, 2010). 
 
 
6.4 POLITICAL FACTORS: NEW PATTERN OF PRIORITIES  
 
 
The current Saudi foreign policy calculations are driven by a deep fear and suspicion 
of expanding Iranian influence. Saudi leadership has begun to look at all regional 
security issues through the prism of their fears about growing Iranian influence.  They 
see Iran‘s activities as dangerously provocative, not only in Iraq, but also in Lebanon, 
Palestine, Bahrain, Yemen, parts of Africa, and Southeast Asia. Indeed, the Iranian 
―threat‖ moved again to Riyadh‘s top list of priorities. In a secret letter, leaked by 
Wikileaks, summarising the trip of White House counterterrorism adviser John 
Brennan to Saudi Arabia in March 2009 concerning his meeting with the Saudi King, 
U.S. Political Counsellor at the U.S. Embassy in Saudi Arabia, Lisa Carle, wrote that, 
in summarising his history with Iran, Saudi Arabia King Abdullah concluded: ―We 
have had correct relations over the years, but the bottom line is that they cannot be 
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trusted‖, (Wikileaks, March 22, 2009). Prince Turki Al-Faisal argues that: ―Iran is 
very vulnerable in the oil sector, and it is there that more could be done to squeeze the 
current government to join the world efforts toward peace‖, (Al-Faisal, June 8, 2011). 
According to Stuart Levey, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations who 
served as Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, 
―Iran‘s ability to develop its most critical industry and create jobs for its young people 
is at great risk‖, (Reed, Stanley & others, 2011). In this regard, The International 
Energy Agency forecasts a 20 percent decline in Iran‘s production capacity, now 
about 3.6 million barrels per day, in the five years through 2016. Sanctions are 
blocking foreign investment and delaying projects, (IEA, Medium-Term Oil & Gas 
Markets 2011). 
 
As discussed earlier in the previous chapters, the first major breakthrough in Chinese-
Saudi relations did not occur in the energy field, but came with a controversial 
missiles deal in the late 1980s, (Nonneman, 2005: 344). At that time Saudi Arabia had 
reasons to reach out to China to not only curtail arms sales to Iran but to lure China 
away from Iran with higher bids and diplomatic pressure, (Obaid, 2002). As a former 
assistant director in the Saudi General Intelligence Directorate put it:  
―Clearly, we [Saudis] are going to have to give the Chinese numerous incentives for them to 
stop supplying the Iranians with those long-range missiles. One way is clearly going to have 
to be a redirection of Saudi purchases to also include Chinese military equipment. The usual 
suppliers [U.S., England, and France] won‘t lose importance, of course‖, (Ibid). 
 
These reasons are still valid today, in the Saudi political calculations; Riyadh is 
betting that strong Sino-Saudi relations could prevent Beijing in following a policy 
which might represent a threat to the Saudi national security. In this regard it‘s very 
interesting to mention that in a confidential memo leaked by ―Wikileaks‖ commenting 
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on the trip of the Chinese Foreign Minister to Saudi Arabia in January 2010, U.S. 
Ambassador James B. Smith to Saudi Arabia wrote that:  
―…Since King Abdullah‘s historic visit to Beijing in January 2006, the Saudi-Chinese 
relationship has focused predominantly on energy and trade.  However, the relationship may 
be showing signs of political evolution.  While the Chinese would likely prefer to stay away 
from political controversy, their economic power and permanent seat on the UN Security 
Council has made it more and more difficult for them to avoid politics altogether. The 
incentives for the Saudis to try and leverage their economic relationship with China for 
political gain with respect to sensitive regional issues, such as Iran and the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, are significant and growing.  After patiently focusing on building the economic 
relationship since 2006, FM Saud‘s public and private prodding of FM Yang indicates the 
Saudis are ready to try and cash in some political chips‖, (Wikileaks, January 27, 2010) 
 
There are several other factors that are pushing Saudi Arabia to develop closer 
relations with China. Firstly, most Muslims do not have a negative political 
perception of China, (Rubin, 1999). Due to the fact that China is not associated with 
hegemony, imperialism and domination as the United States and European nations 
are, (Alistair, 2006). There is also little concern that China‘s increasing status as a 
world power will constitute an international threat, (Jiang, 2007: 12-15). While there 
is not negative perception of China, the same cannot be said of America.  Anti-
American sentiment still exists strongly in Saudi Arabia, two years after U.S. 
President Barack Obama called in a groundbreaking speech from Cairo for a ―new 
beginning‖ in relations with the Muslim world. The United States‘ popularity in the 
Arab World has plummeted to levels lower than the last year of the George W. Bush 
Administration (2008), (Zogby, 2011).  According to James Zogby‘s survey (2011) of 
public opinion in six Arab countries, an overwhelming majority of more than 4,000 
people surveyed in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and the United 
Arab Emirates, told the Arab American Institute that they felt that Obama had not met 
the expectations he laid out in the June 2009 Cairo speech, (Ibid). Secondly, most 
Saudis have a certain degree of admiration for China. They are impressed with 
China‘s explosive economic growth believing that it has occurred without China 
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sacrificing social justice, law and order, or traditional values, (Jiang, 2007: 12-15). 
Finally, relations with China keep the Saudi Arabia‘s future options open and give 
them a political flexibility as the Arab World (including Saudi Arabia) expects China 
to play a bigger role in the Middle East as well as in international affairs, (Jin, 2004). 
 
The ―China model‖ has captivated Arab governments in two ways. First, it promises 
rapid growth without regime change. There is a tendency for the West to link 
economic reform as a ―Trojan Horse‖ for political reform. Second, the China model 
also promises independence from the West, (Simpfendorfer, 2009: 162). From a Saudi 
perspective, on one hand the Saudi public sees China as a counter balance to the 
United States; on the other hand China‘s conservative approach to political and 
economic development and modernisation appears to be a model worth adopting and 
a viable alternative to U.S. - and western-inspired reform models, (Zambelis & 
Gentry, 2008). Prince Turki AL-Faisal stated, ―With China, there is less baggage; 
there are easier routes to mutual benefit‖, (Meyer, 2010). According to Freeman (a 
former U.S. ambassador to the Kingdom), the simple bargain of oil for security has 
become more complex because after 9/11 there are ―all sorts of other agendas that the 
Saudis either find irksome or difficult to address‖, (Freeman, 2006). In this regard, 
Freeman astutely observed: 
The Arabs see a partner who will buy their oil without demanding that they accept a foreign 
ideology, abandon their way of life, or make other choices they‘d rather avoid. They see a 
country that is far away and has no imperial agenda in their region, but which is 
internationally influential and likely in time to be militarily powerful... They see a country that 
unreservedly welcomes their investments and is grateful for the jobs these create. They see a 
major civilization that seems determined to build a partnership with them, does not insult their 
religion or their way of life, values its reputation as a reliable supplier too much to engage in 
the promiscuous application of sanctions or other coercive measures, and has no habit of 
bombing or invading other countries to whose policies it objects, (Ibid)).  
 
Additionally, through Saudi‘s lens, China could be regarded as a valuable source of 
support as Riyadh continues on a path of cautious and selective economic 
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liberalisation while seeking to deflect U.S. pressure in the area of political reform, 
(Douglas & others, 2006). In this context, Clovis Maksoud, a former Arab League 
ambassador to the United Nations, United States and India, said, ―America will be 
more deferential to the Saudi and Arab priorities in the future, because they will 
realise the traditional bilateral relations between Saudi Arabia and the United States, 
though sustainable, is no longer exclusive‖, (Giridharadas, 2006). 
 
 
6.5 CONCLUSION 
 
 
The chapter has shown that Saudi Arabia‘s objectives of the Sino-Saudi relationship 
are closely aligned with the economic interdependence school of thought for 
numerous reasons: (a) Saudi Arabia‘s energy strategy is not a strategy to exclude the 
United States. It‘s a strategy to go where the market growth is; (b) Saudi Arabia sees a 
need to diversify its political relations as a result of the rise in criticism of U.S.-Saudi 
relations; (c) Saudi Arabia is hoping that closer Sino-Saudi relations will affect the 
Sino-Iranian relationship. As stated earlier, the Saudis would like to see decreased 
Sino- Iranian military relations and get China onboard to support tougher action in the 
event of Iran continuing to pursue its nuclear program. For Saudi Arabia, maintaining 
good relations with the United States remains its key foreign policy objective, given 
the long-standing economic and military ties between the two countries. Though 
China and Saudi Arabia have expanded their cooperation, Saudi Arabia will probably 
attempt to strike a balance between the United States and China and avoid 
compromising U.S. interests to please the Chinese or the vice versa in the near future. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE SCOPE OF CHINA-SAUDI ECONOMIC 
RELATIONS 
 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Saudi Arabia in 
1990, bilateral ties have witnessed smooth and rapid development. China attaches 
great importance to its ties with Saudi Arabia and will further strengthen the friendly 
cooperation, ((Xinhua, January 14, 2010). The market share of Chinese products in 
the Saudi market is going up every year, (Yu, 2010).  Today Saudi Arabia remains 
China‘s top partner in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), for nine 
consecutive years,  (Yang, 2010). 
 
This chapter will examine the economic relationship that China and Saudi Arabia 
have formed over the past two decades. The following will be examined in the 
economic realm: (a) Trade relations; (b) Cross-investments between the two 
countries; and (c) The factors which could slow China-Saudi economic ties. The 
chapter attempts to decipher Chinese intentions with Saudi Arabia. If China is acting 
within the realist theory, it should be attempting to expand its power and influence in 
Saudi Arabia at every opportunity with the intent to undermine U.S. influence. This 
would include proactive actions such as: (a) Providing Saudi Arabia with massive 
economic assistance and incentives to develop closer Sino-Saudi economic and 
political ties with the intent to degrade the U.S.-Saudi relationship; and (b) Allocating 
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huge investments in Saudi Arabia‘s economy to make it dependent on Chinese capital 
significantly.  On the other hand if China is acting within the economic 
interdependence school of thought, it should be: (a) Interacting economically with 
Saudi Arabia in a manner which makes commercial sense; and (b) Developing a Sino-
Saudi political relationship based on furthering their economic interests and not based 
on degrading the U.S.-Saudi political relationship. In this regard we will show the 
conditions under which high energy interdependence between China and the Middle 
East will lead to a pacific or belligerent China. If decision-makers‘ expectations of 
future trade are high they will likely pursue policies that will enhance security in the 
region. On the other hand, if they have a negative view of their future trading 
environment they are likely to take action to protect their interests in the region. 
 
 
7.2 TRADE TIES: GROWING INTERACTIONS  
 
 
The trade between Saudi Arabia and China commenced before they established their 
official diplomatic relations in 1990. Concerted efforts on the part of China to 
improve its relations with Saudi Arabia began in 1978, particularly when China 
embarked on the economic openness. In 1981 Saudi Arabia lifted a long-standing 
politically and religiously motivated ban on direct imports from China, (Shichor, 
1998). A small volume of Chinese goods had entered Saudi markets indirectly, but 
from the early eighties Chinese exports increased steadily and Saudi Arabia became 
one of China‘s most important Middle Eastern trading partners, (Ibid). Since 1990 the 
two-way traffic between the capitals has led to a series of trade deals. Between 1990 
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and 2000, the bilateral trade between the two countries grew ten-fold to reach 
US$3.098 billion, (People's Daily, April 1, 2002). By mid 2000s the trade was 
booming; bilateral trade between the two countries in 2005 increased further in excess 
of US$14 billion, (AP, January 23, 2006), to jump in 2008 to a new record as the 
bilateral trade volume reached 41.8 billion U.S. dollars. In 2009, although being 
affected by the global financial crisis, the bilateral trade volume also reached 32.6 
billion U.S. dollars, (see Table 7.2.3). But 2010 saw a significant increase in trade 
between the two countries. According to the statistic report of Chinese Customs, the 
bilateral trade volume between China and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia reached a 
record high of US$43.18 billion in 2010; increased 32.7 percent compared to the 
previous year, and exceeded the historic record US$41.8 billion in 2008, (China‘s 
Ministry of Commerce, February 9, 2011). On other hand trade data provided by the 
U.S. Census Bureau shows that the value of imports and exports between the U.S. and 
Saudi Arabia reached US$43.011 billion in 2010, a 30.9 percent increase from 2009. 
U.S. exported US$11.59 billion worth of goods and services to the Kingdom, while 
the U.S. imported US$31.42 billion worth of Saudi products and services, (U.S. 
Census Bureau, February, 2011). 
 
These figures show that China took over the U.S. as trade partner (excluding military 
and security contracts) for the first time since 1990. Meanwhile, Chinese products are 
gaining a stronger foothold across the Gulf. Analysts point to the success of 
DragonMart, a shopping centre in Dubai, in which 4,000 Chinese businesses are 
housed, as an indicator that low-tech Chinese products may soon dominate in other 
markets in the region, despite the Arab population‘s penchant for high-end Western 
products, (Guiffrida, 2011). In this regard, John Sfakianakis, Chief Economist at the 
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Banque Saudi Fransi in Riyadh, noted that: ―Over the past few years, the U.S.‘ total 
market share of Saudi Arabia trade has declined, while it has been increasing for the 
Chinese‖, (Ibid) (see Table 7.2.1 & 7.2.2). 
 
(Table 7.2.1): China‟s Exports (Selected Indicators US$ Billions) 
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
China‟s Exports  
to World  
266,09 325,5 438,2 593,3 761,9 968,9 1220 1430 1201 1578 
China‟s Exports  
from Middle 
East 
8,6 11,4 16,2 21,1 28,3 39,8 59,3 75,3 64,5 80,6 
China‟s Exports  
to GCC  
4,07 5,5 8,085 10,435 13,76 18,38 27,84 38,74 31,27 36,05 
China‟s Exports 
to Saudi Arabia  
1,3 1,6 2,1 2,7 3,8 5,05 7,8 10,8 8,9 10,3 
Source: General Customs Administration of China and UNCOMTRADE 
 
 
(Table 7.2.2): China‟s Imports (Selected Indicators US$ Billions) 
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
China‟s Imports 
From World  
243,5 295,1 412,7 561,2 659,9 791,4 956,11 1132 1003 1394 
China‟s Imports  
from Middle East 
9,4 9,8 15,1 22,4 31,8 41,8 49,3 82,2 58,6 90,6 
China‟s Imports  
from GCC  
5,6 6,01 8,7 14,2 19,9 26,5 30,2 53,7 36,6 56,3 
China‟s Imports  
from Saudi Arabia  
2,7 3,4 5,1 7,5 12,2 15,08 17,5 31,02 23,5 32,8 
Source: General Customs Administration of China UNCOMTRADE 
 
 
Indeed, trade is at the heart of the growing links between the two countries, which 
centre on the crude oil and petrochemicals industries. Chinese Vice President Xi 
Jinping in an address to a meeting of Saudi and Chinese businessmen held at the 
Jeddah Chamber of Commerce and Industry (JCCI) in June 2008, said: ―The situation 
is favourable for further growth of economic cooperation in diverse fields between the 
Kingdom and China… KSA is our largest economic partner in the Middle East as the 
volume of trade is on the path of continuous growth‖, (Fakkar, 2008). Indeed, the 
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growth of China-Saudi trade jumped in the last three decades in dramatic way, 
between 1978 and 2010 the volume of trade increased over 1115 times, (see Table 
7.2.3 below). 
 
(Table 7.2.3): Trade between China and Saudi Arabia, 1978-2010 (US$) 
 
 China‘s Trade 
with Saudi 
Arabia 
China‟s Trade 
with the World 
China -
Saudi 
Trade of 
China‘s 
Total (%)
a
  
Saudi Arabia‟s 
Trade with the 
World 
China -
Saudi 
Trade of 
Saudi‘s 
Total (%)
b
  
2010 43,230,400,000 2,974,320,000,000 1.45% 334,747,000,000 13.01% 
2009 32,566,250,000 2,207,330,000,000 1.47% 265,421,900,000 12.26% 
2008 41,853,200,000 2,561,260,000,000 1.63% 418,102,000,000 10.01% 
2007 25,360,140,000 2,174,964,000,000 1.16% 299,393,400,000 8.47% 
2006 20,140,930,000 1,761,493,000,000 1.14% 266,236,900,000 7.56% 
2005 16,111,240,000 1,422,872,000,000 1.13% 214,328,900,000 7.51% 
2004 10,299,660,000 1,154,918,000,000 0.8% 155,726,900,000 6.61% 
2003 7,341,840,000 851,323,000,000 0.8% 122,388,000,000 5.99% 
2002 5,109,230,000 621,223,000,000 0.8% 97,714,900,000 5.22% 
2001 4,079,570,000 510,290,000,000 0.7% 99,866,600,000 4.08% 
2000 3,098,230,000 474,398,000,000 0.6% 105,447,000,000 2.93% 
1999 1,855,329,000 360,659,000,000 0.5% 76,923,400,000 2.41% 
1998 1,703,953,000 324,136,000,000 0.5% 68,749,300,000 2.47% 
1997 1,679,958,000 325,089,000,000 0.5% 89,195,900,000 1.88% 
1996 1,588,204,000 290,120,000,000 0.5% 88,555,200,000 1.79% 
1995 1,287,411,000 281,129,000,000 0.4% 77,491,500,000 1.66% 
1994 1,027,133,000 236,581,000,000 0.4% 65,957,800,000 1.55% 
1993 697,392,000 195,333,000,000 0.3% 70,597,700,000 0.9% 
1992 571,704,000 167,494,200,000 0.3% 83,560,500,000 0.6% 
1991 525,668,000 135,846,700,000 0.3% 76,890,600,000 0.6% 
1990 417,096,600 116,570,400,000 0.3% 68,498,800,000 0.6% 
1989 319,263,000 112,057,700,000 0.2% 49,538,200,000 0.6% 
1988 425,200,000 103,017,100,000 0.4% 45,522,100,000 0.9% 
1987 354,400,000 82,689,600,000 0.4% 42,624,700,000 0.8% 
1986 185,900,000 74,675,900,000 0.2% 39,296,600,000 0.4% 
1985 155,200,000 69,813,200,000 0.2% 51,101,700,000 0.3% 
1984 160,900,000 50,779,100,000 0.3% 71,216,900,000 0.2% 
1983 167,700,000 43,409,000,000 0.3% 85,042,800,000 0.1% 
1982 192,700,000 40,786,500,000 0.4% 116,492,200,000 0.1% 
1981 232,100,000 43,107,000,000 0.5% 148,472,000,000 0.1% 
1980 151,600,000 37,644,200,000 0.4% 132,179,000,000 0.1% 
1979 76,400,000 29,332,000,000 0.2% 82,909,400,000 0.09% 
1978 37,000,000 20,660,000,000 0.1% 58,165.000,000 0.06% 
Source: IMF (DoTS), (September 2011)  
(a) & (b) Percentages were calculated by the author 
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The above tables demonstrate that the relations between the two countries have 
developed rapidly in the last two decades. Working through both high-level and low-
level contacts, China and Saudi Arabia were able to coordinate their efforts in 
pursuing several mutual interests, most notably economic and development 
endeavours. An investment agreement was signed in 1992, followed by a series of 
further pacts to strengthen economic ties, (Mirza, 2009) and an economic agreement 
also signed in 1992 encouraged cooperation, most notably on establishing a refinery 
capable of processing Saudi crude oil in China. Saudi Oil Minister Ibrahim al-Naimi 
furthered such discussions in 1995, claiming that such ventures would ―give China a 
permanent and steady source of oil, as Saudi Arabia is considered a safe and reliable 
source for petroleum supplies‖, (Anderson, 2004). Specifics on financing were 
worked out through a series of meetings in 1996, yielding two joint refinery projects 
in Shandong and Guangdong provinces. King Abdullah, the then Crown Prince, 
visited China for the first time in 1998, becoming the highest-level Saudi official ever 
to visit China, (Ibid). In 1999, Prince Salman, Governor of Riyadh province, pursued 
a similar strategy in an attempt to promote Sino-Saudi cooperation on infrastructure 
development; his efforts yielded an agreement with the Mayor of Beijing to 
collaborate in the fields of ―urban infrastructure, real estate, transportation, and 
entertainment facilities‖, (Ibid). 
 
Recognising Saudi Arabia‘s pre-eminent place among the Middle East oil producers, 
China has cultivated what former President Jiang Zemin  described as a ‗‗strategic oil 
partnership‘‘ with Saudi Arabia. In November 1999, accompanied by a delegation of 
Chinese businessmen, Jiang paid what was the first ever visit to Saudi Arabia by a 
head of state of China. During the trip, agreements were signed whereby the Saudis 
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opened their oil and markets (except for ‗‗upstream‘‘ exploration and production) to 
Chinese investment and in return the Saudi national oil company, Saudi Aramco, was 
allowed to participate in China‘s ‗‗downstream‘‘ refining sector, (Pham 2009: 177- 
193). As shown in Table 7.2.1, the trade also accelerated after the 9/11 terrorists 
attacks. By 2002 Saudi Arabia had become China‘s leading foreign supplier of 
petroleum, and the Chinese were gaining from the Saudis, (Ibid). 
 
The year of 2006 was a turning point. Tang Zhichao, director of Middle East Studies 
under the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, argues that: ―Since 
then, Saudi Arabia has valued its relations with China much more highly‖, (Ding, 
2009). Indeed, Saudi-China relations reached their zenith in January 2006 when King 
Abdullah bin Abdulaziz al-Saud had visited China in what was the first visit by a 
Saudi monarch to the People‘s Republic since diplomatic relations were established in 
1990. The king‘s visit also was the first since Saudi Arabia became a full (WTO) 
member in December 2005 potentially signalling a new strategic partnership, (Mirza, 
2009).  
 
The visit saw the signing of five agreements, including a landmark pact for expanding 
cooperation in oil, natural gas and minerals. Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal 
told reporters during the visit that the four other agreements focused on nurturing 
economic, trade and technical cooperation; avoiding dual taxation and preventing tax 
evasion; cooperating on vocational training; and extending a Saudi Arabian 
Development Bank loan to the predominantly Muslim city of Aksu in western China, 
(Oster, 2006). In addition, Saudi Arabia has also officially joined the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), offered Chinese companies investment opportunities in the 
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country‘s enormous infrastructure sector that includes petrochemicals, gas, 
desalination, power generation and railways,  (Madsen, 2006). 
 
Three months later in April 2006, Chinese president Jintao Hu reciprocated the visit. 
The two heads of state signed five additional accords that expanded Sino–Saudi 
economic cooperation, including agreements on cooperation in oil, gas, and mining; 
health care; and on quality inspection and standards of goods and services, (Ibid). The 
highlight of the visit was the signing of a major public works agreement for the first 
time between the two countries, specifically a US$1.8 billion deal for the China 
Railway Construction Corporation to build a high-speed monorail linking Islam‘s two 
holiest cities, Makkah and Medina, (Ibid). Furthermore, economic relations between 
Saudi Arabia and China in February 2009 received a shot in the arm with the signing 
of five landmark agreements, during the second visit of Chinese president Hu, 
(Shaheen, 2009) aimed at taking ties to a new height. The agreements included one 
for the ambitious Makkah mono-rail project; cooperation in oil, gas and mining; in the 
field of health; on quality inspection and standards of goods and services; and a 
Memorandum of Understanding to set up King‘s Abdul Aziz Public Library in 
Beijing, (Ibid). 
 
Within this context, relations between Saudi Arabia and China are mutually strategic 
in nature. China is the second largest economy in the world. Saudi Arabia is the 
largest economy in the Middle East and North Africa region and plays a unique 
systemic role in the global oil market, (Sfakianakis, 2011). China is an exporter of 
goods and Saudi Arabia is a significant importer, while China‘s growth and acute 
demand for oil imports has been largely supplied by Saudi Arabia. China is the 
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second largest source of imports to the Kingdom and is ranked fifth as a destination 
for Saudi exports. Saudi Arabia is most interested in China‘s bustling labour market 
and the products the country can manufacture cheaply, such as textiles. Just as Saudi 
Arabia has large oil surpluses, China has large labour surpluses; this dynamic has 
driven the rapid expansion of China-Saudi trade. Amr Dabbagh, Governor and 
Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Saudi Arabian General Investment 
Authority (SAGIA), argues that: ―The theory of comparative advantage would lead to 
a situation where energy-intensive goods from Saudi Arabia are traded for labour-
intensive goods from China‖, (Teslik, 2008). 
 
Indeed, since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1990, Sino-Saudi ties have 
become one of the most dynamic bilateral relationships in the region, (Zambelis, 
2010: 4-7). The Sino-Saudi economic relationship has grown at an impressive rate. 
According to the Council of Saudi Chambers of Commerce and Industry (SCCI), 
trade between China and Saudi Arabia grew at an annual rate of 30 percent and 50 
percent in 2003 and 2008, respectively. Bilateral trade rose 64.7 percent in 2008 and 
over 40 percent in 2010 and is estimated to rise 50 percent by 2015 (see Table 7.2.4). 
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(Table 7.2.4): China‟s Trade 2001-2010, (Selected indicators – US$ in billions) 
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
World‟s 
Total  
Trade 
(US$ 
trillions)
a
  
12,34 12,93 15,09 18,54 21,01 24,32 27,89 32,17 24,53 30,63C 
China Total Trade 
World 
(US$ 
trillions) 
0,509 0,620 0,850 1,15 1,421 1,76 2,176 2,56 2,20 2.97 
(%) 
of 
World‟s 
Total
b 
4.05% 4.85% 5.6% 6.2% 6.75% 7.21% 7.8% 7.95% 8.95% 9.7% 
Arab 
Countries 
(US$ 
billions) 
14,69 17,74 25,40 36,69 51,26 66,16 84,25 129,64 103,91 145.40 
(%) 
of 
China‟s 
total 
2.88% 2.86% 2.98% 3.15% 3.6% 3.75% 3.9% 5.15% 4.75% 4.89% 
Saudi 
Arabia 
(US$ 
billions) 
4,07 5,10 7,31 10,29 16,07 20,14 25,40 41,84 32,59 43.19 
 (%) 
of 
China‟s 
total 
0.7% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 1.13% 1.14% 1.16% 1.63% 1.14% 1.45% 
Source: General Customs Administration of China and UNCOMTRADE 
(a) Total Trade = Exports + Imports, calculated by the author. (b) The percentage were 
calculated by the author;  (c) WTO 
 
 
Furthermore, Saudi Arabia accounts for about a third of the total volume of Sino-Arab 
trade, as the total volume of Sino-Arabic trade grew to 132.8 billion U.S. dollars in 
2008 from 5.8 billion U.S. dollars in 1996, but fell slightly in 2009 due to the 
economic crisis, to about US$107, (US$32.6 billion with Saudi Arabia alone), 
(Xinhua, September 26, 2010). According to figures cited by the Saudi Finance 
Minister Ibrahim Al-Assaf, trade relations between Saudi Arabia and China grew 
more than 25-fold during the past decade, the volume of trade between the two 
countries in 2008 reached more than US$40 billion, a goal set by leaders of both 
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countries in 2006 and to be achieved by 2010, (Hamidi, 2010) (see Table 7.2.5& 
7.2.6). 
 
(Table 7.2.5): China‟s Exports 2001-2010 (Selected indicator)a 
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
World Total  
Exports (US$ 
trillions) 
6,06 6,38 7,45 9,12 10,38 12,07 13,82 15,94 12,14 15.23b 
China total Exports 
World (US$ 
trillions) 
0,266 0,325 0,438 0,593 0,761 0,968 1,22 1,43 1,20 1.57 
(%) 
 of World‟s Total 
4.3 5.2 5.8 6.5 7.3 8.02 8.8 8.9 9.8 10.4 
Arab Countries 
(US$ billions) 
7,21 9,6 13,05 17,62 23,63 31,79 43,22 59,38 51,81 64.90 
(%) 
 of China‟s total 
2.7 2.9 2.9 2.9 3.1 3.2 3.5 4.1 4.3 4.1 
Saudi Arabia 
(US$ billions) 
1,35 1,6 2,14 2,77 3,82 5,05 7,83 10,8 8,97 10.36 
(%) 
 of China‟s total 
0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.6 
Source: General Customs Administration of China and UNCOMTRADE 
(a) Percentages were calculated by the author. (b)WTO 
 
 
(Table 7.2.6): China‟s Imports 2001-2010 (Selected indicator)a 
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
World‟s Total  
Imports (US$ 
trillions) 
6,27 6,55 7,63 9,42 10,63 12,25 14,06 16,23 12,38 15.40b 
China total Imports 
World (US$ 
trillions) 
0,243 0,295 0,412 0,561 O,659 0,791 0,956 1,13 1,003 1.39 
(%) 
 of World Total 
3.8 4.5 5.4 5.9 6.2 6.4 6.8 7 8.1 9.0 
Arab World (US$ 
billions) 
7,48 8,11 12,35 19,07 27,63 34,36 41,02 70,26 52,10 80.49 
(%) 
 of China Total 
3.07 2.7 2.9 3.4 4.1 4.3 4.3 6.2 5.2 5.7 
Saudi Arabia 
(US$ billions) 
2,71 3,43 5,17 7,52 12,24 15,08 17,56 31,02 23,62 32.82 
(%) 
 of China Total 
1.1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.8 1.9 1.8 2.7 2.3 2.3 
Source: General Customs Administration of China and UNCOMTRADE 
(a) Percentages were calculated by the author. (b) WTO 
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Al-Assaf also said that the Chinese companies are involved in 100 important projects 
in infrastructure in the Kingdom, with a total of around 44 billion riyals (US$11.7 
billion). He called on Chinese firms to enter the competitions implementation of other 
projects in the Kingdom, (Ibid). Meanwhile China‘s commerce minister Chen Deming 
drew an optimistic picture of the relations between the two countries as he projects 
that the trade volumes between the two countries will increase by 50 percent by 2015, 
―We want to increase the trade volume to US$60 billion by 2015 after the target of 
US$40 billion (for 2010) was surpassed early in 2008‖, (Laessing, 2010). Some 
experts say that bilateral trade between China and Saudi-Arabia could ―far exceed‖ 
the goal of US$60 billion by 2015 and further strengthen trade ties with the Middle 
Eastern region, (Ding, 2010). Tang Zhichao, Director of Middle East Studies with the 
China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, argues that: ―It (the goal) is a 
conservative estimate. There is high possibility that the China-Saudi Arabia trade 
would far exceed the target by 2015, as bilateral relations are getting stronger and the 
two nations‘ industries are highly complementary‖, (Ibid). 
 
This optimism was clear during his official visit to Saudi Arabia in January 2010 
where Saudi Arabia hosted the fourth session of the joint committee meeting, (Yu, 
2010). The Minister of Commerce of China, Chen, hailed the rapid growth of bilateral 
economic and trade ties since the third meeting of the joint committee in 2006, noting 
that bilateral trade has accomplished, two years in advance, the goal of US$ 40 billion 
by 2010, and Saudi Arabia has been China‘s biggest trade partner in West Asia for 
eight consecutive years, (Xinhua, January 11, 2010). In demonstrating Beijing‘s 
commitment to strengthening the economic ties binding China and Saudi Arabia, 
Minister Chen made a five-point proposal, in which he said both countries should 
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strive to expand bilateral trade to reach US$ 60 by 2015, (Ibid). He also proposed to 
maintain the long term and steady crude oil trade between the two sides, in addition to 
enhancing cooperation on exploiting gas, oil projects and in the petrochemical 
industry, and by establishing a cooperation mechanism on trade remedy, (Ibid).  
 
It‘s not surprisingly then that Saudi Arabia has become the biggest potential overseas 
contracting market for China. Yang Hongelin, the Chinese Ambassador to Saudi 
Arabia, told leading Saudi daily newspaper Arab News in September 2011 that over 
80 projects under construction in Saudi Arabia are implemented by Chinese 
enterprises, with a total contract value of US$12.5 billion, and there are about 16,000 
Chinese business people working in Saudi Arabia, (Yang, September 30, 2011). The 
Chinese Ambassador also pointed out that the contracts have been signed for 35 
projects worth 23.2 billion riyals (over US$6 billion) in 2009; the finished turnover 
was US$3.6 billion, (Jibril, 2010).  In addition, China also signed 27 new industrial 
projects in Saudi Arabia during the first half of 2010, (Carey, 2010). 
 
China is establishing itself in the Saudi market, constructing high-speed railways, 
desalination plants and aluminium and cement factories, (Gresh, 2011). Furthermore, 
Chinese contracting companies have won great reputations in the Saudi market on the 
basis of efficient cooperation, competitive quotation and pioneering spirits, (Yu, 
2010). Projects captured by Chinese contractors range from the expansion of King 
Khalid University, the Makkah-Medina high-speed rail link to a scheme to build 200 
schools in the Kingdom, (Drummond, 2010). Perhaps the most notable improvement 
of Saudi Arabia‘s many projects is the railway built to accommodate Hajj pilgrims 
which shuttled tens of thousands of people around the holy sites. As the modern, high-
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tech trains picked up and dropped off passengers, they created a newfound respect for 
Chinese-made products and Chinese-engineering prowess, (Wahab, 2010). Indeed, the 
state-of-the-art rail system is changing people‘s perceptions about the country. China 
has overnight become a nation to respect and emulate, (Ibid) (see Table 7.2.7 below). 
 
(Table 7.2.7): Chinese Major Contracts in Saudi Arabia 2004-2010 
 
Company US$ Year Place  Sector 
Sinopec 300 
millions 
March 
2004 
Rub‘ al Khali 
(Empty 
Quarter) 
Energy/Gas 
SINOMA 276 
millions 
May 2005 Muzamiyah Construction/Cement 
Sinopec 380 
millions 
September 
2005 
petrochemical 
refinery in 
Yanbu 
Chemicals 
China National 
Machinery 
Industry Corp 
(SINOMACH), 
and China 
Nonferrous Metal 
Industries (NFC) 
4 
billions 
April 2007 Jizan 
Economic City 
Metals/Aluminium 
China Petroleum 
Pipeline Bureau 
and China 
Petroleum 
Engineering and 
Construction  
 June 2007 360km 
pipeline oil 
from Saudi 
Arabia‘s to 
Fujairah.  
Construction/ pipeline 
Energy 
China‟s Guizhou 
Hongfu Industry 
& Commerce 
Development 
Company 
(Hongfu) 
350 
millions 
December 
2007 
Al-Jalamid 
mine 
Metals/ phosphate 
China Harbour 
Engineering 
Company 
443 
millions 
November 
2007 
Jeddah Construction/ 
container terminal at 
Jeddah Islamic Port 
Chalco 1,2 
billion 
November 
2007 
Binladin MMC Metals/Aluminium 
Guangdong 
Overseas 
Construction 
612 
millions 
July 2008 King Khalid 
University 
Real 
Estate/Construction 
China Railway 
Construction 
1,78 
billion 
February 
2009 
Makkah Transport/Rail 
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China Railway 15 
Bureau Group 
Corporation 
533 
millions 
July 2009 Saudi Arabia Construction/ 200 
school buildings 
China Civil 
Engineering 
Construction 
Corp 
720 
millions 
September 
2009 
Riyadh to Al-
Qassim 
Transport/Rail 
Sinopec 141 
millions 
January 
2010 
Wasea in 
Ritadh 
Construction /Energy 
distribution plant 
China‟s Sinoma 
International 
Engineering Co 
200 
millions 
May 2010 Hail  Construction/Cement 
China‟s Sepco III 
Electric Power 
Construction 
Corp (with 
partners) 
2.4 
billion 
September 
2010 
 
Ras Al Zour Water/power and 
desalination plant 
China Harbor 
Engineering 
Company 
85 
millions 
December 
2010 
 
Eastern 
Province 
Expansion of Ras Al-
Zour 
China‟s Sepco III 
Electric Power 
Construction 
Corp (with 
partners) 
1.0 
billion 
January 
2011 
Ras Al Zour supply power plant 
components 
Source: SAGIA, ARAMCO, Bloomberg, Reuters and MEED 
 
 
To put things in context, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, U.S. suppliers shunned the 
Kingdom, while Chinese and Asian firms rose in prominence. America‘s market share 
in Saudi trade declined from about 20 percent in 2000, (Allam, 2010), to around 14 
percent in 2010, (see Table 7.3.8). If the growth of trade between Saudi Arabia and 
China continues in future at this rate, China is very likely to become a top trade 
partner of Saudi Arabia. According to John Sfakianakis, Chief Economist at Riyadh-
based Banque Saudi Fransi, ―In absolute terms, the U.S. is the biggest trading partner 
with Saudi Arabia...But they are losing market share. Chinese companies are 
competing on all fronts‖,   (Carey, 2010), (see Table 7.3.8). 
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(Table 7.2.8): China and Saudi Arabia Trade with Main Partners (2010) 
 
The Major Trade Partners 
Saudi Arabia China 
Rank Partners (%) Rank Partners (%) 
1 EU27
a 
15.3% 1 EU27 17.0% 
2 United States 13.6% 2 United States 13.6% 
3 China 13.3% 3 Japan 10.5% 
4 Japan 12.7% 4 Hong Kong 8.1% 
5 South Korea 7.4% 5 South Korea 7.3% 
6 India 7.1% 6 Australia 3.1% 
7 Singapore 3.6% 7 Malaysia 2.6% 
8 Thailand 2.4% 8 Brazil 2.2% 
9 Brazil 1.8% 9 India 2.2% 
10 U.A.E 1.7% 10 Singapore 2.0% 
11 Indonesia 1.7% 11 Russia 2.0% 
12 Turkey 1.5% 12 Thailand 1.9% 
13 Bahrain 1.5% 13 Saudi Arabia 1.5% 
14 Pakistan  1.4% 14 Indonesia 1.5% 
15 South Africa 1.4% 15 Canada 1.3% 
Source: IMF (DoTS, May 2011)  
(a) European Union: 27 members. 
 
 
Despite this rapid growing trade between the two countries, if we exclude the 
importance of Saudi oil exports, the total volume of trade between Saudi Arabia and 
China constitute less than 1.5 percent of China‘s total foreign trade. On the other hand 
we find that the Saudi trade with China accounted for more than 13 percent of Saudi 
Arabia‘s total foreign trade. This trend indicates that Saudi Arabia could be the one 
who is courting the Chinese market, not the other way round (see Table 7.2.9). 
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(Table 7.2.9): China‟s Trade with the World and KSA (2002-2010, US$ billions) 
 
   2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
World Exports 
(trillion) 
325.6 0.438 0.593 0.762 0.969 1,22 1,43 1,20 1,54 
Imports 
(trillion) 
0.295 0.412. 561.2 660.0 791.5 956.1 1,13 1,00 1,41 
Total Trade 
(trillion) 
0.620 0.851 1,154 1,421 1,76 2,17 2,563 2,20 2,95 
Balance 
(billion)  
30.4 25.5 32.1 102.0 177.5 264.3 298.1 196.1 130.8 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Exports 
(billion) 
1,67 2,14 2,77 3,82 5,05 7,83 10,82 8,97 32.81 
Imports 
(billion) 
3,43 5,17 7,52 12,24 15,08 17,56 31,02 23,62 10.37 
Total Trade 
(billion) 
5,10 7,31 10,29 16,07 20,14 25,40 41,84 32,59 43.18 
Balance 
(billion) 
-1,76 -3,03 -4,75 -8,42 -
10,03 
-9,73 -20.2 -
14,65 
-
22,44 
Sources: UNCOMTRADE, (May, 2011) 
 
 
As for Chinese projects in Saudi Arabia, although their share is important, in China‘s 
overseas projects it is still small or less than 4 percent of the total volume and value. 
According to China‘s official statistics, the turnover of China‘s over 3000 overseas 
contracted projects reached US$92.2 billion in 2010, up by 18.7 percent year-on-year; 
and the value of newly-signed contracts was US$134.4 billion, up by 6.5 percent year-
on-year.  By the end of 2010, the accumulated turnover of China‘s foreign contracting 
projects amounted to US$435.6 billion with the contract value of US$699.4 billion, 
(Ministry of Commerce, January 28, 2011). Furthermore, by the end of 2010 over 
15,000 overseas enterprises were started up by Chinese state companies, according to 
data from the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the 
State Council (SASAC).  The total assets of those overseas enterprises exceeded US$ 
1 trillion, (Min, 2011) while the Chinese workers in Saudi Arabia represent about 2.4 
per cent of China‘s total workers abroad. By the end of 2010, the labour dispatched 
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overseas totalled 847,000, 69,000 more than that of 2009, (China‘s Ministry of 
Commerce, January 30, 2011).    
 
It is also important to point out that when analysing the composition of trade between 
China and Saudi Arabia, the large share of its trade is in small consumer goods, such 
as the ornaments, hammers, and clocks which typically sell for less than a few dollars, 
(Simpfendorfer, 2009: 155). In the table below, the Chinese exports do not contain 
sophisticated technology …their composition is similar to China‘s exports to most 
countries in the region. Its low-price products, including textiles, garments and toys, 
have a ready market among migrant workers and the low and middle income workers 
in Saudi Arabia, where they do not compete with local products as they do in Africa 
and some other Arab countries, (Gresh, 2010) (see Table 7.2.11). 
 
(Table 7.2.10): Saudi Arabia‟s Top 5 Products Imported from China (2001-2010)  
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
All Products (US$ 
billions) 
1,3 1,6 2,1 2,7 3,8 5,0 7,8 10,8 8,9 10,3 
In US$ millions 
Women‟s Suits, 
dresses, skirt etc & 
short, knit/croch 
53,8 83,8 134,2 136,5 134,8 99,3 330,7 345,1 350,4 453,1 
Electric 
Applications  for 
Line Telephony, 
Incl curr Line 
System 
8,1 5,5 10,1 60,5 59,9 61,7 191,7 442,9 562,6 447,7 
Other Furniture 
and Parts thereof 
17,7 35,5 58,5 73,5 103,4 152,9 176,7 264,1 333,6 337,9 
Automatic Data 
Processing 
Machines; Optical 
Reader, etc 
13,6 17,4 23,1 34,5 48,9 106,4 139,4 239,0 259,6 305,4 
Men‟s Suits, 
Jackets, Trousers 
etc & Shorts, 
Knit/Croch 
28,2 47,1 69,3 93,9 104,9 82,2 245,3 236,0 234,5 302,8 
Source: adapted from UNCOMTRADE, (May, 2011) 
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On the other hand, when analysing the composition of China‘s imports from Saudi 
Arabia, we will find that exports of oil, chemicals, and plastics account for almost 100 
percent of the total Saudi exports to China.  They represent about three quarters of the 
total trade volume between China and Saudi Arabia, evidence that the trade is based 
on oil. 
 
(Table 7.2.11): Saudi Arabia‟s Top 5 Products Exported to China  
 
(US$ billions, 2001-2010) 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
All Products 2,7 3,4 5,1 7,5 12,2 15,0 17,5 31,0 23,6 32,8 
Mineral Fuels, 
Oils, Distillation 
Products, etc 
1,9 2,4 3,7 5,4 9,2 11,8 13,6 26,4 19,3 25,8 
Organic 
Chemicals 
0,380 0,517 0,745 1,2 1,7 2,0 2,6 2,6 2,7 4,0 
Plastics and 
Articles thereof 
0,408 0,411 0,486 0,656 1,0 1,0 1,0 1,0 1,3 2,3 
Polymers of 
Propylene or of 
other Olefins, in 
primary forms 
0,028 0,069 0,083 O,078 0,148 0,165 0,163 0,276 0,439 0,911 
Cyclic 
Hydrocarbons 
0,051 0,071 0,130 0,265 0,251 0,267 0,266 0,355 0,541 0,757 
Source: adapted from UNCOMTRADE, (May, 2011) 
 
 
 
7.3 CROSS INVESTMENTS: LOOKING FOR OPPORTUNITIES  
 
 
In the last two decades, several factors have contributed to improving Saudi Arabia‘s 
investment environment. (a) The Saudi Government does realise the importance of 
diversification, as the Saudi economy remains heavily dependent on oil, which 
accounted for about 85 percent of its budgetary revenue in 2010 and around 31 
percent of its gross domestic product, leaving the Kingdom exposed to price volatility, 
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(Shamseddine, 2011). (b) The Kingdom‘s desire to join the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) since the late nineties. (c) The repercussions of 9/11 confirmed to Saudi 
leadership the urgent need for structural reforms to cope with external pressures and 
to address domestic problems. 
 
In this context, the Saudi Government started to lay the economic foundation to 
achieve economic liberalisation and diversification. On April 2000 the Saudi Arabian 
General Investment Authority (SAGIA) was created by the Saudi Government as part 
of measures geared towards formalising the process of economic liberalisation. 
SAGIA is responsible for managing the investment environment in the Kingdom. Its 
objective is to achieve rapid and sustainable economic growth by creating a pro-
business environment, providing comprehensive services to investors and fostering 
investment opportunities in key sectors of the economy, including energy, 
transportation, ICT and knowledge-based industries,  (SAGIA, 2010).  
 
Afterwards, in October 2002, the Saudi Ministry of Economy and Planning held a 
symposium to address the issue of Saudi development strategies. Through this 
symposium, Vision 2020 was developed which is an ―expression for the national 
development strategies of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia up to the year 2020‖, (Saudi 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 2010). In Vision 2020, the strategies were 
organised along five distinct themes (Ibid): (a) Economic diversification; (b) 
Development of human resources; c) Expansion of public services needed to support 
these objectives; (d) Promoting the expansion of the private sector as a key partner in 
the implementation of Vision 2020; (e) Streamlining and modernising the governance 
structures of the public sector to meet the challenges of implementation, (Ibid).   
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Two years later, one of King Abdullah‘s most ambitious plans, the 10x10 Program, 
was established in 2004. In the plan Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority 
seeks to establish Saudi Arabia as one of the world‘s ten most competitive countries 
by the year 2010. Three major initiatives have been implemented to help Saudi 
achieve its 10x10 target (Ibid):  (a) Establishment of a National Competitiveness 
Centre (NCC). The NCC is an independent body set up to monitor, assess and support 
competitiveness in Saudi Arabia. (b) Instrumental to this plan, six new economic 
mega-cities, four of which have been launched to encourage private-sector 
involvement, which will allow 100 percent foreign ownership. The objectives of the 
economic cities are to: promote balanced regional development, achieve economic 
diversification, create jobs and enhance competitiveness in Saudi Arabia. And (c) 
Sector opportunities: SAGIA is actively pursuing investment in the sectors where 
Saudi has a current or potential competitive advantage. These include energy, 
transport and knowledge-based industries, (Ibid). 
 
By joining the World Trade Organisation in December 2005, Saudi Arabia committed 
to opening up its economy through reform of its trade and investment policies as well 
as that of its regulatory structure – with the private sector as a key driver of economic 
development. Economic reforms have created many opportunities for foreigners 
seeking new trade and investment avenues. In addition, this development was coupled 
with the establishment of the Saudi National Competitiveness Centre (NCC) in 2006. 
Saudi Arabia became a developing country making the transition from selling its raw 
materials to a country selling processed goods. The initial outcomes were impressive: 
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1. Saudi Arabia was one of the top 10 most attractive countries in the world for 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in 2009 with inflows reaching US$36 billion, 
according to the World Investment Report (WIR 2010), (World Investment 
Report 2010: 4), ranking 12 on 2010 (see Table 7.3.1). 
2. Saudi Arabia‘s ranking in the World Bank report of Doing Business 2012 
jumped from to 67 in 2005, to 12 in 2011, (World Bank 2012: 6). Additionally, 
Saudi Arabia remained the regional leader with a global ease of doing business, 
ahead of the U.A.E., Bahrain, and Qatar. The report also ranks the Kingdom 
ahead of advanced economies, such as Canada, Japan, Germany, France, and 
Spain, (Ibid). 
3. Saudi Arabia has been ranked among the world‘s top 10 countries in terms of 
the least risky debt sovereign. According to the fourth quarter of 2010 
sovereign debt credit risk data by financial research firm CMA Vision, the 
Kingdom has a 5.2 percent chance of defaulting over the next five years - on 
par with Germany, (CMA Vision, January 7, 2011). 
 
(Table 7.3.1): World‟s Top 10 (FDI) Destinations in 2010 (US$ Billions) 
 
 Country FDI inflows  
1 United States 228 
2 China 106 
3 Hong Kong 69 
4 Belgium 62 
5 Brazil 48 
6 Germany 46 
7 UK 46 
8 Russia 41 
9 Singapore 39 
10 France 34 
11 Australia 32 
12 Saudi Arabia 28 
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report, (July 2011: 4) 
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Five years ago Chinese firms used to look solely for manufacturing in the Middle 
East. Now, though, they are increasingly seeking to take equity in the projects they 
help develop, or even be the principal developer. One example is the case of Chinese 
firms Sinomac and NFC, which are contracted to build two aluminium-processing 
plants in the south-eastern Saudi Arabian city of Jazan. Under the terms of the 
agreement, NFC will help raise funds for the project from Chinese banks. But NFC 
has entered into a partnership with a U.S. metal trading company in the hope of taking 
a 25 percent stake in the two plants, (O‘Neill, 2007). 
 
In recent years, Saudi Arabia has invited China to invest and assist in developing 
Saudi Arabia‘s massive infrastructure sector and China has shown some interest in 
doing so. When the Saudi Monarch visited China in 2006, King Abdullah invited 
Chinese businessmen to invest in Saudi Arabia and take advantage of the Kingdom‘s 
economic reforms and privatisation of some state-owned firms, (Pant, 2006: 45-52). 
With Chinese investments, Saudi Arabia hopes to improve its infrastructure which 
includes a wide range of investment opportunity encompassing gas, water 
desalination, power generation and railways, (Madsen, 2006). Outside of investments 
in Saudi Arabia‘s infrastructure, China has expressed interest in investing in certain 
industries within Saudi Arabia. China has already invested over US$4 billion in Saudi 
Arabia‘s refinery to produce alumina or aluminium oxide, (Amy, 2006). In March 
2009 Saudi Arabia also awarded a SR6.79 billion (US$1.8) railway infrastructure 
contract to a consortium including a unit of China Railway Construction Corp, 
contractors. The rail section will link Jeddah‘s airport to the cities of Makkah and 
Medina, home to Islam‘s holiest sites, (China Economic Review, December 14, 
2009). 
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China could be an essential partner in enhancing Saudi Arabia‘s national industrial 
strategy in the years to come. Doubling industrial contribution to 20 percent of GDP 
by 2020 is Saudi Arabia‘s goal, (Sfakianakis, 2011). Saudi Arabia is particularly 
eager to attract Chinese investments in its petrochemical industry. The Governor of 
SAGIA, Amr AL-Dabbagh, made it clear that Saudi Arabia intends to be a major 
player within the global petrochemical industry when he laid out Saudi Arabia‘s goal 
of: (a) Capturing 15 percent of the global plastic market by 2020; and (b) Increasing 
ethylene output, from 7 to 14 million tonnes by 2010, (Amy, 2006). Saudi Arabia is 
attempting to become one of the top three countries in this sector and has on 
numerous occasions‘ courted Chinese support to develop their petrochemical industry, 
(Ibid). AL-Dabbagh was confident that Saudi Arabia would reach its goals to the 
point that he stated: ―China should invest in Saudi Arabia‘s petrochemical sector or 
risk becoming a victim of the Gulf nation‘s aggressive bid to use its energy reserves 
to become an industry leader‖, (Ibid). 
 
From the Saudi perspective, China is an extremely attractive partner to solicit 
petrochemical investments from because it is an export-oriented country, and much of 
their exported goods use petrochemicals (i.e. plastics, fertilisers, detergents, resins). 
The greater the amount of Saudi petrochemicals the Chinese use to produce its export 
products, the greater the Saudi profits; therefore, as Chinese global exports grow, so 
too will Saudi profits. In AL-Dabbagh‘s words, Saudi Arabia needs an investor ―who 
could also push the product, and they (the Chinese) have markets that can take these 
products. They have the distribution channels‖, (Reuters, November 10, 2006). For 
the Chinese, it does make economic sense to invest in the Saudi petrochemical 
industry. It would be cheaper for Chinese companies to process petrochemicals in 
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Saudi Arabia and then ship to China rather than shipping the raw materials and 
resources to China and then processing petrochemicals there, (Ibid). Saudi Finance 
Minister Ibrahim Al-Asaf, for his part, said that Saudi Arabia hopes to see and will 
provide convenience for more Chinese enterprises to participate in Saudi economic 
construction as the country is speeding up its petrochemical industry, urban 
development, and traffic and environmental protection projects, (Xinhua, January 11, 
2010). 
 
Within this framework, China and Saudi Arabia are making capital investments in one 
another‘s markets. Often, these investments are targeted at improving the 
effectiveness of pre-existing trading relationships, or catalysing new ones. AL-
Dabbagh said that direct Chinese investment has helped to enhance the 
competitiveness of his company‘s mining projects, in turn bolstering the quantities of 
commodities the firm is able to export to China, (Ibid). While there has been limited 
Sino-Saudi cooperation in the petrochemical field (see Table 7.3.5), China has yet to 
substantially invest in Saudi‘s petrochemical industry, despite Saudi Arabia‘s 
aggressive efforts to solicit Chinese investments.  
 
Interestingly, Saudi companies have instead invested in Chinese petrochemical 
factories to gain a foothold in the Chinese economy. On November 10, 2006, Saudi 
Basic Industries Group (SABIC) stated that it intends to form a joint venture to build 
petrochemical facilities in China, (SABIC, November, 2006). Saudi Basic Industries 
Corp. (SABIC) and China Petroleum and Chemical Corp. (SINOPEC) announced in 
May 2010 the start-up of a commercial production at the newly constructed 
petrochemical complex in Tianjin, China, (SABIC, May 11, 2010). Mohamed al-
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Mady, SABIC‘s chief executive, said: ―SABIC‘s growth in China has no limits, 
especially when the Chinese market is currently the world‘s biggest for petrochemical 
products‖, (Reuters, December 6, 2009). Al-Mady also told the Financial Times that 
―China and Saudi Arabia are our most important markets,‘‘ (Allam, 2010). 
 
However, if the demand for Chinese goods and petrochemicals increases and the 
Chinese do determine that it would be more cost-efficient to produce petrochemicals 
in Saudi Arabia, great potential exists for Chinese investments in Saudi Arabia‘s 
petrochemical industry in the future. The Sino-Saudi relationship in this realm is 
mutually beneficial. While Chinese companies have an opportunity to profit from 
investing in various industrial projects, Saudi Arabia would also be benefiting from 
whatever Sino-Saudi economic arrangements it enters by receiving: (a) Chinese 
investments and technology for its industries, and/or (b) Chinese assistance in 
developing the necessary infrastructure that Saudi industries rely on to further grow 
and become competitive.  There is no doubts that the amount of Chinese investments 
into Saudi Arabia is projected to increase in the future as China and Saudi Arabia are 
studying a plan to establish a fund to promote investment between the two countries, 
(Ibid). It is also important to note that, despite the fact there is great potential in this 
realm for the Sino- Saudi relationship, other than the US$4 billion investment China 
made in Saudi Arabia‘s alumina or aluminium oxide refineries (and other two 
projects, see Table 7.3.5), there has not been much Sino-Saudi interaction as of yet.  
 
While each side is taking the first steps for the Sino-Saudi relationship to grow in this 
area there has not been any substantial investments, or mega-projects. According to 
figures cited by the Saudi Minister of Finance Ibrahim Al-Assaf, he pointed to the 
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weakness of the volume of joint projects between the two countries, where there are 
only 19 joint ventures, (Hamidi, 2010). Furthermore, Mohammed Ajlan, Vice 
President of Saudi-Chinese Business Council, told Asharq AL-Awsat newspaper on 
January 22, 2011 that: ―The volume of licences granted by Saudi Arabia to Chinese 
investments is US$ 8.5 billion, while the amount actually invested in the Kingdom 
doesn‘t exceed US$ 400 million. This figure is tiny compared with Chinese 
investments in other countries, (Ziani, 2010). In addition, Saudi Arabia‘s share of 
China‘s total global outward investment ―between‖ 2005 and 2010 was only 4.6 per 
cent and ranked in 8
th
 position (see Table 7.3.2). 
 
(Table 7.3.2): China‟s Outward Investment Destinations, (2005-2011) 
 
Non-Bond Transactions, From January 2005 to June 2011 
 Country U.S. billions (%) of Total  (a) 
1 Australia 38.4 14.6% 
2 U.S. 30.5 11.5% 
3 Brazil 18.3 6.9% 
4 Iran 17.1 6.5% 
5 Nigeria 15.3 5.8% 
6 Argentina 14.0 5.3% 
7 Indonesia 13.5 5.1% 
8 Saudi Arabia 12.2 4.6% 
9 Kazakhstan 11.5 4.3% 
10 Canada 10.4 3.9% 
11 Algeria 9.2 3.4% 
12 Russia 9.1 3.4% 
13 Britain 9.0 3.4% 
14 Switzerland 7.3 2.7% 
15 Vietnam 7.2 2.7% 
16 Singapore 7.0 2.6% 
17 South Africa 6.6 2.5% 
18 D.R Congo 6.6 2.5% 
19 Iraq 5.5 2.0% 
20 Greece 5.2 1.9% 
21 Others 9.1 3.4% 
Source: Adapter from Heritage Foundation, China Global Investment Tracker 2011 
(a) Percentages were calculated by the author 
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Meanwhile the Saudi direct investments in China are still small compared to the size 
of the economy and the amounts of the overall FDI in China. The biggest Saudi 
investments in China concentrate in the energy sector. Saudi Aramco has 25 percent 
in the US$ 5 billion refinery in China‘s Fujian province, while SABIC collaborated 
with Sinopec to build a petrochemical complex in the northern Chinese port city of 
Tianjin. Outside of the energy sector the Saudi investments are insignificant. 
Mohammed Ajlan, Vice President of Saudi-Chinese Business Council, noted that 
Saudi companies‘ investments in China are limited and estimated they are worth 
about US$8 billion, mostly in the petroleum and petrochemicals sectors.  According 
to the Chinese official figures, the Arab States‘ total investment in China was 
estimated at US$2.15 billion by mid-2010, mainly in the real estate, chemical and 
food sectors, (Ding, 2011) (see Table 7.3.2 and Table 7.3.3). 
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(Table 7.3.3): China and Saudi Arabia Cross FDI, (2002-2010) 
 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Economy FDI 
China Inward (US$ 
Billions) 
52,7 53,5 60,6 72,4 72,7 83,5 108,3 95,0 105,7 
Outward 
(US$ 
Billions) 
2,5 2,8 5,4 12,2 21,1 22,4 52,1 56,5 68.0 
To Saudi 
Arabia (US$ 
billions) 
0,001 0 0,001 0 1,1 1,4 1,3 1,6  
Saudi Share 
of China‟s 
Total 
Outward 
(%)
a 
0 0 0 0 5.1% 6.3% 2.5% 3.4%  
Saudi 
Arabia 
Inward (US$ 
billions) 
0,453 0,778 1.9 12,1 17,1 22,8 38,1 32,1 28,1 
Outward 
(US$ 
billions) 
2,02 0,473 0,079 6,6 5,3 12,7 1,4 6,5  
Saudi 
Utilized FDI 
into China 
(US$ 
millions) 
13,14 3,55 7,01 9,3 8,1 122,6 275,2 113,65  
China‟s 
Share of 
Saudi total 
Outward 
(%)
b 
0.5% 0.7% 8.8% 0.1% 0.1% 0.9% 18.9% 1.7%  
Source: UNCTAD, China‘s Ministry of Commerce and SAGIA 
(a) & (b) All percentages were calculated by the author 
 
 
Indeed, the U.S. is still Saudi Arabia‘s largest source of FDI in Saudi Arabia. In 2010, 
there were 357 U.S.-Saudi joint ventures with a value US$21.9 billion, (U.S.-Saudi 
Arabian Business Council, November 2010). U.S. Undersecretary for International 
Trade Affairs Francisco Sanchez noted that American investments represent more 
than 25 percent of all direct foreign investments in the Kingdom. Furthermore, a 
number of U.S. corporate giants, including Exxon Mobil, are seeking new joint 
ventures with Saudi Arabia, (Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabian Washington, 
December, 2010). Although China has increased its direct investments towards Saudi 
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Arabia since 2006, China is still ranked sixth, and its (FDI) represented only 4.6 
percent of the total FDI in Saudi Arabia, compared to U.S., which is in the first place 
(see Table 7.3.4 below). 
 
(Table 7.3.4): Top 10 Countries Investing in KSA 2009 (US$ millions) 
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Total FDI 
Inflows to 
KSA 
183 504 453 778 1,942 12,097 17,140 22,821 38,151 35,514 
USA FDI 
(US$) 
7 16 8 268 269 84 1,594 3,978 5,228 5,830 
(%) 
of 
Total
a 
3.8% 3.2% 1.7% 34.% 13.% 0.6% 9.2% 17.4% 13.7% 16.4% 
Kuwait 2 29 9 2 13 25 267 2,370 4,638 4,299 
UAE 1 5 1 10 846 5,015 -19 2,381 5,595 3,787 
France 8 5 16 28 2 2,057 2,053 1,136 3,022 2,558 
Japan 3 0 0 1 1 2,540 3,512 1,068 3,246 2,044 
China FDI 
(US$) 
0 0 1 0 1 0 1,100 1,428 1,323 1,665 
(%) 
of 
Total
b
  
0% 0% 0.0% 0% 0% 0% 6.4 % 6.2 % 3.4 % 4.6 % 
Netherlands 5 0 0 10 2 49 820 904 1,363 1,344 
Bahrain 3 0 2 42 116 445 789 593 1,681 1,095 
UK 1 2 36 4 68 147 636 444 998 886 
Jordan 17 27 34 32 42 73 557 384 841 818 
Source: Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA), (2010) 
(a) & (b) Percentages calculated by the author 
 
 
 
7.4 FACTORS COULD SLOW CHINA-SAUDI ECONOMIC EXPANSION  
 
 
Despite the surge in trade since 2000, experts note a slew of factors slowing 
expansion, comprising of mutual suspicions and a lack of developed business 
relationships. Further obstacles which remain also include trade disputes, language 
barriers, business attitudes, methods of dealing with the outside world, differences 
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between Saudi and Chinese laws as well as a lack of transparency in information and 
data on potential investment projects, (Ramady, 2006):  
 
(1) The absence of a database on the volume, types of investment and trade 
opportunities available to Chinese companies and/or the Saudi investors, 
(Elsidafy, 2009).  In addition, there is a significant shortfall in the numbers of 
the specialised companies which study and market opportunities.  
(2) While China provides Saudi producers with a lucrative market today, there is 
no guarantee that it will remain so in the longer term. This means that if 
China‘s growth slows down in the future — which most economists agree will 
happen, yet they do not know when — Saudi producers will face harder 
competition with Chinese firms in the Chinese market, (Yamada, 107). 
(3) The absence of direct communication could be a factor undermining China-
Saudi relationship going beyond energy. Unlike the West, there are very few 
Chinese experts in the Gulf. Very few Chinese companies have employees 
who speak Arabic, and vice versa, (Zhang, 2008). For example, businesses 
from either side do not always know what to expect when they venture into the 
other: some experts say going into the [Saudi] economic cities, Chinese 
companies‘ leaders will wonder who is in charge. Is it the Saudi companies? Is 
it the central government? Is it the regional government? When large amounts 
of money are on the table, these unknowns become very real business risks, 
(Teslik, 2008). Local companies are often able to work around these market 
eccentricities and skirt bureaucracy through connections, but it takes time to 
develop these relationships and to garner the trust that makes them work 
effectively, (Ibid). 
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(4) The perception that the Chinese companies lack advanced technology in 
comparison to western companies. Still China has a big sales job in persuading 
buyers that the qualities of their high-end products are just as high as that of its 
competitors. For example, Saudi tycoon Abdulrahman Abdullah Al Zamil told 
Forbes magazine: ―I received a very competitive price from China for [red-
brick making] machinery... Even though [the price] was 30 percent cheaper, 
my partners refused; they said we need German machinery. The Chinese are 
going to have difficulty changing minds‖, (Andelman, 2006). 
(5) Failure by Chinese companies which export products to Saudi Arabia to abide 
by standard specifications and quality levels, (Elsidafy, 2009). Faced with 
copycat and quality problems, many companies in China are struggling to 
shake off the ―made in China‖ stereotype. Abdul Rahman Al-Jeraisy, Vice 
President of the Council of Saudi Chambers of Commerce and Industry, 
expressed these Saudi concerns strongly: ―We are concerned about the quality 
of the imported goods to protect the Saudi consumers from fraud and 
counterfeit products‖, (Rasooldeen, 2010). While Saudi Minister of Finance 
Ibrahim Al-Assaf said that the obligation to ―quality and specifications‖ will 
be a key condition for boosting trade exchange between the two countries 
during the coming period, (Hamidi, 2011). In this context, there are also 
serious allegations against Chinese industries. In January 2011 the Chairman 
of the Saudi Consumer Protection Society (SCPS) warned that some products 
imported from China could contain cancerous materials, (Fakkar, 2011). This 
issue also worries the Chinese. During a visit to the Saudi capital on March 
2011, Qong Izeng, the Deputy Governor of Jajiang Chinese province, urged 
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local businessmen not to import counterfeit or poor quality goods from his 
country, saying that such products not only damage China‘s reputation but 
also result in huge losses for the Kingdom‘s economy, (Abdullah, 2011). 
(6) The obstacles of Chinese markets to Gulf commodities and goods, especially 
petrochemicals; China has accused Saudi Arabia in the past of dumping 
petrochemicals on its markets, (The Economist, 2010). China‘s ethylene 
producers may be hurt from imports from the Middle East that have a price 
advantage, (YarnsandFibers, 2010). Currently, China has 19 ethylene 
producers, mainly subsidiaries of Sinopec and PetroChina, China‘s largest 
refiners. In Middle Eastern countries, the production costs of such 
petrochemical products as ethylene, polyethylene and glycol is less than 30 
percent of most Chinese refineries, (Ibid). 
(7) Sectors such as mining, electrical power, transport, manufacturing, scientific 
research and telecoms are seen as ―vital industries in key sectors‖ by the 
Chinese government, limiting foreign investment in them. There are 
exceptions. A petrochemical is considered a strategic sector, but it is an area in 
which Saudi Arabia's technological level is higher than China‘s, (Ibid). 
(8) Many foreign companies (including the Chinese) in Saudi Arabia still 
complain of an unsatisfactory regulatory climate, requirements for maintaining 
large local bank balances, particularly in the case of foreign-owned trading 
companies, and ―Saudization‖ of the work force, as specific impediments to 
further growth and investment. 
(9) A rise in the cost of Chinese commodities in recent years, which has prompted 
Gulf consumers to obtain commodities and goods from Southeast Asia; and 
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the limited availability of airlines and shipping firms to carry goods from 
China on a regular basis.  
(10) The Chinese and Saudis do have another bone of contention: workers‘ 
unrest. Chinese workers on the Makkah underground damaged train carriages 
and smashed windows in protest against their low wages and poor working 
conditions in 45-degree heat (to the displeasure of the Saudi authorities), 
(Gresh, 2011). Slashing prices has a cost; a much-heralded project, a railway 
between Makkah and the holy sites of Mina and Mount Arafat, recently built 
by the Chinese, has ended in a row, with China Railways threatening to sue 
the Saudi authorities for the losses it has made on the investment, (The 
Economist, 2010). The project was a technical success, but the pressure 
Beijing exerted on its company to complete the project resulted in a US$600 
million loss for the firm, (Ramzy, 2011). Some firms would have been put off 
by the fact that non-Muslims are barred from working in Makkah, so China 
simply converted hundreds of railway workers to Islam. The project also ran 
into problems over the allocation of land, cost overruns, and even workers‘ 
riots, which rarely occur in Saudi Arabia, (Ibid). Other blunders have been 
sillier – a shop selling safes in the new China Mart only had catalogues and 
instructions in Chinese, (Gresh, 2011). 
(11) Rising numbers of trade disputes. According to the Economic and 
Commercial Counsellor‘s Office of the Embassy of the People‘s Republic of 
China in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the trade dispute cases claimed and 
coordinated in 2010 amounted to 84 with the sum of US$6,615,454. The cases 
claimed by Chinese companies are 9, and account for 10.71 percent, with the 
sum of US$515,776, accounting for 7.8 percent of the total. The cases claimed 
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by Saudi companies are 75, and account for 89.29 percent, with the sum of 
US$6,099,678, accounting for 92.2 percent of the total (Economic & 
Commercial Counsellor‘s Office of Chinese Embassy in Saudi Arabia, 
January 31, 2011). Complaints from Saudi companies to Chinese companies 
account for a big proportion. The main reasons of trade disputes are Internet 
shopping fraud, quality problems and breach of contracts, etc, (Ibid). 
(12) With the continued U.S. and international pressure on China to revalue 
its currency, there are increasing concerns among Saudi economists and 
traders that this step will make Chinese goods more expensive at a time of 
high rates of inflation in the Kingdom. 
(13) And finally, despite his optimism, Ben Simpfendorfer, who is a well-
known economist and expert in China and the Middle East, also injects a few 
notes of caution: politically, other parts of Asia have stronger Islamic ties with 
the Arab world than China does. Beijing must ensure that its ―Go out‖ policy 
of encouraging local firms to venture abroad does not swamp Arab markets 
with imported goods, destroying jobs and goodwill, (Wheatley, 2009). Ties are 
flourishing but have to be seriously stress-tested. Simpfendorfer concludes: ―It 
is still too early to judge the outcome...Tensions between the China growth 
model and Go Global are a useful reminder that relations between the Arab 
world and China are still delicately poised‖, (Ibid). 
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7.5 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has attempted to decipher Chinese intentions toward Saudi Arabia. The 
main question it attempted to address was whether Chinese actions were in 
accordance with the offensive realism model or economic interdependence school of 
thought. As stated earlier in the chapter, if China is acting in the realism model, it 
should be attempting to expand its power and influence in Saudi Arabia at every 
opportunity with the intent to undermine U.S. influence. This would include proactive 
actions to: (a) Provide Saudi Arabia with massive economic assistance and incentives 
to develop closer Sino-Saudi economic and political ties with the intent to reduce U.S. 
power and influence; and (b) Allocate huge investments in Saudi Arabia‘s economy to 
make it dependent on Chinese capital significantly. If China is acting in accordance 
with the economic interdependence model, it should be: (a) Interacting economically 
with Saudi Arabia in a manner which makes economic sense; and (b) Developing a 
Sino-Saudi political relationship based on furthering their economic interests and not 
based on degrading the U.S.-Saudi political relationship.  
 
This chapter has shown that Chinese intentions are more along the lines of the 
economic interdependence school of thought rather than the realism model. China 
views Saudi Arabia not only as a long-term energy source but also as an opportunity 
to further expand economically - not as a state that it wishes to wrestle away from 
U.S. power and influence. With respect to the Sino-Saudi economic relationship, 
China is primarily concerned with three things: (a) Securing Saudi Arabian energy 
sources in order to continue its economic growth over the long term; (b) Expanding its 
trade market in Saudi Arabia; and (c) Taking advantage of various investment 
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opportunities in Saudi Arabia. These three goals are all economic in nature and are 
not intended to undermine U.S. influence in the region. If China was acting in the 
realism model, it should be taking advantage of every opportunity to use its economic 
resources, even if its policies do not make economic sense, towards a political agenda 
of developing closer Sino-Saudi ties in a manner which decreases U.S. power and 
influence in Saudi Arabia. On the contrary, Chinese economic policies toward Saudi 
Arabia make economic sense and are not political in nature with respect to the 
international balance of power. China has not arbitrarily invested in Saudi Arabia with 
the sole purpose to develop closer Sino-Saudi ties. It is also interesting that China has 
not invested heavily in Saudi Arabia, despite the Kingdom‘s government desire for 
more Chinese investments. These actions are not consistent with a state that is 
aggressively trying to expand its power and influence in a region at the cost of the 
United States.  
 
As for future trade expectations, great potential exists for Sino-Saudi relations to 
expand substantially in the future. As was evident in the preceding chapters, China‘s 
needs for oil, petrochemical, plastic and aluminium will increase steadily in the future 
and Saudi Arabia will be a major player in providing China with those needs. Saudi 
Arabia is also pumping hundreds of US$ billions for the development of 
infrastructure, employment and housing projects and the Chinese companies will play 
an important role in the completion of these projects. Additionally, future initiatives to 
broaden China-Saudi trade links include the ongoing negotiations with regards to a 
Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between China and the GCC countries. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
OIL - THE BACKBONE OF GROWING TIES 
 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
A decade ago, China imported relatively little crude oil from Saudi Arabia; today, it is 
one of the top three markets and is the fastest growing international market, (Saudi 
ARAMCO Annual Review: 2010: 35). Currently, Asia accounts for about two thirds 
of Saudi crude oil, refined products and natural gas liquids exports, while China 
accounts for one fifth of the Saudi Arabia‘s Asian export market, (Dawnay, 2011). 
The bilateral relationship is also of growing importance; for nine years (2002-2010), 
Saudi Arabia has consistently been China‘s top oil provider. A reflection of the 
importance of China for Saudi Arabia came in May 2010. In the first time in its 
history, Saudi ARAMCO‘S Board of Directors met in China in 2010. The regular 
spring semi-annual meeting in Beijing on May 6-7 was a good occasion to celebrate 
the company‘s strong, multi-faceted and mutually beneficial relationship with China, 
(Saudi ARAMCO Annual Review: 2011: 5). 
 
This chapter‘s main aim is to decipher Chinese intentions toward Saudi Arabia. The 
main question it attempts to address is whether Chinese actions are in accordance with 
the realism model or economic interdependence school of thought. If China is acting 
in the realism model, it should be attempting to expand its power and influence in 
Saudi Arabia at every opportunity with the intent to undermine U.S. influence. This 
would include proactive actions to: (a) Provide Saudi Arabia with massive energy 
assistance to develop closer Sino-Saudi ties with the intent to reduce U.S. influence; 
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(b) Allocate huge investments in Saudi Arabia‘s energy sector to make it significantly 
dependent on Chinese capital; and (c) Import more Saudi oil to make the Kingdom 
more reliant on the Chinese market. If China is acting in accordance with the 
economic interdependence model, it should be: (a) Interacting economically with 
Saudi Arabia in a manner which makes financial sense; (b) Developing a Sino-Saudi 
oil relationship based on furthering their economic interests and not based on 
degrading the U.S.-Saudi political relationship; and (c) Working to diversify sources 
for oil suppliers without becoming more dependent on Saudi Arabia.  In this regard 
we will show the conditions under which high energy interdependence between China 
and the Middle East will lead to a pacific or belligerent China. If decision-makers‘ 
expectations of future trade are high they will likely pursue policies that will enhance 
security in the region. On the other hand, if they have a negative view of their future 
trading environment they will likely take action to protect their interests in the region. 
 
 
8.2 CHINA‟S OIL POLICY: EMERGING OF A RELIABLE PARTNER 
 
 
China is using its state-owned energy corporations to pursue a ―two imports and one 
export‖ strategy in the Middle East and North Africa Region (MENA).  The Chinese 
energy companies conclude long-term supply agreements for oil and gas (e.g. with 
Saudi Arabia, Iran, Oman, Sudan, Yemen, Libya, Kuwait, Qatar, and Algeria). At the 
same time, the region‘s financially powerful (and often higher-tech) energy 
companies (Saudi-ARAMCO above all) are encouraged to invest in the Chinese 
downstream sector. This strategy‘s export element is bound up with a direct 
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involvement of Chinese companies in the development of oil and gas fields as well as 
in the production of oil, (Steinhilber, 2006). For example, China‘s oil company, 
Sinopec, is committed to the exploration of natural gas in the Saudi region, while 
Saudi ARAMCO and SABIC have made significant investments in the development 
of the oil refinery and petrochemical infrastructure in China, (Mobrez, 2008). 
Furthermore, since the 1980s, China‘s relationship with Saudi Arabia has evolved 
from one centred around arms sales to one which ensures the supply of energy 
resources to support China‘s economic growth. China has made significant efforts to 
diversify its sources of oil, developing resources in Russia, Central Asia, Africa, and 
Latin America. However, for almost the last decade, Saudi Arabia has consistently 
been China‘s top oil provider and this is likely to continue for the foreseeable future 
(see Table 8.2.1 below). 
 
(Table 8.2.1) China-Saudi Arabia Energy Trade, (2002-2010, US$ billions) 
 
Selected Indicators 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
China 
Middle 
East 
Total 
Trade  
21,3 31,3 43,5 60,2 81,6 108,6 157,6 123,2 171,3 
Mineral 
Fuels, 
Oils, 
Distillation 
Products, 
etc   
7,2 11,3 17,1 25,2 34,1 39,2 68,6 45,8 68,7 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Total 
Trade  
5,1 7,3 10,2 16,07 20,1 25,4 41,8 32,5 43,1 
Mineral 
Fuels, 
Oils, 
Distillation 
products, 
etc  
2,4 3,7 5,4 9,2 11,8 13,6 26,40 19,3 25,8 
(%) Saudi 
of Total 
Middle 
East 
Trade 
23.9 23.3 23.4 26.6 24.6 23.3 26.5 26.3 25.1 
Source: UNCOMTRADE, (May, 2011) 
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China‘s oil imports from Saudi Arabia between 1990 and 1999 were small in terms of 
volume or value, as countries like Oman and Iran were China‘s top major oil partners 
during that period. China began limited crude oil imports in 1988, favouring low-
sulphur heavy waxy crudes from Indonesia and elsewhere which were similar to its 
domestic grades that were suited to China existing refineries, (Yamaguchi & others, 
2002). Indeed, Oman and Iran were the only two Middle Eastern countries which 
exported oil to China in 1989. Even in the 1990s, China‘s oil imports from the Middle 
East were mostly focused on Oman and Yemen, (Hongtu, 2010).  
 
As demand continued to grow, China itself became a net oil importer in 1993 and a 
net crude oil importer in 1996. In the period (1993-1998) China‘s main oil import 
partners were Oman, Yemen, Iran and others, (Ibid). For example, in 1995, Saudi 
Arabia was China‘s 25th largest exporter of oil but moved quickly to seventh place in 
1999, then occupied the fourth position in 2000, then later climbed to second place in 
2001. In 2002, Saudi Arabia became for the first time China‘s top supplier of oil 
(ARAMCO, June 23, 2008) and since then Saudi Arabia still dominates this position, 
(see Tables 8.2.2 and 8.2.3). 
 
(Table 8.2.2): Chinese Oil Imports 1992-1998 (selected countries thousand b/d)  
 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
China‟s total 227.2 313.4 247.0 341.8 452.4 709.4 546.4 
Oman 61.2 81.6 67.2 73.0 113.0 180.6 115.8 
Yemen 8.6 33.0 25.0 49.4 75.2 81.0 80.8 
Iran 2.2 1.3 1.3 18.6 46.2 55..0 72.4 
U.A.E 4.6 11.4 1.3 7.2 n/a 0.9 10.2 
Saudi Arabia 3.6 4.2 2.8 6.6 4.6 9.8 36.0 
Source: Derived from Chinese customs data and converted at 7.3 barrels per tonne. 
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In fact, the increase in China‘s oil imports from Saudi Arabia has occurred only 
during the past decade, especially after the Chinese president Jiang Zemin visited the 
Kingdom in 1999. China‘s oil imports from Saudi Arabia jumped dramatically in the 
last decade with about a quarter of China‘s crude imports now coming from the 
Kingdom, or about 1 million barrels a day compared with 455,000 barrels a day in 
2005, (Meyer, 2010), 228,744 barrels/day in 2002 (ARAMCO, June 23, 2008) and 
about 50,000 barrels a day in 1999 (see Table 8.2.3 below).  
 
(Table 8.2.3): China‟s Top Oil Suppliers, 1999-2010, (million tonsa) 
 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
China‟s 
Total  
36.6 70.2 60.2 69.4 91.1 122.8 127.1 145.2 163.2 178.8 203.7 239.3 
China‟s Top Oil Suppliers (b)  
Saudi 
Arabia 
2.4 5.7 8.7 11.3 15.1 17.2 22.1 23.8 26.3 36.3 41.8 44.6 
% of 
Total 
6.5 8.1 14.5 16.4 16.6 14.04 17.4 16.4 16.1 20.3 20.5 18.6 
Angola 2.8 8.6 3.7 5.7 10.1 16.2 17.4 23.4 24.9 29.8 32.1 39.4 
% of 
Total 
7.6 12.2 6.3 8.2 11.1 13.2 13.7 16.1 15.3 16.7 15.7 16.4 
Iran 3.9 7.0 10.8 10.6 12.3 13.2 14.2 16.7 20.5 21.3 23.1 21.3 
% of 
Total 
10.6 9.9 18.0 15.3 13.6 10.7 11.2 11.5 12.5 11.9 11.3 8.9 
Oman 5.02 15.6 8.1 8.04 9.2 16.3 10,.8 13.1 13.6 14.5 11.7 16.7 
% of 
Total 
13.7 22.1 13.5 11.6 10.1 13.3 8.5 9.0 8.3 8.1 5.7 7.0 
Russia 0.572 1.4 1.7 3.02 5.2 10.7 12.7 15.9 14.5 11.5 15.3 15.2 
% of 
Total 
1.5 1.9 2.8 4.3 5.7 8.7 9.9 10.9 8.8 6.4 7.5 6.3 
Sudan 0.266 3.3 4.9 6.4 6.2 5.7 6.6 4.8 10.3 10.4 12.1 12.5 
% of 
Total 
0.7 4.7 8.2 9.2 6.8 4.7 5.2 3.3 6.3 5.8 5.9 5.2 
Source: General Customs Administration of China, various years 
(a) One ton = 7.33 barrel 
(b) All percentages were calculated by the author 
 
 
China recognises the implications of Saudi dominance of the world energy markets, 
and has responded by increasing its economic, diplomatic, and cultural ties with the 
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Kingdom. China also needed to develop domestic capacity to process the cheaper 
higher-sulphur crudes of greater international availability. Acknowledging that its 
domestic oil industry is no longer capable of self-sufficiency, China has moved to 
modernise its refineries, expand domestic production of oil products, increase quality, 
and integrate its oil sector more extensively with the international industry, 
(Yamaguchi & others, 2002). According to David Kirsch, Director of Market 
Intelligence at PFC Energy in Washington, ―No single producer is really going to 
challenge the Saudi position in China in the long run…China is a key market and 
Saudi doesn‘t want to lose market share there. It doesn‘t want to lose out to Russia 
and Iran. And that is part of why they will continue to push for long-term refinery 
deals in China‖, (Webb, 2010). 
 
(Figure 8.2.1): Saudi Arabia the World‟s Top Oil Exporter (2010) 
 
Source: OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 2010/2011 
 
0.7 
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Saudi Arabia in its part recognises that energy demand is shifting from the developed 
world to the developing world, and China (Asia) is expected to account for much of 
the growing demand during the next 20 years, (Dittrick, 2010). Asia accounted for 
around two thirds of Saudi crude exports in 2010 and Saudi Arabia is the top crude oil 
supplier to China, the world‘s second-largest oil consumer, (Shamseddine, 2011). The 
growing importance of China and the wider Asian region to Saudi ARAMCO‘s and to 
the petroleum industry as a whole became evident when the company Board of 
Directors met abroad in May 2010 in Shanghai for the first time in its history, 
(ARAMCO, May 12, 2010). Indeed, Saudi Arabia‘s primary target is Asia.  China is 
the lynchpin of Saudi strategy and it has put considerable effort into building a 
strategic relationship, (Lidstone, 2009). With one of the world‘s most developed 
energy sectors in terms of infrastructure and operating efficiency, Saudi Arabia is not 
desperate to attract foreign investment to help expand its capacity to produce and 
export oil. Instead, Saudi Arabia is keen on identifying a stream of steady, long-term 
demand, an urgent priority as the United States and other western countries look to 
decrease their consumption of oil and incrementally adopt conservation methods and 
alternative fuels, (Alterman & Garver 2008: 58).  
 
While exports to the United States rebounded in 2010, in the long run the decline in 
American demand and the growing importance of China represent a fundamental shift 
in the geopolitics of oil, (Mouawad, 2010). ARAMCO‘s President Khalid AL-Falih 
agrees with that assessment: ―We believe this is a long-term transition…Demographic 
and economic trends are making it clear — the writing is on the wall. China is the 
growth market for petroleum‖, (Ibid).  Some international organisations also argue 
that China‘s oil consumption is projected to increase to 1.7 (mb/d) by 2015 and 7 
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(mb/d) day by 2030. China‘s and Asia‘s demand are projected to be met mainly from 
supplies from Saudi Arabia and the other Arab Gulf states, (Al-Naimi, 2009). Saudi 
Arabia‘s position as OPEC‘s top oil producer and holder of a fifth of the world‘s oil 
reserves also gives it the advantage over other producers when competing for new 
markets, (Reuters, February 19, 2010) (see Tables 8.2.4 below). 
 
(Table 8.2.4): World Oil Demand Outlook in the Reference Case (mb/d) 
 
 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 
North America 23.9 24.1 23.8 23.4 22.9 22.3 
Western Europe 14.5 14.2 14.0 13.7 13.3 12.9 
OECD Pacific 7.8 7.7 7.4 7.2 6.9 6.7 
OECD 46.1 46.0 45.2 44.2 43.1 41.9 
Latin America 5.2 5.7 6.0 6.3 6.6 6.8 
Middle East And Africa 3.4 3.7 4.0 4.4 4.7 5.1 
South Asia 4.0 4.8 5.8 6.8 8.0 9.2 
Southeast Asia 6.2 6.8 7.6 8.4 9.1 9.9 
China 8.9 11.6 13.8 15.6 17.1 18.4 
OPEC 8.1 9.2 9.9 10.7 11.6 12.5 
Russia 3.1 3.3 3.3 3.4 3.4 3.4 
World 86.8 92.9 97.8 102.0 105.8 109.7 
Source: World Oil Outlook 2011 
 
 
 
8.3 BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP: INTERDEPENDENCE AT WORK 
 
 
Saudi ARAMCO‘s President and CEO Khalid A. Al-Falih argues that: ―Some 
observers - particularly those outside of China and Saudi Arabia -  superficially see 
our bilateral relationship with China as a one-way flow of oil from our company to 
this country, and view our ties exclusively through the narrow lens of energy supply 
security.  Certainly that supply of petroleum is important, (Al-Falih, 2009). But 
viewed from the other side of the equation, security of supply can also be seen as 
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security of demand, and it is important to understand that we rely on China as a 
consumer as much as China looks to us as a producer.  This dynamic of mutual 
dependence will only become stronger as Saudi ARAMCO continues to invest in 
multi-billion dollar infrastructure and development projects, and as its level of crude 
oil exports to China continues to rise in the decades ahead, (Ibid). 
 
An early indication of that interdependence came after an oil cooperation agreement 
was signed in the late nineties, (Obaid, 2002: 30). Already, in 1998, China concluded 
a supply contract for 10 million tons of Saudi oil annually for a 50 year period, 
(Christie, 2010). Saudi ARAMCO also established a sales and marketing subsidiary 
office in Beijing in 1998, at a time when China‘s crude oil imports were small, (Wan, 
2009).  But China took a big step in 1999; Chinese President Jiang Zemin visited 
Saudi Arabia and signed an agreement with the Kingdom which in his words 
―inaugurated a strategic oil partnership.‖  This agreement set forth two things: (a) 
Saudi Arabia would open its domestic oil and gas markets to China with the exception 
of upstream oil exploration and production; and (b) China agreed to open its 
downstream sector to Saudi ARAMCO.  
 
The signed Memorandum of Understanding on Petroleum Cooperation between China 
and Saudi Arabia, (October 31, 1999), reveals energy dynamics of the new Sino-
Saudi relationship: ―Both sides agreed to facilitate investments in refining, 
petrochemical sectors and petroleum technical services cooperation in their respective 
countries‖, (Memorandum of Understanding on Petroleum Cooperation between the 
Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia). While this agreement was driven by mutual strategic benefits, it was 
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also catalysed by the need to resolve a major technical obstacle, (Lee & Dan, 2007). 
The growth in Chinese oil imports from Saudi Arabia has less to do with politics than 
with technicalities. Saudi oil tended to have too high a sulphur content for Chinese 
refining capability.  
 
The Chinese Government has turned the impediment into advantage, though, as it 
gives Beijing an opportunity to engage the Saudis not only politically but also 
economically, (Jin, 2005: 3-10). Both countries also engaged in talks to allow Saudi 
ARAMCO to expand the capacity of Sinopec‘s existing oil refining facilities and 
other petrochemical complexes in China to handle Saudi oil, (Wan, 2010). In addition 
to its highly sought after premium grade light sweet crude reserves, Saudi Arabia is 
keen on securing a market for its medium grade crude oil in China, as well as other 
parts of Asia, (Chris, 2010:6).  
 
Medium grade crude oil, while cheaper than its premium grade counterparts, is far 
denser and contains a higher amount of impurities and sulphur content compared to 
light sweet crude, meaning that it will yield less gasoline, diesel, and other finished 
products after what is a more complex refining process, (Ibid). In 2001 and after 
several years of negotiations, Saudi ARAMCO, ExxonMobil, and Fujian 
PetrocChemical took another step toward the ultimate completion of a 240,000 b/d 
upgrade of a major Fujian refinery by signing an agreement for a Joint Feasibility 
Study (JFS), (Obaid, 2002: 31), coupled with a new, large ethylene production 
facility, (Calabrese, 1998: 351-366). Abdulaziz F. Al-Khayyal, Senior Vice President 
of Saudi ARAMCO, said at that time: ―The signing of the JFS submission agreement 
marks a key milestone in the development of the Project and Saudi ARAMCO‘s 
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strategic partnership in China‖, (Obaid, 2002: 31). Moreover, China agreed to allow 
the partners in this deal to open and manage 600-700 gas stations in the province. In 
return, China received a 30-year supply contract for 30,000 per day of Saudi crude oil, 
(Ghafouri, 2009: 80-92). 
 
But the year of 2002 was a turning point, as since that year Saudi oil shipments to the 
U.S. have been declining while shipments have been increasing to China. Indeed, in 
2002, Saudi Arabia became China‘s leading source of oil imports, (Bajpaee, 2006). 
However, large scale Sino-Saudi cooperation in the energy field kicked off only in 
2003. As a result, Sinopec and Saudi ARAMCO began to collaborate on downstream 
projects in China, joining forces to build a refinery in Qingdao and to expand a 
petrochemical facility in Quanzhou, (Christie, 2010). China also needed to increase its 
domestic refining capacity to cope with the rise in imports from Saudi Arabia. To this 
end, Saudi ARAMCO, the U.S.‘ ExxonMobil Corporation and state-owned China 
Petroleum & Chemical Corporation (Sinopec) signed an agreement in 2007 to expand 
the capacity of the Quanzhou refinery in Fujian province, in the southeast of the 
country, (Mirza, 2009). 
 
In addition to purchasing energy from Saudi Arabia, China has expressed interest in 
entering into energy exploration contracts with Saudi Arabia. In March 2004, Sinopec 
signed a US$300 million gas exploration licence for nearly 40,000 square km in a 
north-western block of the Rub al-Khali gas fields, an area that Saudi Arabia has 
opened up to foreign firms for the first time in 25 years, (Jiang, 2007). In April 2006, 
China was awarded the contract to explore and produce natural gas in the Rub al-
Khali Basin in Saudi Arabia, (Fandy, 2005). Saudi ARAMCO also awarded three 
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contracts, worth a total US$300m, to the CNPC-led BGP Arabia consortium in 
November 2009. The contracts were to gather seismic data on new gas reserves in the 
Rub al-Khali and Red Sea, and oil reserves at the Manifa field, (Lidstone, 2009). 
 
Indeed, Saudi officials increasingly see the writing on the Great Wall: China will be 
their biggest oil market in the future, making it important to cultivate good relations 
with China. Ali Al-Naimi, the Minister of Petroleum of Saudi Arabia, argues that: 
―We view China as a strategic partner and seek to strengthen and enhance such 
partnership. Soon after assuming the throne, King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz 
underscored the importance of our relationship by making China the destination for 
his first state visit‖, (Al-Naimi, 2009). The visit by Saudi King Abdullah bin Abdul 
Aziz to China in January 2006 demonstrated the deepening ties between the world‘s 
fastest growing oil market and the world‘s biggest oil supplier, (Pant, 2008). During 
the Saudi king‘s visit, the two countries signed an agreement on oil, natural gas and 
mineral cooperation, in which Saudi Arabia promised to increase the annual oil and 
gas exports to China by 39 percent. As part of the agreement, a 100-million-ton crude 
oil storage facility was planned for construction in China‘s Hainan province, (Tu, 
2006).  
 
In the aspect of oil trade, with the signature of the ―Energy Cooperation Agreement‖ 
and ―Complementary Protocol‖ in 2008 and 2009, China‘s oil import from Saudi 
Arabia increased from 36.36 million tons in 2008 to 42.00 million tons in 2009, 
accounting for over 20 percent of the total volume of oil imported by China. Saudi 
Arabia has become one of the most important and stable overseas oil suppliers for 
China, (Yu, 2010). In addition, Saudi ARAMCO signed a memorandum of 
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understanding with China Petroleum and Chemical Corp., (Sinopec), under which, 
China would increase its imports from the Saudi producer up to 1 million barrels a 
day (50 million tonnes a year) by 2010, (Xinhua, November 13, 2009) and to 1.5 
million barrels per day by 2015, (ARAMCO, June 23, 2008). 
 
ARAMCO is also participating in oil processing and storage projects in Asia. These 
actions are to improve access to markets there amid the region‘s increasing 
consumption of fuel and crude. China may increase refining capacity by one-third to 
more than 12 million barrels a day by 2015 to feed economic growth, (EIA, 
November 2010). ARAMCO marked the completion of a project to expand refining 
capacity and integrate petrochemical production with an existing refinery in its first 
equity venture to China. Khalid Al-Falih Saudi, ARAMCO‘s President, told the 
audience at the Inauguration of the Fujian Refining & Ethylene Project, Quangang, 
Fujian Province, in China in November 2009 that: ―I view today as a moment to 
celebrate Saudi ARAMCO‘s thriving relationship with the wider Chinese energy 
sector.  Ten years ago, China imported relatively little crude oil from us; now, it is 
one of our top three markets, and is the fastest growing market for us globally.  At this 
moment, we are providing nearly a million barrels of crude oil to China each and 
every day, accounting for a quarter of this country‘s total imports and a sizable 
portion of its overall energy requirements‖, (Al-Falih, 2009). 
 
Saudi Arabia‘s ties to China are expanding beyond the crude oil trade and deepening 
in the area of refining operations. ARAMCO plans to ship 200,000 barrels per day 
(bpd) to Fujian after starting up in 2009. The Saudi company is also looking to invest 
in a second Chinese refinery, a 200,000 (bpd) plant in the eastern port of Qingdao, 
305 
 
(Reuters, February 19, 2010). Furthermore, China National Petroleum Corp, parent of 
Asia‘s largest oil and gas producer PetroChina, has signed an agreement with Saudi 
ARAMCO for further cooperation. The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was 
signed during a visit by CNPC‘s General Manager Jiang Jiemin to Saudi Arabia on 
December 18-21, 2010, (Hua & Miles, 2010). Additionally, Saudi ARAMCO Chief 
Executive Khalid al-Falih said in April 2011 that the company‘s daily refining 
capacity would soon grow 50 percent from its current level to more than 6 million 
barrels per day, (Al-Falih, 2011). That growth will be accomplished through two new 
refineries already under construction in Saudi Arabia and four more refineries are 
currently being considered, including one in the Kingdom along with joint venture 
refinery projects in China, Vietnam and Indonesia, (Ibid). 
 
In this context China and Saudi Arabia announced within one week of March 2011 in 
two separate MOUs that they will build two refineries; one in Saudi Arabia and 
another in China. Firstly, China Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec) signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on March 16, 2011 to jointly build a US$10-
billion Yanbu refinery on the Red Sea coast, a pact that further cements ties between 
the two energy giants, (ARAMCO, March 16, 2011). ARAMCO said it would hold a 
62.5 percent stake in the Red Sea Refining Co. which was formed to develop the 
400,000 barrels per day refinery in Yanbu, while Sinopec would own the remainder, 
(Ibid). The venture would be the first refining project the Chinese state oil major, 
parent of top Asian refiner Sinopec Corp, builds outside China. The Yanbu plan is 
expected to start operations in 2014 and accounts for just under a quarter of Saudi 
plans to add around 1.7 (mb/d) of refining capacity to the current 2.1 (m/b), (Ibid). 
China‘s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) has approved a 
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400,000 bbl/day refinery joint venture at Yanbu in Saudi Arabia between Sinopec and 
Saudi ARAMCO in June 2011, (Zhang, 2011). 
 
Secondly, just four days later ARAMCO and Sinopec announced ARAMCO 
Overseas Company B.V., a subsidiary of Saudi ARAMCO, and PetroChina Company 
Limited, a subsidiary of CNPC, signed on March 17, 2011, a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) related to the planned development of a 10 million metric tons 
per annum (200,000 barrels per day) grassroots full conversion refinery in Yunnan 
Province in the People‘s Republic of China. China National Petroleum Corp., the 
state-owned parent of PetroChina, said that the new refinery in Yunnan province will 
receive crude through a pipeline being built from the coast of Myanmar to China, 
(Said, 2011).  
 
Meanwhile, in July 2009, Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC), the world‘s 
largest chemicals producer by market value, was also given approval by the Chinese 
regulator, the National Development & Reform Commission (NDRC), to help 
develop a US$3bn petrochemicals complex at Tianjin (which became operational in 
2010), in the northeast of the country, (Mirza, 2009). SABIC will take a 50 percent 
stake in the project, with state-owned Sinopec holding the remaining 50 percent. Once 
completed, the plant will produce about 3.2 million tonnes a year (t/y) of 
petrochemicals, including the basic plastics polyethylene and polypropylene.  
 
According to SABIC CEO Mohamed Al-Mady: ―China is the world‘s biggest 
petrochemical market and is growing…We want to invest in more than one project in 
China‖, (Reuters, January 20, 2010). SABIC is particularly interested in tapping into 
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the Chinese automotive, aircraft and construction sectors, (Ibid). Indeed (SABIC), 
announced in May 2011 that it is planning a US$1 billion-plus facility in China with 
China Petroleum & Chemical Corp (Sinopec) to tap into the country‘s robust demand 
for plastics,  (Leung, 2011). The project in the eastern port city of Tianjin would have 
an annual capacity of 260,000 tonnes of polycarbonate and is expected to be 
operational by 2015, (SABIC, May 17, 2011) (see Table 8.3.1 below). 
 
(Table 8.3.1): Saudi Downstream Co‐operation with Chinese Partners 
 
Investors from Saudi 
Arabia 
Chinese 
partners 
Number of filling stations 
planned 
Location 
Saudi 
ARAMCO/ExxonMobil 
Sinopec 750 Fujian(China) 
Investors From Saudi 
Arabia 
 
Chinese 
partners 
Refinery Product Types 
and Crude Processing 
Capacity (Mt/y) 
Location 
Saudi ARAMCO/ 
ExxonMobil 
Sinopec Crude oil: 
12 Mt/y 
Ethylene: 0.8 
Polyethylene: 
0.8 
Quanzhou, Fujian 
(China) 
Saudi SABIC  Sinopec Ethylene: 1 
Polyethylene: 0.6 
Glycol: 0.4 
Tianjin (China) 
Saudi ARAMCO
a 
Sinopec 10 Mt/y Yunnan (China) 
Saudi ARAMCO
b
 Sinopec 20 Mt/y Yanbu /Red Sea 
(Saudi Arabia) 
Saudi SABIC
c 
Sinopec 260,000 Tonnes of 
Polycarbonate 
Tianjin (China) 
Source: IEA (February, 2011), ARAMCO (March, 2011) and SABIC (May, 2011) 
(a) & (b) Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed on March 2011 for both 
refineries 
(c) Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed on May 2011 
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8.4 OIL COOPERATION: DIVERSITY NOT DEPENDENCY 
 
Despite these growing relations, China-Saudi relations have been restricted to oil 
exports to China and limited cross-investment. Chinese NOCs‘ activities in Saudi 
Arabia are very much limited to engineering services, such as pipeline and well 
repair, seismic data collection, and natural gas projects, which involve higher risks 
and capital input, (Hongtu, 2010). Saudi Arabia does not allow Chinese companies (or 
any foreign companies) to invest in its upstream (exploration and production) oil 
sector, but it has allowed them to invest in the upstream gas sector.  
 
Saudi Arabia‘s tight restrictions on inward investment in the oil sector and the high 
degree of competence for Saudi ARAMCO are likely to limit the engagement of 
China‘s NOCs in the Kingdom, except in the gas sector, which to date has proved to 
be of little interest, (Andrews-Speed, 2009: 13-28). Likewise, the growth of Saudi 
ARAMCO‘s investments in China‘s refining industry will be constrained as long as 
China‘s domestic pricing policy for oil products is unfavourable to refiners, (Ibid). As 
Jon B. Alterman and John W. Carver describe in their book, ―The Vital Triangle: 
China, the United States and the Middle East‖, the relationship between China and 
Saudi Arabia, is simple ―uncomplicated by either country‘s sense of its global role or 
its global responsibility. Saudi Arabia has gas and oil; China needs gas and oil. On 
that basis, agreements were made between the China and Saudi Arabia‖, (Alterman & 
Garver, 2008: 1). Indeed the bulk of the trade between the two countries is of crude 
oil (see Table 8.4.1). 
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(Table 8.4.1): Share of Oil Products in China-Saudi Arabia Total Trade (2001-
2010; US$ in thousands) 
 
 Total Trade 
between 
China & 
Saudi Arabia 
China‟s 
Imports 
from Saudi 
Arabia 
Saudi 
Arabia‟s 
Imports 
from China 
Mineral 
Fuels, Oils, 
Distillation 
Products, etc 
Share of Mineral 
Fuels, oils, 
Distillation 
Products (of All 
Products %)
a 
2010 43,195,659 32,825,960 10,369,699 25,861,054 59.8% 
2009 32,598,096 23,620,244 8,977,852 19,351,188 58.04% 
2008 41,846,166 31,022,698 10,823,468 26,400,192 63.08% 
2007 25,400,435 17,560,476 7,839,959 13,644,629 53.7% 
2006 20,140,366 15,084,532 5,055,834 11,876,934 59% 
2005 16,070,130 12,245,715 3,824,415 9,284,592 57.7% 
2004 10,298,103 7,522,645 2,775,458 5,427,437 52.7% 
2003 7,319,125 5,172,322 2,146,803 3,763,615 51.4% 
2002 7,319,125 3,435,351 1,671,544 2,460,056 33.6% 
2001 4,070,010 2,715,895 1,354,115 1,910,992 46.9% 
Source: General Customs Administration of China and UNComtrade 
(a) Percentage calculated by the author 
 
 
While there is no denying that China and Saudi Arabia have extensive energy ties, it 
is clear that China is also attempting to limit its ties to Saudi Arabia. Despite Saudi 
Arabia having the largest proven oil reserve in the world, China has shown a desire to 
keep its oil sources diversified. China has made significant efforts to diversify its 
sources of oil, developing resources in Russia, Central Asia, Africa, Latin America 
and the Middle East. As Table 8.4.2 shows, in relation to oil sources, China has 
developed relations with many countries. 
 
China is also wary about becoming too reliant on Saudi oil and has attempted to 
diversify its domestic oil refineries. For example three major oil refining projects in 
the southern Chinese province of Guangdong are set to begin operations in 2011. 
These projects include two joint venture plants, including one between China 
Petroleum & Chemical Corp (CPCC) or Sinopec and Kuwait Petroleum Corp (KPC). 
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Another is the deal between PetroChina Co and Petroleos de Venezuela SA 
(PDVSA), (Su, 2011). The third project is the expansion of an existing refinery run by 
China National Offshore Oil Corp (CNOOC), the parent of Cnooc Ltd. Additionally, 
in September 2010 Russian oil company OAO Rosneft agreed to build a 260,000-
barrel-a-day refinery in Northern China in a joint venture with China National 
Petroleum Corp,  (Hall, 2011). The three oil refineries with foreign joint venture when 
completed will increase crude oil processing capacity by about one (mb/d), (Ibid).  
 
(Table 8.4.2): China‟s Oil Imports by Major Suppliers, 2001-2010, (US$ Billions) 
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
World  17,51 19,32 29,24 48,02 64,08 89,09 105,17 169,25 123,97 188,6 
Saudi Arabia  1,91 2,46 3,76 5,42 9,28 11,87 13,64 26,40 19,35 25.8 
Angola  0.721 1,08 2,20 4,71 6,57 10,93 12,87 22,35 14,61 22,7 
Iran  2,16 2,07 2,96 3,98 6,06 9,02 11,64 16,79 10,56 13,07 
Russia  0.008 1,28 2,09 4,18 6,554 9,46 9,35 11,94 9,38 12,7 
Oman  1,59 1,44 1,97 4,27 4,10 6,08 6,59 11,24 5,00 9,09 
Australia  0.279 0.488 0.785 1,13 1,11 1,39 1,70 1,72 6,43 8,03 
South Korea  1,92 1,32 1,94 3,21 3,50 5,81 6,53 9,94 5,48 7,8 
Indonesia  0.653 0.822 1,16 1,30 2,00 1,64 2,47 2,57 4,26 7,2 
Sudan  0.009 1,15 1,43 1,65 2,57 1,87 4,14 6,29 4,64 6,5 
Iraq  0.073 0,096 0 0,319 0.415 0.652 0.764 1,32 3,29 6,2 
Kazakhstan 0,098 0,170 0,248 0,393 0,590 1,33 3,22 4,32 2,81 5,7 
Kuwait  0.327 0.337 0.346 0.510 0.731 1,66 2,06 4,70 3,00 5,6 
Venezuela  0.009 0.052 0.327 0.271 0.712 2,34 2,57 5,78 3,71 5,5 
Singapore 0,780 1,01 1,54 2,29 2,20 2,50 1,84 4,32 2,90 4,6 
Libya  0.052 0 0.028 0.381 0.941 1,69 1,52 2,55 3,15 4,4 
Source: General Customs Administration of China, UNComtrade 
 
 
With respect to China‘s efforts to build strategic oil reserves, it has used a variety of 
methods to fill its reserves in the first and the second phases.  China‘s total strategic 
petroleum reserve capacity reached 24.38 million tonnes or 178 million barrels by the 
end of 2010, suggesting that 76 million barrels has been added to the project‘s second 
phase, (Bai, 2011). The filling of the first phase of 102 million barrels took 30 months 
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since the first batch of tanks were ready in October 2006. The prices for the crude oil 
stored in the first phase averaged at about US$58 a barrel, (Ibid). 
 
The Chinese do not seem to be placing much urgency on filling their oil reserves from 
Saudi Arabia for many reasons. Firstly, there is domestic and international concern as 
to the effects on oil prices should China decide to fill its strategic oil reserves at a 
rapid pace. Instead, China is taking a more patient approach by filling its strategic oil 
reserves gradually over many years. Secondly, China is unwilling to pay a high price 
for oil that will be used to fill its strategic oil reserves. Zhang Guobao, the Vice 
Minister of the Chinese State Development and Reform Commission, stated that: ―It 
would be a great financial risk for China to buy oil at the international market for its 
strategic reserve program as the current global oil price has been fluctuating at a high 
level‖, (Chen, 2006). China is content to wait until oil prices drop to what they 
consider an acceptable level prior to importing oil into their strategic oil reserves. In 
the meantime, China has filled its first strategic oil reserve using domestic oil instead 
of imported oil, (Ibid). China also may be looking to fill its strategic oil reserves with 
overseas oil assets which Chinese firms own stakes in, (Wang, 2006). 
 
Despite this, Saudi Arabia agreed with Beijing in 2006 to build a crude oil storage 
facility on Hainan Island, which has been selected to become a site for its state and 
commercial oil reserves, nothing has been decided upon what role, if any, the 
Kingdom will play in the project, (Pachymuthu & Topham, 2010). On the contrary, 
Saudi Arabia‘s Oil Minister Ali al-Naimi said in December 2009 that the Kingdom 
had accepted an offer to put ―millions of barrels‖ of crude oil in commercial storage 
in Japan, (Ibid). Indeed, in February 2011, Saudi ARAMCO agreed to lease storage 
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tanks from Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corp (JOGMEC) for the storage of 
Arabian crude oil at Japan‘s Okinawa storage facilities, (ARAMCO, February 9, 
2011).  
 
This is the second agreement for storage that ARAMCO reached with Japan as the 
company seeks greater access to Asia, its largest export market. ARAMCO had 
already agreed in June 2009 with Japan‘s Agency for Natural Resources and Energy 
to store another 3.8 million barrels of oil, also on Okinawa, (Anthony, 2011). The 
additional storage capacity gives ARAMCO a bigger cushion against disruptions to 
supply through the Strait of Hormuz, (Ibid).  The agreement allows for about 3.8 
million barrels of Arabian crude oil to be stored at the storage facilities initially, with 
the option of expanding storage in the future.  
 
Al Troner, President of Houston-based Asia Pacific Energy Consulting (APEC), 
argues that: ―The Saudis want a break bulk point and this is another way for them to 
get into China… Japan will act as a springboard...smaller tankers can be used to move 
the oil to smaller refineries in China located on the coast‖, (Ibid).  Meanwhile, David 
Kirsch, PFC Energy‘s Director of Market Intelligence Service, believes that: ―The 
Saudis have storage in what they know is a key market, and they‘d be able to get the 
oil to Japan or/and China in case of any disruptions‖ (Ibid). 
 
As for Saudi Arabia, despite its aggressive policy towards China, it has also shown a 
desire to keep its energy sources diversified. Saudi ARAMCO is the single largest 
supplier of oil to China, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and 
Philippine, (ARAMCO, 2010:.19). Geographical diversity is also a priority. 
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ARAMCO‘s energies have been increasingly directed outside the Kingdom in recent 
years, with more than a third of its refining capacity now based in other countries, 
(Lidstone, 2009). As well as the joint Chinese venture, the company is involved in 
four other refining and marketing ventures outside of the Kingdom: Motiva in the US; 
SsangYong Oil Refining in South Korea; Petron in the Philippines; and Motor Oil 
(Hellas) in Greece, (Ibid). 
 
(Table 8.4.3): Main Markets for Saudi Crude oil (2001-2010, US$ billions) 
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Position 
in 2010 
Japan 9,9 9,5 11,7 14,9 24,2 31,8 29,9 45,1 26,0 32,4 Top 
Supplier 
U.S. 13,0 13,0 18,2 20,8 26,3 31,5 35,2 55,3 22,1 31,1 3rd 
Supplier 
China 1,6 2,08 3,2 4,6 8,2 11,0 13,1 25,8 18,9 25,5 Top 
Supplier 
South 
Korea 
6,6 6,2 7,4 9,3 13,2 17,4 18,3 28,6 16,7 22,8 Top 
Supplier 
India 0,17 0,19 0,29 0,48 0,71 9,7 15,1 21,1 13,0 17,0 Top 
Supplier 
Taiwan 
(China) 
1,9 1,6 3,3 4,2 6,0 8,08 8,3 12,2 7,1 9,05 Top 
Supplier 
Singapore 3,8 3,5 3,5 5,0 8,3 8,6 8,0 13,6 7,2 8.9 Top 
Supplier
 
Thailand 1,1 0,999 1,4 1,9 3,5 3,7 3,9 6,4 3,4 4,8 2nd 
Supplier 
Pakistan   1,1 1,6 2,1 2,5 3,3 5,0 2,8 2,9 2nd 
Supplier
 
South 
Africa 
1,6 1,2 1,8 2,4 2,7 3,3 3,2 4,8 2,9 2,7 2nd 
Supplier 
Philippine 0.87 0.99 1,2 1,3 2,2 2,9 3,5 5,04 1,5 2.4 Top 
Supplier
 
Source: UNComtrade, (July, 2011) 
 
 
On the other hand there is no evidence to say that China is using advanced technology 
that is owned by Saudi ARAMCO to develop the production of energy within China. 
On the contrary, China is striving to get this technology from all over the world. 
Indeed, Chinese oil majors are set to accelerate their overseas buying spree in 
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unconventional oil and gas assets, with an eye on technology, the key to help shift 
China‘s reliance on coal to lower-carbon fuel over the next decade. Such technology 
will be critical for China to boost energy security and tap into its own potentially vast 
unconventional gas resources - part of the drive by the world‘s fastest-growing major 
economy to triple gas use - as Chinese firms lack the expertise, (Master, 2011). 
 
In that regard foreign upstream mergers and acquisitions (M&A) activity by China‘s 
national oil companies (NOCs) reached a staggering US$26bn in 2010 – up by 85 
percent on 2009‘s US$14bn almost none in Saudi Arabia. The 2010 figure 
represented 15 percent of global upstream deals, according to IHS Herold, a 
consultancy, (Petroleum Economist, February 2011). Fu Chengyu, General Manager 
of CNOOC, said recently that his company alone plans to spend as much as 
US$151bn by 2015 to boost production, (Ibid). The latest trend is that they are giving 
priority to the technology of developing unconventional reserves, such as tight gas, 
coal bed methane (CBM), shale gas and oil sands, as well as deep-water drilling.  
 
According to Peter Gastreich, Executive Director at UBS in Hong Kong: ―In the case 
of China, I don‘t think they are purely interested in becoming operators for the sake of 
additional resources…What they are really interested in now is more on the 
technology side with the aim of applying this expertise to China‖, (Master, 2011). 
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8.5 ENERGY IMPEDIMENTS & GEOPOLITICAL CONSTRAINTS 
 
As discussed above, China-Saudi relations have been restricted to oil exports to China 
and limited cross-investment; additionally there have been several hurdles and 
obstacles that may have slowed the pace of economic relations between China and 
Saudi Arabia. Firstly, energy is a very sensitive sector to both countries. To penetrate 
the upstream sector in the Middle East, China is facing some legislative obstacles and 
contractual hardships in such countries as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, where foreign 
investment in the oil upstream sector is not allowed, (Xu, 2002).  
 
Secondly, as the competition in the Chinese market intensifies, it is likely that the 
Chinese government will face stronger lobbying pressures from domestic producers to 
protect their products against imports. China has been known as a frequent user of 
anti-dumping tariffs since its accession to the WTO in 2001, and the majority of them 
were applied to petrochemical imports, (Yamada, 2011:108). 
 
Thirdly, the IEA has repeatedly said that China‘s oil demand forecasts aren‘t precise 
as Beijing doesn‘t publish figures on a key element which are needed to calculate this 
— the amount of oil it holds with regard to strategic and commercial reserves. (Wall 
Street Journal, February 10, 2011). China has held on to its oil inventories dearly, 
more than four years after the start of its first strategic crude reserve base in 2006, and 
is likely to guard them tighter as it accelerates building reserves. China treats stocks 
of other commodities from grain to metals as state secrets, (Chen, 2010). In a speech 
titled: ―A Pillar of Global Stability: Saudi Arabia‘s Petroleum Policy‖, (November 
2010) at James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy,  Saudi Prince Turki Al-Faisal 
called for countries like India and China to be transparent in reporting their energy 
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consumption as this would lead to a more efficient and stable global energy market. 
He went on to say, ―We must work together to make sure that all nations have the 
resources and incentives to publish accurate and valuable information on their energy 
supplies and uses‖, (AL-Faisal, November 11, 2010). 
 
Fourthly, Amy Myers, an energy expert at Rice University‘s James A Baker III 
Institute for Public Policy in Texas stated that China would likely improve the 
efficiency of its oil usage faster than experts had predicted, (Stanton, 2010).  If China 
implemented the types of energy efficiency improvements that western countries 
introduced during the 1970s oil crises, Myers believes, China‘s use of oil over the 
next two decades could be millions of barrels per day lower than originally forecast, 
(Ibid).  
 
Finally, industry experts say that differences on shouldering the financial risk are 
complicating the joint ventures in modernising the refinery in Quanzhou (China) and 
building Yanbu‘s new refinery (Saudi Arabia). In China, the government tightly 
regulates retail prices for petroleum products; Beijing reportedly does not want to 
share the financial risk with the Saudi side. In Saudi Arabia, the Chinese probably 
want assurances with regards to managing the risk properly, (Baxter, 2011). Finally, 
in every case, China is facing intensive competition in the Middle East when it bids 
for major projects. Chinese companies are at a disadvantage in competition for large 
projects, (Xu, 2002). One reason that Chinese companies like Sinopec have made 
little progress in getting more acreage in Saudi Arabia is because they lack the 
technical expertise the Kingdom requires. Saudi Arabia‘s oil fields are vast but many 
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of them are ageing, and it likely needs to find new ways to keep pumping oil from 
mature fields at high volumes, (Winning, 2009). 
 
Some of these obstacles gradually could be removed through regular contacts and 
visits by Saudi and Chinese investors. Indeed, the Council of Saudi Chambers called 
on investors in China for the need to increase their investments in Saudi Arabia via 
eight suggestions made by Saudi businessmen to their Chinese counterparts, at the 
meeting held in Riyadh, the Saudi capital, in October, 2010, (Council of Saudi 
Chambers, 2010).  
 
A number of Saudi businessmen, from the Saudi-Chinese Business Council, presented 
suggestions to strengthen trade between the two countries which included: (a) Urging 
Chinese companies within the Kingdom to cooperate with Saudi contracting 
companies in the implementation of projects assigned to it; (b) Supporting joint 
projects in promising industrial areas such as in the field of petrochemicals; (c) 
Establishing a direct air route between the two countries to facilitate the transportation 
of passengers and goods; (d) Reducing travel costs for small and medium-sized 
company sectors, (e) Establishing a factory for spare machine parts and equipment 
specifically for the manufacture of cement, (f) Urging the Chinese Government to 
encourage Chinese companies to make the Kingdom the regional hub for its 
businesses; (g) Discussing the establishment of a specialised institute to serve the 
cement industry and to provide personnel to operate it; and (h) Setting up a joint 
company in Saudi Arabia in which the majority would be Chinese employees, (Ibid). 
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Of course it‘s not just only economic in geopolitical terms there are also several 
factors which could also affect the Sino-Saudi relations: (1) Inside the Chinese 
Government there is no agreement among the policy makers to determine to what 
extent should China get involved in the Middle East; (2) A severe economic downturn 
in China leads to a decline in crude oil consumption and subsequently decreases the 
volume of imports of oil from Saudi Arabia or/and the Middle East. Although this 
scenario is unlikely, it is still a risk or as the Economist Intelligence Unit puts it: ―The 
risks associated with a downturn would be great both within China and abroad. 
Internationally, the main impact would likely be on commodity markets. Chinese 
demand, and assumptions that it will continue to rise rapidly, underpin current prices 
for oil, metals and a number of other commodities. If China‘s GDP slowed, 
commodity exporters, especially those in the developing world, would be badly 
affected‖, (Economist Intelligence Unit, June 16, 2011);  (3) Middle Eastern issues 
have been intertwined with many complex interests, many of which have to be looked 
into individually; and (4) Climate change could be a factor which could force China to 
rationalise its energy structure. It may consequently affect China‘s demand for oil 
imports from Saudi Arabia in the long term, (Zhang, 2009).   Finally, Ben 
Simpfendorfer offers a cautionary note: 
Given China‘s economic importance to the Gulf, the country‘s efforts to rebalance its 
economic model and control its inflation problems are crucial to the rest of the region. In 
effect, the country is attempting to reverse its growth model of the last 30 years: rather than 
rely on exports from wealthy coastal provinces to developed countries, China will increasingly 
rely on consumption by its poorer interior provinces. Clearly, the rise of China‘s interior 
provinces can have a significant impact on the country‘s consumption of consumer goods, 
housing and, importantly, oil. For sure, the interior provinces might be relatively poorer, but 
they are huge in size. They have a combined GDP of $2,900bn and population of 790m, 
figures that are significantly larger than the Gulf‘s combined GDP of $1,450bn and population 
of 170m, (Simpfendorfer, 2011). 
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(Table 8.5.1): Geopolitical Factors that could Constrain/Delay Energy 
Investment between China and Saudi Arabia 
 
 Description  Impacts Countries potentially 
demonstrating risk 
Depletion 
policies 
Policies to preserve resources 
over time. Choice to deplete 
resources more slowly in 
order to provide a wealth fund 
for future generations or 
simply through belief that in a 
context of rising prices, 
resources are worth more left 
in the ground for extraction in 
the future. 
Less willingness to 
supply export market; 
higher prices. 
Saudi Arabia; Kuwait; 
Mexico; Venezuela; 
Qatar. 
Resource 
nationalism 
Lack of access to reserves for 
IOCs and/or risk of 
appropriation. 
Reliance on NOCs often 
less technologically 
advanced leads to 
inefficient exploitation 
of resources; less supply 
to global market. 
Reserves inaccessible to 
IOCs: Saudi Arabia; 
Iran; Iraq; Kuwait; 
Mexico. Access 
restricted: UAE; 
Venezuela; Russia; 
Libya; Nigeria; 
Kazakhstan; Qatar; 
Algeria, Libya. 
Political 
instability 
and 
terrorism 
Military conflict or terrorist 
activity or popular revolt 
Acts as a deterrent to 
foreign investment 
and/or makes operations 
difficult. 
Nigeria; Algeria; Libya; 
Iraq; Iran; Saudi Arabia. 
The civil war in Yemen 
and its possible spill 
over into Saudi Arabia. 
Transit risks A dispute among supplier and 
transit nations prevents 
supplier‘s consumer 
obligations from being met. 
Transit routes in potential 
conflict zones. 
Supply shortages 
through political 
interference or physical 
infrastructure damage. 
Russia; Ukraine; 
Turkey; Georgia; Straits 
of Hormuz; Gulf of 
Aden; Malacca Straits; 
Suez Canal. 
Source: adapted from the UK Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) 
 
 
 
8.6 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has shown that Chinese intentions are better placed within the lines of 
the economic interdependence school of thought rather than the realism model. China 
views Saudi Arabia not only as a long-term energy source but also as an opportunity 
to further expand economically - not as a state that it wishes to wrestle away from 
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U.S. power and influence. With respect to the Sino-Saudi energy relationship, China 
is primarily concerned with three issues: (a) Securing Saudi Arabian energy sources in 
order to continue its economic growth over the long term; (b) Maintaining Saudi 
Arabia‘s continued role in providing diversification in Chinese energy sources; and 
(c) Taking advantage of various energy investment opportunities in Saudi Arabia. 
These three goals are all economic in nature and are not intended to undermine U.S. 
influence in the region.  
 
If China was acting in the realism model, it should be taking advantage of every 
opportunity to use its economic resources, even if its policies do not make economic 
sense, towards a political agenda of developing closer Sino-Saudi ties in a manner 
which decreases U.S. power and influence in Saudi Arabia. On the contrary, Chinese 
economic policies toward Saudi Arabia make economic sense and are not political in 
nature with respect to the international balance of power. China has not arbitrarily 
invested in Saudi Arabia with the sole purpose to develop closer Sino-Saudi ties. It 
has also shown an unwillingness to become overly reliant on Saudi oil or drawn to 
projects with financial risks. These actions are not consistent with a state that is 
aggressively pursuing to expand its power and influence in a region at the cost of the 
United States. 
 
As for future trade expectations, great potential exists for Sino-Saudi relations to 
expand substantially in the future. There is no doubt that the economic relations 
between China and Saudi Arabia will thrive, especially with the increase of China‘s 
dependence on oil from the Middle East and with China becoming the biggest market 
for Saudi oil in the coming years.  
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CHAPTER NINE 
CHINA-SAUDI MILITARY COOPERATION 
 
 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
China‘s arms sales to the Middle East range from small arms and ammunition to 
transfers of some advanced weapons systems. During the 1960s and early 1970s, 
China was particularly active in supplying revolutionary governments and 
movements, especially in Asia and Africa. However, from the mid-1970s, China 
diversified its recipients to include Israel and Saudi Arabia (neither had diplomatic 
relations with China at the time), Chile, Iran, Iraq, Myanmar, Oman, Sri Lanka, Syria 
and Thailand, (Medeiros & Gill, 2000). China was an important arms supplier to 
certain developing nations during the 1980s, through arms agreements with both sides 
during the Iran-Iraq war, (Grimmett, 2005). However, over the past thirty years, arms 
sales have generally declined in importance to China as a tool of influence, 
particularly as China‘s weapons systems became less competitive compared to the 
more sophisticated systems available from Western or Russian sources, (Office of the 
U.S. Secretary of Defence, 2010). 
 
The China-Saudi military cooperation was recently highlighted by an unprecedented 
visit (the first ever) by the People‘s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) at Jeddah Port in 
Saudi Arabia on November 27, 2010. While the exact purpose of the Jeddah port visit 
is uncertain, the motive behind the visit appears to be strategic, (Hsiao, 2010 
December). This chapter will examine the military affairs and technology transfers 
that China and Saudi Arabia have formed over the past three decades. The variety and 
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amount of Sino-Saudi arms sales will be examined. The case study attempts to 
decipher Chinese intentions towards Saudi Arabia.  
 
If China is acting in the offensive realism model, it should be attempting to expand its 
power and influence in Saudi Arabia at every opportunity with the intent to 
undermine U.S. hegemony by: (a) Selling Saudi Arabia sophisticated weapons and 
providing security assurances to make Saudi Arabia less dependent on the United 
States and more so on China; (b) Interacting militarily with Saudi Arabia regardless to 
the International Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
15
; and. 
(c) Providing Saudi Arabia with the technology and expertise to make it less 
dependent on the U.S.  
 
If China is acting in the economic interdependence theory, it should be: (a) Interacting 
militarily with Saudi Arabia in a economically profitable manner and not providing 
Saudi Arabia with massive amounts of advanced military hardware in order to make 
Saudi Arabia less reliant on the U.S. security assurances and arms sales; (b) 
interacting militarily with Saudi Arabia according to the International Treaty on the 
Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); and (c) Ensuring that the cooperation 
between China and Saudi Arabia regarding technology and science is conducted  in a 
manner to advance the economic relations between the two countries. As for future 
trade expectations, as the quality of Chinese weapons systems improves in the long 
run, the trend of western and Russian monopoly over the arms trade may reverse. 
 
 
                                                             
15 The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, also Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT or NNPT) is a treaty to limit the spread (proliferation) of nuclear weapons. The treaty came into 
force on 5 March 1970, and currently there are over 190 states party to the treaty. 
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9.2 CHINA AND THE ARMS MARKET  
 
China‘s diplomacy in the Middle East started to take advantage of the situation during 
the Iraq-Iran war between 1980 and1988 to use its arms trade within the region, (Zhu, 
2009). China became an important supplier of less expensive weaponry during that 
war in the 1980s. During that conflict China demonstrated that it was willing to 
provide arms to both combatants in quantity and without conditions, (Grimmett, 
2010). China also supplied long range missiles to several other countries in the region, 
including Saudi Arabia, in addition to ―Silkworm‖ anti-ship missiles to Iran. 
―Between‖ 1980 and 1990, China sold US$2.6 billion in conventional arms to Iraq 
alone, making it the world‘s fourth largest weapons supplier to the Third World - 
largely as the result of arms transfers to the Middle East. During the peak years (1986-
90) of its sales to its three primary Gulf customers (i.e., Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia), 
China earned an estimated US$3.9 billion, (Calabrese, 1992). 
 
By the mid-1990s, the Middle East was Beijing‘s largest and most lucrative weapons 
export market, accounting for over 50 percent of China‘s deliveries, (Medeiros & 
Gill, 2000). From 1992 through to 1999, the value of China‘s arms transfer 
agreements with developing nations averaged US$860 million annually, (Grimmett, 
2000). China‘s principal recipient in the Middle East was Iran, while substantially 
smaller amounts went to Israel (US$100 million), Libya (US$100 million), Saudi 
Arabia (US$800 million), and Iraq (US$200 million) , (Medeiros & Gill, 2000). Over 
the 1990s, China‘s customer base contracted significantly and shifted from the Middle 
East to Asia. Chinese arms exporters recruited a few new buyers for conventional 
weapons, relying mainly on modest transfers to traditional clients like Iran, Pakistan, 
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Myanmar (Burma), Sri Lanka, and a few African countries, (Ibid). China sells 
primarily to developing countries, where Beijing‘s low cost weapons are able to 
achieve market access, (Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defence, 2010). A significant 
portion of China‘s totals can be attributed to a significant contract with Pakistan, a 
key client, associated with the production of the J-17 fighter aircraft, (Ibid). 
 
During the 2000s Pakistan continues to be a key Chinese client attributable to the sale 
of frigates and jet aircraft to Pakistan, a client of long standing, (Grimmett, 2002). 
From 2003-2006, the value of China‘s arms transfer agreements with developing 
nations averaged about US$1.5 million annually, a figure inflated by very large 
agreements with Pakistan in 2005, (Grimmett, September 2011).  From 2007-2010, 
the value of China‘s arms transfer agreements with developing nations averaged over 
US$1.9 billion annually, (Ibid). In that period (2007-20010), China sold 
approximately US$8 billion worth of conventional weapons systems worldwide. 
China‘s arms agreement total in 2010 (US$900 million) was its lowest total since 
2003. Meanwhile Saudi Arabia has received almost nothing from China‘s military 
arms sales during the 2000s. (See Tables 9.2.1) 
 
(Table 9.2.1): Saudi Arabia‟s Arms Transfers Supplier 1995-2010 
 
New Arms Deliveries by Supplier, ((In Current Million US$; 0 = Less than US$ 50 
million) 
 1995-1998 1999-2002 2003-2006 2007-2010 1995-2010 
US 2,800 4,900 4,200 13,800 25,700 
Russia 0 0 0 0 0 
China 0 0 800 100 900 
Major W. European 300 1,500 10,000 13,800 25,600 
All Other European 1000 200 300 1,100 2,600 
All Others 0 0 100 100 200 
Total 4,100 6,600 15,400 28,900 55,000 
Source: Adapted from Grimmett, various editions 
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The total value of all arms transfer agreements with developing nations from 2003-
2010 was U$284.6 billion (in current dollars). Saudi Arabia alone accounted for 15.5 
percent of all developing-world arms-transfer agreements during these eight years, 
(Grimmett, 2011). Nearly 50 percent of foreign military sales signed between 2006 
and 2009 were with Middle Eastern countries. During that time, Saudi Arabia 
purchased about US$ 13 billion worth of American weapons, (Kimes, 2011). 
According to data published by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
(SIPRI), the Middle East spent US$111 billion on military expenditure in 2010, an 
increase of 2.5 per cent over 2009. The largest absolute rise in the region was by 
Saudi Arabia, (SIPRI, April 2011). 
 
Indeed, Saudi defence procurement spending for 2010 is estimated at US$ 19 billion, 
(Entous, 2011). A new industry analysis also concludes that military procurement by 
Middle Eastern states, primarily Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Iraq and 
Israel, is expected to grow by 14 percent over the next five years, (UPI, January 
2011).  Middle Eastern states are expected to spend US$123 billion on arms in that 
period. U.S. arms sales will account for most of all this, (UPI, February 2011). Most 
recently, Saudi Arabia has been the principal arms purchaser in the Middle East 
region. In the period from 2007-2010, Saudi Arabia‘s total arms agreements were 
valued at US$28.9 billion (in current dollars), (Grimmett, September 2011). Saudi 
Arabia was the leading developing world arms purchaser from 2003-2010, making 
arms transfer agreements totalling U$44.3 billion during these years (in current 
dollars), (Ibid). 
 
326 
 
Furthermore, according to SIPRI, the five biggest suppliers of major conventional 
weapons in 2006–10 were the United States, Russia, Germany, France and the United 
Kingdom (see figure 2 and table 1). The USA and Russia remained by far the largest 
exporters, accounting for 30 per cent and 23 per cent of all exports, respectively, 
(SIPRI, March 2011). The top five suppliers accounted for 75 per cent of all exports 
of major conventional weapons in 2006–10, compared with 80 per cent in 2001–2005, 
(Ibid). Indeed most Chinese weapons for export are less advanced and sophisticated 
than weaponry available from western suppliers or Russia. China was not a major 
supplier of arms during the last four decades and consequently, does not appear likely 
to be a key supplier of major conventional weapons in the world conventional arms 
market in the immediate future. On the contrary, China was a major arms recipient 
particularly from Russia, (See Figure 9.2.1 and Tables 9.2.3). 
 
(Table 9.2.2): The Five Largest Suppliers of Conventional Weapons, 1995–2010 
 
Supplier Share of 
Global Arms 
Exports (%) 
(2006-2010) 
Main Recipient 
(share of 
suppliers 
transfers, 
2006-2010) 
Share of 
Global Arms 
Exports (%) 
(2005-2009) 
Share of 
Global Arms 
Exports (%) 
(2000-2004) 
Share of 
Global Arms 
Exports (%) 
(1995-1999) 
USA 30 South Korea 
(14%) 
Australia (9%) 
UAE (8%) 
30 31 48 
Russia 23 India (33%) 
China (23%) 
Algeria (13%) 
23 32 13 
Germany 11 Greece (15%) 11 6 5 
France 7 Singapore 
(23%) 
8 8 11 
UK 4 USA (23%) 4 5 7 
Source: SIPRI Yearbook various issues and SIPRI Fact Sheet (March 2011) 
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9.2.1 US-Saudi Security Dimension 
 
In this context, Sino-Saudi military cooperation has been progressing slowly, because 
of Saudi Arabia‘s special security relations with America. Saudi Arabia is an 
important partner with whom the U.S. have an over seven-decade-long history of 
close political-military relations.
16
 Dating back to the Cold War, the United States has 
viewed the security of Saudi Arabia as part of its national interests. The United States 
followed through with its promise to protect the Saudi Kingdom in 1979 during the 
Iranian revolution, and in 1990 when Iraq invaded Kuwait; the United States sent its 
military to the region to protect the Saudi Kingdom and also to force Saddam Hussein 
to retreat from Kuwait. Furthermore, a U.S.-Saudi military partnership was 
demonstrated in the basing of U.S. fighters and surface-to-air missiles in Saudi Arabia 
between 1992 and 2003, which played a critical role in enforcing sanctions in Iraq. It 
also was demonstrated during the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, (Cordesman, 
November 2010). 
 
Despite the relations between Washington and Riyadh being badly damaged by the 
9/11 attacks and post U.S. invasion of Iraq (as discussed in earlier chapters), common 
strategic interests and pressures generated by the arms industry and the recession 
helped smooth differences, (Black, 2010). The U.S.-Saudi military relationship is 
longstanding and a centrepiece of the U.S.-Saudi political relationship. Furthermore, 
Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) expert 
Anthony Cordesman argues that: ―The U.S.-Saudi security cooperation is becoming 
                                                             
16 On February 14, 2011 the two countries marked the 66th anniversary of the historic meeting between 
H.M King Abdul Aziz Al-Saud and President Franklin D. Roosevelt aboard the U.S.S. Quincy in 
Egypt‘s Great Bitter Lake. Many of the issues discussed that day in 1945, such as U.S.-Saudi military 
cooperation and the Kingdom‘s prospects for economic development, still hold relevance today. 
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steadily more important as Iran expands its capabilities for asymmetric warfare in the 
Gulf, increases its long-range missile forces, and moves toward a capability to build 
and deploy nuclear weapons. The same is true of the enduring threat from terrorism, 
dealing with Iraq‘s weakness and uncertain political leadership, the problems of 
Yemen, and instability and piracy in the Red Sea area and Indian Ocean‖, 
(Cordesman, September 2010). 
 
Additionally, the then-U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and U.S. Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton wrote to Congress on November 12, 2010 to argue that: ―Saudi 
cooperation on counterterrorism issues is significant, and U.S. law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies continue to benefit from this relationship. Saudi Arabia played 
an integral role in helping the U.S. thwart the cargo package bomb plots of late 
(October 2010) emanating from Yemen, and we have publicly thanked the Saudis for 
this critical information sharing. The Saudi Government has also taken numerous 
regulatory and institutional steps to counter terrorist financing. Moreover, Saudi 
Arabia has been very involved in addressing regional Gulf security issues‖, (Gates 
and Clinton letter, 2010).  
 
The U.S.-Saudi defence relationship has been also a major outlet for American arms 
sales and defence supplies. Saudi Arabia is the biggest military spender in the Gulf. 
The U.S. Defence Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) has documented the history 
of arms sales to Saudi Arabia, (DSCA, 2011). From 1950 through to 2010, Saudi 
Arabia has purchased and received from the United States weapons, military 
equipment, and related services through Foreign Military Sales (FMS) worth over 
US$69.32 billion, (Ibid) and Foreign Military Construction Services (FMCS) worth 
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over $17.32 billion (figures in historical dollars), (Ibid). These figures represent 
approximately 18.7 percent of all U.S. FMS deliveries and about 83 percent of all 
FMCS deliveries made worldwide during this period, (Ibid). The largest single recent 
U.S. foreign military sale to Saudi Arabia between 1950-2010 was a US$9 billion 
contract for 72 F-15S fighter aircraft, (Christopher, 2011) (see Table 9.2.1.3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
330 
 
(Table 9.2.1.1): U.S. Arms Sales to Saudi Military, 1950-2010
a
  
 
Selected Indicators (US$ thousands) 
 Total Sales 
Agreements 
Total Sales 
Deliveries 
FMS 
Agreement 
FMS 
Deliveries 
FMCS 
Agreement 
FMCS   
Deliveries 
2010 2,490,284 1,679,545 2,081,074 1,587,402 409,210 92,143 
2009 3,295,751 1,750,010 2,862,225 1,715,752 433,526 34,259 
2008 6,306,101 911,285 6,264,101 894,733 42,000 16,553 
2007 1,712,830 1,051,156 1,657,662 1,013,788 55,168 37,367 
2006 805,944 1,031,807 805,944 977,675 - 54,132 
2005 735,833 1,012,974 735,833 981,232 - 31,743 
2004 1,843,465 1,243,168 1,790,332 1,223,121 53,133 20,047 
2003 676,670 1,064,279 649,618 1,007,629 27,052 56,649 
2002 861,321 1,356,298 861,321 1,265,441 - 90,857 
2001 665,373 1,990,567 665,373 1,875,852 - 114,715 
2000 687,839 2,045,418 638,472 1,967,593 49,367 77,825 
1999 828,360 4,443,098 781,362 4,354,650 46,999 88,449 
1998 2,257,598 4,631,704 1,987,710 4,283,205 269,887 348,499 
1997 521,538 4,476,122 521,538 4,439,368 - 36,754 
1996 1,129,523 3,517,945 1,115,523 3,468,894 14,000 49,051 
1995 434,406 4,044,856 434,406 3,936,895 - 107,961 
1994 1,501,315 2,589,828 1,495,464 2,498,537 5,851 91,291 
1993 10,616,039 3,481,117 10,488,331 3,359,984 127,708 121,134 
1992 875,107 2,564,120 871,107 2,347,794 4,000 216,326 
1991 9,055,096 3,013,918 8,700,365 2,740,530 354,732 273,388 
1990 6,941,955 1,137,016 6,385,290 873,923 556,665 263,093 
1989 1,096,440 963,332 1,096,440 616,731 - 346,602 
1988 1,575,809 1,297,228 1,557,141 937,582 18,668 359,646 
1987 627,903 3,072,918 627,903 2,830,371 - 242,546 
1986 633,348 2,742,906 627,348 2,195,879 6,000 547,027 
1985 3,178,392 2,255,847 2,261,522 1,354,731 916,871 901,117 
1984 2,873,404 3,570,374 2,511,735 2,099,562 361,668 1,470,812 
1983 732,615 5,804,087 716,211 3,650,917 16,404 2,153,170 
1982 3,877,359 3,849,632 3,813,819 2,074,036 63,540 1,775,596 
1981 1,841,171 2,839,176 963,771 1,347,579 877,400 1,491,597 
1980 4,193,512 2,577,816 2,554,409 1,119,901 1,639,103 1,457,916 
1979 5,974,209 2,440,508 5,118,847 940,394 855,361 1,500,114 
U.S. 
Total 
1950-
2010 
506,661,716 396,998,826 482,971,575 375,987,528 23,690,141 21,011,299 
U.S. 
Saudi 
Arabia 
1950-
2010 
100,031,371 86,653,175 81,568,397 69,326,609 18,462,974 
 
17,326,567 
Saudi 
Share of 
Total 
(%)
b 
%19.7 %21.8 %16.8 %18.4 %77.9 %82.4 
Source: adapted DSCA Historical Facts-book and Fiscal Year Series as of September 30, 
2010, (October 2011) 
(a) U.S. fiscal year begins on October 1 and ends on September 30  
(b) Percentages were calculated by the author 
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In addition, record oil revenues have allowed the Saudi Government to boost public 
spending on numerous security projects, including addressing concerns over 
terrorism, criminal cross-border activities, and national defence/internal security 
coordination. The Kingdom forecasts to procure SR53 billion (US$14 billion) worth 
of security systems and services over the next six years, (Wahab, March 2011). Saudi 
Arabia also increased its military expenditure by 2.7 percent in real terms, or 33 
percent of its total national budget, (SIPRI Yearbook 2010). Indeed, the Saudi defence 
budget swelled from US$24.9 billion in 2001 to US$41.3 billion in 2009, a 65 percent 
increase, (UPI, February 2011), to reach almost 45 billion in 2010 (see Table 9.2.1.2 
below). 
 
(Table. 9.2.1.2): Saudi Arabia‟s Military Expenditure, (2001–2010 in US$ bna) 
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
 
Expenditure
 25,1 21,9 22,1 24,6 29,6 33,8 38,9 38,2 39 ,2 45,2
 
(%) of GDP 11.5% 9.8% 8.7% 8.4% 8.0% 8.3% 9.2% 8.2% 9.4% 10.4 
(a) The figures for Saudi Arabia are for expenditure on defence and security. 
Source: SIPRI Yearbook 2010 and 2011 
 
 
This is resulting in tremendous market opportunities for U.S. defence and security 
companies.  Saudi Arabia maintains one of the world‘s fastest growing markets for 
safety and security solutions, equipment, and systems.  In that regard, according to a 
report revealed by the Washington Post published on January, 2010, the Obama 
Administration was quietly working with Saudi Arabia to speed up arms sales and 
rapidly upgrade defences for oil terminals and other key infrastructure in a bid to 
thwart future military attacks from  Iran, (Warrick, 2010). The expanded cooperation 
includes new U.S. agreements with Saudi Arabia to help establish a facilities-
protection force under the country‘s Interior Ministry to harden defences for oil 
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facilities, ports and water desalination plants, (Ibid). The new force will be used to 
deter attacks by Al-Qaeda, as well as possible strikes by Iran or Iranian-inspired 
extremist groups, (Ibid). The new force is expected to grow to at least 35,000 
members, trained and equipped by U.S. personnel and overseen by U.S. Central 
Command, (Burns, 2011). 
 
Most important of all, President Obama notified Congress on October 20, 2010, of the 
largest arms sales in American history to Saudi Arabia, including the proposed sale of 
fighter aircrafts, attack and utility helicopters, upgrades of existing Saudi fighter 
aircrafts, and related weaponry and services. If all options are exercised, the proposed 
sales may be worth over US$60 billion dollars over a period of ten to fifteen years, 
(Congressional Research Service R41556, 2011). The proposed sales include 84 new 
F-15SA fighter aircrafts, the upgrade of 70 F-15S fighter aircrafts, 70 new AH-64D 
Block III APACHE helicopters, and dozens of UH-60M BLACKHAWK and other 
helicopters. The Obama Administration hopes the proposed sales will help ―sustain 
long-term relationships to ensure continued U.S. influence for decades‖, (Ibid), or as 
the Economist put it:  
―…the package of sales would not only tilt the balance of conventional weaponry in the Gulf 
decisively against Iran, whose suspected bid to acquire atomic bombs frightens its Gulf 
neighbours as well as Israel and the West. It would signal the return to normal of America‘s 
tight, 70 year-long alliance with Saudi Arabia. This had frayed following the revelation that 
15 of the 19 hijackers who attacked American cities on September 11, 2001 were Saudi 
nationals. Fearing congressional opposition, Saudi Arabia had in recent years sought 
weaponry from other sources‖, (The Economist, September 15, 2010). 
 
The deal is unique and very significant for several reasons: (a) A package of U.S. 
arms worth more than US$60 billion for Saudi Arabia accounts for the largest single 
component of this military build-up; (b) The package provides a huge boost to the 
American defence industry, (Khalaf & Drummond, 2010); (c) The deal will prevent 
Saudi Arabia from pursuing other means (nuclear) of strengthening its security and 
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will lock Riyadh and Washington into a close military relationship for another two 
decades; (d) Arms purchases from the U.S. are central to  Saudi Arabia‘s strategy of 
asserting its military leadership in the Gulf and confronting Iranian influence; and (h) 
Totally offensive in nature, the package, with its attack planes, helicopters, and 
―bunker-buster‖ bombs, is clearly designed to deter Iran, (Teitelbaum, 2010).  
 
In addition, supporters of the arms deal argue that there are other strategic aspects to 
the deal: (1) U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia help sustain American influence in 
Riyadh; (2) From a U.S. viewpoint, these arms transfers are part of a new post–Iraq 
War security structure that can secure the flow of energy exports to the global 
economy, (Cordesman, September 2010).  Stepping up - or ―burden sharing‖, as 
military types like to call it - is the theory that arming allies with U.S. weapons will 
lighten the load for U.S. troops, (Kimes, 2011). Alexander Vershbow, the Assistant 
Secretary of Defence for International Security Affairs, argues that:  ―This is not 
solely about Iran…It‘s about helping the Saudis with their legitimate security needs ... 
they live in a dangerous neighbourhood and we are helping them preserve and protect 
their security…so it means we may have to station fewer forces on a continuing basis 
in the region‖, (Reuters, October  20, 2010); and (3) Others say arms sales are just one 
part of a complex dance the U.S. engages in with allies. Lawrence Korb, a senior 
fellow at the Center for American Progress and former assistant to the U.S. Secretary 
of Defence, points out that when the U.S. sells conventional arms to Saudi Arabia, for 
example, it deters the country from pursuing nuclear options, (Kimes, 2011). 
 
Since the September 11 attacks, Washington and Riyadh have each been hesitant to 
press the issue of major arms sales, fearing that congressional debate might prove too 
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bruising for the recovering bilateral relationship, (Oxford Analytica, 2010). The deal 
falls within the framework of a policy announced by President George W. Bush in 
July 2007, which intended to approve a large scale sale of arms to member states of 
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), (Yiftah, 2010). The then-U.S. Secretary of 
Defense Robert Gates and U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in their defence of 
the deal, after Members of Congress had written to the Obama‘s Administration on 
November 12, 2010, to raise ―concerns and pose a number of strategic questions 
about the impact such sales would have on the national security interests of the United 
States and our allies‖, argued that:    
―…This proposed sale will directly support U.S. interests by reinforcing our longstanding 
defense and security partnership with Saudi Arabia, enhancing Saudi Arabia‘s ability to deter 
and defend itself against terrorist groups and other regional threats, improving 
―interoperability‖17 with the U.S. military, and sending a strong message to all countries that 
the United States is committed to supporting the security of its key partners and allies in the 
Gulf and broader Middle East…We believe the proposed package promotes U.S. strategic and 
foreign policy interests, and it is a key component of our overall regional strategy. The United 
States is committed to deepening its bilateral and multilateral security relationships in the Gulf 
to enhance regional stability and security. A key component of our regional cooperation is 
enhancing the defensive capabilities of our Gulf partners‖, (Gates and Clinton letter, 2010). 
 
According to U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Political and Military Affairs 
Andrew Shapiro, ―This proposed sale has tremendous significance from a strategic 
regional perspective. It will reinforce our longstanding security partnership with Saudi 
Arabia…It will send a strong message to countries in the region that we are 
committed to support the security of our key partners and allies in the Arabian Gulf 
and broader Middle East. And it will enhance Saudi Arabia‘s ability to deter and 
defend against threats to its borders and to its oil infrastructure, which is critical to our 
economic interests‖, (Shapiro, 2010). 
 
                                                             
17 Refers to the U.S. military‘s capacity to coordinate attacks with Saudi Arabia 
335 
 
The Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) argues 
along similar lines in a recent report outlining how this arms deal would help advance 
U.S. national security interests. The report, titled ―The Saudi Arms Sale: Reinforcing 
a Strategic Partnership in the Gulf‖, argues that the United States shares critical 
strategic interests with the Saudis which ―shape the proposed Saudi arms sale.‖ These 
interests include addressing Iranian threats in the region, securing Gulf energy exports 
critical to the U.S. economy, and easing the U.S. defence burden in the region. The 
United States, the report states, needs allies who ―can fight effectively alongside the 
U.S., and that can ease the burden on the U.S. by defending themselves‖, (Cordesman, 
November 2010).  Most important of all, Cordesman argues ―in fact, strong U.S. 
security ties to Saudi Arabia offer Israel a far better alternative than Saudi Arabia 
turning to European or other suppliers and questioning U.S. support if it faces a crisis 
with Iran...They will also help ensure the U.S. strategic position in the region at a time 
when other powers like China are becoming key players in global energy, and when 
recycling ―petrodollars‖ is even more important than in the past‖, (Ibid). 
 
Within this context, the announcement of the sale was formalised in four separate 
notifications to Congress, representing various arms of the Saudi armed forces, (Ibid): 
The biggest, totalling US$29.4 billion includes the sale of 84 Boeing F-15 fighter 
aircraft and the upgrade of another 70 F-15s, as well as advanced missiles, night 
vision goggles and guided munitions. The other three packages, which total 
US$31.1bn, include 72 Blackhawk helicopters, 70 Apache attack helicopters and 
thousands of Hellfire missiles. Not included are a naval upgrade and missile defence, 
both currently under discussion and could add another US$30 billion. 
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1. The Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) was prepared to purchase 84 F-15SA aircraft, 1,100 
GBU-24 PAVEWAY III Laser Guided Bombs (2,000-lb.), and 1,000 GBU-31B V3 Joint 
Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) 2,000-lb. bombs, along with 193 LANTIRN navigation 
pods (3rd Generation-Tiger Eye), 170 APG-63 (v) 3 Active Electronically Scanned Array 
Radar (AESA) sets, Harpoon, HARM (anti-radar), and Sidewinder missiles. Also 
included are the upgrade of the existing RSAF fleet of 70 F-15S multi-role fighters to the 
F-15SA configuration, communication security, site surveys, trainers, simulators, 
publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, 
U.S. government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistical support services, 
and other related elements of logistical and program support. The estimated cost is 
US$29.432 billion, (DSCA, October 2010)  
2. The Royal Saudi Land Forces (RSLF) was to receive 24 AH-64D Block III Apache 
Longbow helicopters and associated missiles and electronics. Also included are trainers, 
simulators, generators, training munitions, design and construction, transportation, 
personnel training and training equipment, publications and technical documentation, 
U.S. government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services, and 
other related elements of program support. The estimated cost is US$3.3billion,  (DSCA, 
October 2010) 
3. The Saudi Arabian Royal Guard (SARG) signed up for 10 AH-64D Block III Apache 
Longbow helicopters with the requisite missiles and electronics. Also included are 
trainers, simulators, generators, training munitions, design and construction, 
transportation, tools and test equipment, ground- and air-based SATCOM and line-of-
sight communication equipment, personnel training and training equipment, publications 
and technical documentation, U.S. government and contractor engineering, technical, and 
logistics support services, and other related elements of program support. The estimated 
cost is $2.223 billion,  (DSCA, October 2010) 
4. The Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG)  components were 36 AH-64D Block III 
Apache helicopters, 72 UH-60M Blackhawk helicopters, 12 MD-530F light turbine 
reconnaissance helicopters, and 36 AH-6i light attack helicopters, along with missiles and 
electronics. Also included are trainers, simulators, generators, munitions, design and 
construction, transportation, wheeled vehicles and organisation equipment, tools and test 
equipment, communication equipment, spare and repair parts, support equipment, 
personnel training and training equipment, publications and technical documentation, 
U.S. government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services, and 
other related elements of program support. The estimated cost is $25.6 billion,  (DSCA, 
October 2010) 
 
Further to that deal the Defence Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a 
possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Saudi Arabia of 150 JAVELIN 
Guided Missiles and associated equipment, parts and logistical support for a complete 
package worth US$71 million, (DSCA, November 2010). Saudi Arabia will use the 
enhanced capability as a deterrent to regional threats and to strengthen its defence. 
Saudi Arabia currently does not have JAVELIN Anti-tank missiles in its inventory, 
but will have no difficulty absorbing these additional missiles, (Ibid). In May 2011 the 
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DSCA also notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale Order to the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for various night and thermal vision equipment, including 
parts and logistical support with an estimated cost of US$330 million, (DSCA, May 
2011). The proposed sale will augment Saudi Arabia‘s capability to meet current and 
future threats from potential adversaries during operations conducted at night and 
during low visibility conditions, (Ibid). 
 
Furthermore, in June 2011 the Defence Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) also 
notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Saudi 
Arabia of a variety of light armoured vehicles and associated equipment, parts, 
training and logistical support for an estimated cost of US$350 million, 404 CBU-
105D / B Sensor Fuzzed Weapons and associated equipment, parts, training and 
logistical support for an estimated cost of US$355 million and a variety of light 
armoured vehicles and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for 
an estimated cost of US$263million, (DSCA, June 2011). Additionally, in September 
2011, the DSCA notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia of Howitzers, radars, ammunition and associated 
equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of $886 million, 
(DSCA, September 2011). Cordesman summed up the Saudi-U.S. military 
cooperation with very interesting words: ―The U.S. can still count on some support 
from allies like Britain and France, but the fact remains that it will need it friends and 
allies in the Gulf even more. The same forces that have made the U.S. and Saudi 
Arabia key de facto partners in Gulf security will become even more important in the 
future‖, (Cordesman, 2010). 
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9.2.2 China-Saudi Military Cooperation 
 
Saudi Arabia and China began their relationship slowly, commencing with Chinese 
purchases of Saudi Arabian crude oil. In the 1980s, China supplied a total of some 
US$5 billion in military goods to Saudi Arabia, including in 1988 some 30-50 CSS-2 
intermediate-range surface-to-air missiles and 15 mobile launchers valued at US$3 
billion, (Cordesman, 1997). The unfavourable experience Saudi Arabia had with 
China in the CSS-2 missile system deal may also play a role in explaining the 
minimal Sino-Saudi military relations.  The downside to the CSS-2 missile system is 
twofold: (a) It is an extremely cumbersome system; and (b) The accuracy of the CSS-
2.  Although the Saudis have modified the CSS-2s to improve their accuracy, the 
missiles are still outdated and relatively inaccurate when compared to ballistic missile 
systems possessed by other countries, (Ibid). However, no publicly available evidence 
suggests that Riyadh is attempting to purchase new systems. China-Saudi cooperation 
in the defence sector actually decreased in the 1990s in the aftermath of the first Gulf 
War, with Saudi Arabia procuring much of its defence upgrades and replacements 
from the West. Chinese arms exports to Saudi Arabia likely did not exceed US$1.5-
2.0 billion throughout this decade, (Calabrese, 2004). Since Saudi Arabia took 
delivery of CSS intermediate-range ballistic missiles in 1988, there has been no 
documented evidence for transactions of a similar nature. Nor since then have there 
been credible reports of sales by China for significant quantities of conventional arms 
to Saudi Arabia, (Calabrese, 2005). 
 
Due to Saudi Arabia‘s relations with the United States, Sino-Saudi military relations 
have been very limited. In the mid-eighties China supplied Saudi Arabia with long-
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range missiles at the same time but not really much happened after that. Militarily, 
China‘s relations with Saudi Arabia remained as a buyer and seller relationship and 
did not move to strategic levels whereby China can place a greater control on the 
country security, (Sager, 2011). In this regard, Anthony Cordesman argues: ―Saudi 
Arabia has strong incentives to maintain its security cooperation with the United 
States and to build up its forces to deter and defend against Iran and other potential 
threats. It faces the same challenges and threats, it needs a strong ally, and it faces 
many of the same strategic uncertainties. Moreover, there is no credible regional 
alternative‖, (Cordesman, September 2010). Indeed, China does not have the same 
capability to project power globally as the United States does and therefore cannot 
provide the same security assurances against the international threats Saudi Arabia 
faces, particularly against Iran or/and the internal dangers of terrorism. Even if the 
Chinese had the capability to project power globally, the Saudis may question the 
reliability of China‘s security assurances due to the long relations China has with Iran.   
 
Additionally, the Saudis view China as a poor substitute for U.S. support against the 
other threats the Saudi Kingdom faces on the domestic front from terrorism 
(Calabrese, 2004), or from instability in Yemen. For example in 2009 during the 
Saudi military‘s two months‘ campaign against Yemeni Houthi rebels, the Kingdom 
turned to the U.S. for emergency provision of munitions, imagery and intelligence to 
assist them to operate with greater precision. According to a secret U.S. diplomatic 
cable sent in December 2009 and released by WikiLeaks, the U.S. Ambassador to 
Saudi Arabia, James B. Smith, acknowledged supplying Riyadh with ―stocks of 
ammunition for small weapons and artillery.‖ He would later approve using U.S. 
satellites to target the Yemeni rebels near Saudi Arabia‘s southern border, 
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(WikiLeaks, December 2010). In addition to the security assurances provided by the 
United States, Saudi Arabia also purchased a substantial amount of arms from the 
United States further expanding U.S.-Saudi military relations.  
 
Interestingly, China itself was the world‘s biggest arms importer over the past five 
years, with 9 percent of the total, followed by India, South Korea, the UAE and 
Greece, (Norton-Taylor, 2010). Saudi Arabia was the leading recipient of arms 
deliveries among developing world recipients in 2003-2010, receiving US$29.0 
billion in such deliveries. China ranked third in arms deliveries with US$13.2 billion. 
India ranked second with US$16.9 billion, (Grimmett, 2011).  According to 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute the major recipient countries for 
2006–2010 were India, China and South Korea. Asian and Middle Eastern countries 
are expected to remain among the world‘s largest importers, (SIPRI Yearbook 2011) 
(see Tables 9.2.2.1 & 9.2.2.2). 
 
(Table 9.2.2.1): Arms Deliveries/Transfer Agreements to/with Developing 
Nations, 2003-2010 
 
By the Leading Recipients (in millions of current U.S. dollars) 
 Arms Deliveries Transfer Agreements 
Rank  Recipient Value Recipient Value 
1 Saudi Arabia 29,000 Saudi Arabia 44,300 
2 India 16,900 India 38,100 
3 China 13,200 U.A.E 18,700 
4 Egypt 12,100 Egypt 14,400 
5 Israel 10,300 Pakistan 13,000 
6 U.A.E. 8,600 Venezuela 12,700 
7 Taiwan 8,300 South Korea 10,000 
8 Pakistan 7,600 Brazil 9,800 
9 South Korea 7,300 Algeria  8,700 
10 Algeria 4,500 Iraq 8,600 
Source: Grimmett, (September, 2011) 
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In addition, most Chinese weapons for export are less advanced and sophisticated 
than weaponry available from western suppliers or Russia. China, consequently, does 
not appear likely to be a key supplier of major conventional weapons in the 
developing world arms market in the immediate future (see Table 9.2.2.2 below). 
 
(Table 9.2.2.2): Arms Transfer Agreements or Deliveries to/with World  
 
2003-2010;  (in millions of current U.S. dollars , selected indicators) 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 TOTAL 
2003-
2010 
Arms Deliveries to the World 
World 
Total 
34,145 34,814 30,575 35,520 35,108 36,223 37,405 34,989 278,779 
U.S. 10,845 11,614 11,775 12,320 12,308 11,923 14,305 12,189 97,279 
(%) of 
Total 
31.76% 33.36% 38.51% 34.68% 35.06% 32.92% 38.24% 34.84% 34.89% 
China 800 900 1,100 1,500 2,000 1,900 1,700 2,200 12,100 
(%) of 
Total 
2.34% 2.59% 3.60% 4.22% 5.70% 5.25% 4.54% 6.29% 4.34% 
Arms Transfer Agreements with the World 
World 
Total 
31,386 41,775 46,294 57,268 60,794 66,917 64,175 40,355 408,964 
U.S. 14,286 12,375 12,594 15,468 23,894 36,717 22,275 21,255 158,864 
(%) of 
Total 
45.52% 29.62% 27.20% 27.01% 39.30% 54.87% 34.71% 52.67% 38.84% 
China 600 1,000 2,800 1,900 2,700 2,100 2,100 900 14,100 
(%) of 
Total 
1.91% 2.3% 6.05 3.32% 4.44% 3.!3% 3.27% 2.23% 3.44% 
Source: Adapted from (Grimmett, September 2011) 
(a) Major West European category includes France, United Kingdom, Germany and Italy 
 
 
Saudi Arabia has more recently preferred to limit the quantity and type of weapons it 
buys from China in order to maintain its close ties with the U.S., Saudi Arabia‘s 
largest arms provider, and China has done nothing to try and divert Saudi Arabia from 
this course, (Pant, 2008). The only reported deal was in 2007 which said China had 
signed a contract to provide Saudi Arabia with PLZ-45 155mm self-propelled 
howitzers for one battalion. This was the first time for the Saudi Arabian army to 
purchase Chinese-made weapons, (see Table 9.2.2.3). 
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(Table 9.2.2.3): The Suppliers of Major Suppliers to Saudi Arabia, (2005–2009) 
 
Recipient Supplier (a) 
China France Russia UK USA Others Total 
Saudi Arabia 6% 4% 0 42% 40% 8% 100% 
Gulf region 4% 21% 9% 5% 54% 7% 100% 
Source: SIPRI database 
(a) Figures are suppliers‘ percentage shares of each recipient‘s total volume of imports. 
 
 
(Table 9.2.2.4): China‟s Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia 1950-2010 
 
No. 
ordered 
Weapon 
designation 
Weapon 
description 
Year of 
order 
Year(s) of 
deliveries 
No. of 
produced 
50 DF-3/CSS-2 IRBM 1986 1987-1988 50 
54 PLZ-45 155mm Self-propelled 
gun 
2007 2008-2009 54 
Source: SIPRI database 
 
 
This lack of activity in the Sino-Saudi military relationship may be explained by the 
fact that the stability and preservation of the current Saudi Royal Family is in both 
Chinese and U.S. interests; (in particular due the recent instability in the Middle East), 
China is content with the strong U.S.-Saudi military relationship. The Chinese may 
view the situation as the United States being obligated to protect Chinese interests 
without China having to take an economic hit. In this light, China‘s behaviour would 
definitely be in line with the economic interdependence model. China is content with 
the status quo because it benefits and/or preserves Chinese economic interests and 
therefore will not take any actions which may change it. While the Sino-Saudi 
military relations has the potential to expand in the future (partially as a result of the 
growing Iranian threat and the Sino-Saudi security agreement signed in April 2006 
and October 2010), China and Saudi Arabia have yet to take the big step. 
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As for the future, there is potential for the Sino-Saudi military relationship to expand. 
However, Sino-Saudi relations are still in their infancy and it is still uncertain which 
precise direction they will take. It is unlikely, for example, that now or in the 
immediate future Saudi Arabia would seek to use China as a military alternative to the 
United States, (Financial Times, March 18, 2011). In this context many analysts argue 
that increased energy trade will not necessarily lead to growing political and military 
ties as is the case with India, Japan and South Korea. This relationship will be driven 
by energy considerations, at least in the foreseeable future. Indeed, China doesn‘t 
present a viable replacement for the U.S. role and has never claimed to be so.  
 
In this regard Andrew Shearer, Director of Studies at Australia‘s Lowy Institute for 
International Policy, argues that: ―Asia has been something of a bystander in the 
Middle East and importantly, in the case of China, an increasingly anxious 
bystander‖, (Critchlow, March 2011). Abdulaziz Sager, the Chairman of the Gulf 
Research Center based in Dubai-UAE, goes further to say: ―China will not have a 
significant role on the region security in the next twenty years because number one 
military deployment in the region is the western type, the majority of American and 
European position. And the Chinese always have a problem in communication, 
language in this part of the world and we see it in many aspects. Their primary 
interest is energy supply; they don‘t have this much political interest‖, (Moscow 
Times, February 24, 2011) 
 
Barak Barfi, a research fellow with the New America Foundation, argues that: ―The 
Chinese focus on economic interests and want regional stability, but are willing to do 
very little to ensure it‖, (Critchlow, March 2011).  Indeed, the United States spends 
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around US$50 billion per year to protect the free flow of oil from the Arabian Gulf to 
the global economy, (Yetiv, April 2011). China, by comparison, spends virtually 
nothing on Gulf security, while pursuing its strategy of building political and 
economic relations with oil-rich countries in order to secure oil for its growing 
economy. This is nowhere more apparent than in China‘s relationship with Saudi 
Arabia, the world‘s biggest oil power, (Ibid). In this light, China‘s action would 
definitely be in line with the economic interdependence model. 
 
Additionally, with recent developments in the Arab World, Saudi Arabia remains 
fearful of the ability of Iran to destabilise the Saudi regime. Security and stability of 
the Saudi regime remains of the utmost importance and, in that regard, U.S. military 
might in the Gulf is the House of Saud‘s final guarantor. Here China still lags far 
behind America, which remains the Saudis‘ military mainstay. In this context, John 
Garver, a professor at the Georgia Institute of Technology in Atlanta-U.S., argues 
that: ―Middle Eastern authoritarian regimes that survive the upheaval -- especially 
Saudi Arabia -- may well look upon China as a more reliable supporter than the 
U.S…But the problem is that China is simply not prepared, materially or 
psychologically, to meet the security needs of those countries‖, (Buckley, March 
2011). The presence of American troops in the Gulf, though no longer on Saudi soil, 
reassures the Saudis - and China, since it can bank on America‘s presence, (The 
Economist, December 2010). 
 
However, the Saudis are still keeping their options open. The overwhelming uprisings 
that swept the Arab countries in 2011 and resulted in overthrowing some Arab leaders 
made Saudi Arabia angry at the American reactions and the way they abandoned 
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Egypt‘s Mubarak. This could have very serious implications in the long term. It might 
make the Saudi Royal family more cautious in foreign policy. In that regard, China 
and Saudi Arabia also signed several security agreements, although the details of the 
agreements have not yet been released. During the Chinese President Jintao Hu‘s visit 
to Saudi Arabia in April 2006 the two sides signed a security cooperation agreement 
and a contract for some defence systems.
18
 China and Saudi Arabia also on October 
11, 2010 have agreed to set up a joint security commission, (AFP, October 11, 2010). 
Chinese Public Security Minister Meng Jianzhu and his counterpart Saudi Interior 
Minister Prince Nayef bin Abdul Aziz signed a letter of intent on security training and 
exchanges. They also agreed to form a joint body of ―high-level security officials‖ to 
boost cooperation in the field, (Ibid).  
 
In summary, China and Saudi Arabia have not had close military relations. There are 
two primary reasons for this: (a) The United States has provided Saudi Arabia with 
advanced military equipment to strengthen the Saudi military and National Guard 
against foreign and domestic threats; and (b) The U.S. has provided security 
assurances to Saudi Arabia that China cannot provide. While U.S. military might has 
long offered the capability to protect Saudi Arabia‘s vast energy resources, links 
between the leading oil exporter and China are chiefly commercial. More than ever, 
as a revolutionary tide has swept away entrenched Arab leaders and rocked the oil-
producing Middle East to its core, Saudi Arabia could need powerful back-up, 
(Laessing & Lewis, 2011).  
 
                                                             
18 For example see, in Arabic: ―The Kingdom and China are Signing Agreements for Security and 
Defence Cooperation and a Memorandum of Understanding for the Advancement of Trade,‖ Al-
Riyadh, Apr 23, 2006, Issue 13817, available on: 
[http://www.alriyadh.com/2006/04/23/article148704.html.], (accessed on September 9, 2007) 
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9.3 SAUDI ARABIA NUCLEAR OPTION 
 
Speculation about the Kingdom‘s potential interest in acquiring nuclear weapons goes 
back to the 1980s. Saudi Arabia originally signed the NPT in 1988 to address 
concerns that it wanted to arm its newly Chinese acquired DF-3 (CSS-2) intermediate 
range ballistic missiles (IRBM) with nuclear warheads. Many experts noted that Saudi 
Arabia‘s commitment to nuclear non-proliferation has not resulted in a safeguards 
agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency for more stringent 
inspections of nuclear-related facilities. Moreover, the Saudis refused to sign the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Such resistance may be further 
evidence that Saudi Arabia is seeking to keep its options open regarding future 
nuclear weapons development, (Feldman, 2004). In this context, four major issues 
could alter the Saudi‘s proliferation calculus in the future, making it more likely that 
Saudi Arabia would decide to acquire nuclear weapons. According to Russell, the 
Saudis ―already have in place a foundation for building a nuclear weapons deterrent‖, 
(Reuters, 2004). 
 
Firstly, deterioration of the U.S.-Saudi relationship could cause Saudi Arabia to 
consider nuclear proliferation to deter foreign aggression independently of U.S. 
security assurances. This scenario would only be likely if Saudi leaders completely 
lost confidence in the U.S. promise of protection during crises. Michael Freund 
argued recently in the Israeli newspaper Jerusalem post, that: ―The lack of American 
will to confront the ayatollahs and stop them in their tracks has given various Arab 
leaders plenty of incentive, as well as a good excuse, to proceed down the nuclear trail 
... If the Iranians aren‘t stopped, and soon, we may wake up a few years from now to 
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discover that Saudi Arabia and other unfriendly regimes have decided to upgrade their 
‗civilian‘ nuclear programs into weapons-making industries‖, (Freund, 2010). While 
Luft goes further to say that Saudi Arabia could break its military dependence on the 
U.S. either by entering into an alliance with some other existing nuclear power or by 
acquiring its own nuclear capability. In either case, China would play a crucial role, 
(Luft, 2004). 
 
Secondly, many analysts in Washington and the Middle East assume that in the event 
of a nuclear breakout by Iran, Saudi Arabia would feel compelled to build or acquire 
its own nuclear arsenal. Given Saudi Arabia‘s vast wealth and strategic weakness, 
such a decision might seem logical, (Lippman, 2008). Riyadh‘s view that the Iranian 
threat is serious and immediate was recently expressed by Saudi Foreign Minister 
Saud al-Faisal: ―Sanctions are a long-term solution ... But we are looking at an Iranian 
nuclear program within a shorter term because we are closer to the locus of the threat. 
We are interested in immediate rather than in gradual solutions‖, (Burns, 2010). 
Diplomatic cables obtained by WikiLeaks and published recently by the Guardian 
newspaper revealed that Saudi King Abdullah had privately warned Washington in 
2008 that if Iran developed nuclear weapons ―everyone in the region would do the 
same, including Saudi Arabia‖, (The Guardian, June 29, 2011). Whether Saudi Arabia 
relied on its emerging nuclear power program to manufacture nuclear weapons (which 
would take approximately a decade), or simply bought ready-made atomic bombs 
from Pakistan, China will play a vital role, (Weitz, 2010). 
 
Thirdly, Israel is also cited as a potential motivator for Saudi nuclear proliferation, 
since, as a regional rival, Israel‘s nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities could prove 
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threatening to Saudi Arabia, (Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, 2008). In 
an interview with the Washington Post Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al-Faisal 
raised this concern strongly. He said: ―Iran is always mentioned but no one mentions 
Israel, which has [nuclear] weapons already‖, (Prince Al-Faisal, 2005). The 
emergence of a nuclear Iran would conceivably tempt Israel to declare its nuclear 
capabilities openly. Israel may consider an overt Iranian deterrent too dire a threat to 
continue its opacity policy, thus creating strong pressure in Saudi Arabia to acquire its 
own deterrent vis-à-vis Israel, Iran, (McInnis, 2005).  
 
Finally, external factors, however, are not the sole sources of motivation behind 
nuclear proliferation. Domestic circumstances must also be considered. (a) In a 
discussion of future Saudi proliferation decisions it is important to consider who will 
replace the ageing King Abdullah as the next ruler of Saudi Arabia. It is important to 
keep in mind that a new ruler in Saudi Arabia could have an important influence on 
the propensity of the Kingdom to proliferate. (b) Saudi nuclear ambitions crystallised 
in the run-up to the 2009 Copenhagen Summit, when it was realised that global efforts 
to control climate change could end up punishing countries that put off including non-
carbon-based energy sources in their power portfolios, (Jha, 2011). (c) Saudi Arabia 
depends almost solely on oil export revenues to develop its economy. Burning oil for 
electricity production currently consumes about a quarter of the crude oil Saudi 
Arabia produces, (Hibbs, 2011). In 2010 Saudi Arabia consumed an average of 2.6 
(mb/d), (IEA, June 2011) and the country is on course to consume an average of 2.8 
(mb/d) of oil in 2011, up from 1.9 (mb/d) in 2007 and 1.6 million (mb/d) in 2003, 
(Jadwa, 2011), making it the world‘s sixth-largest oil consumer behind the U.S., 
China, Japan, India and Russia. On a per capita basis, its oil consumption is sky high. 
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In 2011, its consumption is set to jump by 5.6 per cent, way above the global average 
of 1.4 percent, (Blas, 2011). Saudi oil demand has risen by 75 percent in the ten years 
since 2001 due to strong economic and industrial growth and subsidised prices. The 
strong surge contrasts with the more modest increase of 39 percent in the 1990-2000 
periods, (Ibid).  
 
Some economists argue that if Saudi Arabia‘s current energy consumption continues 
at the current rate, that within 20 years the Kingdom will burn the equivalent of 
almost all its recent daily output - more than eight million barrels a day - or around 
two-thirds its total production capacity‖, (McDowall, 2011). The Saudi investment 
firm ―Jadwa‖ even paints a bleak picture for the future of oil exports in Saudi Arabia 
as the Kingdom could face a serious revenue crisis within the current decade as it will 
have to cut exports to meet rising demand. Jadwa pointed out the Kingdom's oil 
exports had declined from around 7.5 (mb/d) in 2005 to 5.8 (mb/d) in 2010 and could 
drop further by 2015, (Jadwa, 2011). In this context Jareer Elass and Amy Jaffe from 
James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University, argue that: 
―…It is in the Kingdom‘s long-term geopolitical and security interests to maintain its 
leadership role in the global oil arena. Riyadh‘s ability to threaten other oil producers that it 
could flood the oil market is a critical aspect buttressing its leadership role inside OPEC and 
gives the country regional clout as well. Saudi Arabia‘s ability to singlehandedly alter the 
price of oil gives the Kingdom significant geopolitical power, and it has used its ability to 
lower the price of oil to its geopolitical advantage on many occasions over the decades. With 
this oil superpower stature comes much of the global influence that Saudi Arabia enjoys on 
the international stage‖, (Elass & Jaffe, 2011). 
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(Table 9.3.1): Saudi Break Even Oil Forecast at Current Spending Patterns 
 
 2005 2010 2015f 2020f 2025f 2030f 
Oil Indicators (million barrels per day) 
Oil Production 9.4 8.2 9.3 10 10.7 11.5 
Oil Exports 7.5 5.8 6.3 6 5.6 4.9 
Domestic Consumption 1.9 2.4 3.1 3.9 5.1 6.5 
Budgetary Indicators (SR billion) 
Total Revenue 564 735 843 961 1,108 1,120 
Total Expenditure 346 627 893 1,147 1,620 2,453 
Balance 218 109 -50 -186 -512 - 1,334 
SAMA Net Foreign Assets 564 1,652 1,958 1,331 375 375 
Domestic Debt 475 167 167 167 949 5,889 
Breakeven Oil Price (US$ per barrel)
19
 
Saudi Export Crude 30.3 71.6 90.7 118.5 175.1 321.7 
Source: Jadwa Investments (July, 2011); f= forecast 
 
 
Against this strategic backdrop, Saudi Arabia‘s signalling that it is prepared to go 
down this road may be an effective way of testing the U.S. by pressuring the 
American Administration to demonstrate more strongly its commitment to defend the 
Kingdom, especially after ―abandoning‖ a longstanding regional ally like Mubarak, 
(McDowall, 2011). Indeed, many analysts believe that Saudi words about developing 
nuclear arms may have been intended to focus western attention on Saudi concerns 
about their regional rival rather than to indicate any kind of definite decision by 
Riyadh because the practical and diplomatic obstacles of doing so would be immense, 
(The Guardian, June 29, 2011). Within this context, those who believe Saudi Arabia 
would not respond to an Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons by pursuing a weapon 
of its own usually emphasise one of three arguments. 
 
                                                             
19 A new estimate by the Institute of International Finance suggests that Saudi Arabia will need at least 
US$110 oil by 2015 to balance its budget, up from US$88 a barrel in 2011 given rising spending needs, 
(Elass & Jaffe, 2011). 
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The first argument suggests the value the Saudis place on their relationship with the 
United States would dissuade them from taking a nuclear decision that would severely 
damage their most important bilateral relationship, (Report to the Committee on 
Foreign Relations, 2008). Saudi Arabia depends on the United States for conventional 
armaments and military support during crises. Riyadh does not want to proliferate at 
the present time because doing so would deeply strain the U.S.-Saudi relationship, 
perhaps to an irrevocable degree, (Cabrera & Salama, 2006). Riyadh‘s desire to 
maintain a strong U.S.-Saudi relationship impedes the development of nuclear 
weapons within the Saudi Kingdom, as does the Royal Family‘s desire to prevent 
unconventional terrorism within their own borders, (Amlin, 2008).  
 
The second argument relates to the character of the regime. Some argue the Saudi 
regime is too conservative, too timid to take such a bold and controversial step. 
Lippman is convinced that confrontation and defiance are not Saudi Arabia‘s style. 
He argues: ―The Saudis‘ weapons of choice are cash and diplomacy. It is difficult to 
imagine the Princes of the House of Saud deliberately positioning themselves as 
global outliers and inviting reprisal from countries capable of inflicting serious 
damage on them‖, (Lippman, 2008). While Nield noted that Saudi Arabia has 
committed itself to a major industrialisation campaign that will require sustained 
engagement with the rest of the world ... It‘s not rational that they would jeopardise 
this in favour of a pre-emptive strike against the theoretical possibility of a nuclear-
armed Iran‖, (Nield, 2010). Additionally, Amlin believes that the Saudi leaders do not 
want to incur the political and economic backlash that would result from their 
development of a nuclear arsenal at a time when they are trying to integrate more into 
the international economy, (Amlin, 2008). 
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The third argument often cited suggesting that Saudi Arabia would not pursue nuclear 
weapons relates to Saudi Arabia‘s nuclear technology capabilities. There exists a 
relatively strong consensus regarding the immature state of Saudi Arabia‘s nuclear 
technology infrastructure. Saudi Arabia lacks the human expertise and the technical 
knowledge necessary to develop a nuclear weapons program on its own, (Report to 
the Committee on Foreign Relations, 2008). For instance, since Saudi Arabia does not 
operate nuclear power facilities, its scientists do not have the experience necessary in 
enriching uranium for reactor fuel, in nuclear fuel conversion, or in operating nuclear 
reactors, (Feldman, 2004). Despite this, Saudi Arabia started a new civilian nuclear 
programme, but it will need years to be developed. Mohammed ElBaradei, then the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (I.A.E.A) Director General, in a visit to Saudi 
Arabia in 2007, estimated that the Saudi nuclear civilian plan might take up to 15 
years, (Broad & Sanger, 2007). 
 
However, if the Saudi pursues the ―nuclear option‖ China could theoretically be an 
attractive partner, but in the current strategic environment it‘s hard to imagine that this 
could be a realistic scenario. From China‘s perspective Iran is not yet a nuclear power 
and has not reached the ―point of no return.‖ Li Guofu, Director of the Chinese Center 
for Middle East Studies at the Institute for International Studies (CIIS), argues that 
China is not 100 percent convinced that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons. He 
indicated that observers who believe there is a ―point of no return‖ in Iran‘s technical 
development of nuclear weapons were incorrect, because the problem was 
fundamentally a political one and not technical, (Wikileaks, 2009). Furthermore, 
China is a member of the NPT system (since joining in 1992), and obliged ―not in any 
way to assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or 
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otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other explosive devices, or control over such 
weapons or explosive devices‖, (Lippman, 2008). Under the Nuclear Proliferation 
Prevention Act of 1994, China would face revocation of the U.S. nuclear cooperation 
agreement it worked so hard to secure, as well as economic sanctions, if it were 
deemed to have ―aided or abetted‖ the acquisition of nuclear weapons, ( Ibid).  
 
The well known economist Simpfendorfer noted that a nuclear Iran and regional arms 
race would be bad for business. He argues that even Chinese academics have 
signalled that Iran‘s unpredictable behaviour is challenging China‘s relations with its 
other regional partners, especially Israel and Saudi Arabia. While China may not 
agree to sanctions easily, its support for Iran is often overstated, and the idea of a non-
nuclear Iran with still strained relations with the United States is not an unattractive 
outcome for China‘s leadership, (Simpfendorfer, 2010). From the Chinese perspective 
if Iran pursues the nuclear weapons it will violate its international obligations. 
Subsequently, it will be difficult for China to support Tehran‘s action. Secondly, 
China‘s economic and strategic interests in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states are much 
more important than its interests in Iran. In this regard the Saudi Arabia and the Arab 
Gulf States, (even Iraq) could easily make up Iran‘s oil exports to China in the event 
of an oil embargo on Iran. Most important of all, the prospect of a nuclear arms race 
in the Middle East could push China strongly towards cooperation with the United 
States and the oil-consuming nations such as Japan, South Korea and India for the 
stability of the Gulf region thus containing the Iranian threat.  
 
Indeed, China has broad interests that cannot be made hostage to Iran‘s ideological 
priorities or its regional goals. While the priority for China is stability, for Iran it is 
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change, including disruptive change. Chinese scholar Zha Daojiong argues that, ―part 
of Chinese strategy is to respect America‘s concerns about Sino-Middle-Eastern 
relations‖, (Zha, 2007). Furthermore, Garver suggests a desire to keep a certain 
distance; China has avoided the use of the word ―strategic‖ in its relations with Iran, 
although it has had no such hesitation in relation with Saudi Arabia, (Garver, 2006).  
Even from the Iranian perspective, a virtual or ambiguous nuclear capability could be 
attractive to Iran as a way of avoiding expanded international economic sanctions and 
isolation, or even worse possible U.S. or Israeli strikes. Moreover, Iran does not want 
to jeopardise its partnership with China or provide a pretext for the GCC states, 
especially Saudi Arabia, to acquire a nuclear weapon capability of their own, (Davis, 
2011).  Hence, in the short to medium term Iran is likely to strive to stay within the 
bounds of international norms and laws established by the NPT while continuing with 
uranium enrichment and warhead experimentation, (Ibid).  
 
For Sino-Saudi interests to be maintained, however, Saudi security needs must be 
met; their status as a primary parameter of Saudi national interest does not permit 
them to be ignored. Up until now, this role has been filled by the United States, 
allowing the Sino-Saudi relationship to flourish based on other interests, combined 
with the light level of security dialogue. If U.S.-Saudi relations falter, China would 
doubtless feel pressure to take a more active role in Saudi defence. Failure to do so 
would defy the community of interests China has established over the past several 
decades, (Anderson, 2004). However, Bahgat has concluded that no evidence suggests 
that the U.S.-Saudi relationship will sour in the near future, and the United States and 
Saudi Arabia are likely to share common interests for many years, creating a strong 
reason for Saudi Arabia not to develop nuclear weapons, (Bahgat, 2011).  
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Saudi Arabia is currently linked to arms deals with the United States for at least the 
next decade. While Riyadh‘s civilian nuclear program could also take a decade to 
develop the potential human and technical resources that Saudi Arabia would need. At 
present there is no solid evidence that Riyadh intends to go down this route and there 
is also no evidence which points to the Saudi acquisition of weapons of mass 
destruction. For all of these reasons, Saudi Arabia does not appear to be interested in 
developing - or seem to be developing - a weapon of mass destruction, nor is China 
actively supporting Saudi Arabia in acquiring nuclear weapons.  
 
 
9.4 TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER & EDUCATION EXCHANGE 
 
 
China and Saudi Arabia have undertaken efforts to further develop their relationship 
in science, education and technology transfer. The number of personal and 
professional contacts and exchanges has risen in recent years, overcoming the 
linguistic-cultural divide, and establishing in both countries a widening band of 
educated elites who are familiar with each other‘s societal norms and traditions, 
knowledgeable about each other‘s distinctive ways of conducting business, and 
attuned to their counterparts‘ national and institutional interests, (Calabrese, 2004). 
 
The two nations are also witnessing enhanced cultural, educational and religious 
cooperation and exchange, which has deepened understanding and friendship between 
the two peoples, (Xinhua, June 21, 2008). Saudi Arabia has created Chinese language 
study programs to prepare Saudis to work in the Jizan Economic City, where planned 
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Chinese investments in aluminium production and other industries will create 
thousands of new jobs. Saudi Arabia also has offered loans to support Chinese 
government education projects, (China Daily, February 6, 2009). Educational 
cooperation between China and Saudi Arabia has achieved considerable progress. 
With full support from the Chinese Government, the King Abdullah Scholarship 
Program chose China as one of the five destination countries in Asia for its applicants, 
(Perspectives ASIA, 2009). Indeed, Khalid Al-Anqari, Saudi Minister of Higher 
Education, recently led a Saudi delegation constituting of more than twenty 
universities to China. During the visit, Saudi universities signed ten cooperation 
treaties with Chinese education institutions in the field of higher education, (Ali Khan, 
2011). Following the visit of the Saudi delegation, a high-level Chinese delegation 
comprising chairmen of a number of universities visited Saudi Arabia, (Ibid). 
 
Scientific cooperation is booming. The Gene Institute of the Chinese Science 
Academy is working closely with its Saudi counterpart on improving the gene of 
Saudi date. The relations also witnessed strengthening cooperation in bio-chemistry, 
nanotechnology, meteorology, precision instrument and other advanced areas of 
science and technology, (Perspectives ASIA, 2009). King Abdul Aziz City for 
Science and Technology (KACST) has also signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) with Huawei Technologies, China‘s major telecommunications equipment 
manufacturer, to strengthen cooperation in telecom technology and personnel training, 
(Ibid). Most important of all, in April 2011, Saudi Arabia announced its plan to sign a 
nuclear cooperation agreement with China. The Saudi Cabinet said it has authorised 
Hashim Yamani, President of the King Abdullah City for Nuclear and Renewable 
Energy, to hold talks with Chinese officials to reach a deal for the peaceful use of 
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atomic energy, (Arab News, April 12, 2011). The agreement allows the two countries 
to cooperate in the fields of production, use and transfer of knowledge regarding the 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy, (Ibid). 
 
The emphasis on education is perhaps the most spectacular of the king‘s revolutionary 
changes. The Saudi Government has already offered scholarships to thousands of 
students to study in the United States, Canada, Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand, 
Japan, China and others.  According to the Saudi Minister of Higher Education Khalid 
Al- Anqari, Saudi students worldwide reached in 2011 a total of over 120,000 noting 
that more than 43,500 Saudi students now were studying in the United States alone. 
An additional 5,000 students will participate in the scholarship program (2011-2012), 
(Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Washington, 2011). In contrast, ten years ago, 
there were only twenty to twenty five students from Saudi Arabia studying in China, 
but that number now is up, (China Daily, April 29, 2009). The total number of 
students studying in China under this program had reached 147 by the end of 2007, 
(Perspectives ASIA, 2009). That number rose to 400 in 2008 and then jumped to 500 
in 2009, (China Daily, April 29, 2009). Today, according to Yang Honglin, the 
Chinese Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, 1100 Saudi students are currently studying in 
universities located in different Chinese cities, (Ali Khan, 2011). Few would know 
that Saudi Aramco has been sending students to study in China since 1986, 
(Sfakianakis, 2009). 
 
To put these figures in perspective, they represent less than one percent of the total 
Saudi students studying abroad.  In comparison almost half of the Saudi students 
studying abroad are in the United States and the United Kingdom, the U.S. has 
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received 30 percent of Saudi scholarship students, followed by the U.K. 15 percent, 
Canada 11 percent, Australia 8 percent and Egypt 6 percent, (Abdul Ghafour, March 
13, 2011). The Saudi‘s student number in the U.S. is a higher number than the one 
prior to 9/11 and the Saudis are in the top ten student nationalities list studying in the 
U.S., (Wahab, 2010). Moreover, as of 2010, an estimated 15,616 Saudi students were 
in the United Kingdom alone, (Wanger, 2010). On the other hand around 50 Chinese 
are enrolled at various Saudi universities, (Ali Khan, 2011). For the Chinese and 
Saudis students the U.S. is still the favourite technological destination. China is the 
leading place of origin for international students in the United States with 127,628 in 
2009/10, an increase of 30 percent from the previous year, (Institute of International 
Education, 2010). 
 
While Saudi Arabia realises the importance of technology transfer there has been little 
Sino-Saudi interaction here. There is not much data available regarding this topic 
suggesting that there has not been much Sino-Saudi interaction in this realm (mostly 
educational). As stated earlier, while China and Saudi Arabia seem to be taking the 
first steps in increasing the Sino-Saudi technology transfer by signing cooperation 
agreements over the last few years, a strong Sino-Saudi relationship in this realm is 
yet to be seen. Neither side is aggressively pushing the other for more cooperation in 
this area.  
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9.5 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has attempted to decipher Chinese intentions towards Saudi Arabia. The 
main question it attempted to address was whether Chinese actions were in 
accordance with the realism model or economic interdependence model. As stated 
earlier in the chapter, if China is acting in the offensive realism model, it should be 
attempting to expand its power and influence in Saudi Arabia at every opportunity 
with the intent to undermine U.S. hegemony. This would include proactive actions to: 
(a) Sell Saudi Arabia sophisticated technologies and arms and provide security 
assurances to make Saudi Arabia less dependent on the United States and more so on 
China; (b) Encourage Saudi Arabia to shift its political allegiance from the United 
States over to China; and (c) Provide Saudi Arabia with the technology and expertise 
to make the country less dependent on the U.S.   
 
If China is acting in the economic interdependence model, it should be: (a) Interacting 
militarily with Saudi Arabia in a business manner, and not providing it with massive 
amounts of advanced military hardware with the sole purpose to make it less reliant 
on the U.S. security assurance and arms sales; (b) Interacting militarily with Saudi 
Arabia according to China-U.S .relations and  to the International Treaty on the Non-
proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); and (c) Basing its technological cooperation 
with Saudi Arabia in a manner to advance the economic relations.  
 
This case study has shown that Chinese intentions are more along the lines of the 
economic interdependence school of thought rather than the realism model. Thus the 
developing dependence of China on Middle-Eastern oil does not seem to point 
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towards future oil for weapons deals that would undermine the security of this region. 
On the contrary, the Chinese leadership appears to have relinquished that tactic to 
secure its oil supplies. Indeed, China and Saudi Arabia have not had close military 
relations. There are two primary reasons for this: (a) The United States has provided 
Saudi Arabia with advanced military equipment to strengthen the Saudi military, Air 
force and National Guard against domestic threats such as the Al-Qaida groups; and 
(b) The United States has provided security assurances to Saudi Arabia against 
international threats that China cannot provide. 
 
While China may be limited in the military assistance it can provide to Saudi Arabia, 
if it was acting in the offensive realism model it should still be attempting to 
undermine the U.S.-Saudi military ties in order to further the Sino-Saudi military ties. 
For example, if China wants to advance military ties with Saudi Arabia in order to 
keep it away from U.S. influence, it would be possible to do what China did with 
Pakistan through the development of missile capabilities and/or nuclear weapons in 
Saudi Arabia in order to be able to protect itself without the urgent need for the 
United States. Until now there has been no documented evidence to support such 
scenario. The chapter has shown that this is not the case; on one hand China does not 
want to be an alternative to the U.S., on the other Saudi Arabia is still pursuing 
security cooperation with the United States and China has done nothing to undermine 
it.  Yet some analysts point to the possibility that China will encourage Saudi Arabia 
to adopt the nuclear option and the development of long-range missiles, but there is 
no evidence confirming this to be the case, for several reasons: (a) That such choices 
are strategic in nature which may lead to serious confrontation with the U.S., 
something that both  Saudi Arabia and China do not want to happen; (b) That such a 
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program is not difficult to be detected or monitored especially in light of advanced 
technological resources owned by the United States or its allies; and (c) It needs the 
human capital/talents and infrastructure in Saudi Arabia which is not currently 
available. 
 
Energy is undoubtedly the primary driver of the Saudi-China relationship today, and 
will remain so in coming decades. Yet, as for Saudi Arabia, the new situation presents 
it with a dilemma. On the one hand, given China‘s rising global status, Saudi Arabia 
has an interest in strengthening bilateral ties, especially in energy sector. In addition, 
strengthening ties with China may offer Saudi Arabia an additional means to promote 
its campaign against the Iranian nuclear program. On the other hand, having 
previously ―suffered‖ due to its missiles deal with China, Saudi Arabia is not 
interested in creating the impression that cooperation is growing, thereby yet again 
arousing American suspicions. These limitations are clear to China, and because it is 
sincerely interested in a long term strengthening of energy relations with Saudi 
Arabia, China has not and will likely not force Riyadh to choose between China and 
the US. Chinese military policies are not directed at increasing its power and 
influence in Saudi Arabia at the cost of the United States as realists may contend. All 
China‘s military actions closely align with the economic interdependence school of 
thought. As for the future of militarily, educational and technological fronts the study 
forecasts that Saudi Arabia will depend on the U.S. at least for the next decade. While 
the Sino-Saudi military relations has the potential to expand in the future for three 
reasons: (a) The Sino-Saudi security agreements signed in April 2006 and October 
2010; (b) As the quality of Chinese weapons systems improves; and (c) The Saudi 
desire to keep their options open as a hedge policy to balance the American power. 
362 
 
CHAPTER TEN 
IMPLICATION FOR THE U.S. & ASIA‟S MAJOR OIL 
CONSUMERS 
 
 
10.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The case studies have shown Saudi Arabia needs the United States to remain (at least 
in the near future) the major strategic force in the Gulf, in particular to constrain what 
the Saudis perceive as potential military threats from Iran. At the same time China‘s 
and other Asian powers growing weight is more consistent with the Saudi view of the 
new ―oil silk-road.‖ While Beijing‘s approach is more gravitational than 
confrontational, China seeks influence so that the United States and its allies will not 
work together to limit China‘s options, (Fredriksen, 2006; 209). As China and India 
influence grows in the Middle East two contradictory points should be highlighted: on 
one hand, the old ―oil for security‖ paradigm of U.S.-Saudi relations could weaken as 
China‘s (and India) economic and political gravitational force grows over time, 
(Andrews-Speed, 2009: 8). On the other hand, while there is fear for the future of the 
U.S. role, there is at the same time no alternative to it. No other country has the 
military resources or the will to safeguard what is, in the end, a global commons, 
(Alterman, 2011: 71). Indeed, a recent study by the Center for Strategic and 
International (CSIS) finds that citizens of countries of the Middle East are more apt to 
expect a weakened United States over the next decade. But there is also still a sense 
that the United States is the only actor with the ability to play the role of external 
guarantor of security for the region, (CSIS, 2011). 
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10.2 IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. 
In this geopolitical environment where China is acting in the economic 
interdependence model, there are three scenarios regarding the Sino-U.S. relationship 
predicted for the Middle East: (a) Containment: the U.S. will see China‘s ―rise‖ in the 
Middle East as a threat which should be contained. On the other hand, the resource 
scarcity could lead China to adopt a more aggressive foreign policy; or (b) The 
unilateral approach: pursue U.S. objectives in the Middle East while refusing to 
acknowledge or take into account Chinese interests; or (c) Cooperate but hedge: 
maintain the status quo and pursue U.S. objectives in the Middle East while 
acknowledging or respecting Chinese interests. While concern over access to 
resources will continue to act as a constraint on China‘s foreign policy and also as an 
inducement for avoiding conflict with the United States, at the same time America 
will respect the Chinese interests while working to keep the U.S. as a dominant power 
in the Middle East.  
 
 
10.2.1 Scenario One: Heading for a Collision 
 
 
Of greatest concern to the U.S. in this scenario is the potential for the burgeoning 
competition to escalate or progress into a military confrontation over resources, or 
access to them. The theory of a ―China threat‖ still has influential supporters in 
Washington and in several U.S. think-tanks. A popular view among many U.S. 
analysts is to see China‘s pursuit of foreign energy supply as an integral part of 
China‘s grand strategy to build up the country‘s power, (Zha, 2007). They argue that 
China adopted a ―String of Pearls‖ strategy which is a manifestation of China‘s rising 
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political influence through efforts to create access to ports and airfields, develop 
special diplomatic relationships, and modernise military forces that extend from the 
South China Sea through the Strait of Malacca, across the Indian Ocean, and onto the 
Arabian Gulf, (Pehrson, 2006). In this regard, Lieberthal and Herberg noted that 
China has greatly increased cooperation, port access agreements, and maritime ties 
with Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Myanmar in an apparent effort to be better positioned 
to protect its maritime energy transport routes during a future crisis. This cooperation, 
in turn, risks exacerbating the broader tensions between the United States and China 
over the increasing pace and scale of China‘s military and naval modernisation, 
(Lieberthal and Herberg, 2006). Indeed, Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro have 
written in their book ―The Coming Conflict with China‖, ―China and the United States 
were not headed toward cooperation and friendship but toward a multifaceted and 
potentially dangerous rivalry‖, (Bernstein and Munro, 1997). 
 
Hardliners in Washington also believe that China‘s global oil strategy signals a 
dangerous threat to U.S. interests. They call for denying China access to energy 
resources while building up U.S. military capacity and strengthening alliances with 
key oil producing states, (Schmitt & Blumenthal, 2005).  Dan Blumenthal and Joseph 
Lin, of the American Enterprise Institute, characterise energy importation as a ―zero-
sum game‖ and describe China‘s energy purchases as reflecting ―the paranoia that 
drives Chinese thinking on energy security.‖ In a longer-run sense, Blumenthal and 
Lin foresee China‘s ―perceived military necessity and an intense sense of national 
pride [that] may already be leading China to its own variant of sea control…American 
offers of cooperation [with China]…may well be overpowered by the nationalist 
instinct to control one‘s own trade… [leading China] to compete with America for sea 
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control‖, (Blumenthal & Lin June 2006). But the bluntest words describing this 
dooming scenario came from Robert Kaplan who wrote recently:  
 
 
In the background of the ongoing Middle Eastern drama looms the shadow of a rising China. 
China is not a ―responsible stakeholder‖ in the international system, as we proclaim it should 
be; it is a ―free rider.‖ We are at war in Afghanistan to make it a safe place for China to extract 
minerals and metals. We have liberated Iraq so that Chinese firms can extract its oil. Now we 
are at war with Libya, which further diverts us from concentrating on the western Pacific—the 
centre of the world‘s economic and naval activity—which the Chinese military seeks 
eventually to dominate, (Kaplan, 2011). 
 
On the other side, many Chinese scholars believe that the top priority of U.S. 
international strategy is maintenance of hegemony (military, economic, and political). 
All other strategic and diplomatic priorities, including counter-terrorism, 
democratisation, free trade, and energy supply are understood to be subsumed within 
this conceptual framework. Within this context, they stress two points: the first is that 
because oil is a finite commodity it is viewed as a vital interest for both the economic 
and national security realms. They also argue that the current American hegemony in 
the Middle East could pose a long-term strategic threat to China if and when its 
relationship with Washington deteriorates and leads to a war over Taiwan. In that 
case, the Americans could be in a position to deny the Chinese access to the energy 
sources in the Middle East, (Hadar, 2010). Indeed, a wide variety of influential 
Chinese experts, including scholars, policy analysts, and members of the military, 
believe that the United States can sever China‘s seaborne energy supplies and in a 
crisis might well choose to do so, (Erickson & Collins 2010).   
 
The second point is that China‘s economic prosperity, survivability, and relative 
position in the world is dependent on securing energy sources to meet future energy 
demand. With such considerations in mind, it would appear that politicians in Beijing 
are worried that the U.S. seeks to exploit China‘s energy weakness. Dependence on 
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imported oil, domestic energy shortages, rising oil costs, and the spectre of long-term 
global energy ―scarcity‖ could undermine the country‘s economic growth and 
seriously jeopardise job creation, raising real risks of social instability in China, 
(Reilly, 2007). In this geopolitical context, the potentially explosive combination of a 
China less willing to passively accept U.S. leadership and the prospect of competition 
between China and other states for control over vital energy resources poses 
particularly critical challenges to U.S. interests in the Middle East. China‘s search for 
oil is making it a new competitor to United States for influence in the Middle East. If 
not managed prudently, this competition will generate multiple points of bilateral 
friction and damage U.S. strategic interests in the region, (Leverett & Bader, 2005).  
 
Yet, conflict between China and America is not likely to play out in the near future. 
Richard S. Williamson, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, former assistant 
to President Ronald Reagan and U.S. Ambassador to several international 
organisations including a spell between 2007 and 2009 as the U.S. president special 
envoy to Sudan, argues that recent events have emboldened Chinese leaders. They are 
seeking their own path. They will not sign on uncritically to the global architecture 
the United States has had such a major role in erecting. But this is not an irrational 
approach by the world‘s most populous country with a surging economy. The 
challenge for the United States is to be clear eyed about its interests, keep faith with 
its values, and engage with the rising China to chart a course of cooperation and 
competition that respects China‘s legitimate interests while protecting America‘s 
(Williamson, 2011). Steve Yetiv, a widely sought expert on the Middle East and 
University professor of political science, goes further to say that the growing Sino-
Saudi relationship could well challenge - but need not hurt – U.S.-Saudi relations. The 
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United States remains an important market for Saudi Arabia. It is also vital to 
Riyadh‘s goal of diversifying its economy and joining the global economy. Most 
importantly, it is the key provider of Saudi security. China cannot replace that role for 
the foreseeable future, if at all, and the Saudis know this very well, (Yetiv, 2011). He 
continued by saying that the growing Sino-Saudi relationship helps bolster China‘s 
economic growth. Provided that China plays a responsible global role in the future 
and does not undermine U.S. foreign policy, that is good for the United States, for 
global trade and business, and for China‘s  long-term domestic stability, (Ibid). There 
is no question that China‘s high interdependence with the Middle East will make it 
more challenging for the United States to successfully pursue its objectives and follow 
through with unilateral action, but despite China‘s increasing influence and economic 
power in the Middle East, neither China nor the United States will take hostile 
military actions against each other for various reasons. Firstly, the most obvious 
reason is that nuclear weapons make it suicidal to risk a great-power war. Recently 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton denied the United States was seeking to contain 
China, she argued that:  
―…The relationship between China and the United States is complex and of 
enormous consequence and we are committed to getting it right…There are some in 
both countries who believe that China‘s interests and ours are fundamentally at odds. 
They apply a zero-sum calculation ... so whenever one of us succeeds, the other must 
fail…But that is not our view‖, (Reuters, October 28, 2010).  
 
Secondly, since China is highly economically interdependent with the United States, 
and the Middle East, it will seek to prevent any situation which may jeopardise the 
ongoing peaceful economic exchanges among them. Therefore, China will seek 
greater cooperation with all sides in order to avoid an armed conflict in an effort to 
protect its economic interests. If Beijing believes that the U.S. is manipulating energy 
policies to weaken and contain China, then China (as Reilly argues) will likely 
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respond by increasing the pace of its military modernisation, tying Chinese energy 
investments abroad ever more closely to dubious regimes, promoting security 
cooperation with adversarial governments, and politicising global energy markets. 
Hardliners in Beijing, who warn of the U.S. military threat, will be strengthened, 
rendering the ―China threat‖ a self-fulfilling prophesy, (Reilly, 2007). According to 
the Chinese scholar Zha Daojiong, any unilateral action against China may produce 
unintended consequences by giving weight to voices in China that see politically 
motivated diplomacy as the ultimate instrument for securing China‘s oil supplies, 
(Zha, 2006).  
 
Thirdly, as China becomes more economically interdependent with the Middle East, 
so the United States will not be able to exclude China from the region.  On the 
contrary, as a result of its reliance on Middle Eastern oil, the interests of the United 
States and that of China and all of the oil producing countries in the Middle East 
region will more closely align. Because both the U.S. and China are reliant on oil, 
regional stability and the preservation of the status quo are in both countries‘ 
economic interests. The stability and security of Saudi Arabia are now in the interests 
of both the United States and China; therefore, cooperation between the two countries 
should increase, (Zhang, 1999). Loren Brandt argues that looking beyond short-term 
friction over trade balances and currency valuations ―we see substantial overlap 
between China‘s economic interests and those of the United States.‖ She goes on to 
say that, ―As a big importer of natural resources, China, like the United States, will 
benefit from and may actively seek to promote stability in the Middle East and other 
resource-rich regions‖, (Barandt, 2007). 
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(Figure 10.2.1.1): China and U.S. Imports of Crude Oil from Saudi Arabia  
 
 
Source: EIA and General Customs Administration of China 
 
 
Alterman noted that the United States is not the principal oil export market for any 
country in the region, nor is any Middle Eastern country the principal source for U.S. 
imported oil, (Alterman, 2011:77). Comparatively speaking, the Middle East and 
Saudi Arabia are more important to China than to the United States as oil suppliers. 
Only two of the top ten suppliers of oil to the United States in 2010 were from the 
Middle East. Saudi Arabia was the U.S.‘s third supplier and only supplied about 11 
percent of total American oil imports. In contrast, five of the top ten suppliers of oil to 
China in 2010 were from the Middle East and supplied Beijing with about 40 percent 
of its total oil imports.  
 
 
 
  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 2010 
U.S. Imports  1,533 1,611 1,519 1,725 1,498 1,445 1,423 1,447 1,503 980 1,082 
China’s Imports  150 176 228 304 364 443 479 529 730 840 893 
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(Table 10.2.1.1): U.S., China Crude Oil Imports from Top 10 Countries in 2010
a 
 
 U.S. China 
 Total Oil Imports = (9.2 mb/d)   Total Oil Imports = (4.8 mb/d) 
 Country (%) of total 
imports 
Country (%) of total 
imports 
1 Canada 21.3% Saudi Arabia 18.6% 
2 Mexico 12.5% Angola 16.4% 
3 Saudi Arabia 11.7% Iran 8.9% 
4 Nigeria 10.6% Russia 7% 
5 Venezuela 9.8% Oman 6.3% 
6 Iraq 4.5% Sudan 5.2% 
7 Angola 4.1% Iraq 5% 
8 Colombia 3.6% Kuwait 4% 
9 Algeria 3.5% Kazakhstan 4% 
10 Brazil 2.7% Brazil 3% 
Source: EIA and China‘s General Customs Administration 
(a) All percentages were calculated by the author 
 
 
Currently, as the above table shows, the pattern of China‘s overseas oil dependency is 
complementary to that of the U.S.  China is much more reliant on the Middle East and 
Africa, while the U.S. sources more from its North and Latin American neighbours. 
That lessens the short-term prospects for direct competition between the world‘s two 
largest economies for sources of crude oil, (Hook, 2011). Another point is made by 
Amy Myers Jaffe who argues that, by the 2020s, the capital of energy will likely have 
shifted back to the Western Hemisphere, where it was prior to the ascendancy of 
Middle Eastern mega-suppliers such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in the 1960s, 
(Myers, September 2011:86). The reasons for this shift are partly technological and 
partly political. She noted that geologists have long known that the Americas are 
home to plentiful hydrocarbons trapped in hard-to-reach offshore deposits, on-land 
shale rock, oil sands, and heavy oil formations. The U.S. endowment of 
unconventional oil is more than 2 trillion barrels, with another 2.4 trillion in Canada 
and 2 trillion-plus in South America.  The latest breakthrough will make these 
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resources technologically accessible, (Ibid). If this is correct, that will lessen the 
prospects for direct competition between China and the U.S. For now and despite that 
the U.S. is decreasing its dependence on both Saudi and Middle East oil, at the same 
time the U.S. still gets almost half of its oil from OPEC member countries. Indeed, six 
of the top ten suppliers of oil to each of the U.S. were OPEC members, (Table 10.2.1).  
 
(Table 10.2.1.2): U.S. Crude Oil Imports (selected indicators, mb/d) 
 
 From 
World 
From 
OPEC 
OPEC‟s 
Share of 
Total (%)
a 
From 
Middle 
East
b 
Middle 
East‟s 
Share of 
U.S. total 
(%)
c 
From 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Saudi 
Arabia‟s 
Share of 
Total (%)
d 
2010 9,21 4,55 49.4% 1,71 18.6% 1,08 11.7% 
2009 9,01 4,35 48.2% 1,66 18.0% 0,980 10.8% 
2008 9,78 5,41 55.3% 2,35 24.1% 1,50 15.3% 
2007 10,03 5,38 53.6% 2,16 21.5% 1,44 14.3% 
2006 10,11 4,78 47.2% 2,22 21.9% 1,42 14.0% 
2005 10,12 4,81 47.5% 2,24 22.1% 1,44 14.2% 
2004 10,08 5,04 50.0% 2,40 23.8% 1,49 14.7% 
2003 9,66 4,57 47.3% 2,47 25.5% 1,72 17.8% 
2002 9,14 4,08 44.6% 2,25 24.6% 1,51 16.5% 
2001 9,32 4,08 51.9% 2,70 29.03% 1,61 17.2% 
2000 9,07 4,54 50.0% 2,43 26.8% 1523 16.8% 
1999 8,73 4,05 46.3% 2,36 27.05% 1387 15.8% 
Source: EIA (October, 2011) 
(a), (b), (c) & (d) All figures and percentages were calculated by the author 
 
 
China and the United States have a high level of dependence on energy imports, 
particularly oil; they are exposed to the same risks of the international oil markets, 
(Zha & Hu, 2007). The argument that the U.S. Government conspires to manipulate 
world oil prices fails to consider the implications of the United States‘ place as the 
largest importer of oil in the world. It would be self-destructive for the U.S. 
Government to support a rise in world oil prices, as oil is openly sold to whoever is 
willing to pay the highest bidding price. If the price were manipulated in any 
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direction, any damage to China would also hurt the United States, (Ibid). Therefore it 
is in the interests of China and the U.S. to both cooperate together towards price 
stability and keeping reliable oil supplies. 
 
Alterman made another important point that while China has shown an interest in 
purchasing discounted heavy crude from Saudi Arabia and is further investing in its 
capacity to refine it, the United States is focused on importing lighter crude that is 
both easier to refine and less environmentally damaging, (Alterman and Garver, 2008: 
58-59). The oil production and consumption network is a perfect example of global 
economic interdependence… China‘s exposure to oil price shock caused by supply 
disruptions is thus exactly equal to America‘s exposure, and to all other nations 
around the globe regardless of their dependence on oil imports. Tellingly, as Table 
10.2.3 shows, the United States is more exposed than China to fluctuations in world 
oil prices, (Blair, 2006) (see Table 10.2.3 below). 
 
(Table 10.2.1.3): Oil Imports by U.S. & China
a
 (selected indicators, 2001-2010) 
 
Mineral Fuels, Oils, Distillation Products, etc (US$ billions) 
 OPEC‟s 
Yearly 
Basket 
Price 
(US$) 
U.S. China 
Total 
(US$ 
bn) 
(%) Of 
U.S. 
Total 
Imports 
From 
OPEC 
(US$ 
bn) 
From 
Middle 
East 
(US$ 
bn) 
Total 
(US$ 
bn) 
(%) Of 
China‟s 
Total 
Imports  
From 
OPEC 
(US$ 
bn) 
From 
Middle 
East 
(US$ 
bn) 
2010 77.45 362,7 18.4% 146,8 51,2 188,6 13.5% 91,3 67,9 
2009 61.06 279,1 17.4% 109,8 38,3 123,9 12.3% 63,1 45,4 
2008 94.45 501,9 23.1% 222,9 87,5 169,2 14.9% 86,8 68,5 
2007 69.08 372,3 18.4% 162,03 53,7 105,1 10.9% 49,6 39,2 
2006 61.08 345,1 17.9% 148,4 50,2 89,09 11.2% 41,2 34,1 
2005 50.64 298,07 17.2% 124,5 43,3 64,08 9.7% 27,5 25,2 
2004 36.05 216,4 14.1% 91,3 35,1 48,02 8.5% 17,5 17,1 
2003 28.10 163,2 12.5% 64,9 27,05 29,24 7.0% 10,5 11,3 
2002 24.36 122,08 10.1% 46,6 19,9 19,3 6.5% 6,7 7,2 
2001 23.12 129,1 10.9% 53,4 23,08 17,5 7.1% 6,2 7,1 
Source: UNComtrade and OPEC 
(a) All figures adapted and calculated by the author 
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Even if the United States attempts to persuade its Arab States allies to isolate China, 
the likelihood that they would abide by the U.S. request is very minimal. The 
possibilities of a politically motivated embargo against China by Saudi Arabia and 
other Middle Eastern exporting countries remain very low. There are several reasons 
for this optimism. (a) China has pursued a balanced foreign policy towards the Middle 
East and the long running Arab-Israeli conflict in the region and most Arabs 
appreciate China‘s position. This reduces the possibility of Arab oil exporters joining 
hands to blockade against China. (b) As discussed earlier, Saudi Arabia (and the 
Middle East in general) has too much to gain from maintaining good Sino-Saudi 
relations, (particularly in light of the Saudi Government accelerating its economic 
development to provide jobs and opportunities for Saudi youth) and would likely push 
aside U.S. requests to minimise that relationship. And (c) China and the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) member countries including Saudi Arabia are working 
toward establishing a free trade area. In this context Chinese scholar Daojiong argues 
that growing levels of interdependence between China (and the U.S.) and the Middle 
East serves as a useful warrant against a blockade against China, (Zha, 2006).  
 
Furthermore the Chinese scholars Zha Daojiong and Hu Weixing reject the argument 
that the United States is planning to control international oil production and 
movement. They argue that since China began to import oil in the early 1980s, there 
has not been a single case of the United States intercepting oil moving into or out of 
China, (Zha & Hu, 2007).  The only confrontation occurred in July 1993 when the 
Clinton Administration suspected that a Chinese cargo ship, called the Yinhe (Milky 
Way) was going to Iran with chemicals that could be used for chemical weapons and 
sought to inspect its cargo. Afterwards, the U.S. State Department said that the 
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suspected chemicals were not found on the ship at that time. China has raised this 
Yinhe incident as a grievance against the United States and against the credibility of 
U.S. intelligence in particular, (Kan, 2011). According to Daojiong and Weixing that 
unfortunate episode in Chinese-U.S. relations, however, was related to non-
proliferation rather than the Chinese acquisition of Middle Eastern oil, (Zha & Hu, 
2007). Additionally, China benefits from the freedom of commercial navigation 
through the Strait of Hormuz and it is certainly in China‘s interest for movement of 
oil through the Strait of Hormuz to continue to be safeguarded against sabotage, 
(Ibid). According to Steve Yetiv, the United States spends around US$40 to 50 billion 
per year to protect the free flow of oil from the Arabian Gulf to the global economy, 
more than the entire defence budgets of all but a few countries. China, by comparison, 
spends virtually nothing on Gulf security, while pursuing its strategy of building 
political and economic relations with oil-rich countries in order to secure oil for its 
growing economy. This is nowhere more apparent than in China's relations with Saudi 
Arabia, the world's biggest oil power, (Yetiv, 2011). 
 
Ryan Clarke made another important point; he argues that irrespective of capabilities, 
the United States cannot also enforce a naval blockade that would starve China of 
energy resources. If it attempted to do so, America‘s failure to effectively execute the 
blockade would damage the prestige of the U.S. Navy (and the entire military for that 
matter) with obvious negative implications for American diplomacy and the nation‘s 
global standing. It would be impossible to discriminate between ships as a wide range 
carry China‘s energy resources, thus inevitably harming the energy security of 
American allies while also severely disrupting the global economy, (Clarke, 2009). 
While Bruce Blair adds that any oil blockade is tantamount to a declaration of war 
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and if China‘s retaliation were to stop all shipping to the rest of North East Asia, it 
would lead to situation that would plunge the world economy into chaos. The 
potential damage would be so devastating to the global economy it makes for an 
almost impossibly remote scenario, (Blair, 2006). Additionally, taking overt actions to 
limit Chinese influence in the Middle East would likely yield more anti-American 
sentiments not only in the Middle East, but also with states throughout the world. In 
this globalised world, China has strong economic ties with countries throughout the 
world (including America and U.S. allies) and as a result there could be a global 
backlash against the United States. 
 
Finally, even in the event of an oil embargo against China, the affect in the country‘s 
economy would not be devastating because (a) China‘s economy is still coal 
dependent; (b) China produces about 4 (mb/d) of oil; (c) China has built-up strategic 
oil reserves; and (d) China has the ability to obtain oil from other countries that reject 
the boycott of China. In this regard Blair emphasises that the Chinese economy is 
more resilient to oil price shocks caused by supply disruptions than may be commonly 
believed. In the event of the sudden and total disappearance of Saudi oil from the 
global supply, the adverse impact of the resulting price spike on China‘s economy 
would not be severe, (Blair, 2006). Furthermore, Robert Ross argues that growing 
Chinese imports of oil is a widespread nationalist argument for expanded power-
projection capability. But Chinese coal, hydropower, nuclear power, and domestic 
sources of oil and natural gas supply China with nearly all of its energy requirements. 
China relies on imported oil for about 10 percent of its total energy usage, and an 
increasing share of this oil comes across land borders with Central Asia and Russia. 
The International Energy Agency forecasts that through 2030 oil will remain a 
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marginal Chinese energy resource and suggests that domestic oil production will be 
sufficient to fuel China‘s commercial transport sector, (Ross, 2009). 
 
While China and other importers may feel vulnerable to Middle Eastern oil 
disruptions the dependencies are mutual. This deepening of economic ties implies that 
Saudi Arabia will have to consider the impact on its own economies of punitive 
actions against Beijing in the area of oil supply. Indeed, the world‘s largest exporter 
by far, Saudi Arabia, for example, cannot stop pumping oil without shattering its 
fragile social contract with its own population, (Ibid). As Iraq‘s experience has 
shown, even the Middle Eastern countries that have overthrown authoritarian 
governments are unlikely to dwell on China‘s reluctance to condemn their fallen 
leaders.  John Calabrese, a scholar at the Middle East Institute in Washington, argues 
that, ―To the extent that they need customers for their commodities and foreign direct 
investment in their economies, memories of China‘s position (or lack of one) in the 
political upheaval could prove short‖, (Buckley, 2011). 
 
These factors do not make this option appealing or likely to happen, much less the 
most beneficial course of action to take regarding Sino-U.S. relations involving the 
Middle East. As much as the United States desires to maintain the power and 
influence it has in the Middle East, this option of considering China as a rising threat 
and taking actions to undermine it does not seem to be successfully attainable, and 
would be a very dangerous option. 
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10.2.2 Scenario Two: U.S. Unilateral Approach  
 
As the dominant geopolitical power in the Middle East, the United States could persist 
in a more unilateral approach to the most strategically critical region of the world, in a 
manner that is dysfunctional for the interests of other important regional and 
international players, and eschews effective leadership in reforming the global energy 
architecture to accommodate rising powers like China, (Leverett, 2008). While the 
United States may be able to pursue its policies in the Middle East without 
cooperating with China, whether the pursuit of those policies will be successful is 
another matter. But if the U.S. chooses to pursue its objectives regardless of the 
Chinese, the long-term consequences for America‘s regional position in the Middle 
East and its international standing generally are potentially serious.  
 
Firstly, Iran remains an emerging challenge deeply involved in strategic competition 
with the U.S. and its friends and allies in the region, (Cordesman, 2010). In this regard 
China could cause problems for the United States and its policies. If China feels that 
U.S. policies act against Chinese core interests, it can undermine U.S. actions in 
numerous ways and China will not hesitate to use its economic, political, and possible 
military means to further its objectives and undermine U.S. policies. Secondly, under 
these conditions, Middle Eastern energy producers and China, may ultimately forge a 
de facto strategic alliance and look collaboratively for non-military means to contain 
American influence in the Gulf region, (Leverett, 2008). At least three options for 
strategic cooperation between China and Middle Eastern energy producers to contain 
U.S. influence in the Arabia Gulf present themselves. (a) China and the Middle 
Eastern states could ultimately move to use their continued willingness to finance 
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America‘s burgeoning current account deficit and overall debt levels as a source of 
strategic leverage over U.S. foreign policy. (b) China and the Middle Eastern states 
with substantial influence in OPEC could coordinate their actions to shift away from 
the U.S. dollar, (Ibid). And (c) the single most important long-term implication of the 
instability in the Middle East may well be consolidation of the Gulf Co-operation 
Council under Saudi leadership, a move that would leave the Gulf monarchies less 
reliant on Washington for regional security, (Bremmer, 2011). 
 
Yet, the Chinese behaviours are more consistent with economic interdependence. 
Yoram Evron argues that, if Chinese conduct is examined through the prism of its 
diplomatic actions, the general balance appears to be positive. China has adjusted its 
policy to the American line in most international crises, and in some cases has even 
acted to help the U.S. For example, China cancelled its nuclear agreements with Iran 
in 1997, immediately embraced the U.S. declaration of war on global terrorism in 
2001, refrained from vetoing most UN Security Council sanction resolutions sought 
by the U.S., and has played an active and important role in the North Korean crisis, 
(Evron, 2009). As discussed previously, China‘s support for Iran is often overstated. 
China‘s lack of military capability in the Gulf region has forced it to resort almost 
exclusively to other tools of statecraft to protect and advance its interests, (Yetiv & 
Lu, 2007). There is no strong evidence that the Chinese engagement with the region is 
designed to undermine U.S. interests. While not being entirely compliant with 
Washington‘s wishes, Chinese officials, nevertheless, have repeatedly emphasised the 
commercial nature of China‘s relations with the Middle East, (Jiang, 2007).  Freeman 
believes that what China is not, and is not likely to be in the foreseeable future, is 
either a substitute or a counter to American military power in the Middle East. It will 
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likely take a couple of decades for this to change substantially, (Freeman, 2009). In 
the interim, the United States will remain the central element in the balance of power 
in the Middle East, (Ibid).  
 
Beijing will continue to rely upon Washington for its energy security interest in the 
Middle East. Given Beijing‘s limited political influence and the unstable geopolitical 
situations in the region, China shows no interest in exploiting the energy relationships 
it might have to influence the oil-producing countries in the region, thereby 
challenging America‘s influence and strategic interests, (Wu & Liu, 2007). Professor 
Tim Niblock of Exeter University argues along these lines by highlighting China‘s 
cautious approach, ―The Chinese are perfectly aware of the fact that oil supplies from 
the Gulf are dependent on the U.S. Navy, both in the Gulf and the Straits of Malacca, 
and are keen to integrate into the global leadership role, not challenge it‖, (EIU, 
2011:15). 
 
Analyst Mustafa Alani at the Gulf Research Center in Dubai is sceptical that China 
could step in and he argues that: ―Certainly in the region (the Arabian Gulf) we feel 
the United States losing credibility, and we feel that in the near future we‘re going to 
see a vacuum in the region…But we still believe the Chinese [are] not a mature 
power: Politically, it‘s still really very weak; strategically, it still is not trusted. We 
don‘t feel China is a replacement to United States in any sense‖, (Kenyon, 2008). 
Certainly, China is becoming more influential economically, and its military is 
increasing its capacity, but it has little ability to project force beyond its borders, and 
Beijing has shown little interest in supporting or paying for the global commons that 
underpins the world economy. For now, China prefers to be largely a ―free rider‖ on 
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the international system that helps safeguard trade routes, sea lanes and relative 
regional stability — allowing Beijing to focus on pressing domestic challenges, 
(Larson, 2010).  
 
The United States has thrice in the past two decades put its military might behind 
securing access to Middle East oil supplies, (these include military interventions in 
Iraq both in 2003 and in 1990-91 and the Gulf ―tanker war‖ in the mid-1980s). The 
U.S. Navy controls the sea lines of communication (SLOC) in all the key energy 
transit bottlenecks, including the Straits of Hormuz, the Malacca Straits, and the 
Southeast Asian sea lanes, (Lieberthal & Herberg, 2006: 7). In all cases there is no 
evidence that the United States plotted to undermine China‘s interests. On the 
contrary, Beijing has been a major beneficiary of the enormous U.S. efforts to 
maintain stability and security in the greater Middle East and seems content to 
freeload on the U.S. policy of securing sea lanes for the time being. For example, in 
the first Gulf War (1990-1991), the liberation of Kuwait by U.S. forces, did not 
prevent the flow of Kuwaiti oil to China or stop trade relations between Kuwait and 
China to thrive. On the contrary, China‘s interests in Kuwait expanded and increased 
as the volume of trade jumped to more than US$8.5 billion by the end of 2010, 
(UNComtrade, 2011).  
 
Iraq serves as another example. After the American invasion, Iraq turned into an 
important energy/trade partner for China, similar to Kuwait. The trade between Iraq 
and China doubled almost 20 times. The volume of trade between China and Iraq 
jumped to US$9.86 billion by the end of 2010 from US$517.1 million in 2002, (Ibid). 
Also ironically, (a) the U.S. imports from Iraq of crude oil in 2010 were less in 
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volume in comparison before the invasion; (b) the first oil license awarded by Iraq‘s 
government after the U.S.-led invasion was to state-run China National Petroleum 
Corp. (CNPC) who won a US$3.5 billion development contract for Iraqi oil field Al-
Ahdab in November 2008, (Bloomberg, July 7, 2011). And (c) the U.S. was 
encouraging Saudi Arabia and others Arab producers (including Iraq) to increase their 
oil exports to China to make it less dependent on Iranian oil. Additionally, China and 
Iraq recently consolidated their trade ties with the two countries signing agreements 
on economic cooperation and personnel training, (Qin, 2011). 
 
(Table 10.2.2.1): U.S. Imports from Iraq of Crude Oil (mb/d) 
 
 Before the U.S. 
Invasion 
After the U.S. Invasion 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Iraq Total 
Oil Exports 
1,85 1,49 0,911 1,60 1,43 1,55 1,61 1,65 1,87 1,89
a 
To the U.S. 0,795 0,459 0,481 0,655 0,527 0,553 0,484 0,627 0,449 0,414 
Source: EIA, (July, 2011) 
(a) OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin (2010/2011) 
 
 
(Table 10.2.2.2): Iraq Main Trade Partners (2010) 
 
Main Destinations of Exports, 2010 
(share of total) 
Main Origins of Imports, 2010  
(share of total) 
US 24.3% Turkey 24.1% 
India 17.3% Syria 18.6% 
China 12.1% China 14.7% 
South Korea 8.1% US 6.5% 
Italy 6.8% Germany 3.7% 
Japan 6.5% Jordan 3.6% 
Others 24.9% Others 28.8% 
Source: based on IMF (DoTS), (July 2011) 
 
 
The International Energy Agency (IEA) is predicting that an additional 3.6 million b/d 
from both Iraq and Saudi Arabia will be needed to balance demand by 2030, (Elass & 
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Jaffe, 2011). And more worryingly for both China and the United States is the fact 
that many countries in the Middle East are vulnerable to domestic unrest or political 
crises and oil exports could easily be curtailed by work stoppages or strikes by oil 
workers or political unrest. Thus, it is very important that the United States and China 
should work together to ensure:  (a) Stability in the Gulf region; (b) Iraq‘s ability to 
complete the required projects to develop the oil sector major export infrastructure 
development projects. 
 
(Table 10.2.2.3): Over 21 (mb/d) of Middle East Oil Production could be at Stake 
from Middle East Turmoil and Political Contagion 
 
Country Median Age (years) Unemployment Rate Oil Production (mb/d) 
Algeria 27.1 10% 2.1 
Libya 24.2 30% 1.5 
Syria 21.5 8% 0.4 
Yemen 17.9 35% 0.4 
Saudi Arabia 24.9 11% 9.5 
Iran 26.3 15% 4.5 
Iraq 20.6 15% 2.8 
Source: (Elass & Jaffe, July 2011). 
 
 
As for the dollar issue, China and the Arab Gulf States has amassed around US$5 
trillion (more than three of them belong to China alone) of foreign exchange reserves 
much of it held in U.S. Treasury securities. About two-thirds of China‘s US$3.2 
trillion (end-June, 2011) in currency reserves, the world‘s largest by a wide margin 
and which are estimated to be invested in U.S. dollar-denominated assets, 
(Rabinovitch, 2011). Some observers have described this as a great shift in the global 
balance of power and China could bring the United States to its knees by threatening 
to sell its dollars. But in doing so, China would not only reduce the value of its 
reserves as the price of the dollar fell, but it would also jeopardise U.S. willingness to 
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continue to import cheap Chinese goods, which would mean job loss and instability in 
China. As Nye put it bluntly, ―If it dumped its dollars, China would bring the United 
States to its knees, but might also bring itself to its ankles‖, (Nye, October 2010).  
 
Andy Rothman, an analyst in Shanghai for the investment bank CLSA, goes on the 
similar lines to say: ―If Beijing even hinted that it might try to sell part of its 
American debt other countries might sell their dollar assets noting that this would 
drive down the value of China‘s holdings…It would be financial suicide for China‖, 
(Barboza, 2011). China carefully manages its currency, the renminbi (RMB), to 
closely track the value of the U.S. dollar. Any major disruption in the stability of the 
dollar would therefore have powerful implications for the stability of the RMB and 
have potential complications for China‘s own economic health, (Freeman & Bean, 
2011). While China holds 25 percent of U.S. foreign-held treasury securities, a sizable 
percentage, China does not hold a strategic hammerlock on the United States‘ 
international financial position, (Department of the Treasury/Federal Reserve Board, 
July 18, 2011). China is unlikely to pre-emptively abandon the dollar because of its 
own fears of resulting international chaos. However, China‘s certain goal to reduce its 
dependence on U.S. dollar–denominated debt is becoming more urgent, (Freeman & 
Bean, 2011). 
 
In this regard, Yi Gang, China‘s Director of State Administration of Foreign 
Exchange, explained that ‗‗Chinese investments in U.S. Treasuries are market 
investment behaviour and we don‘t wish to politicise them,‘‘ (Anderlini, 2010 
March). Overall China‘s options may be limited. Dong Yuping, an economist with the 
Institute of Finance and Banking at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), 
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argues that ―China faces a dilemma in its holding of the US T-bonds ... Beijing has 
little choice but to continue to buy the U.S. debt because Beijing wants a stable dollar. 
And the US Treasury bonds remain the most liquid investment product in the market‖, 
(China Daily, July 20, 2011). While Zhang Ming, also expert at (CASS), agrees that, 
―China has no choice but to keep buying …After all, US Treasury bonds are still the 
largest and most liquid investment product in the world…There‘s really nothing 
different they can do‖,  (Barboza, 2011). Furthermore, Nicholas R. Lardy, a China 
expert with the Peterson Institute for International Economics, agreed that the Chinese 
government has little incentive to begin any large sell-off of U.S. securities, and 
probably could not find a market to buy them even if it did, (Richburg, 2009). He 
went on further to say, ―If it was known they were beginning to sell their holdings, 
prices would come down and they‘d take bigger losses. They‘d be shooting 
themselves in the foot.  They‘re in the dollar trap…There‘s no easy way out of it‖, 
(Ibid). But, unlike the Cold War, Kenneth Lieberthal, a China specialist with the 
Brookings Institution in Washington, argues that the current economic version of a 
stalemate is not necessarily antagonistic; both sides benefit, (Ibid). 
 
Today, with the downgrade of U.S.‘s credit rating, many influential voices in China 
have started calling loudly to make the Chinese currency convertible and dump the 
investment in the U.S. dollar. Yu Yongding, a former academic member of the 
Monetary Policy Committee at China‘s central bank, urged Beijing to stop buying 
dollar-denominated assets in order to reduce its vulnerability to swings in the world's 
major reserve currency. He argues that: ―China must stop buying U.S. dollars and 
allow the renminbi exchange rate to be decided by market forces as soon as possible. 
China should have done so a long time ago… The situation is ultimately 
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unsustainable. The longer it continues the more violent and destructive the final 
adjustment will be‖, (Yongding, 2011). But Yu‘s comments were at odds with recent 
remarks from Xia Bin, a current academic member on the Chinese central bank‘s 
Monetary Policy Committee, who said that China can‘t have a freely floating yuan in 
the next decade, and that the dollar would be a key global reserve currency for a long 
time, (Wang, 2011). 
 
On the other hand, The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency‘s holdings of foreign 
securities rose 12 percent this year to a record 1.32 trillion riyals (US$ 350 billion), as 
shown on June 30, 2011 according to central bank data. HSBC Holdings Plc estimates 
a ―large proportion‖ of those investments are in Treasuries, (Varma & Maedler, 
2011). The advance boosted the reserve assets of the world‘s biggest oil exporter by 
12 percent to 1.86 trillion riyals, (US$496 billion) as shown on central bank data, 
(Ibid). Liz Martins, Dubai-based senior economist at HSBC, noted that,: ―Given that 
Saudi export revenues are predominantly U.S. dollar-denominated, we assume a large 
proportion of these holdings to be U.S. Treasuries, and we do not expect a major shift 
in this policy‖, (Ibid). In this regard, a secret cable was leaked by Wikileaks of a 
meeting between US Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner and Saudi Finance 
Minister Ibrahim Al Assaf in Riyadh in 2009.  In the meeting Al Assaf told Geithner, 
―We still believe that the dollar will be the dominant reserve currency and trading 
currency for a long time to come…Our policy is to support this and maintain the 
riyal-dollar peg‖, (Wikileaks, July 30, 2009). Currently there is no evidence that either 
China or Saudi Arabia are dumping the dollar. On the contrary China increased its 
holding of U.S. Treasury securities to US$1159.8 billion by the end of June 2011 and 
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from US$867.7.2 billion by the end of June 2010, (U.S. Department of the 
Treasury/Federal Reserve Board, July 15, 2011).  
 
Additionally, Charles Freeman and Jeffrey Bean from the Center for Strategic & 
International Studies (CSIS) made another important point: as China heads toward a 
year of political transition in 2012, any external source of instability will be examined 
through a prism of domestic political stability. A crisis in the value of the dollar that 
could spur inflation or a disruption in China‘s export machine will therefore be 
viewed with alarm, (Freeman & Bean, 2011). Finally, even if China and oil producing 
countries decided to diversify away from the dollar it would be gradual and not 
coordinated and based on the U.S.‘s economic performance rather than based on 
political reasons. China and the Saudi Arabia would be better advised to move to a 
managed float against a basket of currencies than to peg to another currency if there 
were to be a change, (Financial Times, August 6, 2011). 
 
The scepticism regarding the U.S. and the dollar is reinforced by the weakening 
American economy. The world needs another reserve currency. The problem is there 
is no credible alternative yet. Stuart Gulliver, the Chief Executive of HSBC and 
formerly a currency trader, argues along similar lines: ―On a secular basis, the 
dollar will continue to weaken. But on a cyclical basis, there is no alternative. There is 
a lack of [other] things to buy. There is a real absence of alternatives‖, (Financial 
Times, August 6, 2011). The U.S. dollar still has ―reserve-currency status‖, as Table 
10.3.2 shows that throughout the last decade, an average of two thirds of the total 
allocated foreign exchange reserves of countries have been in U.S. dollars. The dollar 
may remain dominant currency for at least the next decade because: (a) the Chinese 
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currency ―yuan‖ currently is non-transferable and could take another decade to 
become a convertible currency in world markets; (b) the troubles faced by the euro 
zone now; and (c) the small size of Japan and the British currency markets. 
 
(Table 10.2.2.4): Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves  
 
 1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
US Dollar 59.0 70.5 66.4 65.7 64.1 64.1 62.1% 61.5% 
Euro  18.8% 24.3% 25.2% 26.3% 26.4% 27.6% 26.2% 
Pound Sterling 2.1% 2.8% 3.6% 4.2% 4.7% 4.0% 4.3% 4.0% 
Japanese Yen 6.8% 6.3% 3.7% 3.2% 2.9% 3.1% 2.9% 3.8% 
Swiss Franc 0.3% 0.3% 0.1% 0.2% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 
Other 13.6 1.4 1.9% 1.5% 1.8% 2.2% 3.1% 4.4% 
Source: IMF, (June 2011) 
 
 
As for the future, the National Intelligence Council in its comprehensive study 
“Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World” predicts that, ―The United States will 
remain the single most powerful country but will be less dominant…The need for the 
U.S. to act as regional balancer in the Middle East will increase, although other 
outside powers - Russia, China and India - will play greater roles than today, 
(National Intelligence Council, 2008). In this regard U.S. President Barack Obama in 
a May 19, 2011 speech on the Middle East and North Africa identified what he called 
four ―core interests‖ in the region. (1) ―Countering terrorism‖, (2) ―Stopping the 
spread of nuclear weapons‖, (3) ―Securing the free flow of commerce and 
safeguarding the security of the region‖, and, (4) ―Standing up for Israel‘s security 
and pursuing Arab Israeli peace‖, (Office of the White House Press Secretary, 2011). 
The U.S. military and intelligence presence in this region is designed to support these 
objectives and to reassure U.S. allies while deterring potential adversaries such as 
Iran, (Terrill, 2011). From the Chinese perspective they have no problem (as they 
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demonstrated in the past) to respect the American interests as far as the U.S. respects 
the Chinese interests in the region. Indeed, China will continue to rely upon the U.S. 
for its energy security interest in the Middle East. Given Beijing‘s limited political 
influence and projected power and the unstable geopolitical situations in the region, 
China shows no interest in exploiting the energy relationships it might have to 
influence the oil-producing countries in the region, thereby challenging America‘s 
influence and strategic interest.   
 
In sum, it will be very difficult for the U.S. to pursue her objectives in the Middle East 
while refusing to acknowledge or take into account Chinese interests.  If the United 
States remains in control of the Middle East, but still takes into account the interests 
of China, Beijing will not stand in the face of U.S. hegemony at least in the next 
decade or two. Of course there will be differences in policies between the two 
countries, but they will be manageable if each side respect the interests of the other. 
 
 
10.2.3 Scenario One: Engage But Hedge  
 
 
Under this scenario, the United States will encourage China to play a larger global 
role and will not view China‘s increased influence in the Middle East as a threat to 
U.S. hegemony or interests.  On the contrary, the United States will gladly offer China 
more prestige. In return, however, Washington will expect Beijing to shoulder greater 
international responsibilities and obligations, (Schweller, 2011). Former U.S. 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger argues that the United States and China should 
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―find a way to cooperate‖ to avoid strategic confrontation. Kissinger‘s advice in his 
recent book ―On China‖ is this, ―The U.S. should not seek an enemy in China à la 
Huntington but cooperation in a global condominium.‖ Kissinger believes that: 
―Chinese thinkers developed strategic thought that placed a premium on victory 
through psychological advantage and preached the avoidance of direct conflict… 
Relations between China and the United States need not – and should not – become a 
zero-sum game…Key issues on the international front are global in nature. Consensus 
may prove difficult, but confrontation on these issues is self-defeating‖, (Kissinger, 
2011). In On China, Kissinger says: 
―Eight American presidents and four generations of Chinese leaders have managed this 
delicate [non-conflictual] relationship in an astonishingly consistent manner, considering the 
difference in starting points.‖ Yet their exceptionalisms go in different directions: ―American 
exceptionalism is missionary. It holds that the United States has an obligation to spread its 
values to every part of the world. Chinese exceptionalism is cultural. China does not 
proselytise; it does not claim that its contemporary institutions are relevant outside China.‖  
 
Furthermore, Franklin Lavin, who previously served as Undersecretary for 
International Trade at the U.S. Department of Commerce, where he was lead 
negotiator for China and has also served as U.S. Ambassador to Singapore (2001–
2005), uses similar lines to argue that: ―Since the Nixon-to-China moment, we have 
had about four decades of relations, across eight presidents, both political parties, a 
range of philosophies, different challenges, and different times. But, there is a high 
degree of continuity in that relationship and I think there are two pillars that allow for 
that continuity. One is the pillar of engagement that, regardless of the issue or the 
challenge, we were not going to break off or try to diminish relations but always try to 
find a way to improve them. The second pillar is respect for China‘s ―One-China‖ 
policy, that we would not seek to undermine that, although we certainly have interests 
vis à vis Taiwan. But we never tried to directly do something to diminish the one-
China policy‖, (Lavin, 2011). 
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Indeed, the U.S. and Chinese economies - the world‘s largest and the fastest-growing 
major economy, respectively - have become inextricably intertwined, locked in a kind 
of co-dependency that neither side thinks is particularly healthy, but which for the 
moment neither will move to break, (Richburg, 2009). China depends largely on the 
United States as the most important market for its cheap goods. America, with 
growing budget deficits and a huge national debt, depends on China as the main 
holder of U.S. Treasury securities, with Beijing‘s stockpile officially estimated to be 
nearly US$1.15 billion (at the end of June, 2011).  
 
(Table 10.2.3.1): China‟s Top 5 Export Partners in 2010 
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
U.S 54,3 70,0 92,6 125,1 163,3 203,8 233,1 252,7 221,3 283,6 
Hong Kong 46,5 58,4 76,2 101,1 124,5 155,4 184,2 190,7 166,2 218,2 
Japan 45,0 48,4 59,4 73,5 84,0 91,7 10,21 116,1 98,0 120,2 
South Korea 12,5 15,5 20,0 27,8 35,1 44,5 56,1 73,9 53,6 68,8 
Germany 9,7 11,3 17,5 23,7 32,5 40,3 48,7 59,1 49,9 68,0 
Source: IMF (July, 2011) 
 
 
In this context Kenneth Lieberthal argues that, ―China and the U.S. are in a fairly 
advanced stage of economic mutual interdependence…I think the Chinese can pull 
the rug out from under our economy only if they want to pull the rug out from under 
themselves…I think it is in neither of our interests to see that unravel.‖ He added: ―If 
we can find ways to manage our differences and cooperate where we can, we both 
win. If not, we both lose‖, (Ibid). Indeed, as the case studies have shown, the United 
States alone cannot single-handedly shoulder the task of stability and security of the 
Middle East. Meanwhile, China is still incapable of projecting power in the Middle 
East and that robs it of significant strategic and political leverages in the power play 
in the Middle East, (Kapila, 2011). Also Kierman argues on similar lines that China‘s 
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rise as a Middle East power can be managed by the United States if Beijing can be 
convinced that it shares the same interests as the developed-economy oil consumers - 
stability in oil-producing areas, resource development through cooperation, reduced 
oil and gas consumption - and if at the same time the U.S. recognises that China has 
legitimate concerns about its own energy security that can be addressed in a 
cooperative way, (Kiernan, 2008). 
 
Despite that the U.S. views China‘s presence in the region with some apprehension, 
so far there is no evidence that it has an exclusionary policy toward China. The U.S 
seems to be accommodating to China‘s oil needs, and China is reciprocating by being 
sensitive to American interest in the Middle East, (Olimat, 2010). Indeed the case 
studies have shown that the Chinese strategy towards Saudi Arabia and the Middle 
East is not a government conspiracy, nor is it indicative of aggressive Chinese 
strategic posturing. Alterman and Garver argue in their book, ―The Vital Triangle: 
China, the United States and the Middle East‖, that two nations (Saudi Arabia and 
China) made narrow agreement in their mutual interest, uncomplicated by either 
country‘s sense of its global role or its global responsibility. Saudi Arabia has oil, 
China needs oil. On that basis, agreements were made, (Alterman & Garver, 2008). 
They go further to say, China is not and does not seek to be a rival of the United 
States in the Middle East, (Ibid). 
 
The case studies have also shown that Chinese actions are more closely linked to the 
economic interdependence theory of international relations; therefore, it may be 
possible to increase Sino-U.S. cooperation as long as each side acknowledges and 
respects each other‘s economic and national interests. China is not determined to 
392 
 
undermine U.S. objectives in the Middle East as long as it does not feel its economic 
interests are threatened. We have seen this in China‘s stance on many Middle Eastern 
crises such as Kuwait, Iraq, Bahrain, Sudan, the Iranian nuclear crisis, the Libyan 
conflict and even in Saudi Arabia. The main point of controversy between China and 
the United States in the Gulf region is certainly Iran. While it is in China‘s economic 
interest to see a strong Iranian regime that can provide it with long-term energy, 
China has gradually weakened its support for Iran culminating in its June 2010 UN 
vote to support a resolution imposing a new round of sanctions on Iran for continuing 
its uranium enrichment program. The change in the Chinese stance is because they 
realise that the proliferation of nuclear weapons is not beneficial for China and is also 
counterproductive towards Middle East stability and security. Somewhat ironically, 
the United States is now said to be urging Saudi Arabia and others to step up oil and 
gas exports to China in order to undercut Chinese dependence on Iran, (Freeman, 
2009).  
 
While some analysts in China and the U.S. may believe that it may not be possible for 
China and the United States to work together, there are indications that state 
otherwise. In the public levels, polls by the Pew Global Research Center in July 2011 
indicate that 51 percent of Americans still have a generally favourable view of China, 
while about 44 percent of the Chinese people have a generally favourable view of the 
U.S., (Pew Global Research Centre, July 13, 2011). The two countries instituted the 
China-U.S. Strategic and Economic Dialogues mechanism. China and the United 
States have carried out practical cooperation in a wide range of areas including 
economy and trade, energy, the environment, counter-terrorism, law enforcement and 
culture. The two countries have maintained close contact and coordination in dealing 
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with major international and regional hotspot issues and addressing global challenges, 
such as climate change and the international financial crisis. The strategic significance 
and global impact of China-U.S. relations have been on the rise, (The Washington 
Post, 16 January, 2011). 
 
Politically, China and the United States still share a wide range of common interests. 
These include promoting the peace process in the Middle East, bringing to an end the 
Palestinian–Israeli conflict and stabilising the Iraqi situation, (Li, 2009). The two 
countries also share a need for cooperation in areas such as counter-terrorism and 
WMD and missile technology non-proliferation efforts which are crucial to 
maintaining regional stability in the Middle East, (Rachel, 2006: 312). Above all, both 
countries share a deep interest in regional stability and the free flow of energy, 
(Alterman & Garver, 2008). The interruption of energy supplies is not in the interest 
of either country, and on this front there is considerable room for Sino-American 
cooperation, (Wehrey, 2010: 62). This view is shared by John Sfakianakis who 
believes that is a noticeable shift in trading flows and that this, in itself, is offering 
economic alternatives to Saudi Arabia. However, he argues that the relationship 
should not be seen as a shift in Saudi Arabia‘s politico-military direction, 
(Sfakianakis, 2009).  
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(Figure 10.2.3.1):  China and the U.S. Highly Interdependent with Saudi Arabia 
 
 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, (July, 2011) 
 
 
Yitzhak Shichor goes further to suggest that giving the highest priority to economic 
relations may, in fact, constrain China‘s political options. Moreover, China‘s 
integration into the international economy subordinates the Chinese to a variety of 
norms, regulations, and rules that limit their room to manoeuvre, (Shichor, 2006). 
Nawaf Obaid, a Saudi expert who has insight in this issue, argues that Chinese 
dependence on Saudi Arabia for its energy needs will not present any direct threat to 
U.S. national interests, (Obaid, 2002).  In general Chinese reliance on foreign oil will 
lead to its deeper integration into the global economy, (Ibid). 
 
While China has sought to expand its footprint in the region and become more 
proactive in ensuring its access to Middle East markets and share of the region‘s oil 
and gas, this expansion of China‘s role in regional affairs is likely to proceed 
gradually and remain focused on the economic dimension, (Wehrey, 2010: 56). It 
seems that the Chinese are aware of these equations as well. In this regard, Xia 
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Yishan, a researcher specialising in China‘s energy strategy at the China Institute of 
International Studies, argues that: ―China‘s influence in the Middle East should be 
estimated realistically. It is just an active participant in the redistribution of 
international resources. The U.S. position in the Middle East won‘t change in a very 
long period. In the Middle East, China should focus on economic relations and 
endeavor to boost its cooperation with multinational oil companies. Chinese 
companies should change their usual practice of seeking oil alone, and instead look 
for ways of sharing risks‖, (Chen and Huang, 2011).  Li Guofu goes in the same 
direction to say: ―At present, whether we like it or not, the United States is the most 
dominant outside power in the region and it has broad regional interests in the Middle 
East. We have made it clear to the United States that China‘s policy of strengthening 
its relationships within the region is neither aimed at undermining U.S. regional 
interests nor aimed at challenging the U.S.‘s dominant position‖, (Li, 2009).  China 
might not be comfortable accepting a ―free ride‖ on American military protection. 
But, at least for the time being, it has no alternatives, (Obaid, 2002).  
 
In the energy realm, China and the United States are the two biggest players on the 
international energy markets and will retain their positions as the world‘s largest oil 
importers far into the future, (Lieberthal & Herberg, 2006: 42). Both countries also 
face similar serious energy challenges: increasing dependence on foreign sources of 
energy, high energy prices, and increased environmental degradation caused by the 
rise in energy use, (Medeiros, 2009). The two countries also share enormous interests 
in maintaining overall supply security and price stability, two goals that are well 
served by far greater and more effective bilateral and multilateral cooperation, 
(Lieberthal & Herberg, 2006).  
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As the two largest consumers of oil worldwide, the U.S. and China share common 
interests: avoiding disruption to global energy supplies, ensuring political stability in 
key oil producer regions, accelerating the development of alternative energy sources, 
limiting domestic consumption, increasing energy efficiency, creating greater transit 
and fuel flexibility, and reducing the environmental impacts of fossil fuel 
consumption. Beijing and Washington should seek to ameliorate differences on tense 
energy issues. Although dialogues on energy security conceptualisations and policy 
preferences are positive, they must move beyond talking toward a true partnership 
that can confront the common challenges they face as importers, (Zha & Hu, 2007). 
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, in his address at the Copenhagen climate change 
summit (Copenhagen, December 18, 2009) argued that both Beijing and Washington 
have begun work to increase the use of clean energy as well as to develop new energy 
sources. Though China is arguably the world‘s largest greenhouse gas emitter, it also 
ranks first in the installation of hydroelectric power capacity, nuclear power capacity 
under construction, the coverage of solar water panels, and photovoltaic power 
capacity, (Jiabao, 2009). Meanwhile, since Obama entered office, the United States 
has become more active in developing its green economy. The two countries have 
also agreed to cooperate in a wide range of areas related to energy and the 
environment.
20
 
 
Within this context some specific measures can build mutual trust while reducing the 
risk of U.S.-China conflict over oil. Firstly, China should be engaged in multilateral 
energy institutions such as the International Energy Agency (IEA). In order to foster 
                                                             
20 See the Memorandum of Understanding to Enhance Cooperation on Climate Change, Energy, and 
Environment between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the 
People‘s Republic of China, available on: [http://www.state.gov/documents/organisation/126802.pdf.] 
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more Sino-U.S. dialogue on energy security and to coordinate international energy 
security policies with China‘s policies, the United States should support China‘s 
admission into the International Energy Agency (IEA). As long as China is not part of 
the IEA, Chinese energy security policies may continue to pose a challenge to the 
western nations‘ efforts on energy security, (Leverett & Bader, 2005/2006). A 
sensible and prudent approach would start by ensuring that the market has as much 
information about supply and demand as possible. More reliable data would dampen 
short-term volatility by reducing uncertainty and facilitating timely investments in 
production capacity, limiting the amplitude of price extremes over the long term, 
(Robert & Michael, 2011). The Chinese Government has been particularly reluctant to 
participate in such arrangements so far. But, as its oil consumption balloons, China 
increasingly stands to gain from stamping down volatility, too, (Ibid). Nobuo Tanaka, 
Executive Director of the IEA, recently told the Financial Times: ―Our relevance is 
under question because half of the energy consumption is already in non-Organisation 
of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. And for oil it is soon 
coming that the majority of consumption is happening in non-OECD countries, 
(Hoyos, 2010)… In many ways they [the Chinese] are already working closely with 
us. But eventually we wish they would join us…For the sake of transparency, we need 
their help‖, (Ibid). 
 
Chinese coordination with the IEA and participation in its various activities could 
prove to be very important in the event of future oil supply uncertainty on the 
international markets, (Lieberthal & Herberg, 2006: 33). The United States expressed 
support for China to join the organisation as a non-OECD member, but to date, 
however, China has not sought to join. Beijing remains uncomfortable with 
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international energy markets and institutions, and it would prefer not to rely so 
heavily on other countries to secure the sea lines of communication on which it 
depends, (Stanway, 2011). Beijing has been wary of joining multilateral organisations 
it sees as being controlled by rich developed countries, particularly the U.S., (Hoyos, 
2010). 
 
China has been relatively slow to give out critical oil market data, but it is beginning 
to work more closely with the IEA and the IEF, which collects data from both 
producers and consumers. Yet, the IEA on its ―Medium-Term Oil & Gas Markets 
2011‖ noted that at the international level, policy is moving in the right direction but 
moving too slowly. Multilateral forums like IEA, the International Energy Forum, and 
the G-20 all have oil market transparency squarely on the agenda. IEA has also 
stepped up its bilateral engagement, working with China‘s National Energy 
Administration to improve the quality of Chinese energy statistics and forecasting, 
(IEA, medium-term oil & gas markets 2011). Mid-ranking Chinese officials have 
been allowed to attend IEA committee meetings on issues such as the energy security 
dialogue and energy technologies. They have also attended meetings on more 
sensitive subjects, such as emergency response and long-term policy planning, 
(Hoyos, 2010). Meanwhile, China‘s ministry of science and technology is translating 
much of the IEA‘s work into Chinese and the IEA itself has a Chinese version of its 
website, (Ibid).  
 
Furthermore, the so-called ―Arab Spring‖ of 2011 and its aftermath have provided a 
reminder that global events are unpredictable and play a vital role in shaping the 
direction of the oil market and highlight the need of cooperation. That cooperation 
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between China and the International Energy Agency was demonstrated on June 2011 
when the IEA consulted China before it authorised the release of 60 million barrels of 
its emergency reserves in June 2011, (Ma, 2011), in response to the ongoing 
disruption of oil supplies from Libya to ensure that adequate supplies of oil were 
available to the global market, (IEA, June 2011). In a statement released after the IEA 
action China‘s National Energy Administration (NEA) said that, ―China appreciates 
and supports the International Energy Agency‘s (IEA) decision to release strategic oil 
reserves to ease supply disruptions in Libya…The IEA‘s move will increase the 
global supply of crude oil and help to stabilise prices‖, (Xinhua,  June 24, 2011).  
 
Although IEA officials do not expect Chinese membership overnight, they do believe 
it could be possible within the next five years. In this regard, IEA‘s Executive 
Director believes that China eventually will join and he cites five reasons why closer 
co-operation with the IEA would be beneficial: (a) Enhanced energy security through 
support from IEA partners as well as coordination during major disruptions in the 
supply of oil; (b) Participation in a community which is influential in shaping future 
energy security and sustainability on a global level; (c) Participation in open 
discussions relating to technology policy and better access to state-of-the-art 
technologies themselves; (d) The opportunity to learn and benefit from best practices 
of other countries in areas such as statistics or energy efficiency; and (e) The chance 
to demonstrate to the world that China is reaching the point of development where it 
can confidently engage alongside other developed economies in areas of global 
importance, (Tanaka, 2011). 
 
400 
 
Additionally, Stanway urges that Washington should reinvigorate efforts to draw the 
new major oil-consuming states, such as China, into coordinating their policies on 
strategic reserves. China is finally building strategic reserves and a report issued by 
the China National Petroleum Corp‘s research unit showed that China‘s total storage 
capacity reached 24.38 million tonnes (178 million barrels) by the end of 2010, 
suggesting that 76 million barrels of the project‘s second phase has now been built, 
(Stanway, 2011). This development should share the burden of responding to 
disruptions with the United States and others. A coordinated policy would make the 
world better able to respond to supply disruptions and thus limit unnecessary price 
swings, (McNally & Michael, 2011). 
 
Secondly, encourage Chinese energy efficiency and environmental protection. China 
will aggressively pursue clean energy policies for the foreseeable future, driven 
mostly by the desire to reduce its dependence on overseas energy supplies. China is 
working to reduce its economy‘s ―energy intensity‖ as the Chinese Government has 
committed to reducing its carbon intensity reduction target. China‘s 12th 5-Year Plan 
(2011-2015) has set targets to further reduce energy intensity by 16 percent by 2015. 
Along with measures to reduce pollution and increase the shares of non-fossil fuels in 
the energy sector, China has set goals to improve its CO2 intensity by 40-45 percent 
by 2020, with an interim target in the 12th 5-Year Plan of 17 percent by 2015, (The 
China Greentech Initiative, 2011: 24). According to the recent report published by 
McKinsey & Company titled, ―China‘s green revolution: Prioritizing technologies to 
achieve energy and environmental sustainability‖, China could build a ―green 
economy‖ and emerge as a global leader in clean energy technologies during the next 
two decades, (McKinsey & Company, 2009: 10). By investing in technologies 
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commercially available today, China could reduce its projected oil imports by up to 
30 to 40 percent, cut demand for coal by 40 percent, and reduce greenhouse gases by 
up to 50 percent throughout to 2030. China could also emerge as a global leader in 
green technologies such as electric vehicles, (Ibid).    
 
Daniel Kammen, the chief technical specialist for renewable energy and energy 
efficiency at the World Bank Group, noted that quiet cooperation between China and 
America does exist, in the form of decades of joint work on energy efficiency 
standards, (Kammen, 2011). That cooperation reached its peak in November 2009, 
when U.S President Barack Obama and Chinese President Jintao Hu announced seven 
new U.S.-China clean energy initiatives during their Beijing summit: (A) U.S.-China 
Clean Energy Research Center; (b) Electric Vehicles Initiative; (c) Energy efficiency 
action plan; (d) Renewable Energy Partnership; (e) 21st century coal; (F) Shale gas 
(produced from shale) resource initiative; and (g) Energy cooperation program. All of 
these initiatives work on cooperation projects in renewable energy, developing 
electric cars, smart grid, clean transportation, green building, clean coal, combined 
heat and power, and energy efficiency, (DOE,  January 2011). The seven areas of 
cooperation are also within the U.S.-China Framework for the ten year cooperation on 
energy and environment within the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, 
 (S & ED) (DOE, June 2011). 
 
There is no doubt that this cooperation will enhance energy security in both countries. 
And, of course, will open a huge market for clean energy, which will provide 
enormous economic opportunities for U.S. companies. About 70 percent of China‘s 
energy and 80 percent of its electricity come from coal. The U.S., too, is dependent on 
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coal, 49 percent of its electricity in 2010 came from coal, and both countries import 
more than 50 percent of their total oil consumption, (Kammen, 2011). Additionally 
both nations have made clean energy investment central to national energy strategies 
and the two countries need each other in order to build a clean energy economy for 
the 21st century, (Ibid). In short, this situation will provide both countries with strong 
incentives to cooperate in energy and other issues. China Greentech Initiative 
estimated that China‘s addressable ―green-tech market‖ could reach US$500 billion to 
US$1 trillion by 2013, (The China Greentech Initiative, 2011: 24). In this regard, the 
United States Secretary of Energy, Steven Chu, wrote on January 2011 in the 
introduction of the progress report by the U.S. Department of Energy titled, ―U.S.-
China Clean Energy Cooperation‖ in which he summarised the cooperation between 
China and the United States and stated U.S.‘s in a very pragmatic way: 
―… As the world‘s largest producers and consumers of energy, the United States and China 
share many common challenges and common interests. Our clean energy partnership with 
China can help boost America‘s exports, creating jobs here at home, and ensure that our 
country remains at the forefront of technology innovation. At the U.S. Department of Energy, 
we are committed to working with Chinese partners to promote a sustainable energy future. 
Working together, we can accomplish more than acting alone.‖ (DOE, 2011) 
 
China is already the world‘s largest investor in the renewable energy sector and 
emerging as the world‘s clean energy powerhouse. For the first time, China took the 
top spot for overall clean energy finance and investment in 2010, (UNEP, 2011: 5). 
According to the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), ―Global Trends 
in Renew Energy Investment 2011‖, the world invested in 2010 a record US$211 
billion in renewable energy. It was boosted in particular by wind farm development in 
China and small-scale solar PV installation on rooftops in Europe. China‘s total of 
US$48.9 billion dwarfed all other countries, accounting for more than two-thirds of 
the developing countries total and more than a third of the global total. (UNEP, 
2011:11-12 & 18), (See Figure 10.4.1). 
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(Figure 10.2.3.2) Top 10 in Renewable Energy Investments, (2010, US$ bn) 
 
 
Source: Bloomberg New Energy Finance, UNEP (2011) 
 
 
In the military realm, the military relations between the two countries are weak, 
meaning they are often the first and the most affected when the China-U.S. relations 
experience ups and downs, (People‟s Daily Online, July 14, 2011). Regular contact 
has been suspended a number of times over the past two decades and each new 
cancellation sparks a round of worrying over the causes of the rift, (Auslin, 2011). 
Schiffer Michael, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for East Asia, argues 
that the military-to-military relationship remains among the least developed parts of 
the U.S.-China relationship. The U.S. Congress sought to limit the scope of the 
military relationship in the National Defence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 
(P.L. 106-65), when it barred exchanges or contacts with China that include 
―inappropriate exposure‖ to a range of subjects, including surveillance and 
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reconnaissance operations and arms sales, (Schiffer, 2011). The U.S.-China relations 
also remain dogged by long-standing mutual mistrust. For the United States, points of 
friction included China‘s currency and industrial policies; its reluctance to condemn a 
series of North Korean provocations; its expansive claims to disputed territory in the 
South China Sea; and its ongoing suppression of domestic dissent, (Lawrence & Lum, 
2011). For China, points of friction include U.S. arms sales to Taiwan; the American 
President‘s meeting with Tibet‘s exiled spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama; U.S. joint 
military exercises with South Korea in the Yellow Sea; and the U.S. declaration of a 
―national interest‖ in the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, (Ibid). 
 
Yet, Obama‘s Administration has pushed hard for a Chinese commitment to a 
―reliable and sustained‖ military relationship, arguing that, ―The on-again-off-again 
cycle that has all too often characterised the military-to-military relationship increases 
the risks and dangers of an incident or accident that could derail the overall bilateral 
relationship‖, (Michael, 2011). U.S. President Barack Obama and Chinese President 
Jintao Hu decided during a 2009 presidential summit in Beijing to advance and 
sustain military-to-military relationships. China abruptly cut off military exchanges 
after the United States announced arms sales to Taiwan in January 2010, (Miles, 
2011). But China-U.S. relations have rebounded thanks to joint efforts from both 
sides, (People‟s Daily Online, July 14, 2011). The Obama Administration‘s decision 
to open up some sensitive military installations can be interpreted as a sign of 
goodwill towards China as well as reciprocation of China‘s gesture to open up its own 
military bases, such as the PLA Second Artillery Command Post, to the U.S., (Teng, 
2011). Additionally, Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of 
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Staff, recently visited China in January, 2011. This visit is a response to top Chinese 
General Chen Bingde‘s earlier visit to the Washington, (Miles, 2011). 
 
Within this context, the then-U.S. Defence Secretary Robert M. Gates believes that, 
―Military-to-military contacts between U.S. and China contributes, not only to greater 
understanding, but contributes to avoiding miscalculations and misunderstandings and 
miscommunications‖, (Garamone, 2011). Gates is hoping that a system of regular 
contact between the U.S. and Chinese defence officials can help avoid an arms race, 
increase transparency, reduce suspicion, and eases the pressure that would otherwise 
push for greater military preparation on both sides, (Haddick, 2011). While Admiral 
Mike Mullen, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, regards the American 
military ties with China as ―absolutely vital‖, (Bloomberg, July 10, 2011). He offers 
―three tones‖ for both nations to build on as they renew their military relationship to 
complement cooperation being seen in political and economic channels, (Miles, 
2011). First, both the United States and China must ―work from a posture of mutual 
respect‖, recognising each others‘ strengths and achievements. Secondly, both the 
United States and China must recognise that local issues that impact Asia and the 
Pacific often have global implications. Finally, the two nations should look ―to the 
future, not to the past‖, (Ibid). 
 
Many policy makers in Washington may be opposed to this approach because closer 
coordination between the United States and China will force the United States to 
acknowledge Chinese economic, military, and political interests. These policy makers 
may view this as a decrease in U.S. power and influence in the Middle East, which 
may be the case. But other options would likely cause an even larger decline in U.S. 
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power and influence. Working against or ignoring Chinese interests will only 
embolden China to undermine U.S. efforts in the Middle East even further. On the 
other hand, China‘s Minister of Defence General Liang Guanglie suggested that any 
future Taiwan arms sales could again disrupt the relationship. During a joint press 
conference with the then U.S. Secretary in Beijing in January, 2011, Liang stated that, 
―The United States arms sales to Taiwan seriously damaged China‘s core interests and 
we do not want to see that happen again; neither do we hope that the U.S. arms sales 
to Taiwan will again further disrupt our bilateral and military-to-military 
relationship‖, (U.S. Department of Defence, January 10, 2011).  
 
While some analysts may believe that it may not be possible for China and the United 
States to work together, there are indications that state otherwise. China and the 
United States have shown that they can work together towards mutual objectives with 
their handling of the Taiwan issue, the North Korean nuclear crisis, Iraq‘s post-
invasion energy sector development, Iran‘s UN sanctions, Libyan conflict and the 
independence of South Sudan.  Through intensive dialogue and cooperation, China 
and the United States were able to overcome their differences peacefully. The 
foundation to increase Sino-U.S. dialogue and cooperation exists. The question is 
whether the United States and China will take advantage of the situation. Chinese 
scholar Jianqun Teng argues that relatively stable security relations between China 
and the U.S. will endure for a while. With the U.S. presidential election just around 
the corner, Obama needs to score diplomatic points while trying to avoid losing points 
for issues like North Korea‘s nuclear program. There‘s not much room for the U.S. to 
show off its talents in northeast Asia and keeping China close will reinforce Obama‘s 
image. On a deeper level, with China and the U.S. becoming more and more 
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interdependent, direct confrontation benefits no one, (Teng, 2011). Teng suggests 
several reasons for his optimism and these can be summarised as follows: (a) Political 
relations between the two countries have gradually improved and developed, and the 
deepening of dialogue on security issues has guaranteed the smooth development of 
China-U.S. military exchanges; (b) China‘s capabilities have been greatly enhanced 
especially in the last decade, along with the strengthening of its military power, and 
this has led the U.S. to pay close attention to China‘s military development; and (c) 
Although the U.S. has adopted aggressive policies in the Asia-Pacific region, its 
fundamental interest still lies in maintaining stability in the region instead of sparking 
off conflicts or causing direct confrontations, (Ibid). 
 
Finally, Yan Xuetong, Director of Tsinghua University‘s Institute of International 
Studies, sums up the U.S.-China relations in very interesting words: ―Despite the 
interdependence and the mutual benefits, many in both countries remain deeply 
suspicious of each other‘s intentions…At this point no one can say China and the 
United States are friends. It‘s better to say we are competitors, like McDonald‘s and 
Burger King are competitors…McDonald‘s wants to open more shops, not destroy 
Burger King and in the process destroy itself. Why would we be so silly as to hurt 
ourselves? (Richburg, 2009) 
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10.3 IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MAJOR ASIAN POWERS 
 
The centre of gravity of international relations is decisively shifting towards Asia. In 
such a scenario, the rise of China and India is taken for granted. The rapid economic 
rise of the two countries—each with a population of more than a billion—has 
contributed to the notion of ‗Chindia‘ in popular imagination, (Holslag, 2010). The 
current great and emerging powers of the world, including the United States, China, 
India, Japan, and the European Union, all vie for natural resources from the Middle 
East. China, India and to less extent the United States are the main powers that seek to 
secure oil and natural gas from the region to fuel their economies, (Gresh, 2010). 
China is currently the second- largest economy in the world, while India will likely 
surpass Japan in the next decade to become the second-largest economy in Asia (and 
the third in world).   
 
Consequently, the geopolitical landscape of the world‘s energy demand and supply 
has changed. First, most consumers in the West are starting to view ―green‖ sources 
of energy in a more favourable light than the fossil fuels that have hitherto largely 
powered the industrialised world, (Hoyos, 2010). Second, and perhaps more 
importantly, the oil market, is facing a significant shift in demand from West to East. 
Demand from the customers which Saudi Arabia has supplied for the past 50 years is 
stagnating, as market saturation and environmental policies move the U.S. and Europe 
away from oil. However, energy-hungry Asian nations, such as India and particularly 
China, are taking their place, refocusing the country‘s attention eastward, (Ibid). 
Indeed, the Asia Pacific region was importing an average 18 (mb/d) in 2010. This 
total rises to an estimated 22 (mb/d) in 2015, (BMI, 2011:14) and could reach over 30 
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(mb/d) in 2030, (EIA, 2011). The principal importers will be China, India, Japan and 
South Korea, (BMI, 2011:14). 
 
Japan continued to be one of the biggest importers of petroleum from Saudi Arabia 
and the Middle East. According to EIA, Japan consumed 4.4 (mb/d) of oil in 2010, 
making it the third largest petroleum consumer in the world, behind the United States 
and China. However, oil demand in Japan has been declining since 2005. This decline 
stems from structural factors, such as fuel substitution, an aging population, and 
government-mandated energy efficiency targets, (EIA, Japan: Country Analysis 
Briefs, 2011). In the medium and long terms, Japan‘s total oil consumptions and 
imports will continue to be flat or decline, (see tables Table 10.2.1 & 10.2.2). Overall, 
though, Japan is unlikely to become a major military power given its colossal fiscal 
and debt burdens (which reduce the scope for a bigger defence budget) and a lack of 
public support for such a role. In the event of intensified Sino-Indian rivalry in the 
Indian Ocean, most projections expect Japan to be sympathetic to India and the US, 
but Tokyo cannot afford to antagonise Beijing, given that China is now Japan‘s top 
trade partner, (BMI, Pakistan Defence & Security Report, 2010:50).  
 
But Japan‘s strategic relationship with the US remains a central pillar of its foreign 
policy. Despite the growing debate within Japan between those (in a minority) that 
want foreign policy to focus on improving ties with China, owing to its growing 
diplomatic and economic weight, and those that view China‘s rise as a threat that 
should encourage Japan to remain close to the US, (EIU, Country Report: Japan, 
January, 2011:5). Japan needs to sustain the alliance with the US, on which it is 
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dependent for its military security; and this requires it to accommodate US demands, 
(Miyagi, 2011). 
 
Meanwhile, South Korea‘s oil consumption has remained relatively steady over the 
past decade and will continue in the same direction in the next two decades, (see 
tables Table 10.2.1 & 10.2.2).  South Korea imported over 2.2 (mb/d) of total oil in 
2010, and was the world‘s sixth largest crude oil importer in 2010. South Korea is 
highly dependent on the Middle East for its oil supply, with the Arabian Gulf 
accounting for nearly 75 percent of its 2010 total oil imports. Saudi Arabia was the 
leading supplier, and the source of more than a quarter of total oil imports, (EIA, 
South Korea: Country Analysis Briefs, 2011). Since the 1950s, Seoul‘s foreign policy 
has been driven principally by deterrence and defense requirements vis-à-vis North 
Korea, (Min, 2011:160). While South Korea‘s immediate defence concerns will 
naturally focus on North Korea, the government is looking beyond the threat from 
Pyongyang and is seeking greater naval capabilities. Seoul has joined anti-piracy 
activities, and many experts expect South Korea to increase its naval capabilities 
along the route to the Arabian Gulf. However, it is probably too weak to exert 
influence independently, (BMI, South Korea, 2010:50). South Korea will seek to 
maintain warm relations with the US. Both countries recognise the importance of their 
strategic partnership in the political and economic arenas. This will be strengthened 
now that their respective legislatures have finally ratified the South Korea-US 
bilateral free-trade agreement (FTA), which was signed in 2007, (EIU, Country 
Report: Japan, January, 2011:6). 
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 (Table 10.3.1): Asia Pacific Oil Consumption, Production and Imports, (selected 
countries 2010-2015) 
 
 Projections 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
China Consumption 8.907 9.426 9.945 10.392 10.829 11.235 
production 4.076 4.079 4.089 4.114 4.135 4.112 
Imports 4.831 5.347 5.856 6.287 6.694 7.123 
India Consumption 3.315 3.450 3.610 3.818 4.038 4.265 
production 0.910 1.035 1.095 1.150 0.940 0.925 
Imports 2.405 2.415 2.515 2.668 3.098 3.340 
Japan Consumption 4.422 4.188 4.138 4.088 4.088 4.113 
production 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.015 0.015 
Imports 4.405 4.171 4.121 4.171 4.073 4.098 
South Korea Consumption 2.249 2.267 2.293 2.315 2.335 2.351 
production 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 
Imports 2.234 2.252 2.278 2.300 2.320 2.336 
Source: All figures adapted and calculated by the author from (BMI, 2011) 
 
 
In this context, China and India are seen as racing ahead in terms of explosive 
economic growth, as competitors over energy markets and increasingly indispensable 
pillars of regional stability, (Bidawai, 2010). China and India are expected to remain 
as the twin engines of global oil demand growth over the next two decade on the back 
of strong economic growth. The numbers behind China and India‘s seemingly 
insatiable thirst for energy are mind-boggling. For example, Chinese demand for 
petroleum reached over 9 million barrels per day in 2010, and is projected to jump to 
around 16.4 billion barrels in 2030. Although China has massively increased its 
refining capacity to meet most of its current and projected needs, the estimate is that 
China will still need to import over 12 million barrels of crude oil in 2030, up from 
4.8 million barrels currently. This means 70 percent to 80 percent of China‘s crude oil 
needs will be from imports, (Annual Energy Outlook 2011). The numbers for India are 
smaller but still overwhelming. India consumes 3.3 million barrels per day, two-thirds 
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of them imported. According to EIA analysis of projected trends, India will eventually 
be importing around 6-7 million barrels per day, roughly 90 percent of its future 
petroleum needs, (Ibid). 
 
(Table 10.3.2): Liquids Consumption by Selected Country, (2015-2035, mb/d) 
 
 Projections, (Reference case) 
 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 
U.S 20.4 20.7 21.0 21.4 21.9 
China 12.1 13.6 15.6 16.4 16.9 
Japan 4.3 4.6 4.7 4.6 4.5 
India 3.8 4.6 5.7 6.8 7.5 
South Korea 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.6 
Total World 93.3 97.6 103.2 108.0 112.2 
Note: Conventional liquids include crude oil and lease condensates natural gas plant liquids 
Source: EIA, Annual Energy Outlook 2011 
 
 
As a result, the realists argue that geopolitics dominates the Sino-India relationship, 
(Scott, 2008). China‘s relationship with Pakistan, and forays in the Indian Ocean 
Region, are seen as encirclement strategies, prompting India‘s Look East policy. This 
competition is accentuated due to the increasing energy demands in both countries, 
(Garver, 2001:447).  On the other hands Liberals predict that the imperative for 
economic development will propel India and China towards peace, (Guihong, 2005). 
The liberals feel that India and China‘s economies have advantages in different 
sectors, thus they are complementary, (Frazier, 2004). This theory sees greater 
convergence between India and China on issues relating to global economic 
governance and views the border conflict as a legacy of the past, (Emmott, 2009:315). 
 
Though India‘s relations with China have improved considerably in the last few years, 
this relationship remains by and large competitive, if not in outright conflict. This is 
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particularly true with the competition for global energy resources, (Pant, 2011) 
Moreover, India‘s aspirations to emerge as a major global power may also lead it to 
counter China‘s growing influence around the globe, (Ibid), and rivalry for regional 
and global influence, (Sujit, 2011). In this context, Jonathan Holslag the Head of 
Research at the Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies in his recent book 
China and India: Prospects for Peace argues that between China and India is 
economic competition and rivalries. Holslag gives four main reasons for his 
scepticism. Firstly, economic complementarities between India and China will 
disappear once India begins to challenge China in manufacturing and China competes 
with India in IT and services. Cooperation will then be replaced by economic 
competition and rivalries, (Holslag, 2010:168). Secondly, public perception in both 
countries is characterised by acute mutual suspicion. This will constrain the political 
leadership from having a cooperative relationship, (Ibid). Thirdly, ‗trade and mutual 
economic gains have not neutralised the military-security dilemma‘. There has been 
no breakthrough in the border dispute. Finally, the two countries are increasingly 
vying for influence in the South Asian neighbourhood and in the Indian Ocean, (Ibid). 
  
(Figure 10.3.1): Share of Global Incremental Oil demands, (2001-2030) 
 
 
Source: Facts Global Energy, (2011) 
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India from its part is worried by Chinese territorial claims on vastly-populated regions 
of India, (Sujit, 2011). The Indian security community also worried about China‘s 
military build-up in areas close to the Indian borders. India, long suspicious of 
China‘s close relations and military support for Pakistan, views an increased Chinese 
presence in northern Pakistan and expanded civil nuclear cooperation between Beijing 
and Islamabad as particularly worrisome, (Curtis & Cheng, 2011).  Indian military 
strategists believe they must plan for the possibility of a two-front war with Pakistan 
and China even as they actively seek dialogues with both to diminish the chances of 
such a dire scenario, (Ibid). Indian military strategists also believe that Chinese naval 
ties with Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Myanmar are one source of concern 
for India, (Ciorciari, 2011). China‘s bases or installations in those countries threaten 
to encircle India with a Chinese ―string of pearls‖-points from which China can exert 
naval influence along the Asian littoral from the Straits of Malacca to the Middle 
East, (Ibid). In this regard, while China‘s naval capabilities focus primarily on 
deterring US intervention in a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, from an Indian 
perspective they could be used over the long term to expand China‘s sea-denial 
capabilities in other regions, including the Strait of Malacca and the Indian Ocean, 
(Bajpaee, 2010). Additionally, China is also set to emerge as a ―manufacturing threat‖ 
to India. China is emerging as a ―slow killer‖ for India‘s domestic manufacturing 
industry through cheap imports that are not able to compete with Chinese imports on 
cost factor, (Kumar, 2011). 
 
On the other hand, from the viewpoint of China, the Indian rapprochement with the 
United States may lead to a broader alliance in the future may include Japan, South 
Korea and perhaps other countries to counter China. The US‘s strategic outreach to 
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India from 2000 is seen as a move by America to gain a new regional ally with which 
to jointly contain China, (BMI, Pakistan Defence & Security Report, 2010:47). China 
has been concerned with its ocean-going navy being small compared to other major 
powers like the United States, Japan or India which dominate the Indian Ocean, 
especially at the mouth of the Strait of Malacca choke-point (Zweig and Jianhai, 
2005: 34). Furthermore, the Chinese security community is worried at the adverse 
strategic implications of the Indo-US nuclear deal, which is perceived as bringing 
India and the US together against the Chinese. At the same time, Chinese assessments 
of Indian military planning suggest a view in Beijing that New Delhi sees China as a 
major threat. One Chinese assessment concludes that the Indian military sees Pakistan 
as the main operational opponent and China as a potential operational opponent. It 
also describes the Indians as seeing China and Pakistan as closely aligned in 
threatening India, (Curtis & Cheng, 2011). 
 
To be sure, nations have long competed for finite energy and other resources. But 
Asia has not seen a powerful China and India since the 1600s. Their rapid 
modernization over the past three decades means energy competition is occurring on 
an unprecedented scale, (John & Charles, 2010). In this environment of uncertainty 
and security concerns, the Indian Ocean, through which raw materials from Africa 
and the Middle East regularly pass en route to China, is fast emerging as a potential 
zone of contention between China and India, (Singh, 2011). China and India are 
significant military powers, possessing small but growing arsenals of nuclear weapons 
and fielding two of the three largest militaries in the world, (Fravel, 2011:65).  Given 
China and India‘s growing strategic interests in the Indian Ocean, through which 80 
percent of Chinese and over 60 percent of Indian oil imports transit, each is likely to 
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perceive the other‘s naval modernization initiatives as inherently threatening, (Aiyar, 
2011). 
 
Yet, in both India and China, there is a realization that this is an important 
relationship, it has to be managed well, and if managed well it can bring huge 
economic and security gains. Indeed, the two countries over the last two decades or 
more have avoided developing a rivalry, notwithstanding significant differences over 
several issues. After all, both are developing countries with similar needs to improve 
the quality of life of their populations, including environmental improvement, (Dellios 
& Ferguso, 2011). Despite the rivalry between China and India, a Cold War-style 
confrontation, let alone a shooting war, is far from inevitable or even probable, and 
any tensions between the two could be reduced by promoting regional military 
cooperation by means of a NATO-like organisation that includes China, India, the US 
and other concerned powers, (BMI, Pakistan Defence & Security Report, 2010: 53).  
India and China in recent years have expanded their functional cooperation in areas as 
diverse as science and technology, space, coal, renewable energy, water resources, 
forestry, agriculture, railways, culture, tourism, youth affairs, media and information, 
traditional medicine, labour, human resource development, auditing, anti-corruption 
and policing, (Ghoshal, 2011). 
 
Growing economic interdependence and confidence building measures are likely to 
deter open hostilities over the short to medium term. On the economic front, in the 
past decade China and India have forged strong economic ties. Trade volume between 
the two countries rose from over US$270 million in 1990 to US$1.16 billion in 1995 
and about US$3 billion in 2000 to US$43 billion in 2008, (IMF, December 2011). 
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Currently, China has emerged as India‘s second-largest trading partner after the EU. 
Bilateral trade exceeded US$41 billion in 2011 and in the first six months of 2011, 
bilateral trade amounted to US$14.1 billion, a 44 percent increase over the same 
period in 2010, (Ibid). India has emerged as the 6th largest export market of China 
and 9th largest trade partner. China became the second largest trade partner of India, 
(Ibid). The ever-expanding trade between the two countries automatically gives them 
a huge stake in keeping co-operation alive, despite occasional hiccups. 
 
(Table 10.3.3): Trade between China and India, (2000-2010) 
 
 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Total Trade (US$ billions) 2,91 18,71 25,05 38,69 51,85 43,40 61,73 
Source: IMF, (DoTS, December 2011) 
 
Politically, both states have common interests in combating terrorism and 
establishment of a multi-polar world order. China and India also maintained a 
relatively united front during the climate talks as neither wanted to be bound by an 
emissions regime, (Bagchi, 2010). India remains a staunch supporter of the ―One 
China‖ policy and recognizes the People‘s Republic of China on the mainland over 
the Republic of China authorities on Taiwan, (Bajpaee, 2007). Most important of all, 
India is unlikely to join the U.S.-led alliance structure in Asia given New Delhi‘s 
legacy of non-alignment, desire to maintain ―strategic autonomy‖ in conducting its 
foreign policy, and an increasingly non-ideological foreign policy approach that seeks 
to promote trade and attract foreign investment to meet India‘s development needs, 
(Ibid). India remains wary of being seen either as aligning or band-wagoning big 
powers and would be unable to join any power-driven multi-polar order. India instead 
feels more at home with norm and institution-driven multilateralism, (Singh, 2011). 
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Indeed, there is no guarantee that an Indo-US alliance, whether formal or informal, 
will emerge. Firstly, such cooperation would antagonise China, perhaps leading to a 
counter-alliance. Secondly, China and India are generally trying to improve relations, 
not to mention boost bilateral trade. Thirdly, an empowered India could in time 
conceivably challenge US interests in the region. With this in mind, it would make 
sense for the US to balance geopolitical power in the Indian Ocean, (BMI, Pakistan 
Defence & Security Report, 2010). 
 
In the military sphere, although China has had an apparent head start in the new 
competition for the Indian Ocean, no major power is likely to achieve hegemony over 
the whole ocean. From a military point of view, China‘s ―string of pearls‖ is far from 
assured, and even if Beijing were to develop bases in each ―pearl‖, India is already 
taking counter-steps. Meanwhile, the US is still the only truly global naval power, and 
has considerably more maritime experience than China or India, which could take 
decades more development to match the United States. Furthermore, the US already 
has 11 aircraft carrier battle groups, whereas China and India combined are unlikely 
to field as many for decades to come, (Ibid, 2010:52). Most important of all, the 
international energy market is dependent upon secure and safe transport through 
global maritime shipping channels, (Ciorciari, 2011). The three major global maritime 
choke points (the Bab el- Mandeb Strait at the Gulf of Aden, the Strait of Hormuz at 
the Gulf of Oman, and the Strait of Malacca) all feed into the Indian Ocean, (BMI, 
Pakistan Defence & Security Report, 2010:39). The blockage of a chokepoint, even 
temporarily, can lead to significant increases in energy prices around the world. 
Additionally, maritime chokepoints leave oil tankers susceptible to pirate hijackings, 
terrorist attacks, and other hostilities, (Ciorciari, 2011). These factors are a recipe of 
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cooperation not conflict because it‘s in the interest of all oil consumers to keep the 
uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price. More important, 
till now, the US navy has ensured secure oil movement from and beyond the Gulf. 
India has been a free rider, getting oil security at no cost. China‘s presence in the 
region has until now been minimal, (Aiyar). It is unlikely the status quo will change 
soon or at least in the next two decades. 
 
At the regional level, both countries are highly interdependent with Saudi Arabia and 
the Middle East. Both China and India have become more economically 
interdependent with the Middle East and the two countries will not be able to exclude 
each other from the region. As a big importer of natural resources, India, like China, 
will benefit from and may actively seek to promote stability in the Middle East and 
other resource-rich regions. Additionally, China and India have a high level of 
dependence on energy imports, particularly oil; they are exposed to the same risks of 
the international oil markets. Therefore it is in the interests of China and India to both 
cooperate together towards price stability and keeping reliable oil supplies. The 
Middle East oil producers export more oil to Asia than to Europe and North America 
combined. In fact, about two-thirds of GCC oil exports are channelled to the Asia 
Pacific market, (Calabrese, 2009). Asia Pacific countries, individually and 
collectively, are heavily dependent on oil from the Gulf. Japan sources roughly 80 
percent, South Korea 75% and India imports almost two thirds of their oil from the 
GCC states, (EIA, 2011). The International Energy Agency (IEA) forecasts that China 
will import 70% of its oil from the GCC by 2015, (Ibid). India is projected to replace 
Japan and emerge as the third-largest consumer of energy (after the United States and 
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China) by that time. The bulk of Indian supplies come from the Gulf; this dependency 
is expected to change only marginally, (Ibid).  
 
 (Table 10.3.4): Oil Interdependence of Major Powers with the Middle East  
 
Selected indicators, 2010 
 GCC Middle East Saudi Arabia Saudi 
Position  Trade 
Value 
(Billion 
US$) 
% oil 
a 
of 
total 
Trade 
b
  
Trade 
Value 
(Billion 
US$) 
% oil of 
total 
Trade 
c 
Trade 
Value 
(billion 
US$) 
% oil of 
total 
Trade
d 
U.S. 72,69 52% 149,59 34% 44,24 71.6% 3rd Oil 
Supplier 
China 92,52 49.6% 171.40 40.1% 43,19 59.9% Top Oil 
Supplier 
Japan 122,63 82.7% 148,80 78.5% 42,45 83.5% Top Oil 
Supplier 
South 
Korea 
78,96 81.5% 109,12 70.3% 31,32 82.7% Top Oil 
Supplier 
India 88,75 36.6% 119,45 39.6% 19,59 67,3% Top Oil 
Supplier 
Source: UN COMTRADE, (December, 2011) 
(a) Mineral fuels, oils, distillation products, etc 
(b), (c) & (d) All figures were calculated by the author 
 
 
In this geopolitical environment; China and India are acting in the economic 
interdependence model, and there is no evidence to suggest otherwise. Firstly, the two 
countries will depend on the import of large quantities of oil from the Middle East and 
Saudi Arabia; therefore, the stability of the region is in their interest. Secondly, Saudi 
Arabia and most of the Middle East countries do not allow investments in the 
upstream oil sector (exploration and production), thus there is no room for 
competition between Chinese and Indian firms. Thirdly, China and India do not yet 
(and maybe decades to come) have the capability to deploy significant naval forces in 
the Middle East and Indian Ocean and will remain dependent on the US presence. 
Fourthly, The Middle East countries depend on oil exports to sustain their economies, 
thus they will not encourage any party against the other in order to ensure stable 
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markets. Fifthly, the fight against terrorism and prevent the spread of nuclear weapons 
are also a common interest for all Asian countries and Middle East states. Finally, it is 
arguable that it is in the interests of both countries to enhance their collective leverage 
over energy suppliers. 
 
(Figure 10.3.2): GCC Trade with Main Partners (2010) 
 
 
Source: IMF (DoTS, December 2011) 
 
 
In this context, common interests suggest that intense security competition between 
the two countries in the next decade is unlikely. Enhanced cooperation with a rising 
India allows Beijing to avoid a potentially costly confrontation that would harm the 
growth of both countries, block the formation of a close U.S.-India relationship, and 
reduce the overall influence of the U.S. over China, (Fravel, 2011:97). India, like 
China, needs a peaceful and stable security environment for its continued 
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development. Because of this focus on growth, they see India as inward-looking and 
thus as having strong incentives to avoid a confrontational relationship with China 
that would harm India‘s own growth prospects, (Ibid: 78)   
 
Indrani Bagchi a leading foreign policy journalist and the Diplomatic Editor at The 
Times of India eloquently summarized the evolving Indo-China relationship as 
―competition on some levels and co-operation on others‖, wherein some discomfort, 
ambivalence and hedging will always remain, despite the level of engagement, 
(Bagchi, 2010). Indeed, China‘s strategy toward a rising India combines engagement 
with deterrence. China pursues comprehensive political, economic, and international 
engagement with India to advance its broader strategic objectives. China also seeks to 
deter India from undermining Chinese interests by withholding cooperation or 
maintaining its policies on specific issues, such as its ties with Pakistan, (Tellis, 
2011:6). Correspondingly, India has adopted a prudent dual strategy, reaching out to 
China to reap the benefits of trade and diplomatic engagement while hedging and 
balancing China by striking strategic partnerships with Japan and the United States, 
deepening ties with Western Europe and Southeast Asia, and keeping up ties with 
Russia, (Ibid). 
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10.4 CONCLUSION  
 
This chapter has shown that China is acting in interdependence environments: (a) 
China is weak militarily in the Middle East and the U.S. will be the dominant power 
for the foreseeable future; (b) China is highly economically interdependent with the 
United States; (c) China, India, Japan, South Korea and the U.S. are also highly 
economically interdependent with Saudi Arabia and the Middle East. In this context 
the study projects that the third scenario is the most logical outcome regarding 
China‘s relations with the United States (and India). Yet, concern over access to 
resources will continue to act as a constraint on China‘s foreign policy and also as an 
inducement for avoiding conflict with the United States. China‘s worries about 
external dependence remain prevalent, as Beijing has come to rely more and more on 
imported energy. China now imports more than 50 percent of its oil, and if present 
trends continue, that figure that may reach 70- 80 percent by 2030. Most of these 
imports are likely to come from the Middle East and Africa, crossing the Indian 
Ocean and passing through the narrow Malacca Strait. China will continue pursuing a 
two-pronged strategy toward energy; (engages but hedge), on the one hand to enhance 
cooperation with the U.S. (and India), advance China‘s political links with energy 
exporters, increase energy efficiency, diversify, accelerate investments and overseas 
production and transportation, while on the other hand strengthening China‘s 
emergency response. Meanwhile the United States will continue to recognise Chinese 
legitimate energy interests but at the same time will monitor Chinese actions in the 
region closely to prevent any ―hostile‖ development which could threaten the 
American dominant position. 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
OVERALL CONCLUSION 
 
 
11.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
This chapter is a summary of the thesis which presents outcomes of this research. In 
the first section the key findings of the thesis will be summarised, and in the second 
section the hypotheses for the research questions will be revisited. In the third section 
the findings for the research questions will be systematised, while the final section 
provides recommendations for further research regarding China‗s oil policy towards 
the Middle East. 
 
 
11.2 SUMMARY OF KEY FINDING 
 
 
 China is not seeking to undermine the American influence, but is looking to 
secure its energy needs and meet its expanding economic interests. China‗s 
policy of strengthening its relationships with Saudi Arabia is neither aimed at 
undermining U.S. regional interests nor aimed at challenging the U.S.‗s 
dominant position; it‗s primarily driven by economic energy imperatives. 
 China‗s overriding foreign policy objective is to secure energy supplies to fuel 
its domestic growth. China does not want to rely entirely on Saudi oil, but 
looks to Saudi Arabia as an important trading partner and a reliable source for 
the supply of oil, thus helping the diversity of its sources. 
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 China (India, Japan and South Korea) has no near term substitute for Middle 
Eastern oil, thus it is expected that Saudi Arabia (and the Middle East) will 
play a major role in meeting Chinese and Asian demand for oil the next two 
decades. 
 China will support the stability of Saudi Arabia and the Middle East because it 
expects a significant increase in its trade/energy with Saudi Arabia in the 
future. Chinese energy policies are not directed at increasing its power and 
influence in Saudi Arabia at the cost of the United States. China is looking at 
Saudi Arabia (and the Middle East) as a long-term energy source and as an 
opportunity to further expand economically - not as a country (or a region) 
that it wishes to wrestle away from U.S. influence.  
 The relationship between China and Saudi Arabia suggests that this is an 
energy – economic partnership not strategic – political alliance. China‗s 
economic interests are the driving force behind the expansion of the Sino-
Middle East relationship – and not China‗s desire to expand its power and 
influence in the Middle East at the cost of the United States. The Saudis and 
the Chinese recognise that, for at least the next two decades, the United States 
will remain the only country in the world capable of projecting substantial 
amounts of conventional military power into the Arabian Gulf. That makes the 
United States a strategically indispensable partner to Saudi Arabia for years to 
come. 
 Saudi Arabia increasingly recognises that Asia will provide the region‗s 
largest and fastest-growing oil and gas export markets in the future. Already, 
two-thirds of Saudi Arabia‗s oil exports go east to Asia, reflecting this 
profound shift in the balance of global oil. Though China and Saudi Arabia 
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have expanded their cooperation, Saudi Arabia will probably in the short and 
medium terms attempt to strike a balance between the United States and China 
and avoid compromising U.S. interests to please the Chinese or vice versa in 
the near future. 
 The U.S, China, India and all Asia‘s major powers are becoming more 
economically interdependent with Saudi Arabia and the Middle East, so these 
countries will not be able to exclude each other from the region. Because they 
are reliant on oil, regional stability and the preservation of the status quo are in 
interest of all countries.  
 
 
11.3 TESTING THE HYPOTHESES  
 
 
The thesis‘ main aim is to investigate China‘s primary objectives in pursuing closer 
relations with Saudi Arabia. It also focuses on the implications of high 
interdependence between China, the world‘s second-largest oil consumer, and Saudi 
Arabia, the world‘s top oil exporter, for the U.S. and the Middle East region. In Part I, 
the thesis establishes the theoretical frameworks of trade expectations theory and 
China‘s oil situation in Chapters two and three respectively. The two chapters 
individually validate Hypothesis I that China‘s oil strategy is primarily driven by 
economic imperatives. Among these imperatives, China‘s need for oil is the most 
important.  
 
Part II and Part III are then employed to testify the hypotheses. Part II starts with 
Chapter four which attempts to provide a historical and political background of 
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Chinese intentions toward Saudi Arabia.  This knowledge of history is followed with 
an examination of China‘s perspective of developing relations with Saudi Arabia, and 
also deciphers the Chinese real motives in regarding the Arabian Kingdom throughout 
Chapter five. Of course, this part would not be completed without the discussion on 
the goals of Saudi Arabia to establish partnership with China in Chapter six. The 
analysis of China‘s motives towards Saudi Arabia validates Hypothesis II by 
revealing that China is cautious in the political realm when dealing with Saudi Arabia. 
China is not seeking to undermine American influence, but is looking to meet its 
energy needs and expand its economic interests.  
 
This strengthens the argument for Hypothesis I. Also, the argument on China‘s 
political motives indicates the Chinese objectives are economic and defensive in 
nature as China is seeking influence in Saudi Arabia not because it is seeking to 
expand its power, but because it desires to protect its economic interests from U.S. 
unilateral action, or from the complex political developments in the Middle East. 
Meanwhile, for Saudi Arabia, maintaining good relations with the United States 
remains its key foreign policy objective. Though China and Saudi Arabia have 
expanded their cooperation, Saudi Arabia will probably - in the near future - attempt 
to strike a balance between the United States and China and avoid compromising U.S. 
interests to please the Chinese or vice-versa; particularly when the Saudis are very 
disturbed by what they consider as a growing ―Iranian threat.‖ 
 
Part III further tests Hypothesis I that China‘s oil strategy is primarily driven by 
economic imperatives and validates Hypothesis III that China expects a significant 
increase in its trade and oil imports with Saudi Arabia in the future. In Part III, the 
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thesis provides strong evidence of the high economic interdependence between China 
and Saudi Arabia as Chapter seven shows that trade is at the heart of the growing 
links between the two countries. Between 1990 and 2010, the bilateral trade between 
the two countries multiplied about 100 times. As for future trade expectations, great 
potential exists for Sino-Saudi relations to expand substantially in the future. There is 
no doubt that the economic relations between China and Saudi Arabia will thrive, and 
their trade could double within the next decade.  
 
Chapter eight further examines the scope of the interdependent relationship in the 
energy realm in which Saudi Arabia relies on China as a consumer as much as China 
looks to Kingdom as a key producer.  This dynamic of mutual dependence will only 
get stronger with the prospects that oil demand in China could double over the next 
two decades, which means China is expected to become the biggest market for Saudi 
oil. In contrast Chapter nine shows that, due to Saudi Arabia‘s relations with the 
United States, Sino-Saudi military relations have been very limited. China still lags 
far behind America, which remains the Saudi Arabia‘s military mainstay. Saudi 
Arabia remains fearful of the ability of Iran to destabilise the Saudi regime. Security 
and stability of the Saudi regime remains of the utmost importance and, in that regard, 
U.S. military might in the Gulf is still Saudi Arabia‘s final guarantor at least in the 
foreseeable future.  
 
The three Chapters (seven, eight and nine) individually further tests Hypothesis I and 
indicate that China‘s oil strategy is primarily driven by economic imperatives.  This 
suggests that the relationship between China and Saudi Arabia is an energy-economic 
partnership and not a strategic–political alliance.  The three chapters also validate 
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Hypothesis III, which introduces the variable of expectations of future trade (EFT).  
This variable predicts that China expects a significant increase in its trade and oil 
imports with Saudi Arabia in the future. China will likely pursue policies that will 
enhance security in the region and support the stability of Saudi Arabia and work to 
protect its interests in the region through economical and political means (soft power) 
not by using force or military power (hard power). Finally, Chapter ten further tests 
Hypothesis III. On one hand China is highly economically interdependent with the 
United States and Saudi Arabia, while the United States is highly economically and 
militarily interdependent with the Saudis. On the other hand the United States, China 
and the rest of the oil producing countries in OPEC are highly economically 
interdependent in the oil market. Thus, the regional stability and the preservation of 
the status quo are in both the U.S. and China interests. Subsequently, the stability, 
security and the survival of Saudi regime are now (and for the foreseeable future) in 
the interest of both the United States and China.  
 
 
11.4 SYSTEMATISING THE FINDINGS FOR THE RESEARCH 
QUESTIONS 
 
 
The thesis is structured according to the six research questions and provides key 
findings in the corresponding chapters. 
 H1: China is not seeking to undermine the American influence, but is 
looking to secure its energy needs and meet its expanding economic 
interests. 
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Q1: What have been China‘s core (or primary) objectives in pursuing closer ties with 
Saudi Arabia? 
Q2: Why does the Middle East region have particular significance for China in 
meeting its energy objectives (or security)? 
 
 H2: China will support the stability of Saudi Arabia because it expects a 
significant increase in its trade/energy with Saudi Arabia in the future. 
Q3: Why is Saudi Arabia an indispensable partner for China? 
Q4: What is the nature and extent of China‘s strategic motives in pursuing a 
partnership with Saudi Arabia? 
 
 H3: China will work to protect its interests in the region through 
economical and political means and not through using military power. 
Q5: Does the relationship between China and Saudi Arabia suggest that this is a 
strategic – political or energy – economic partnership? 
Q6: What are the implications for the region and United States? 
 
The thesis discusses China‘s primary objectives or motivations in pursuing closer ties 
with Saudi Arabia from the realist and liberal perspectives in Chapter two and to 
explore China‘s oil situation and the significance of the Middle East region for China 
in meeting its energy security needs in Chapter three. Both chapters show that China‘s 
economic interests are the driving force behind the expansion of the Sino-Middle East 
relationship – and not China‘s desire to expand its power and influence in the Middle 
East at the cost of the United States. Chinese energy policies are not directed at 
increasing its power and influence in Saudi Arabia at the cost of the United States as 
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realists may contend. China is looking at Saudi Arabia (and the Middle East) as a 
long-term energy source and as an opportunity to further expand economically - not 
as a country (or a region) that it wishes to wrestle away from U.S. influence. Because 
China is not using its power (political, military and economical) to further an 
international political agenda to decrease U.S. power and influence, China‘s actions 
closely aligns with the economic interdependence theory.  
 
As for the future, the thesis expects that the stability of Saudi Arabia will be at the top 
of China‘s interests in the coming years. Accordingly, this study predicts that Saudi 
Arabia‘s political and economic relations with China will expand strongly in the 
coming years especially in light of: (a) China‘s growing oil demand and need to 
import more oil from the Middle East; (b) The political consensus between the two 
countries in most regional and international issues; (c) The Saudis‘ desire to keep 
China-Iran relations in check; and (d) The Saudi concerns of ―American meddling‖ 
after the Arab uprising to promote democracy in the Middle East. But, due to what the 
Saudis perceive as a growing ―Iranian threat‖, the Kingdom currently has no 
alternative but to count on the military guarantees provided by the United States. 
Thus, Saudi Arabia will seek in the foreseeable future to balance the relations between 
China and the United States. 
 
The key finding of the thesis regarding question one could be summarised as follows:  
Politically, (as the study demonstrates on Chapters four and five) China‘s overriding 
foreign policy objective is to secure energy supplies to fuel its domestic growth. 
China does not want to rely entirely on Saudi oil, but looks to Saudi Arabia as an 
important trading partner and a reliable source for the supply of oil, thus helping the 
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diversity of its sources. China‘s policy of strengthening its relationships with Saudi 
Arabia is neither aimed at undermining U.S. regional interests nor aimed at 
challenging the U.S.‘s dominant position; it‘s primarily driven by economic energy 
imperatives. China has geared its policies regarding Saudi Arabia towards addressing 
its energy security. China‘s policies have grown closer to Saudi Arabia in order to: (a) 
Ensure access to future energy supplies; (b) Maintain Saudi Arabia‘s role in keeping 
Chinese energy sources diversified; (c) Possibly look to Saudi Arabia to influence the 
United States in curtailing U.S. unilateral action. China views U.S. unilateral action 
(particularly towards Iran) as a threat to Chinese economic interests in the Middle 
East and therefore is seeking to avoid that scenario; and (d) Enlist Saudi Arabia‘s 
support of its ―core interests‖ such as dealing with the Chinese Muslims, Tibet, 
Taiwan and human rights issues. 
 
There is no doubt that with China‘s economic, technological and military ascent there 
will be the potential for a comprehensive global power shift. China‘s persistence in 
actively securing natural resources and building strategic alliances is, and will remain, 
a source of direct economic competition to the U.S. for the near future. Yet, there is 
no evidence to support the ―China threat‖ theory in the Middle East, neither is there a 
concern in Saudi Arabia (and in the Middle East) that China will constitute a threat. It 
is important to note that some of the fundamental aspects of the U.S.-Saudi 
relationship are not likely to change in the foreseeable future. The Saudis and the 
Chinese recognise that, for at least the next decade, the United States will remain the 
only country in the world capable of projecting substantial amounts of conventional 
military power into the Arabian Gulf. That makes the United States a strategically 
indispensable partner to Saudi Arabia for years to come. As for China, the country is 
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trying to benefit from the Middle East‘s economy while strategically hedging against 
American military power by moving even closer to Saudi Arabia and other states. 
Meanwhile the Saudis are pursuing what could be called a ―hedging‖ strategy. They 
are cultivating a genuinely strategic relationship with the world‘s most important 
rising power, at least in part as a hedge against a further, precipitous decline in their 
relationship with the established superpower. China‘s political actions are defensive 
in nature, because China is not using its political power to further an international 
political agenda to decrease U.S. power and influence in Saudi Arabia, subsequently 
China‘s political actions closely aligns with the economic interdependence model.  
 
Economically, (as the study demonstrates in Chapters three, seven and eight) the 
crude oil is at the heart of Sino-Saudi trade. While China does import a large volume 
of oil from Saudi Arabia: (a) It has not invested a great amount in Saudi Arabia‘s 
energy sector; (b) China does not provide huge investments and/or massive economic 
assistant to Saudi Arabia in order to make Riyadh more dependent on Beijing; and (c) 
China does not provide advanced technology to deepen Saudi‘s economic dependency 
on China. Because China is not using its economic power to further an international 
political agenda to decrease U.S. power and influence in Saudi Arabia, China‘s 
economic actions closely aligns with the economic interdependence school of 
thought. While there is great potential for the Sino-Saudi relationship to expand in this 
area, both countries are taking their time developing these relations. China is content 
with focusing on Sino-Saudi energy matters and improving Chinese energy security. 
China‘s oil consumption will rise strongly and could double during the next two 
decades. Despite China‘s attempts to diversify its oil sources, there is no substitute for 
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the Middle East in the near future. Thus, the study expects deepening energy 
interdependence between China and Saudi Arabia over the next decade. 
 
Militarily, (as the study shows in Chapter nine) China has not had strong relations 
with Saudi Arabia. This is most likely due to the fact Saudi Arabia has strong military 
relations with the United States. Additionally, since China views Saudi Arabia as a 
long-term energy source, its interests fall in line with U.S. interests regarding Saudi 
Arabia. Both the United States and China view Saudi Arabia as a vital energy source 
and both want the preservation of stability and security within Saudi Arabia. Saudi 
Arabia relies almost entirely on arms imported from the western countries especially 
the United States. It also depends on the security agreements with the United States to 
combat internal terrorism and external threats. There is no supporting evidence that 
the China is working to jeopardise this situation. Saudi Arabia will rely on the 
security umbrella of the U.S. over the next decade and there is no evidence to show 
that China either seeks to be a substitute for the United States, or is there evidence to 
suggest that China is working to undermine the U.S.-Saudi relations. 
 
To answer question two, the thesis has shown in Chapter three that China has 
attempted to diversify sources of energy and has increased imports from Africa, Latin 
America, Central Asia and other regions. Still, in 2010, about half of China‘s oil 
imports came from the Middle East. Given the global oil reserve, production pattern, 
exports trends and the projections of future oil, the Middle East‘s status as China‘s 
leading oil supplier is unlikely to change any time soon. Diversification away from 
the Middle East, however, has its limits. Two-thirds of proven oil reserves are located 
in the region, mostly in the Arabian Gulf. Regardless of efforts to increase domestic 
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production and diversify its energy supply, China cannot avoid increased dependence 
on the Middle East and Saudi Arabian oil in the next two decades. In sum, Saudi 
Arabia (and the Middle East) will have particular significance for China in meeting its 
energy objectives (or security) for a long period to come. 
 
To answer question three, Chapters four and five show that there are many reasons 
that make Saudi Arabia a very important partner for China. Firstly, Saudi Arabia is 
the cradle of Islam and China needs the Saudi support in dealing with Chinese 
Muslims (Uyghur) in the Xinjiang region. Secondly, Saudi Arabia represents an area 
with huge economic opportunities as the Kingdom represents over 20 percent of the 
combined GDP of the Middle East-North Africa (MENA) region (and an estimated 
quarter of the Arab World‘s GDP) making it the economic engine of the region. 
Thirdly, from the Chinese perspective, energy security lies at the heart of the bilateral 
relationship with Saudi Arabia. China‘s efforts to develop closer relations with Saudi 
Arabia are based on two goals. (a) China is attempting to ensure it has access to Saudi 
energy sources in the future in order to meet its energy demands. And (b) China is 
also attempting to maintain its diversity in energy sources. While China may be 
limiting the amount of Saudi oil it imports, Saudi Arabia still plays a vital role in 
maintaining the diversity in Chinese oil supplies (i.e. keeping China from becoming 
too reliant on Angola, Iran and Russia). 
 
Furthermore, China recognises Saudi Arabia‘s uniquely dominant role among the 
world‘s oil market. Saudi Arabia is the largest oil producer of the Organization of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Despite the questions that hover over the 
future of oil in Saudi Arabia, at the moment, and perhaps for many years to come, 
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there is no alternative to the Kingdom. With approximately one fifth of the world‘s 
proven oil reserves and some of the lowest production costs, Saudi Arabia is expected 
to remain the world‘s largest net oil exporter in the near future. Saudi Arabia is also 
still the world‘s only ―swing producer‖: the country retains the single largest spare 
production capacity of all oil producers. Saudi ARAMCO, the Kingdom‘s national oil 
company, is the world‘s largest producer and exporter of petroleum and has by far the 
world‘s largest sustained production capacity infrastructure at about 12 million 
barrels-per-day and also has the world‘s largest spare capacity - currently estimated at 
about 70 percent of global unused capacity.  
 
Additionally, Saudi Arabia, from China‘s perspective, is a voice of moderation and 
stability - and undoubtedly the single most important country in the world of energy. 
In China‘s eyes, maintaining stable relations with Saudi Arabia is the best possible 
approach to avoid being shut-off from vital oil resources if the Sino-American 
relationship should take a turn for the worse, or/and in the event of political turmoil as 
demonstrated in Libya in 2011. There are no other producers capable of stepping into 
Saudi Arabia‘s shoes. As a result and for all these reasons, China cannot ignore the 
economic and political power of Saudi Arabia. 
 
To find out the nature and extent of China‘s strategic motives in pursuing a 
partnership with Saudi Arabia, Chapter five further highlights the importance of Saudi 
Arabia and tries to answer question four. Due to the close relationship that Saudi 
Arabia has with the United States, China hopes to limit the United States‘ ability to 
act unilaterally through closer Sino-Saudi ties. While realists may view these actions 
as China attempting to expand their power and influence in the Middle East at the cost 
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of the United States, China‘s actions do not fit well with their theory. First, China‘s 
political policies are geared towards increasing China‘s energy security and economic 
interests. China is not only looking to develop closer Sino-Saudi ties so Saudi Arabia 
remains a vital long-term energy source, but also to keep Chinese energy sources 
diversified.  
 
There is no great risk or any indications that Saudi Arabia and China will enter into 
exclusive oil supply relationship. Secondly, China is also looking to expand its trade 
market in Saudi Arabia, as the Kingdom is the largest market in the Arab World and 
the Middle East. Thirdly, China is seeking Saudi support in fighting what the Chinese 
call the ―three ugly forces‖: religious extremism, national separatism, and terrorism. 
China is also seeking full support of Saudi Arabia and other Arab States in the 
international arena on issues regarding Taiwan or ―One China Policy‖ and human 
rights issues.  These Chinese objectives are economic and defensive in nature, which 
aligns Chinese actions closer to the economic interdependence model rather than the 
realism theory. There is no denying that China is looking to curtail U.S. unilateral 
action in the Middle East region; however, even this intention fits within the 
economic interdependence model. China is seeking greater influence in Saudi Arabia 
(and the Middle East) not because it is seeking to expand its power, but because it 
desires to protect its economic interests from U.S. unilateral action or from the 
complex political developments in the Middle East. This indicates that China is 
mainly seeking to avoid armed conflict in order to preserve its economic interests; 
therefore, China‘s actions fit more closely along the lines of the economic 
interdependence model. 
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To answer question five it was essential to know the scope of China-Saudi relations in 
all areas (economic, energy and military) in order to find out whether the relationship 
is politically driven or an energy/economic partnership. In the economic realm, 
Chapter seven has shown that China‘s economic interests are the driving force behind 
the expansion of the Sino-Saudi relationship – and not China‘s desire to expand its 
power and influence in the Middle East at the expense of the United States. Chinese 
economic policies are not directed at increasing its power and influence in Saudi 
Arabia at the cost of the United States as realists may contend. China is taking a 
cautious approach with regard to the Sino-Saudi relationship which does not fit in 
well with the realism theory. China is looking at Saudi Arabia as a long-term energy 
source and as an opportunity to further expand economically - not as a state that it 
wishes to wrestle away from U.S. power and influence. China is not using its 
economic power to further an international political agenda to decrease U.S. power 
and influence; instead China‘s economic actions closely align with the economic 
interdependence school of thought. This is illustrated by three developments:- 
 
Firstly, China is not providing Saudi Arabia with massive economic benefits to 
develop a closer Sino-Saudi relationship as the United States and Soviet Union did to 
its proxy states during the Cold War. China‘s economic policies are geared primarily 
towards addressing its energy security and possibly taking advantage of economic 
opportunities within Saudi Arabia. China is not looking to reduce U.S. power and 
influence in Saudi Arabia through its Sino-Saudi economic ties, and is in fact, taking a 
cautious approach to the Sino-Saudi relationship.  
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Secondly, China has shown a reluctance to become too heavily invested in Saudi 
Arabia. While Saudi Arabia provides China with energy and vast economic 
opportunities, it has not taken full advantage of those economic opportunities. This 
may be for two reasons: (a) Saudi Arabia may not need Chinese capital as much due 
to its massive oil revenues and its strong ties to the United States; and (b) China does 
not see any urgency in assisting Saudi Arabia; on the contrary, the Kingdom is seen to 
be the side aggressively courting Chinese investments (particularly in the 
petrochemical industry) and China is the side restraining its investments. This does 
not fit in well with the realists‘ model because the Saudis courting Chinese 
investments can be viewed as an opportunity for China to gain more power and 
influence in Saudi Arabia. Instead, China has so far refused to take advantage of this 
opportunity. The low amount of Sino- Saudi activity in this realm indicates that China 
is selective about what investments it wants to make in Saudi Arabia. This behaviour 
fits more consistently with the economic interdependence model. China is not 
arbitrarily investing in Saudi Arabia in order to further the Sino-Saudi relationship at 
the cost of the U.S.-Saudi relationship. China invests in Saudi Arabia only if it feels 
that the investment is in its economic interests and/or is making economic sense. 
 
Thirdly, although important, the Chinese projects in Saudi Arabia with regard to their 
share in China‘s overseas projects, are still small or less than 4 percent of the total 
volume or value. If China was indeed acting within the realism model, it should be 
aggressively pursuing closer economic ties with Saudi Arabia by expanding its 
projects. China has not done so; instead the Chinese companies were looking for 
profitable investments. The only project which some analysts have said could have a 
political dimension was the Makkah railway, even though this project opened new 
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economic opportunities to the Chinese and also created a newfound respect for 
Chinese-made products (made in China) and Chinese-engineering prowess in the 
region. 
 
In the energy realm, Chapter eight has shown that China‘s economic interests are the 
driving force behind the expansion of the Sino-Saudi energy relationship – and not 
China‘s desire to expand its power and influence in the Middle East at the cost of the 
United States. China‘s energy policies are not directed at increasing its power and 
influence in Saudi Arabia at the cost of the United States as many realists may 
contend. China is taking a cautious approach to developing a Sino-Saudi relationship. 
This action does not fit in well with the offensive realism school of thought. China is 
looking at Saudi Arabia as a long-term energy source and as an opportunity to further 
expand economically - not as a state that it wishes to wrestle away from U.S. power 
and influence. China is not using its economic power to further an international 
political agenda to decrease U.S. power and influence; China‘s economic actions 
closely align with the economic interdependence school of thought. This is illustrated 
by several developments: 
 
Firstly, while there is no denying that China and Saudi Arabia have extensive energy 
relations, it is clear that China is also attempting to limit its ties to Saudi Arabia. 
Despite Saudi Arabia having the largest proven oil reserve in the world, China has 
shown a desire to keep its oil sources diversified. China has made significant efforts 
to diversify its sources of oil, developing resources in Russia, Central Asia, Africa, 
Latin America and the Middle East.  This strategy has resulted in the fact that 
currently over 80 percent of China‘s oil imports are not coming from Saudi Arabia. 
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China is also wary about becoming too reliant on Saudi ARAMCO and has attempted 
to diversify its domestic oil refineries to include several foreign partners such as 
Kuwait Petroleum Corp (KPC), Petroleos de Venezuela SA (PDVSA), Russian oil 
company OAO Rosneft and the American company ExxonMobil. 
 
Secondly, with respect to China‘s efforts to build strategic oil reserves, it has used a 
variety of methods to fill its reserves in the first and the second phases. The Chinese 
do not seem to be placing much urgency on filling its oil reserves from Saudi Arabia 
for many reasons. (a) China is taking a more patient approach by filling its strategic 
oil reserves gradually over many years; (b)  China is unwilling to pay a high price for 
oil that will be used to fill its strategic oil reserves; and (c) China has filled its first 
strategic oil reserve using domestic oil instead of imported oil. China may also be 
looking to fill its strategic oil reserves with overseas oil assets in which Chinese firms 
own stakes in. Finally, China has shown a reluctance to become too heavily invested 
in the Saudi Arabia energy sector. China does not want to share the financial risk with 
the Saudi side. In China, differences on shouldering the financial risk are 
complicating the joint venture modernisation of a refinery in Quanzhou. While in 
Saudi Arabia, the Chinese took a cautious approach of Yanbu‘s new refinery project 
as they wanted assurances with regards to managing the risk properly. This behaviour 
fits more consistently with the economic interdependence model.  
 
In the military realm, Chapter nine has shown that China isn‘t looking to provide 
Saudi Arabia with the protection it gets from the U.S. which maintains air, naval and 
army bases in the Arabian Gulf. While China may be limited in the military assistance 
it can provide to Saudi Arabia, if China was acting in the realism model it should still 
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be attempting to undermine the U.S.-Saudi military ties in order to further the Sino-
Saudi military ties. This has not been the case. Instead, there exists only two known 
instances where China sold limited military equipment to Saudi Arabia during the 
1980s and 2007, and it would appear there have not been any significant Sino-Saudi 
arms deals since then.  
 
Due to Saudi Arabia‘s relations with the United States, Sino-Saudi military relations 
have been very limited for several reasons. (a) China does not have the desire to 
expand its power and influence in the Middle East at the cost of the United States; (b) 
China does not have the same capability to project her power globally as the United 
States does; and (c) Saudi Arabia views China as a poor substitute for U.S. support 
against the other threats the Kingdom faces on the domestic front in the form of 
terrorism. Chinese military policies are not directed at increasing its power and 
influence in Saudi Arabia at the cost of the United States as realists may contend. 
China is taking a very cautious approach as to the extent of the Sino-Saudi military 
relationship, which does not fit in well with the realism school of thought.  
 
Chapters seven, eight and nine individually strengthen the argument that China‘s 
primary objectives in pursuing closer ties with Saudi Arabia is to establish an energy 
– economic partnership. Indeed, the three chapters have shown that China‘s policy in 
the Middle East is not geared towards expanding its power and influence at every 
opportunity in order to challenge the United States as the offensive realism model 
would predict. Instead, China is seeking to maintain the status quo which is allowing 
the Chinese economy to grow at an astonishing rate and to protect its economic 
interests in the Middle East. These two goals are highly dependent on: (a) Avoiding a 
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disruption in energy flow from the Middle East as a result of an armed conflict; (b) 
Maintaining good Sino-Saudi and Sino-U.S. relationships; and (c) Maintaining its 
economic expansion in the Middle East. Because China‘s actions are geared towards 
fulfilling those three economic goals, which are not intended to undermine U.S. 
influence, its actions are closer to the economic interdependence model, which 
suggest that the relationship between China and Saudi Arabia is an energy – economic 
partnership and not a strategic – political alliance. 
 
Within this context, what are the implications for the region and the United States? 
Chapter ten has shown that China‘s involvement in the Middle Eastern political 
economy may have some (from U.S. perspective) negative effects. But the United 
States and China share many common goals in the region and there are prospects for 
cooperation between them on energy, peace, religion, and other issues. Hardly any 
evidence shows that China is engaged in a ―zero-sum‖ competition with the United 
States in the Middle East, or that the U.S. is plotting to exclude China from the region.  
 
It is premature to declare that the Middle East (or Saudi Arabia) will become a new 
battleground for the two powers to compete for influence and control.  Many 
international and regional problems cannot be solved without cooperation between 
China and the United States. For the United States, paranoia about a coming ―China 
threat‖ and a misguided policy based on this assumption will be the wrong choice. 
China is already heavily involved in a Middle Eastern political economy. The U.S. 
strategic calculations in the Middle East will have to take Chinese interests into 
consideration. It is impossible for the Unites States to exclude or isolate China from 
the region. What the United States can do now is to actively engage China, and 
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address China‘s legitimate needs and concerns. There is no question that China‘s high 
interdependence with the Middle East will make it more challenging for the United 
States to successfully pursue its objectives and follow through with unilateral action. 
Despite China‘s increasing influence and economic power in the Middle East, Beijing 
shows no interest in exploiting the energy relationships it might have to influence 
Saudi Arabia, thereby challenging America‘s influence and strategic interests. There 
are no doubts that there will challenges ahead, but the two countries can establish a 
constructive relationship and lay a solid foundation for future cooperation in the 
Middle East. 
 
In sum, the thesis has shown that China‘s policy towards Saudi Arabia is not geared 
towards expanding its power and influence at every opportunity in order to challenge 
the United States as the realism model would predict. Instead, China is seeking to 
maintain the status quo which is allowing the Chinese economy to grow and to protect 
its economic interests in the Middle East. These two goals are highly dependent on: 
(a) Avoiding a disruption in energy flow from the Middle East as a result of an armed 
conflict; (b) Maintaining good Sino-Saudi and Sino-U.S. relations; and (c) 
Maintaining its economic expansion in the Middle East. Because China‘s actions are 
geared towards fulfilling those three economic goals which are not intended to 
undermine U.S. influence, its actions are closer to the economic interdependence 
model. As for future trade expectations, the case studies indicate: (a) Growing 
interdependence between China and the Middle East; (b) The volume of bilateral 
trade between China and Saudi Arabia could double over the next few years; and (c) 
China could overtake the U.S. and become Saudi Arabia‘s top oil importer within the 
next five years. Thus the study indicates the stability of Saudi Arabia and the Arab 
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Gulf States will be at the top of China‘s interests in the coming years, and these 
interests could bring China even closer to the American policy in the Middle East. 
 
 
11.5 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
 
As with most research projects, some issues needs further investigation as a result of 
this thesis. Future studies would need to be carried out to gain deeper knowledge and 
understanding of China‘s Middle East policy. Therefore, in the course of this thesis, 
four specific areas worthy of future research have become apparent. The fact that the 
study focuses on the oil sector as a result of its centrality in the development of China-
Saudi relations; further research is needed to show how China‘s policies are geared 
for non-energy sectors. The current thesis focuses on relations between China and 
Saudi Arabia at state level (or within the perspective of international relations) and 
did not focus on the sectoral level (i.e. oil companies, political lobbying, political 
behaviours in the international bodies, human rights organisations or even individuals, 
etc.). Further research is therefore warranted specifically addressing the sectoral level.  
Thirdly, while Saudi Arabia provides a solid representation of aspects of China‘s 
foreign oil activities, it does not make up a comprehensive review. It is important to 
consider other countries in the Middle East, Central Asia and Africa. Finally, studies 
at the public level are needed, trying to figure out people‘s opinions on the 
development of Sino-Saudi Arabia and how political leaders interact with these 
opinions. 
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Additionally, general specialised studies of particular interest would include: (a) 
Chinese investments in Arab countries and how the process of decisions-making 
influence that issue; (b) The impacts of high oil prices on the Chinese economy and 
its effect on Arab-Chinese relations; (c) The impacts of Chinese investments in the 
energy sector on the governance practices of Arab countries and their foreign policies; 
(d) Motivations, roles and influence of the various parties in deals concerning 
transnational pipelines to China from Central Asia, Russia, and Myanmar and its 
impacts on Middle Eastern (or GCC) oil producers; (e) Scenario analysis of possible 
supply disruptions, including the impact on the relationship between the Chinese 
Government and the NOCs on one hand and the impact on China‘s relations with 
Arab (Middle Eastern) countries on the other hand; and (f) Comparison of the 
strategies followed by China‘s NOCs in their Middle East oil and gas investments and 
other regions  such as Africa and Latin America along with a comparison between 
China‘s strategies in South East Asia and the Middle East. 
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EPILOGUE 
 
The thesis‘ main aim is to investigate the causes of China‘s motives to establish a 
strategic relationship with Saudi Arabia and its implications for the United States. In 
doing so, the study attempts to decipher China‘s intentions in establishing strategic 
relations with Saudi Arabia. In attempting to fulfil these aims, two forms of research 
data were gathered to guide the research investigation in this study. Quantitative or 
secondary data were in the form of political, economic, military and energy reports 
and studies, government statistics and other forms of quantified data on oil and energy 
in Saudi Arabia and China. Qualitative or primary data were in the form of 
documents, published interviews and opinions of experts and leaders in the oil 
industry as well as oil experts employed in academic organisations and government 
agencies. The empirical analyses have provided valuable results and indicated the 
nature of Sino-Saudi relation with its implication to the United States. This study also 
aimed to enumerate a set of recommendations that would assist in overcoming the 
potential difficulties and sustain its competitive advantage in the sector. This study, 
thus, has fulfilled its aims and objectives; and hence, is now completed. 
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APPENDICES 
 
 
APPENDIX I 
 
 
No. 289 
CHINA 
and 
SAUDI ARABIA 
Treaty of Amity. Signed at Jedda, on 15 November 1946 
Chinese, Arabic and English official texts communicated by the Acting Director of the 
office of the Permanent Chinese delegation to the United Nations. The registration 
took place on 20 September 1948. 
 
_________________ 
CHINE 
et 
ARABIE SAOUDITE 
Traité d'amitié. Signé à Djeddah, le 15 Novembre 1946 
Textes officiels chinois, arabe et anglais communiqués par le Directeur par intérim 
du Bureau de la délégation permanente chinoise auprès des Nations Unies. 
L'enregistrement a eu lieu le 20 septembre 1948. 
 
No. 289. TREATY1 OF AMITY BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND 
THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA. SIGNED AT JEDDA, ON 15 NOVEMBER 
1946 
 
His EXCELLENCY THE PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL 
GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA, on the one hand, and 
His MAJESTY THE KING OF SAUDI ARABIA, on the other hand, 
Animated by the desire to establish and to consolidate the bonds of friend ship and 
good understanding between their respective countries, have resolved to conclude a 
Treaty of Amity and have for this purpose appointed as their 
Plenipotentiaries: 
His Excellency the President of the National Government of the Republic of China: 
His Excellency Mr. Cheng Ye-tung, Ambassador Extraordinary and 
Plenipotentiary of the Republic of China to Iran; 
His Majesty the King of Saudi Arabia: 
His Excellency Sheikh Youssif Yasseen, Acting Foreign Minister of Saudi 
Arabia, 
Who, having communicated their Full Powers, found in good and due form, have 
agreed as follows: 
Article I 
There shall be perpetual peace and amity between the Republic of China and the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as well as between their peoples. 
Article II 
The High Contracting Parties agree to establish diplomatic relations between the two 
States in conformity with the principles of Public International Law. 
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They also agree that diplomatic representatives of each State shall enjoy, on 
the basis of reciprocity, in the territory of the other, the treatment recognized by the 
general principles of Public International Law. 
Article HI 
The High Contracting Parties agree that either High Contracting Party may establish 
consulates in such localities of the territory of the other as may be agreed upon. The 
consular officers of either High Contracting Party shall enjoy, 
On the basis of reciprocity, in the territory of the other, the treatment recognized by 
the general principles of Public International Law. 
Article IV 
The High Contracting Parties agree that the nationals of either High 
Contracting Party residing or travelling in the territory of the other shall be accorded 
the most-favoured-nation treatment in regard to the protection of their person and 
property. 
Article V 
The High Contracting Parties agree that on the death of a national of either High 
Contracting Party in the territory of the other, if there is no lawful trustee to take care 
of the property of such a national, such property, after the carry out of judicial 
procedures concerned, shall be handed over to the nearest consular officer of his own 
country for forwarding to his rightful heir. 
Article VI 
The High Contracting Parties agree to regulate in a convention to be concluded later 
the commercial relations between their respective countries. 
Article VII 
The present Treaty shall be ratified with the least possible delay by the High 
Contracting Parties in accordance with their respective laws. The instruments of 
ratifications shall be exchanged as soon as possible.  
The present Treaty shall enter into force on the day of the exchange of 
ratifications. 
IN FAITH WHEREOF the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present 
Treaty. 
 
DONE at Jedda this fifteenth day of the eleventh month of the thirty-fifth year 
of the Republic of China, corresponding to the twenty-second of Zilhegga of the year 
one thousand three hundred and sixty-five of Hagira, that is, 15th November 1946, in 
duplicate, and in the Chinese, Arabic and English languages, all being equally 
authoritative. 
 
 
 
 
(Signed) Y. T. CHENG 
(Signed) Youssif YASSEN 
 
Source: U.N. 
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APPENDIX II 
 
 
Communiqué Concerning the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between 
the People's Republic of China and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
 
The Governments of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the People's Republic of 
China have decided to establish diplomatic relations between the two countries at the 
ambassadorial level as of 29 Thul Hijjah 1410 AH, corresponding to 21 July 1990 AD 
 
The Government of the People's Republic of China supports the policy of the 
Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in pursuit of achieving its security, 
stability and national interests. 
 
The Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia recognizes that the Government of 
the People's Republic of China is the sole legitimate government that represents the 
entire Chinese people. 
 
The two Governments have agreed to develop cooperation and friendly relations 
between the two countries on the basis of the principles of mutual respect for 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each 
other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. 
 
 
QIAN QICHEN  
 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People‘s Republic of China 
 
SAUD AL FAISAL  
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  
 
 
 
21 July 1990 
 
 
Source: Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People‘s Republic of China 
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APPENDIX III 
 
 
Memorandum of Understanding on Petroleum Cooperation between the 
Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
 
Building on the strong bilateral relations between the People's Republic of China and 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, H. E. Mr. Zhang Zhigang, Vice Minister of the State 
Economic and Trade Commission of the People's Republic of China met with the 
Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 
Riyadh on October 30, 1999. The two sides discussed the bilateral relations in the 
field of petroleum.  
 
The two sides shared the view that the stability of the international oil market is in the 
interest of oil producing and consuming countries and health of the world economy. 
Both sides agreed that Saudi Arabia is a large dependable, reliable and secure 
petroleum supplier, while China is a large dependable and reliable consumer; 
therefore, the two countries are strongly complementary to each other in this field. 
Both sides expressed their willingness to establish long-term friendly and cooperative 
relationship in the field of petroleum.  
 
Both sides agreed to facilitate investments in refining, petrochemical sectors and 
petroleum technical services cooperation in their respective countries. Both sides also 
agreed to encourage their enterprises to actively engage themselves in the scientific 
and technological cooperation, experience exchange and personnel training activities.  
 
Both sides wish to further strengthen bilateral exchange, establish the contact 
channels between the respective institutions, meeting periodically or whenever is 
needed to enhance mutual understanding and friendship.  
 
Signed by the respective representatives of the two governments in Riyadh 
 
 
October 31, 1999 
 
 
Source: Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People‘s Republic of China 
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APPENDIX IV 
 
 
The Honorable Howard L Berman, Chairman  
Committee on Foreign Affairs  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515  
 
Dear Chairman Berman:  
 
Thank you for your letter of November 10th regarding potential arms sales to Saudi 
Arabia. We welcome the opportunity to address your questions regarding the impact 
such a sale would have on the national security interests of the United States.  
 
To meet the criteria for U.S. government approval, any sale of defense  articles and 
services must, among other considerations, support U.S. strategic and  foreign policy 
interests, according to the Conventional Arms Transfer Policy  (CAT), as detailed in 
Presidential Decision Directive 34 (PDD -34, February 10,  
1995).  
 
We believe the proposed package promotes U.S. strategic and foreign policy interests, 
and it is a key component of our overall regional strategy. The United States is 
committed to deepening its bilateral and multilateral security relationships in the Gulf 
to enhance regional stability and security. A key component of our regional 
cooperation is enhancing the defensive capabilities of our Gulf partners.  
 
Saudi Arabia is an important partner with whom we have a long history of close 
political-military relations. We coordinate closely with Saudi Arabia on a wide range 
of issues pertaining to Middle East regional security and we have long been the 
principal supplier of defense equipment and defense services to support Saudi 
Arabia's legitimate defense needs. Our six-decade-long security relationship with 
Saudi Arabia is a primary security pillar in the region. This package continues that 
tradition.  
 
This proposed sale will directly support us interests by reinforcing our Longstanding 
defense and security partnership with Saudi Arabia, enhancing Saudi Arabia's ability 
to deter and defend itself against terrorist groups and other regional threats, improving 
interoperability with the U.S. military, and sending a strong message to all countries 
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that the United States is committed to supporting the security of its key partners and 
allies in the Gulf and broader Middle East.  
 
For the past twenty years, the F-15 has been a cornerstone of the relationship between 
the U.S. Air Force (USAF) and the Royal Sandi Air Force (RSAF). Selling new F-
15SAs, upgrading the current F-15S fleet to the SA configuration, and providing the 
training component will enhance Sandi air defense and deterrence capabilities, ensure 
interoperability between the USAF and RSAF, and sustain long-term relationships to 
ensure continued U.S. influence for decades.  
 
The proposed package will also enable the Saudi Arabian National Guard, Royal 
Saudi Land Forces, and Saudi Royal Guard to deploy the AH-64D, UH60M,  
 AH-60i, and -rvID-530F helicopters to defend vital government and energy 
installations, and bolster Saudi Arabia's counterterr0l1sm capabilities, while 
increasing Saudi interoperability with the US Army. 
 
You asked what conditions were placed on the potential sale. All sales of U.S.-origin 
defense articles and defense services are subject to restrictions outlined in the Arms 
Export Control Act (AECA), as amended, including Section 4‘s limits on the purposes 
for which military sales are authorized and Section 3(g)'s requirement that any 
agreement for the sale of defense articles or services shall state that the United States 
Government retains the right to verify credible reports that any such article has been 
used for an unauthorized purpose. As with all Foreign Military Sales or Direct 
Commercial Sales, actual or possible end-use violations, will be notified to Congress 
as required by Section 3(e) of the AECA.  
 
On the question of threats to Saudi Arabia and its ability to meet those threats, Saudi 
Arabia faces an Iranian threat, including destabilizing actions in the region, and in the 
past year has faced Houthi attacks along its border with Yemen. Saudi Arabia also 
faces considerable challenges in countering domestic and regional terrorism, as 
exhibited by the February 2006 attack on the Abqaiq oil facility. This proposed sale 
will help improve Saudi Arabia's ability to deter and defend against threats, and carry 
out counterterrorism operations. .  
 
On the question of repercussions of future political change in Saudi Arabia, our strong 
political-military relationship with that nation helps ensure a continued long-term 
partnership between our countries. The Saudi choice to partner with the United States 
through such sales will have a decades-long impact, strengthening and deepening our 
military-to-military relationship, and leading to extensive collaborative training and 
exercises. Such engagement helps deepen our relationship with Saudi Arabia beyond 
the senior political level, minimizing the chance that political change will negatively 
impact our relationship. Our close ties to Saudi Arabia also help to guard against 
potential repercussions for our friends in the region.  
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You .highlighted that a recent GAO report noted the Administration, "did not  
consistently document how arms transfers to Gulf countries advanced U.S. foreign  
policy and national security goals ... " We read the recent GAO report with great  
interest and are investigating the possibility of implementing their suggestions, where 
appropriate and feasible. Though record-keeping can always be improved, our 
departments thoroughly analyze every potential arms sale to gauge the impact on U.S. 
national security interests.  
 
Regarding your concerns about Saudi support for wider regional U.S. policy goals, 
the Middle East Peace Process is one area where we coordinate closely with Saudi 
Arabia both publicly and privately. As a key member of the Arab League, the Saudis 
played a leadership role when the Arab League supported President Abbas‘s decision 
to enter into direct negotiations with Prime Minister Netanyahu.  More recently, Saudi 
Arabia has granted the Palestinian Authority an additional $100 million in budget 
support, above the $46 million it provided in accordance with its Arab League 
commitment. We will continue to urge Saudi Ara.bia arid other Arab countries to take 
concrete steps toward implementing the vision embodied in the Arab Peace Initiative.  
 
You also raised a number of questions regarding aspects of Saudi Arabia‘s regional 
policy and its commitm.ent to other key U.S. goals, including counterterrorism and 
countering terrorist financing. Saudi cooperation on counterterrorism issues is 
significant, and U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies continue to benefit 
from this relationship. Saudi Arabia played an integral role in helping the U.S. thwart 
the cargo package bomb plots of late October emanating from Yemen, and we have 
publicly thanked the Saudis for this critical information sharing. The Saudi 
government has also taken numerous regulatory and institutional steps to counter 
terrorist financing. These steps include a historic fatwa criminalizing terrorist finance 
released in. April 20 1 0 and endorsed by King Abdullah in May 2010, the 
development of regulatory and oversight infrastructure to counter money laundering 
and terrorist financing, and active participation by the Saudi government in 
international bodies devoted to these issues. Additionally, Saudi Arabia has been very 
involved in addressing regional Gulf security issues related to Yemen. Saudi Arabia 
has been an active partner in the Friends of Yemen process and has made numerous 
efforts to help Yemen improve its ability to govern, which in turn reduces terrorism‘s 
appeal. We have every confidence that the proposed sale will deepen our partnership 
with Saudi Arabia, which in turn will reinforce and make more productive our work 
with Saudi Arabia on critical regional issues.  
 
On counter-proliferation, Saudi Arabia has been responsive to UNSCR 1540 reporting 
requirements and has recently shown its support for a more substantive regional 
dialogue on counter-proliferation by offering to host a GCC workshop, scheduled for 
December 2010, on 1540 issues. The United. States is developing an Export Control 
and Related Border Security (EXBS) Program with Saudi Arabia.  As a next step in 
this program, a senior Saudi delegation is expected to visit Washington in January 
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2011 to meet with U.S. export control experts to discuss the importance of strategic 
trade controls and the provisions and processes essential for their effective 
implementation. The United States and Saudi Arabia also have signed a Memorandum 
of Understanding (MOU) on cooperation in nuclear energy. This MOV contains a 
statement of intent by Saudi Arabia to rely on the international market for fuel cycle 
services as an alternative to the pursuit of enrichment or reprocessing capabilities. 
This MOD was signed in May 2008 and entered into effect in January 2009 when 
Saudi Arabia brought its Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty safeguards agreement into 
force. .  
 
With regard to your concerns about the impact that this proposed sale will have on 
Israel's security and Qualitative Military Edge (QME), we concluded, as required by 
law and after a thorough interagency assessment, that this sale will not negatively 
impact Israel's security interests or it‘s QME. A more detailed analysis on this issue 
was briefed to Congress as part of the Congressional notification process, and was 
provided in the Congressional Notification package: Our commitment to Israel's QME 
is rock solid and longstanding. Apart from evaluating our arms sales to the rest of the 
Middle East against QME criteria, the  U.S. government ensures Israel's QME is 
upheld in numerous ways, including  through sales of defense equipment to Israel, 
robust security assistant cooperative research and development programs, and 
extensive combined training"  and exercises. .   
 
We believe that the sale of these advanced aircraft will support the national security 
interests of the United States now and in the years to come. We hope this information 
is useful to you. Please do not hesitate to contact us again if we can be of further 
assistance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
